Task Force 71 (TF-71) has been a navaltask force of theUnited States Navy, active since the 1940s.The Task Force also used to fulfill the function of Command and Coordination Force,Seventh Fleet.[1] The Seventh Fleet Command Ship isUSS Blue Ridge, based atU.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Yokosuka, Japan. In 2004,Blue Ridge entered dry dock and the responsibility was transferred temporarily toUSS Coronado.Blue Ridge returned to duty 27 September 2004.
Task Force 71 was based inFremantle, Western Australia in 1941–42, operating submarines under Rear AdmiralCharles A. Lockwood. He was relieved by Rear AdmiralRalph W. Christie on 7 March 1943.[2]
Soon after the war, Task Force 71 was designated as the North China Force. Its mission was to support theUS occupation of southern Korea.[3][4] This included executing various show-the-flag operations along the western coast of Korea as well as in theBohai Sea. These naval demonstrations precededOperation Campus, the amphibious landing of U.S. Army ground forces atIncheon, Korea, on 8 September 1945.[5][6]USS Alaska andUSS Guam both served with the task force. Subsequently, both returned to the United States in mid-December 1945, ahead of being decommissioned.[7][8]
During the first half of 1965, the Seventh Fleet operationally controlled the Vietnam Patrol Force (Task Force 71), the American component of theOperation Market Time effort.[9] The Naval Advisory Group, headquartered in Saigon, served as the liaison between the fleet, Commander U.S.Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and theSouth Vietnamese Navy. On 31 July 1965, formal control of the U.S.Operation Market Time force passed from the Seventh Fleet to the Naval Advisory Group, which in turn activated the Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force 115). The fleet continued to provide logistic and administrative support. The command function was further refined on 1 April 1966 when Naval Forces, Vietnam, was established, relieving the Naval Advisory Group of responsibility for Market Time operations.
Also referred to as a Second Korean War, theKorean DMZ Conflict was a series of low-level armed clashes betweenNorth Korean forces and the forces ofSouth Korea and theUnited States, largely occurring between 1966 and 1969 at theKorean DMZ.[10] The number of incidents along the DMZ jumped from 37 in 1966 to 435 in 1967, with a combined 1967 total of 371 fatalities involving North Korea, South Korea, and United Nations forces while there were no fatalities in 1966 (see chart). Also, during 1967, there were two sabotage attempts to disrupt South Korea railroad operations, the first such attempts since the Korean War. Additionally, in 1967, aSouth Korean patrol vessel was sunk by North Korea shore batteries over a fishing dispute, with thirty-nine of the 79-man crew killed.[11] Finally, in themost overt incident to date, North Korean commandos fromUnit 124 unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate theSouth Korea presidentPark Chung Hee at the presidential residenceBlue House inSeoul, South Korea, on 21 January 1968.[12][13]
Task Force 71 was the centerpiece forOperation Formation Star, the code name for the emergency re-deployment ofU.S. Seventh Fleet warships to theSea of Japan off the eastern coast ofNorth Korea following that country's seizure ofUSS Pueblo (AGER-2) ininternational waters on 23 January 1968. Effective 25 January 1968, in conjunction withOperation Combat Fox, Operation Formation Star was initiated. Taken together, both operations represented a major surge deployment of U.S. naval and air forces into the Sea of Japan region off the eastern coast of North Korea, the largest since the end of theKorean War.[14] Although not directly unrelated to Operation Formation Star, theRepublic of Korea Navy also dispatched nineteen ships and two fast patrol boats to sixteen patrol zones around South Korea.[15]> Concurrently with Operation Formation Star and Operation Combat Fox,U.S. PresidentLyndon B. Johnson signedExecutive Order 11392 ordering certain units of the Ready Reserve of theNaval Reserve,Air Force Reserve, andAir National Guard of the United States to active duty.[16] For the U.S. Naval Reserve, this call-up involved six naval air squadrons and twoSeabee construction battalions for a total of 1621 naval reservists activated.[17] Taken together, as noted bySecretary of DefenseRobert S. McNamara, the purpose of this build-up/call-up was to provide a "measured show of force" in support of the diplomatic effort to resolve thePueblo crisis peacefully.[18]
The US responded to the1969 EC-121 shootdown incident by activating Task Force 71 to protect future flights overinternational waters neighbouringNorth Korea. Initially, the Task Force comprised the aircraft carriersEnterprise,Ticonderoga,Ranger, andHornet with a screen of cruisers and destroyers that also included the battleshipNew Jersey. The ships for TF-71 came mostly from Southeast Asia duty. This deployment became one of the largest shows of force in the area since the Korean War.[19]
Following the attack, some, including RepresentativeMendel Rivers responded to the attack by calling for retaliation against North Korea.[20] On 16 April, the United States National Security Council considered the following options:[21]
In addition to the NSC's ideas, theJoint Chiefs of Staff prepared several plans to bomb the airfield atSondok andWonsan. If all went according to plan, bombers would attack the airfields under cover of night.[21] CINCPAC proposed the positioning of ships, with missiles capable of taking down planes, in the Sea of Japan with orders to destroy North Korean aircraft, impound other North Korean vessels venturing into international waters (fishing boats, etc.), and fire onto the shore (especially near Wonsan).[21]
