Talk:Borda count
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The section on strategic voting was written with an extremely pro-Borda POV, making unfounded attacks on other voting systems, and unjustified declarations that Borda would solve all the world's problems.
The terminology used was taken from Donald Saari's very POV book, "Chaotic Elections", in which he constructs mathematical models specifically designed for analyzing positional election methods, concludes (correctly) that Borda is the fairest positional election method, but then he tries to apply this model to other ranked methods, and uses the fact that it doesn't fit to conclude that Borda is better thanany other election method. He glosses over the strategic flaws in Borda, which are more obvious than the ones he attacks in Approval and Condorcet.
I suspect that the section was written either by a Saari supporter, or someone who has been taken in by his book without looking at the argument critically. I've tried to NPOV the section; let me know if I swung it too far the other way.
An interesting note: Saari and other Borda supporters tend to advocate Instant Borda Runoff when confronted with strategic flaws in Borda, but they claim, approximately, that Instant Borda Runoff is simply a "tallying method" on top of Borda that cleans it up in real-world situations, and allows its excellence to shine through. Yet Instant Borda Runoff turns out to be a Condorcet method, and Saari at least spends chapters on discrediting Condorcet. (My personal opinion is that IBR is indeed better than Borda, but if you're going to do Condorcet, you can do it much more easily than with a boatload of Borda counts.)
RSpeer 17:59, Mar 25, 2005 (UTC)
Fahrenheit451, you added Nanson's method to theVoting system page saying that it passed certain criteria, and also listed them here. Do you have a source or a proof for these criteria?
I have made some correction to the Nanson section perhttp://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/diss/node4.html ----Fahrenheit451
I am most suspicious of the statement that Nanson's method satisfies the participation criterion. I can't find a source that says specifically whether Nanson passes or fails, butParticipation criterion says that "most" Condorcet methods fail.http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/define.htm says thatall Condorcet methods fail, but also gives no source or proof.
That is a vanity page with little mathematical rigor.---Fahrenheit451
I'd also want a proof for the defensive strategy criteria; however, I think those just shouldn't be referenced in articles at all, because it's unclear what they say and what constitutes a proof or a counterexample for them.User:MarkusSchulze says that they're not well-defined at all.RSpeer 21:02, May 1, 2005 (UTC)
I just removed them in my last edit and agree withUser:MarkusSchulze.
Here is the link on the independence of clones for Nanson's method:http://www.ghg.net/redflame/irv.htm---Fahrenheit451
I am convinced on monotonicity, but not independence of clones. Need to investigate further. ---Fahrenheit451
I've removed the criticism of ICC from the text of this article, not actually because it is F451's own opinion (that is a long hard battle to fight), but because it's off-topic. If that criticism belonged here, it would belong on every voting system article.
Fahrenheit451, the proper way for you to add this commentary to Wikipedia would be to make your case on theTalk:Strategic nomination page, get a consensus for it, and add it to thestrategic nomination article.RSpeer 05:02, Jun 13, 2005 (UTC)
It's true, that this doesn't satisfy Plurality. Incidentally, this isn't the variation I had in mind when I editedPlurality criterion, though. I'll give an example to illustrate:
51 A
50 B>C
In the variant that satisfies Plurality, A receives 102 points, B receives 100, and C receives 50.
Using the quoted method, A receives 51 points, B receives 100, and C receives 50.
The method I had in mind was to give A 102 points, but then B and C would split the 51 points that could have gone to one of them. Then B receives 100+25.5 points, and C receives 50+25.5.KVenzke 20:48, August 10, 2005 (UTC)
In my opinion, this (as well as strictly-ranked Borda) violates the "spirit" of the Plurality criterion, since a voter might be compelled to rank randomly when he would prefer to just truncate. Then a candidate could win due to these random rankings.KVenzke 20:06, August 29, 2005 (UTC)
I found a fact that might belong in this article. See the quote below
The Borda Count is named after the 18th-century French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda, who devised the system in 1770.
The fact comes from the following source:
Here is a wikitext snippet to use as a reference:
{{Cite web |title=Borda Count |url=https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/borda-count/ |website=www.electoral-reform.org.uk |access-date=2024-10-11 |language=en-GB |quote=The Borda Count is named after the 18th-century French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda, who devised the system in 1770.}}This post was generated using theAdd A Fact browser extension.
EdNg07 (talk)21:34, 11 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
In the strategic voting example involving Orlando, NY, and Iqaluit, shouldn't the Iqaluit-first voters be giving zero points to New York? Iqaluit voters rank: Iqaluit / Orlando / New York. But the New York count reads: "2. New York (44 x 2) + (48 + 4) x 1 = 140". NY is getting 44 x 2 = 88 from the NY-first voters, 48 x 1 = 48 from the Orlando-first voters, and should be getting 4 x 0 from the Iqaluit-first voters, I think.130.15.33.215 (talk)15:26, 31 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]