Task Force 74 was a navaltask force that has existed twice. The first Task Force 74 was a mixedAllied force ofRoyal Navy,Royal Australian Navy, andUnited States Navy ships which operated against Japanese forces from 1943 to 1945 during thePacific campaign. The second Task Force 74 was assembled from the U.S. Navy'sSeventh Fleet that was deployed to theBay of Bengal by theNixon administration in December 1971 during theIndo-Pakistani War.The fleet was sent to intimidate Indian forces at the height of the conflict.[1][2] TheSoviet Union, which was actively backing Indian actions both politically and militarily during the war responded by deploying two groups ofcruisers anddestroyers as well as asubmarine armed withnuclear warheads in response to the American military presence in the area.[3] From 18 December 1971 to 7 January 1972, theSoviet Navy trailed the American fleet throughout the Indian Ocean. The task force number is now used by the U.S. Seventh Fleet's submarine force.[citation needed]
On 15 March 1943,Task Force 44, an Australia–United States task force made up ofcruisers anddestroyers operating in theSouth West Pacific Area, was redesignated as Task Force 74. In theBattle of Hollandia between American andJapanese forces in April–June 1944, the task force was made up ofHMAS Shropshire and up to four destroyers, includingHMAS Arunta.[4]
Following a preliminary bombardment, the battle forCebu City began on 26 March 1945, when theAllies launchedOperation Victor II.[5] Staging out ofLeyte, where they had conducted rehearsal landings two days earlier, a largeflotilla of cruisers and destroyers from theUnited States Seventh Fleet's Task Force 74 escorted the Cebu Attack Group to the island.[6] Under the leadership ofMajor-GeneralWilliam H. Arnold, the forces assigned to the operation consisted of theAmerical Division's132nd and182nd Infantry Regiments, totalling about 5,000 men, and werelanded at Talisay Beach onCebu Island, 6.4 kilometres (4 mi) southwest of Cebu City. The 182nd came ashore southwest of the city, while the 132nd landed at a wide gravel beach to the northeast opposite a palm grove.[7] While meeting no Japanese opposition, American forces nevertheless suffered heavy casualties fromland mines andbooby traps as they crossed the beach.[8][9]
The Indian Ocean had, in the post-colonial cold-war situation in the 1960s, a strong BritishRoyal Navy presence which projected Western interests in the region, and carried out security operations, as well as a deterrence against Soviet overtures in this area. The US navy's role at this time was confined to a limited presence inBahrain.[10]
By the mid-1960s, with a failing economy, Britain began to roll back her role in the region. In a situation of political instability in the region, the Soviet Union also began a strong diplomatic initiative in the littoral states and initiated limited naval deployments, prompting fears that withdrawal of a western peacekeeping role would allow theSoviet Navy to fulfil its aspirations in the region, threatening western economic and military interests in the region and leading to loss of this area from the western sphere of influence.[11] This lent a strong voice to the proponents of a strong US naval presence in the Indian Ocean, among themElmo Zumwalt, as a diplomatic as well military deterrence against Soviet moves.[11] US security interests in the Indian Ocean were, however, initially restricted to the countries ofEthiopia, Iran andSaudi Arabia.[12]
Both the United States and theSoviet Union had attempted to establish strong links with India following theSino-Indian war of 1962, much to the disturbance ofPakistan especially since they were already in a military alliance with the United States. India had obtained substantial military and economic assistance from the United States towards the end of the conflict, but remained committed to theNon-Aligned Movement. Following the end of the conflict, Soviet offers ofMiG fighter aircraft, as well as offers for transfer of technology and production facilities for military hardware confirmed India's preference for Moscow in terms of long-term security collaboration. In 1963, theUS Navy deployed its firstCarrier group in the Indian Ocean close to the Indian coast. However, since this was within a year of the end of the Sino-Indian conflict, where the US and Britain had offered substantial help to India, this was not interpreted as a diplomatic pressure or a show-of-force, and was in all probability training exercises to familiarise the navy with the Indian Ocean area. India had also at this time allowed the US to install intelligence gathering devices in the Himalayan peaks close to China, on the conditions of intelligence-sharing.