In the end, no action was taken against the North Koreans in the days following the attack. The new Nixon administration had little to no information about the location and availability of both U.S. and North Korean forces, as the administration had difficulty communicating with those in the Pacific. By the time this information was communicated to the planners, it was too late to react.[21] Both Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were ashamed at the outcome of the event, with Kissinger revealing that "our conduct in the EC-121 crisis as weak, indecisive and disorganized."[21] Once it became clear that no action would be taken against the North Koreans, Nixon promised that "they'll [North Koreans] never get away with it again," and ordered a "resumption of aerial reconnaissance flights."[21]
Carrier Groups | Screening Force | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Command | Aircraft Carriers | Carrier Air Wing | Battleships / Cruisers | DLG / DDG | Destroyers | Destroyers | Destroyer Escorts |
Carrier Division 7 | USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) | Carrier Air Wing 9 | USS New Jersey (BB-62) | USS Sterett (DLG-31) | USS Richard B. Anderson (DD-786) | USS Ernest G. Small (DD-838) | USS Davidson (DE-1045) |
Carrier Division 3 | USS Ranger (CVA-61) | Carrier Air Wing 2 | USS Chicago (CG-11) | USS Dale (DLG-19) | USS Meredith (DD-890) | USS Gurke (DD-783) | —— |
Carrier Division 9 | USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) | Carrier Air Wing 16 | USS Oklahoma City (CLG-5) | USS Mahan (DLG-11) | USS Henry W. Tucker (DD-875) | USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729) | —— |
ASW Group 5 | USS Hornet (CVS-12) | ASW Air Group 57 | USS Saint Paul (CA-73) | USS Parsons (DDG-33) | USS Perry (DD-844) | USS John W. Weeks (DD-701) | —— |
—— | —— | —— | —— | USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8) | USS Shelton (DD-790) | USS Radford (DD-446) | —— |
Task Force 71 operated the Search and Rescue/Salvage Operations forKorean Air Lines Flight 007 shot down by the Soviets off Sakhalin Island on 1 September 1983. On the day of the shootdown, Rear Admiral William A. Cockell, Commander, Task Force 71, and a skeleton staff, taken by helicopter from Japan, embarked inUSS Badger (FF-1071), which had been stationed offVladivostok at time of the flight.[22] Cockell was transferred again on 9 September to the destroyerUSS Elliot to assume duties as Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of the Search and Rescue (SAR) effort. Surface search began immediately and on into the 13-day of September. U.S. underwater operations began on 14 September. With no further hope of finding survivors, on 10 September 1983, the Task Force's mission had been reclassified "Search and Salvage" operation from a "Search and Rescue". On 17 October 1983, Rear Admiral William Cockell was relieved of command of the Task Force and its Search and Salvage mission, and Rear Admiral Walter T. Piotti, Jr., was placed in command.
There were three U.S. search and salvage ships involved—the Coast Guard cutterUSCGC Douglas Munro, the rescue salvage shipUSS Conserver, and the Fleet TugUSNS Narragansett. There were also three Japanese tugs chartered through the U.S. Navy's Far East Salvage Contractor (Selco), these were theOcean Bull, theKaiko-Maru 7, and theKaiko-Maru 3.[23] Aside from these vessels, there were the U.S. naval combatants and logistical support ships. These wereUSS Elliot,USS Badger,USS Sterett,USNSHassayampa,USS Callaghan,USS Brooke,USS Meyerkord,USS Towers,USS Stark andUSS Wichita. In addition to the above ships, there were numerous JapaneseMaritime Safety Agency patrol boats and South Korean vessels involved.
In 2021 Task Force 71 was reactivated as the Theater Surface Warfare Commander (TSUWC) for the Western Pacific to formalize the command and control of assigned naval surface forces within the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. CTF 71 also serves as the sea combat commander for the Forward Deployed Naval Forces-Japan Carrier Strike Group and maritime interdiction operations commander.[24]
“We have integrated the Surface Task Force (TF 71) into the 7th Fleet combat scheme of maneuver, theater security cooperation events, and crisis response efforts,” said Vice Adm. Bill Merz, commander, U.S. 7th Fleet. “This was a natural organizational adjustment that reflects the increasing pace of operations throughout the region and is similar in structure to other numbered fleets. We've already enjoyed considerable and measurable improvements in combat readiness, task assignment, and overall mission effectiveness.”[24]
As of 2023[update] the command and control of Task Force 71 is assigned toDestroyer Squadron 15 and consists of the nine US Guided Missile Destroyers forward deployed to Japan, independent Cruiser and Destroyer deployments to Seventh Fleet, Title 10 deployments of U.S. Coast Guard Cutters, and a number of Allied and partner navy surface combatant contributions to coalition operations throughout the Western Pacific.[25]
Hereafter referred to as: Bartow.From Hot War to Cold.
Part III – The Surrender and Occupation of Korea, p. 111
Hereafter referred to as: Bolger.Scenes from an Unfinished War.
Hereafter referred to as: Cheevers.Act of War
Hereafter referred to as: Mobley. "Pueblo: A Retrospective"
Hereafter referred to as: Mobley.Flash Point North Korea.
33 FR 951; January 26, 1968