Theistic finitism, also known asfinitistic theism orfinite godism, is the belief in adeity that is limited.[1][2] It has been proposed by some philosophers and theologians to solve theproblem of evil. Most finitists accept theabsolute goodness of God but rejectomnipotence.[3]
Finitistic theism denies that God is omnipotent.[1] Ray Harbaugh Dotterer in his bookThe Argument for a Finitist Theology (1917) summarized the argument for theistic finitism:
God can not be thought to be at once omnipotent and perfectly good. If we say that he is omnipotent, that his sovereignty is complete, that all events that occur are willed by him; then it follows that he is responsible for the actual world, which is partly evil, and, accordingly, that he is not perfectly good. If we begin at the other end, and say God is perfectly good, then we must deny that he is omnipotent.[4]
The idea that God is and must be infinite has been a nearly universal belief amongst monotheists. Only a minority of thinkers have advanced the idea of a finite deity.[5]
The idea of a finite God has been traced to Plato'sTimaeus.[6][7] Plato's God was not an omnipotent Creator but a Demiurge struggling to control recalcitrant "stuff" or "matter". To Plato, matter was infected with evil, uncreated by God.[7]
William James (1842–1910) was a believer in a finite God which he used to explain theproblem of evil.[8][9][10] James rejected thedivine authorship of the Bible and the idea of a perfect God. He defined God as a "combination of ideality and (final) efficacity" and preferred a finite God that is "cognizant and responsive in some way".[11][12] James's finite God was notomnipotent,omnipresent,omniscient or a creator of the universe.[8][12][13]
TheologianClarence Beckwith (1849–1931) suggested thatHorace Bushnell (1802–1876) was a finitist. According to Beckwith "one of the earliest attempts in America to show that God was finite was made by Horace Bushnell in hisGod in Christ (1849).[14][15]
Another advocate of theistic finitism wasPeter Bertocci (1910–1989) who proposed that "God is all-good but not all-powerful".[1] Most finitists have held that God ispersonal, although a few such asHenry Nelson Wieman (1884–1975) have stated God is impersonal.[1]
PhilosopherEdgar S. Brightman (1884–1953) defended theistic finitism in his bookA Philosophy of Religion, published in 1940. Brightman stated that theistic finitism began withPlato and he traced the idea through history toMarcion,Mani andManichaeism,Pierre Bayle, John Stuart Mill, H. G. Wells and others.[6] Brightman developed the concept of a finite God to solve the problem of evil. He held the view that God is an infinite personal spirit but his power is limited.[19] Brightman suggested that Wells was first "to devote an entire book to the concept of God's finiteness".[6] Wells dissociated his God in any respect from the biblical God.[20]Albert C. Knudson stated that John Stuart Mill was the first modern writer to advocate a finite God.[21]
Rufus Burrow, Jr. a professor of Christian thought, has argued (2012) that Brightman was different from most other finitists as he held the view that God remains infinite in many ways.[22] This was in opposition to Plato and H. G. Wells. Burrow noted that Brightman characterized God as a "finite-infinite God".[22]Charles Hartshorne who rejected omnipotence also argued for a finite-infinite God.[23][24]
^abcdeGeisler, Norman; Watkins, William D. (1989).Finite Godism: A World with a Finite God. InWorlds Apart: A Handbook on World Views. Wipf and Stock Publishers. pp. 187-216.ISBN1-59244-126-2
^McKim, Donald K. (1996).Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms. Westminster John Knox Press. p. 278.ISBN0-664-22089-4
^Sahakian, William S; Sahakian, Mabel Lewis. (1974).Realms of Philosophy. Schenkman Publishing Company. p. 319. "Theistic Finitism is meant the belief that God is limited in some capacity or quality, usually power or goodness; either he lacks absolute power or absolute goodness. The majority of Finitists accept the absolute goodness of God while relinquishing belief in his omnipotence".
^Hudson, Yeager.Omnipotence: Must God Be Infinite?. In Creighton Peden, Larry E. Axel. (1989).God, Values, and Empiricism: Issues in Philosophical Theology. Mercer University Press. p. 92.ISBN0-86554-360-7
^abBarnard, George William. (1997).Exploring Unseen Worlds: William James and the Philosophy of Mysticism. State University of New York Press. p. 251.ISBN0-7914-3223-8 "James's theology answer to the problem of evil is strikingly simple, but theologically daring: God isnot all-powerful, all-knowing, or all-pervasive, but rather, is finite."
^Weidenbaum, Jonathan. (2013)William James’s Argument for a Finite Theism. In Diller J., Kasher A. (eds)Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Springer. pp. 323-331.ISBN978-94-007-5218-4
^Kamber, Richard. (2016).William James: Essays and Lectures. Routledge. p. 159.ISBN978-1138457393
^abPomerlaeau, Wayne P. (1998).Western Philosophies Religion. Ardsley House Publishers. p. 492.ISBN978-1-880157-62-6
^Schwartz, Robert. (2015).Rethinking Pragmatism: From William James to Contemporary Philosophy. Wiley. p. 25.ISBN978-0-470-67469-7
^Bushnell, Horace (2010) [1876].God in Christ: three discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover: with a preliminary dissertation on language. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library.ISBN978-1-4255-3727-2.OCLC678632613., includes a preliminary dissertation arguing that language is inadequate to express things of the spirit.
^Waterhouse, E. S. (1934). "The Concept of a Limited God: A Study in the Philosophy of Personalism by Rannie Belle Baker".Philosophy.9 (36):488–489.doi:10.1017/S0031819100030357.
^Schiller, F. C. S. (1917). "Omnipotence".Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.18:247–270.JSTOR4543943.
^abBurrow, Rufus Jr. (2012).The Finite-Infinite God. InGod and Human Dignity: The Personalism, Theology, and Ethics of Martin Luther King, Jr. University of Notre Dame Press.ISBN978-0-268-02194-8
^Hartshorne, Charles (1967). "The Dipolar Conception of Deity".The Review of Metaphysics.21 (2):273–289.JSTOR20124563.