Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)[a] was aSunniIslamist political organisation and paramilitary group involved in theSyrian civil war.[57][58][59][44] It was formed on 28 January 2017 as a merger of several armed groups:Jaysh al-Ahrar (anAhrar al-Sham faction),Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS),Ansar al-Din Front,Jaysh al-Sunna,Liwa al-Haqq and theNour al-Din al-Zenki Movement.[3][60] The unification process was held under the initiative ofAbu Jaber Sheikh, an Islamist militant commander who had been the secondemir ofAhrar al-Sham. HTS, along with otherSyrian opposition groups,launched an offensive that led to thefall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024.[3]
Proclaiming the nascent organisation as "a new stage in the life of the blessed revolution",Abu Jaber Sheikh urged all factions of theSyrian opposition to unite under its Islamic leadership and wage a "popularjihad" to achieve the objectives of theSyrian revolution, which he characterised as the ouster of theBa'athist regime andHezbollah militants fromSyrian territories, and the formation ofan Islamic government.[61] After the announcement, additional groups and individuals joined. The merged group has been primarily led by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and formerAhrar al-Sham leaders, although the High Command also has representation from other groups.[62] The Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement[6] split from Tahrir al-Sham in July 2017, and theAnsar al-Din Front in 2018.[63]
The formation of HTS was followed by a string of assassinations of its supporters. In response, HTS launched a successful crackdown on Al-Qaeda loyalists, which cemented its power inIdlib. HTS then pursued a "Syrianisation" programme, focused on establishing a stable civilian administration that provides services and connects to humanitarian organizations in addition to maintaining law and order.[60] Tahrir al-Sham's strategy was based on expanding its territorial control in Syria, establishing governance and mobilising popular support. In 2017, HTS permittedTurkish troops to patrol North-West Syria as part of a ceasefire brokered through theAstana negotiations. Its policies brought it into conflict withHurras al-Din, Al-Qaeda's Syrian wing, includingmilitarily.[64] HTS had an estimated 6,000–15,000 members in 2022.
From 2017 to 2024, HTS gave allegiance to theSyrian Salvation Government (SSG), which was an alternative government of theSyrian opposition in theIdlib Governorate.[65][66] While the organisation officially adhered to theSalafi school, the High Council of Fatwa of the Syrian Salvation Government – to which it is religiously beholden – consisted ofulema fromAsh'arite andSufi traditions as well. In its legal system and educational curriculum, HTS implementedShafi'ite thought and taught the importance of the four classicalSunnimadhahib (schools of law) inIslamic jurisprudence.[67]
From 2021 to 2024, HTS was the most powerful military faction within theSyrian opposition.[68] Τhe organisation was designated aterrorist group byUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 2254,[69] which classified the group's precursor,Al-Nusra Front.[70] After thefall of Damascus in December 2024, the SSG was replaced by theSyrian transitional government. On 29 January 2025, at theSyrian Revolution Victory Conference held in Damascus,Hassan Abdul Ghani, spokesperson for theMilitary Operations Command, announced the dissolution of HTS and several armed factions and declared that they would become part of "state institutions".[71][19][72]
In July and October 2025, respectively, theUnited States and theUnited Kingdom revoked their foreign terrorist organization designation for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.[73][74]
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Before becoming the emir ofal-Nusra Front,Abu Mohammad al-Julani started his military career in 2003, travelling from Damascus in Syria to Iraq, where he resisted theU.S. occupation of Iraq. He joined al-Qaeda in Iraq and fought in theIraqi insurgency against the American occupation.[75][76] After his imprisonment by U.S. military in 2006 and subsequent release by Iraqi government in 2011 during theSyrian revolution, Julani was tasked with establishing al-Nusra Front asal-Qaeda's official branch in Syria. Between 2011 and 2012, he co-ordinated withAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of theIslamic State of Iraq (ISI), to expand al-Qaeda's branch in Syria.[76][77][75]
In April 2013, Baghdadi announced his group's expansion into Syria and declared the creation of theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and unilaterally demanded al-Nusra's merger into ISIL. Julani denounced the move; and maintained hisbay'ah (trans: "pledge of allegiance") to al-Qaeda.[75] Al-Qaeda emirAyman al-Zawahiri also denounced al-Baghdadi's announcement, asserting thatSyria was the "spatial state" of the Al-Nusra Front. Zawahiri officially demanded the dissolution of the new entity and urged Baghdadi to withdraw all his troops from Syria.[78][79][80] In a letter addressed to the leaderships of ISIL and al-Nusra Front on June 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri directly rebuked al-Baghdadi's moves by recognizing al-Nusra Front as the only official Syrian branch of al-Qaeda and demanded the dissolution of ISIL.[81][78]
By January 2014, hostile rhetoric between ISIL and al-Nusra Front escalated into violent conflict.[82][83] Al-Nusra Front formally cut all factional links to ISIL in February 2014 when al-Qaeda's general command issued an official statement disavowing and terminating all relations with ISIL.[84][79][85] In July 2016, al-Nusra Front under Julani split from al-Qaeda, rebranding asJabhat Fatah al-Sham.[86][87] Before that time, HTS espoused hardline Islamist views, such as viewing non-Muslims as second-class citizens, but after 2016, it began moderating some of its positions in an effort to gain wider legitimacy.[88]