By the end of the 1960s, theVietnam War became the focus for the United States, with theIndian subcontinent receiving much less attention. Peace in the region was assumed by the US to be the responsibility of the regional powers of India and China.[12]
TheBangladesh Liberation War brought the Indian subcontinent back into the focus of the cold-war confrontations. The crisis had its roots in the economic and social disparities between theEastern andWestern wings of Pakistan and a dominance of the Eastern wing by the west since thecreation of the nascent state in 1947 that increasingly divided the two wings through the 1960s[13] During March 1971 Pakistan Army aided and advised by Bhutto and the army stopped political negotiation with East Pakistan's Sheikh Mujib, whose party Awami League won a landslide victory and majority seats in the Pakistan Parliament, and started a massive crackdown on the civilians and paramilitary police of the Eastern wing. By the last quarter of 1971, Pakistan was in a state of civil war, its Eastern wing locked in a ferocious battle for independence from the Western wing. The crisis precipitated in March 1971 when rising political discontent andcultural nationalism in East Pakistan was met byYahya Khan launchingOperation Searchlight,[13][14][15] which resulted in the1971 Bangladesh genocide. The majority of East Pakistan's political leadership, includingMujibur Rahman, were arrested and, following brief confrontations and bloody battles between Bengali nationalists and some 40,000 strong Pakistani military, political order was forcibly and temporarily reimposed by the end of April amidst strong protests from India, the Soviet Union and other countries against the atrocities against the Bengali civilian population.[14] The Pakistani army aided by paramilitaries from West Pakistan and local non-Bengali and some Islamic minded-Bengali political parties were killing large numbers of East Pakistanis. Depending on the source, the total death toll of the predominantly Bengali East Pakistanis during these events were either up to 500,000 people (according to independent researchers) or 3 million people (according to the government of Bangladesh).[16] The massive and disproportionate crackdown by Pakistan Army forces[17] engendered a sea of refugees (estimated at the time to be about 10 million, 13% of the entire East Pakistani population)[14][18][19] who came flooding to theeastern provinces of India.[14][18] Facing a mounting humanitarian crisis, India started actively aiding and re-organising what was by this time already the nucleus of theMukti Bahini.[14]
In the months before the war, both Pakistan and India attempted to shore up diplomatic support. On 9 August 1971, India signed atwenty-year co-operation treaty with the Soviet Union,[14] followed by a six-nation tour of Europe and USA byIndira Gandhi in October. This tour was intended to demonstrate India's professed neutrality despite the Indo-Soviet treaty, as well as to highlight the refugee problem faced by India.[20]Pakistan came under increasing criticism[21] from India, the Soviet Union, Japan, andEurope as the plight of the refugees and their impact on the Indian economy were highlighted by Indira Gandhi in the UN and on a number of global tours.[19] However, the United States and China showed little interest in the crisis and actively opposed aid, intervention or support to theMukti Bahini.[22][23]Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at this time led a high level delegation to Beijing to obtain commitment from China of support in case of Indian intervention while Pakistan pressed at the UN for an InternationalPeacekeeping Force for the India-East Pakistan border.[20] The Pakistani efforts at the UN were however blocked by the Soviet Union in theSecurity council.[20] India's aid to the Mukti Bahini continued unabated, and fighting between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistani Forces grew increasingly vicious.[24]
The Indo-Soviet treaty had provided India with cover against any possible Chinese intervention in aid of Pakistan if and when the conflict precipitated. To the Pakistani leadership, it became clear that armed Indian intervention and secession of East Pakistan was becoming inevitable.[25]
On 3 December, Pakistan preemptively launchedOperation Chengiz Khan against India, marking the official initiation of hostilities of theIndo-Pak war of 1971. The Indian response was a defensive military strategy in the western theatre while a massive, coordinated and decisive offensive thrust into East-Pakistan. On 5 December, United States began attempts for a UN-sponsored ceasefire, which were twice vetoed by the USSR in the security council. India extended her recognition of Bangladesh on 6 December.[20] On 8 December, Washington received intelligence reports that India was planning an offensive into West Pakistan.[26] It was in this situation that the United States dispatched a ten-ship naval task force, the US Task Force 74, from the Seventh Fleet off South Vietnam into theBay of Bengal.
With intelligence reports indicating the Indian cabinet was discussing the scopes of offensive into West Pakistan, on 10 December, the decision was taken by US to assemble a task force atMalacca strait, spearheaded byUSSEnterprise. The force was to be capable of overshadowing the four Soviet ships already in the Bay of Bengal.[26]
The task force was headed by USSEnterprise, at the timeand still the largestaircraft carrier in the world by length. She was flying the flag of Rear-AdmiralDamon W. Cooper, CommanderCarrier Division Five.[27] Escorts included threeguided missile destroyers:USS King (DDG-41),USS Decatur (DDG-31), andUSS Parsons (DDG-33); four gundestroyersUSS Bausell (DD-845),USS Orleck (DD-886),USS McKean (DD-784) andUSS Richard B. Anderson; and a nuclear attack submarine. In addition, it consisted ofamphibious assault carrierUSS Tripoli (LPH-10), carrying a 200 strongMarine battalion and twenty five assault helicopters; the ammunition shipUSS Haleakala (AE-25); andUSS White Plains (AFS-4), an auxiliary fleet supply ship fromSubic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines, which loaded over 60 Tons of mail and Christmas packages for the Task Force before leaving Subic Bay to join Task Force 74 on 19 December.[26] AboardTripoli, according to her Command History for 1971, were Commander,Amphibious Squadron 5;31st Marine Amphibious Unit; 2nd Battalion,4th Marine Regiment; andMarine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165.[28]
Enterprise was at this time at theTonkin Gulf area. Recovering her airborne aircraft and transferring personnel who were required to stay to theUSS Constellation (CVA-64), she prepared to head off. The task force was delayed while the support ships refueled, it held off East of Singapore, and was ordered into the Indian Ocean on 14 December.[29] crossed Malacca straits on the nights of 13–14 December and entered the Bay of Bengal on the morning of 15 December.[26] The group was required to proceed slowly, averaging a speed of 15knots, both to conserve fuel as well as to allow advance information on its heading.
The US government stated at the time that the goal of the task force was to help evacuate Pakistani forces from East Pakistan following a ceasefire.[26]
The slow progress of Task Force 74 met an increased Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Both forces maintained their presence in the theatre until January 1972, well after from the operations on the ground was clear that Pakistan was in no position to continue the war.[30]
On 6 and 13 December 1971, theSoviet Navy dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers and a submarine armed with nuclear missiles fromVladivostok; they trailed US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine in the Indian Ocean.[31][32]
. USIS Text, pp 1–2.Every Great Power must follow the principle that it should not directly or indirectly allow any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbours.
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