Al-Nusra Front/Jabhat Fateh al-Sham co-operated withAhrar al-Sham throughout most of 2015 and 2016. Leading Ahrar al-Sham clericAbu Jaber saw al-Nusra's affiliation to al-Qaeda as detrimental to their cause. He also sought to unify Islamist rebel factions.[89][3][90] He led a more Islamist and less nationalist faction within Ahrar al-Sham,Jaysh al-Ahrar, which supported a merger with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. There were merger talks in late 2016, but these broke down. In early 2017, Jaysh al-Ahrarclashed with rival Islamist groups in Idlib, particularly Ahrar al-Sham, before separating from Ahrar al-Sham to merge with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in a new body.[91]
Upon its founding, HTS was described by itsemir,Abu Jaber Sheikh, as "an independent entity" formed through the unification of previous groups and factions.[92]
Charles Lister, an analyst specialising in Syria, noted that Ahrar al-Sham lost around 800–1,000 defectors to HTS but gained 6,000–8,000 fighters through the merger ofSuqor al-Sham,Jaish al-Mujahideen, theFastaqim Union, the western Aleppo units of theLevant Front, and the Idlib-based units ofJaysh al-Islam. JFS lost several hundred fighters to Ahrar al-Sham but gained 3,000–5,000 fighters from its merger with Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Haq, Jaish al-Sunna, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din into HTS.[91] Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki previously received support from the United States.[93]
Throughout January 2017, intense fighting broke out between theJFS andal-Qaeda loyalists ofal-Nusra Front, before the JFS-Ahrar al-Sham merger to form HTS on 28 January. Soon after the merger, Emir Abu Jaber Sheikh announced a ceasefire deal aimed at uniting allopposition militia factions under a central command. The creation of HTS was described as by theHenry Jackson Society as a reshaping of dynamics since the2011 Syrian Revolution, with a potential to shift the balance of power in the Syrian civil war and diminish al-Qaeda's influence in northern Syria.[94] Between 2017 and 2019, HTS launched a series of crackdowns against al-Qaeda loyalists while also targetingIslamic State (IS) cells through military operations.[95]
On 30 January,Asharq al-Awsat reported that HTS had approximately 31,000 fighters, bolstered by the inclusion ofJaysh al-Ahrar, a breakaway faction of theAhrar al-Sham militia.[20]
On 3 February, a US airstrike struck a Tahrir al-Sham headquarters inSarmin, killing 12 members of HTS andJund al-Aqsa. 10 of the killed militants were HTS members.[96][97]
Civilians in the rebel regions that HTS controls have resisted it. On 3 February, hundreds of Syrians demonstrated under the slogan "There is no place foral-Qaeda in Syria" in the towns ofAtarib,Azaz,Maarat al-Nu'man to protest against HTS. In response, supporters of HTS organizedcounter-protests inal-Dana, Idlib, Atarib, andKhan Shaykhun.[98] In Idlib pro- Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham protests were held waving pictures of its emirAbu Jaber on 3 February 2017.[99]
On 4 February 2017, a US airstrike killed former al-Qaeda commanderAbu Hani al-Masri, who was a part of Ahrar al-Sham at the time of his death. It was reported that he was about to defect to Tahrir al-Sham before his death.[97] Around 8 February,Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi confirmed that 2 senior Jabhat Fateh al-Sham leaders loyal to al-Qaeda, including former al-Nusra deputy leaderSami al-Oraydi, left Tahrir al-Sham after its formation.[100]
A speech was released by Abu Jaber on 9 February.[101] He emphasized his group being an "independent entity" and praised his "brothers" in the "SyrianJihad" for their "heroic" resistance againstBa'athist forces,Hezbollah and Russians. The statement urged allopposition factions to join forces with HTS and warnedSyrian Sunnis; asserting that Iran will "enslave the region" if the rebels lose the war.[1]
On 12 February, theal-Bunyan al-Marsous Operations Room, of which Tahrir al-Sham was a member, launched anoffensive against theSyrian Army inDaraa's Manshiyah district. Tahrir al-Sham forces reportedly began the attack with 2suicide bombers andcar bombs.[102]
On 13 February, clashes erupted between the previously allied Tahrir al-Sham andJund al-Aqsa, also called Liwa al-Aqsa, in northern Hama and southern Idlib.[103][104]
On 15 February, Ahrar al-Sham published an infographic on its recent defections, claiming that only 955 fighters had defected to Tahrir al-Sham.[100] On 22 February, theCombating Terrorism Center reported that Jabhat Fateh al-Sham had formed the Tahrir al-Sham group due to its fear of being isolated, and to counter Ahrar al-Sham's recent expansion during the clashes in Idlib Governorate.[100]
On 22 February, the last of Liwa al-Asqa's 2,100 militants left their final positions inKhan Shaykhun, with unconfirmed reports in pro-government media that they were to join IS in Ar-Raqqah Governorate after a negotiated withdrawal deal with Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party.[105] Afterward, Tahrir al-Sham declared terminating Liwa al-Aqsa, and promised to watch for any remaining cells.[106]
On 26 February, a US airstrike in Al-Mastoumeh, Idlib Governorate, killedAbu Khayr al-Masri, who was the deputy leader of al-Qaeda.[107][108] The airstrike also killed another Tahrir al-Sham militant.[109][110] Abu Khayr's death left HTS freer to move away from al-Qaeda's any remaining influence.[91]
In early March 2017, local residents in Idlib Governorate who supported FSA factions accused HTS of doing more harm than good, saying that all they've done is "kidnap people, set up checkpoints, and terrorize residents".[111]
On 16 March, aUS airstrike struck the village of al-Jinah, just southwest ofAtarib, killing at least 29 and possibly over 50 civilians; the US claimed the people targeted in the strike were "al-Qaeda militants" but theSyrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), local residents and local officials have said that the building struck was a mosque filled with worshipers, which was subsequently confirmed byBellingcat.[112][113][114]
On the morning of 21 March, according to pro-government media, a US drone strike inDarkush, Idlib Governorate, killed Abu Islam al-Masri, described as an Egyptian high-ranking HTS commander, and Abu al-'Abbas al-Darir, described as an Egyptian HTS commander;[115][better source needed] however, theInstitute for the Study of War reported that the commander killed was Sheikh Abu al-Abbas al-Suri.[116]
On 24 March, twoflatbed trucks carryingflour and belonging to anIHH-affiliated Turkish relief organization were stopped at a HTS checkpoint at the entrance toSarmada. HTS then seized the trucks and the flour, which was intended for abakery inSaraqib. The seizure caused 2,000 families in the area to be cut off from a free supply ofbread.[117]
In April 2017,Jaysh al-Islam attacked HTS and expelled it from the territories under its control in Eastern Ghouta.[118]
On 3 May, HTS arrestedSuhail Muhammad Hamoud, "AbuTOW", a former FSA fighter, in a house raid in Idlib. Earlier, al-Hamoud had published a photograph of himsmoking in front of a HTS billboard thatprohibited smoking.[119]
According to reports from pro-governmentAl-Masdar News, on 20 May, the main faction of the Abu Amara Battalions joined Tahrir al-Sham, which "now boasts a fighting force of some 50,000 militants" according to one pro-government media source.[120][better source needed] However, thecovert operations unit of the Abu Amara Battalions based in Aleppo remained independent.[121]
On 29 May, Tahrir al-Sham arrested opposition activist and FSA commanderAbdul Baset al-Sarout after accusing him of participating in an anti-HTS protest inMaarat al-Nu'man.[122]
On 2 June 2017, defectors from the Northern Brigade's Commandos of Islam Brigade reportedly joined Tahrir al-Sham, although Captain Kuja, leader of the unit, stated that he is still part of the Northern Brigade.[123][124]
During 18–23 July, HTS launched a series of attacks on Ahrar al-Sham positions, which were quickly abandoned.[91] On 20 July 2017, the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement led by Sheikh Tawfiq Shahabuddin announced its withdrawal from Tahrir al-Sham amidwidespread conflict between HTS and Ahrar al-Sham, and became an independent Islamist group.[6] On 23 July 2017, Tahrir al-Sham expelled the remnants ofAhrar al-Sham from Idlib, capturing the entire city[125] as well as 60% of theIdlib Governorate.[126] HTS was now the dominant armed group in opposition-held NW Syria.[91]
On 18 August 2017, Tahrir al-Sham captured 8 rebel fighters from the town ofMadaya after it accused them of wanting to return to Madaya during aceasefire agreement.[127]
Syrian intelligence commanderHassan Daaboul was among the 40 assassinated by Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham, in twin bomb attacks at complexes of theBa'athist secret police inHoms.[128] The explosion killed Ibrahim Darwish, a Brigadier General and the state security branch's chief.[129] Abu Yusuf al-Muhajir, a Tahrir al-Sham military spokesman was interviewed by Human Voice on the bombings.[130] Twenty-six names were released.[131] HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani mentioned the Homs attack, stating that it was a message for the "defeatist politicians" to "step aside".[132] It has been disputed that the raid resulted in the death of Ibrahim Darwish.[133]
On 11 March 2017, Tahrir al-Sham carried out atwin bombing attack in the Bab al-Saghir area of Damascus's Old City, killing 76 and wounding 120. The death toll included 43 Iraqi pilgrims, whom HTS claimed were "Iranian militias" supportingAssad regime's dictatorship.[134] The attacks were at a shrine frequented by Shi'ite pilgrims and militiamen.[135] In a statement released the following day, Tahrir al-Sham stated that the attacks targetedIran-backed militants fight on behalf ofBashar al-Assad and condemned Khomeinist militants for "killing and displacing" Syrians.[136]
From September to November 2017, there were a series of assassinations of HTS leaders, in particular foreign clerics associated with the most hardline elements, such as Abu Talha al-Ordini, Abu Abdulrahman al-Mohajer, Abu Sulaiman al-Maghribi, Abu Yahya al-Tunisi, Suraqa al-Maki and Abu Mohammad al-Sharii, as well as some local military leaders, including Abu Elias al-Baniasi, Mustafa al-Zahri, Saied Nasrallah and Hassan Bakour. There was speculation that the assassinations were carried out either by pro-Turkish perpetrators, given the hostility between Turkey and HTS in Idlib, or by supporters[who?] of Julani's attempt to turn the organization away from hardline Salafi-jihadi positions. There were also high-profile defections from HTS in the same period, includingAbdullah al-Muhaysini andMuslah al-Alyani.[137] In December, HTS arrested several prominent jihadi activists, former members of al-Nusra who remained loyal to al-Qaeda and rejected HTS's turn away from Salafi-jihadist positions. The move was interpreted as an attempt to re-establish as a more pragmatic, pan-Sunni group, with a civilian structure. Al-Qaeda leaderAyman al-Zawahiri denounced this turn.[138][139]
HTS announced Abu Jaber's resignation as the group's leader on 1 October 2017. He was succeeded by Nusra Front founder Abu Mohammed al-Julani, who had already been the de facto military commander.[140][141] On 1 October 2017, theibn Taymiyyah Battalions based in the town ofDarat Izza defected from Tahrir al-Sham.[142] In October 2017, Russia claimed to have injured Abu Mohammed al-Joulani in an air raid; HTS denied the claim.[143][141] HTS established theSyrian Salvation Government in Idlib, as a rival to theSyrian Interim Government recognized by other rebels.[118]
In early 2018, there were reports that HTS had been significantly weakened, and now had "a small presence in Eastern Ghouta and declining influence in Idlib, northern Hama, and western Aleppo provinces", with just 250 men in Eastern Ghouta[118] and a total of 12,000 fighters.[91]
In February 2018, Tahrir al-Sham was accused of killing Fayez al-Madani, an opposition delegate tasked with negotiations with the government overelectricity delivery in the northernHoms Governorate, in the city ofal-Rastan. Hundreds of people, including fighters of the Men of God Brigade, part of theFree Syrian Army's National Liberation Movement group,[144][145][146] proceeded to demonstrate against HTS in the city on 13 February. In response, HTS withdrew from Rastan and handed over its headquarters in the city to the Men of God Brigade.[147] Meanwhile,Al-Qaeda loyalists formed the anti-HTSGuardians of Religion Organization (Hurras al-Din) in February 2018, establishing it as the successor group ofAl-Nusra Front.[148]
HTS was left excluded from the 24 February ceasefire agreement on Eastern Ghouta. In late February, a group of armed factions, includingFailaq al-Rahman andJaysh al-Islam, wrote to the UN declaring they were ready to "evacuate" remaining HTS fighters from Eastern Ghouta within 15 days.[118] At the same time in Idlib Governorate, Ahrar al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki and Soqour al-Sham entered intoconflict with HTS, taking significant territory.[118]
During late 2017 and early 2018, it co-operated with Turkey in Idlib, leading to deepening tensions between the more pragmatic leadership and more hardline (especially foreign fighters) elements hostile to working with Turkey. Some of the latter split in February 2018 to formHuras al-Din. The HTS leadership also cracked down on remaining IS splinter cells active in Idlib. By August, when HTS entered into (unsuccessful) negotiations with Russia and Turkey, HTS was estimated to have around 3,000–4,000 foreign fighters, including non-Syrian Arabs, out of a total of 16,000 HTS fighters. On 31 August, Turkey declared HTS a terrorist organization.[89]
By early 2018, HTS had cracked down on the majority of competing factions and established military control over 80% of the greaterIdlib area.[149] In the summer of 2018, HTS strengthened its crackdown campaign against cells affiliated with IS organization in Idlib and Hama regions.[95]
In January 2019, HTS was able to seize dozens of villages from rivals, and afterwards, a deal was reached in which the civil administration was to be led by HTS in the whole rebel-held Idlib Governorate.[150]
In the wake of the5th Idlib inter-rebel conflict, HTS gained control of nearly the entire Idlib pocket, after defeating the Turkish-backedNational Front for Liberation. Following their victory, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham would immediately violate the ceasefire treaty brokered byTurkey andRussia by placing combat units in the demilitarized zone along the Idlib-Syrian Government border, and attackSAA encampments near the area. In response to these attacks, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad increased the number of troops garrisoned near Idlib, which some have argued is an impending renewed offensive in the region, following theNorthwestern Syria Campaign, where pro-government forces retook the formerly rebel-controlledAbu al-Duhur Military Airbase that was captured by theFSA andArmy of Conquest in 2015. In 2019, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary DefenseMichael Mulroy stated that "Idlib is essentially the largest collection of al Qaeda affiliates in the world."[151][152][153][154]On 10–11 July, 57 pro-government fighters were killed when Tahrir al-Sham militants attacked Syrian positions near the fortified village of Hamamiyat. 44 militants were also killed.[155][156]
HTS successfully defended Idlib from 2019 to 2020 government offensives. During this period, HTS cemented its security partnership with theTurkish military against theAssad regime.[68] The opposition and Islamist groups led by HTS suffered heavy losses as a result of theDawn of Idlib 2 operation launched under the leadership of the Assad regime between December 2019 and March 2020, and many cities and towns from the Idlib Pocket fell under the control of regime forces. During this time, Turkey was protesting the siege of Turkish military observation points deployed according to theAstana agreement by regime forces and wanted Assad to stop his attack on the Idlib region.[157] After 34 Turkish soldiers lost their lives in theBalyut attack carried out by Assad's troops, Turkey launchedOperation Spring Shield. As a result of the Turkish counterattack, regime forces and their supporters suffered heavy losses.[158][159] Turkey's counter-offensive halts regime forces advance into Idlib. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the opposition led by HTS launched a counterattack. This cooperation with Turkey prevented HTS and other opposition groups from losing Idlib and forced deportation to the Turkish border.[160][161][162]
On 1 March 2021 it was reported that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham intensified its campaign against al-Qaeda affiliateHurras al-Din in Idlib.[163] Since 2021, HTS has started implementing various reconstruction projects in areas under its control, with a focus on establishing civil institutions in opposition-held territories. These included theBab al-Hawa Industrial City project and re-opening of al-Ghazawiya crossing point to connect with theSyrian Interim Government held territories.[164]
After achieving stability in Idlib in 2021, HTS launched the policy of repatriating confiscated properties of minorities in North-West Syria. These also included the re-building of destroyed churches in Idlib. HTS commanders andSSG officials have since initiated regular meetings to engage with priests and representatives theChristian community inIdlib.[165][166]
The Washington Post reported in January 2022 that the group was "trying to convince Syrians and the world that it is no longer as radical and repressive as it once was", voicing rhetoric about combating extremism, and shifting its focus to providing services to the refugees and residents of Idlib Governorate through the Salvation Government.[167] In 7 January, Abu Muhammad al-Joulani announced the inauguration of the Aleppo-Bab al-Hawa International Road, presenting the event as part of "a comprehensive plan... to achieve development and progress for the region".[164]
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In August 2022, HTS ideologueAbu Maria al-Qahtani issued a statement demanding the dissolution of Al-Qaeda and urged all AQ branches to cut ties from the organization.[168] In 2022, HTS took a significant amount of territory and several key settlements during theOctober 2022 Aleppo clashes.
In 2023, it was reported that Western hostilities towards HTS had decreased, but were still marked by mutual rivalry, due to conflict with American interests in the region.[169] The U.S. State Department alleged in 2023 that the group obstructed humanitarian efforts in Idlib through licensing and registration protocols as well as through the imposition of taxes and fees on Western NGOs and regulations on aid distribution and beneficiary selection.[170]
In a speech before the revolutionary conference ofSyrian Salvation Government in May 2023, Joulani announced intentions to transform the strategic map of the conflict. Stating that Tahrir al-Sham has achieved remarkable military preparation, Joulani asserted that "Aleppo is the gate toDamascus and it will be under focus for one or two years."[171] In May 2023, HTS and SDF announced separate proposals to host millions ofSyrian refugees stranded across the neighboring countries, following theArab League's reinstatement of theAssad government.[172]
In June 2023, Tahrir al-Sham and theSyrian Democratic Forces initiated formal diplomatic talks, concluding an agreement to initiate trade of fuel supplies betweenRojava andIdlib. The meetings were held against the backdrop of growing tensions between Turkey and SDF, and SDF's intention to deploy HTS as a check on the growingTurkish influence in northern Syria. For their part, HTS proposed jointcounter-terrorism efforts alongside SDF. Apart from economic co-operation, the talks also involved negotiations on political arrangements, such as prospects for a joint HTS–SDF civil administration in the event thatSNA forces were expelled from North-West Syria.[173]
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In November, the HTS launched theNorthwestern Aleppo offensive, which it called OperationDeterrence of Aggression reportedly capturing 11 towns and villages in westernAleppo Governorate, capturing the eponymous governorate's capital ofAleppo four days into the offensive.[174][175] By 4 December, HTS had captured most of Aleppo Governorate andIdlib Governorate and began to advance onHama.[175]
According toAbu Hassan al-Hamawi, commander of HTS's military wing, the offensive resulted from year-long strategic planning and coordination between opposition groups.[176] Prior to the operation, HTS had developed enhanced military capabilities, establishing a dedicated drone unit and indigenous weapons production. The group deployed its newly developed "Shahin" (Arabic for Falcon) suicide drone against regime forces for the first time during the offensive. HTS additionally facilitated the creation of aunified operations room in southern Syria, synchronizing military actions with approximately 25 rebel groups to encircle Damascus from multiple fronts.[176][177]
On 5 December, HTS fighters had captured the city of Hama after two-days of fighting in neighboring villages. The group said it would advance onHoms (40 km from Hama).[178] The next day, it was reported from a rebel commander and pro-rebel media that Tahir al-Sham forces continued to advance on Homs, reportedly reaching 10 km–5 km north of the city.[179]
On 7–8 December, Damascusfell to Syrian opposition forces, including HTS, theSouthern Operations Room, and the US-backedSyrian Free Army,[180] and Assad fled to Russia.[181] On 30 December, HTS leader and thede facto leader of SyriaAhmed al-Sharaa announced that the organisation would be dissolved by 4–5 January 2025,[182][183] however, this announced deadline of the formal dissolution was delayed until the finalized process took place on 29 January.[19]
Abu Jaber Sheikh, a prominent scholar and chief of the Shura Council of Tahrir al-Sham, was arrested several times by theBa'athist regime, which accused him of holdingSalafi jihadi beliefs. He was imprisoned at Sednaya Prison in 2005 and released in 2011 alongside several jihadist prisoners who later formed Salafist rebel groups during the Syrian civil war.[1] Shaykh advocates for "Popular Jihad," a grassroots approach that focuses on winning popular support before establishingIslamic governance, contrasting with IS's "Elite Jihad," which relies on a vanguard to lead from the top down.[184]Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi of theCombating Terrorism Center claimed in February 2017 that despite public statements by Tahrir al-Sham's leaders and partisans, the group (at the time) was essentiallyal-Qaeda-aligned.[100]
On 18 June 2019, HTS released a statement offering condolences toEgypt's former presidentMuhammad Morsi upon his death in Egyptian custody.[185] In an interview given to thePBS Frontline documentarianMartin Smith,Abu Mohammad al-Julani stated regarding the religious doctrines and political goals of Tahrir al-Sham:[12]
To limit the description of the HTS to only being aSalafist or jihadist, I believe, needs a long discussion. And I don't want to comment on that now, because it would take a lot of research and study. We are trying today to talk about Islam in its real concept, the Islam that seeks to spread justice and aspires for building and for progress, and to protectwomen and preserve their rights, and for education as well. So if we agree that there's an Islamic rule in the liberated areas, we say that there are universities, by Allah's grace, full of students, two-thirds being female students. There are more than 450,000 to 500,000 students enrolled in schools. There are fully functioning hospitals in the liberated areas, and there are people working to build towns and pave roads. Others are trying to establish an economic system for people to live securely and peacefully. And there's a judicial system that seeks to give people back their rights and not only to punish the wrongdoers in the way some people would think, when they hear it is an Islamic or a Salafi group.
Being strongly supportive of the four traditionalSunnimadhahib (schools of jurisprudence), HTS has promoted and enforced theShafi'i school in territories under its control, thereby gaining popular support and influence amongst theShafi'i-majority population ofIdlib. One objective of the promotion and implementation of themadh'hab system by HTS has been to foster institutionalisation of governance within the framework of traditionalIslamic jurisprudence.[186] Scholar Abu Abdullah al-Shami, the chief of HTS's religious council, has stated that "relying on the schools of jurisprudence" is a pathway towards "getting closer to people". According to Bassam Sihiouni, an influential member of the High Council of the Fatwa:
"The schools of jurisprudence are among the safest ways of preserving a correct and inventive intellectual orientation while applying the laws, ethics and morals ofIslam. On the contrary, abandoning these schools would result in a decline of jurisprudence on the basis of just and righteous thinking."[187]
Ines Barnard and Charlie Winter have described HTS as the "most complex and sophisticated Islamist group" in Syria, which integrates mobilisation of popular support and military operations through itsstrategic communication networks.[188] HTS has also expressed its support for the right ofPalestinians toreclaim their land.[189]
In 2024, theBBC reported that the goal of HTS since its break with al-Qaeda has been limited to trying to establishIslamic rule in Syria rather than a widercaliphate. The report stated that the messaging of HTS after thefall of the Assad regime was "one of inclusiveness and a rejection of violence or revenge".[190] According to Iranian foreign ministerAbbas Araghchi, HTS gave guarantees to protectShia religious sites in Syria ahead of the fall of the Assad regime.[191]
Despite being a conservativeIslamist political organization, HTS was not socially draconian or extremist in its interpretation of Islamic governance. In contrast to organizations like the more hardlineTaliban or extremistIslamic State, HTS did not impose the harsher aspects and interpretations ofSharia over the populations of the regions it governed. Taxation in HTS-controlled areas was minimized due to high poverty levels and fear of antagonizing locals to its rule. The organization generally avoided interfering in the lives of women. It did not compel the usehijabs/niqabs or discouragewomen's access to education. In 2020, the organization allowed the formation of volunteerreligious police but dismantled it within months, stating the concept had no place in a modern state. The organization was quick to respond to pressure from the local population to change course on policy or rhetoric to avoid public backlashes. The generally lenient approach adopted by HTS was the result of years of internal restructuring that left the group with an uncontested leadership that had adopted a pragmatic outlook.[192]
HTS largely refrained from controlling sectors of governance like education and health. After consolidating administrative control inIdlib, the organization allowed the preexisting Education Directorate to continue its operations. The curricula adopted in schools under HTS control are a mix ofUNICEF and Syrian government textbooks (omitting glorification of theBa'ath Party and theAl-Assad family).[193] Educational curricula of Tahrir al-Sham teach theShafi'i school, the predominantmadhab in Syria, and emphasize the importance of the four traditionalschools of law in ensuring Muslim unity. In theology, Tahrir al-Sham officially follows theAthari school while also allowingAsh'arite scholarship in educational institutes and co-operating withmosques run by Ash'ariimamss. As it consolidated power over time, it also reduced its policy ofmoral policing, arguing that such duties were the role of "relevant ministries of theSSG".[194] Commenting on the changes since 2020, a female Islamist activist campaigning for women's issues stated:
Pressure on individual behaviour fell with the creation of HTS. Before, it would have been inconceivable to imagine that women could talk about politics like this. The pressure to wear the full veil (niqab) has also diminished... this situation is new. All the women wore the full veil after theliberation of Idlib. The current transformation exasperates religious hardliners, but more pressure cannot be exerted on society, or it might get out of control.[195]
HTS, composed primarily of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), had for years—since its inception—viewed non-Muslims as second-class citizens to be tolerated. However, following a public rebranding after 2016, HTS publicly distanced itself from some of its earlier hardline positions.[88] For several years, HTS had worked to significantly improve relations with minority groups under its rule, such as theSyrian Christian andDruze communities ofIdlib, notably returning property stolen during the civil war and permitting Christians in its territories to reopen churches.[196]
Following the fall of the Assad regime, HTS military commanderMurhaf Abu Qasra met withAlawite leaders inLatakia to provide assurances that the minority group would not face retribution, pointing to the group's treatment of Christians in Aleppo as evidence of their commitment to protecting minorities. The group also announced a general amnesty for former regime soldiers, with exceptions for those who committed war crimes or participated in torture.[177]
In June 2022, HTS leaderAbu Mohammad al-Julani met with a delegation of Druze leaders and inaugurated a project that facilitated water supply to the Druze-majority villages in theJabal al-Summaq. At the event, al-Julani assured the Druze leaders that he was committed to improving economic conditions in the region and expanding public services provided by theSyrian Salvation Government. Various Syrian observers viewed the event as part of a public outreach programme of HTS with local Druze residents.[197][198][199]
In 2022, Tahrir al-Sham permitted the re-opening of churches inIdlib, enabling the Christian residents to celebrateMass. After a meeting with members of the Christian clergy and civil activists, al-Julani announced his policy to protect Christian participation in their religious rites and celebrations. He also promised the restoration of properties unjustly seized from Christian citizens. Al-Qaeda-alignedHurras al-Din condemned the move, accusing the Salvation Government of changing Idlib to be "less Muslim". In response, Tahrir al-Sham leaders maintained thatsharia (Islamic law) safeguarded the rights of non-Muslim citizens (dhimmi ormusta'min) to observe and teach their religious rites within their communities, arguing for the need for tolerance and peaceful relations between religious communities living in anIslamic government.[200]
Hanna Celluf,Archpriest of a 1000-year-old church inAl-Quniyah and a member of theFranciscan Order, stated that Idlib residents have been free to practice their religious rites and expressed his pride in serving the Christians of Idlib.[201] In December 2024, following the swift overthrow of Assad, the group's spokesman,Hassan Abdul Ghani, stated that all religions will be free in the new Syrian state now that tyranny is gone forever.[202]
The groups initalic were defectors fromAhrar al-Sham which either left to joinJabhat Fateh al-Sham in the last few days of its existence, or joined its successor group Tahrir al-Sham.
Following the fall of the Assad regime, HTS leadership announced plans to incorporate various militia groups into a unified national army under the ministry of defense, while pledging to exclude jihadist groups focused on attacking Western targets (such as IS). Military commanderMurhaf Abu Qasra (Abu Hassan al-Hamawi]) stated the unified force would be 'tasked with protecting the nation on behalf of all Syrians.'[177]
Liwa al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar[203]
Khorasan group
Suqour al-Ezz
Xhemati Alban[205]
Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad[206]
Katibat Jabal al-Islam[207]
Harakat Sham al-Islam
Ajnad al-Sham (left in June 2017 to joinAhrar al-Sham, before rejoining on November 17, 2017)[211][212]
Mujahidin Ghuroba DivisionSince October 2017 until 29 January 2025, the "general commander" or emir of Tahrir al-Sham wasAbu Mohammad al-Julani, who was also Tahrir al-Sham's "military commander" and the emir ofJabhat Fateh al-Sham, who also led its predecessor organisational-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch ofal-Qaeda until 2016.[235] He would later abandon the use of his nom de guerre and became known by his birth name,Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Previously, the general commander of Tahrir al-Sham was Hashim al-Shaykh, also known as Abu Jaber, who was the leader ofAhrar al-Sham between September 2014 and September 2015.[236] On 1 October 2017, Abu Jaber resigned from his position as the general leader of Tahrir al-Sham and was replaced by Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Abu Jaber took another position as the head of HTS's Shura council.[2]
Individuals initalic were defectors fromAhrar al-Sham, which either left to joinJabhat Fateh al-Sham in the last few days of its existence, or directly joined Tahrir al-Sham.
Ansar al-Sham (disbanded by HTS in 2018)[241]
Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya (becameAnsar al-Din Front – Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya)[63]During its foundation declaration, the first EmirAbu Jaber Sheikh had described the Levant Liberation Committee as "an independent entity" free from all the previous relations and allegiances as a result of the newly formed union with various Syrian Islamic militias, thereby disassociating itself from previously dissolved factions such as the Al-Nusra Front.[244] Since officially disassociating fromAl-Qaeda in 2017, Tahrir al-Sham has formally established governance over many parts of North-West Syria.[245]
In November 2017, HTS launched a wide-scale crackdown on Al-Qaeda elements in Idlib and arrested prominent leaders fromAf-Pak region andAl-Nusra Front such asSami al-Oraydi. EmirAyman al-Zawahiri opposed the split of HTS from Al-Qaeda, stating that it was a treasonous act done without his consent and further denounced the clampdown on foreign Jihadist fighters through an audio-statement.[246] Several Al-Qaeda circles and supporters have also condemned Joulani and compared him toAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi because of the group'sconflicts with other rebel groups, and have described him as an 'opportunist' as well as making claims that he is an agent of foreign powers.[247]
After reaching a ceasefire deal brokered by Turkey, HTS turned its attention to destroying Al-Qaeda cells andIslamic State remnants inIdlib.[169] Rivalry between Al-Qaeda alignedHurras al-Din and Tahrir al-Sham had begun to escalate violently as early as December 2019. In February 2021, HTS intensified its fight againstal-Qaeda cells by launching a large-scale crackdown that saw many military commanders and leaders of Hurras al-Din incarcerated.[163] According toIstanbul-based academic Abbas Sharifeh, the measures were part of a strategy by HTS for governance consolidation: "Golani simply does not want any competitors in Idlib, especially from a jihadi current affiliated with al-Qaeda."[163] By 2023 Tahrir al-Sham had eliminated most of the clandestine networks of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, disarmed the militias and established total control over Idlib.[169]
In 2019, U.S. government alleged that Tahrir al-Sham was working withal-Qaeda's Syrian branch on a covert level, despite its self-identification as a distinct organisation.[248] Some analysts assert that many of the group's senior figures, particularly Abu Jaber, held similarly extreme views.[184][59] However, Tahrir al-Sham has officially denied being part of al-Qaeda and said in a statement that the group is "an independent entity and not an extension of previous organizations or factions".[1] In his2021 interview toPBS News,Abu Muhammad al-Julani argued that financial co-operation with Al-Qaeda was necessary to defend Syrians from the tyranny of theAssad regime, and stated that "even at that time when we were with Al Qaeda, we were against external attacks".[12] Clarifying the reasons behind the termination of relations with Al-Qaeda, Julani said:
"[W]hen we saw that the interest of the revolution and the interest of thepeople of Syria was also to break up from [the] Al Qaeda organization, we initiated this ourselves without pressure from anybody, without anybody talking to us about it or requesting anything. It was an individual, personal initiative based on what we thought was in the public interest that benefits theSyrian revolution."[12]
According toAbdul Razzaq al-Mahdi, who was a leading scholar in Tahrir al-Sham, the groups do not particularly hate one another in the political or social battlefield. Certain members, however, do believe that a war between the two would be possible, since Ahrar al-Sham's attendance at the Astana talks labels it as a "moderate" faction, often seen as blasphemy within groups such as Tahrir al-Sham.[249]
In February 2018Ahrar al-Sham and theNour al-Din al-Zenki Movement merged and formed theSyrian Liberation Front then launched anoffensive against Tahrir al-Sham seizing several villages and the city ofMaarrat al-Nu'man.[citation needed]
| Country | Date | References |
|---|---|---|
 Canada | 23 May 2018 | [49] |
 Turkey | 31 August 2018 | [250] |
 Russia | 4 June 2020; the decisioncame into force on 20 July 2020 | [251] |
 Argentina | 14 April 2014 (Labelled as an alias ofAl-Nusra Front)[47] | [47] |
 New Zealand | 14 April 2014 (Labelled as an alias of Al-Nusra Front[53]) | [53] |
 Australia | 9 April 2022 | [48] |
| Canada | 7 November 2013 (Originally labelled as Al-Nusra) | [252] |
 Japan | 14 May 2014 (Labelled as an alias of Al-Nusra Front[52]) | [52] |
 Indonesia | 21 October 2024 (Previously labelled asAl-Nusra Front since 2016, added as an alias of Al-Nusra Front since 21 October 2024) | [253] |
 United Nations | [254] | |
 European Union | September 2020 | [255] |
HTS was designated a terrorist group by the United States,European Union,Russia,United Kingdom,Canada, and some other countries.[256] The US embassy in Syria, which had suspended operations in February 2012, confirmed in May 2017 that HTS had beendesignated a terrorist organization in March 2017. A US State Department spokesperson further stated that a review of HTS's internal mechanisms was being conducted to analyse "the issue carefully".[257] In May 2018, theUnited States Department of State formally added HTS to its list of "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (FTO).[258][245] The United States officially confirmed in June 2023 that HTS leaderAbu Mohammad al-Julani had severed links to Al-Qaeda in 2016, while sanctioning individuals known to finance HTS. These included Abu Ahmed Zakour, a member of HTS'sMajlis-ash-Shura.[259]
HTS was designated a terrorist group by the United States,European Union,Russia,Canada, and some other countries.[256] The US embassy in Syria, which had suspended operations in February 2012, confirmed in May 2017 that HTS had beendesignated a terrorist organization in March 2017. A US State Department spokesperson further stated that a review of HTS's internal mechanisms was being conducted to analyse "the issue carefully".[260] In May 2018, theUnited States Department of State formally added HTS to its list of "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (FTO).[258][245] The United States officially confirmed in June 2023 that HTS leaderAbu Mohammad al-Julani had severed links to Al-Qaeda in 2016, while sanctioning individuals known to finance HTS. These included Abu Ahmed Zakour, a member of HTS'sMajlis-ash-Shura.[261]
Canada designated Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization on 23 May 2018.[49]
In August 2018,Turkey designated Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization.[262] Despite this, theTurkish army has pursued strategic co-operation with HTS, viewing them as allies in the fight against Al-Qaeda and Islamic State remnants. Since the objective of Tahrir al-Sham was defendingIdlib from theBaathist regime and consolidating governance, it became a party to several ceasefire agreements brokered by Turkey. Following the ceasefire deal in March 2020, HTS turned its focus to eradicating independent militias and hardline Jihadist factions in Idlib. Within a few weeks it was able to dismantle all the Al-Qaeda networks and eventually succeeded in achieving undisputed control of Idlib by subduing or co-opting other rebel factions.[169]
Following thefall of the Assad regime during the2024 Syrian opposition offensives spearheaded by Tahrir al-Sham, theBBC News reported that the UK government could remove HTS from its list of terrorist groups.[263] This was echoed byGeir Otto Pedersen, the UN special envoy for Syria, who toldFinancial Times that international powers would need to consider lifting the designation.[264]
Turkish Foreign MinisterHakan Fidan stated that HTS should be removed from the list of terrorist organizations and called on Western states.[265][266] A few days after this statement, Fidan went to Damascus and met with HTS leaderAhmed al-Sharaa. Thus, Fidan became the first foreign minister to visit the transitional government established by HTS.[267][268]
On 17 December 2024, the leader ofChechnya,Ramzan Kadyrov, called for the Russian government to remove the HTS from Moscow's list of banned terror groups.[269]
On 20 December 2024, the United States lifted a $10-million reward it placed for the arrest of Sharaa following meetings between HTS officials and US diplomats in Damascus.[270]
Following a May 2025 meeting between United States President Trump and HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, in June 2025 Trump signed an executive order lifting most of the sanctions on Syria.[271]
On 7 July 2025, the United States revoked theforeign terrorist organization designation for HTS.[272]
On 21 October 2025, the United Kingdom removed HTS from its list of proscribed terrorist organizations.[74]
In response to the American designation of HTS as a terrorist organisation;Ahmed al-Sharaa, distancing himself from past involvement with Al-Qaeda, stated in a 2021 interview toPBS Frontline:
Our message to them is brief. We here do not pose any threat to you, so there is no need for you to classify people as terrorists and announce rewards for killing them. And also, all that does not affect theSyrian revolution negatively. This is the most important message. The second message is that theAmerican policies in the region, and in Syria in particular, are incorrect policies that require huge amendments... What we might have in common would be putting an end to thehumanitarian crisis and suffering that is going on in the region, and putting an end to the masses ofrefugees that flee to Turkey or to Europe and create huge issues, either for the Syrian people, who are being displaced all over Europe, or for theEuropeans themselves. This is the issue that we can cooperate the most on, by helping people stay here, by providing them with a dignified life here, in the region, or by liberating the lands of these people so that they can return to their homes, instead of having Russia or the Iranian militias push them to flee abroad.[12][273]
In 2018, Turkey designated Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization and the Al-Nusra Front in 2014. The Turkish government said it was opposed to Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and had fought with it and declared it a terrorist organisation, and HTS'sSyrian Salvation Government was a direct challenge to the Turkish-backedSyrian Interim Government.[274]
However, since 2017 there have been times where HTS, particularly its pragmatic faction aroundAbu Muhammed al-Julani, has fought alongside theTurkish-backed Free Syrian Army. HTS has not stopped Turkey from setting up severalobservation posts in Idlib and has joined joint operations rooms with Turkish-backed groups while preserving its autonomy. Some argue that Turkey has been controlling HTS movements in Idlib since 2018.[88] TheClingendael Institute in November 2019 has described the Turkish policy since 2018 as attempting to divide the pragmatic elements from the hardline elements within HTS.[274]
The head of the Turkish intelligence agencyMIT,İbrahim Kalın, visited Damascus on 12 December 2024 and met withAhmed al-Sharaa, the leader of HTS. Kalın's visit was the first by a senior foreign official in Damascus since the rebel takeover.[275][276][277] Turkish Foreign MinisterHakan Fidan stated in an interview after thefall of the Assad regime that Turkey cooperated with HTS during his time as the head of the Turkish intelligence agencyMIT and that HTS provided Turkey with information on many members of IS and Al Qaeda, including high-ranking officials.[278][279] It is assumed that Turkey was the party that finally allowed HTS to start their offensive and oust Assad in late 2024.[88]
In February 2025, theEuropean Union announced the suspension of select sanctions onSyria, including in the energy and banking sectors, as part of an effort to support political transition and economic recovery. The decision was aimed at encouraging HTS to adopt a more inclusive governance approach and uphold human rights. However, the EU maintained key sanctions, particularly those related toarms, and warned that further measures could be imposed if HTS failed to meet its commitments.[280]
In April 2025,Saudi Arabia andQatar agreed to settle all of Syria's debts at theWorld Bank, approximately 15 million US dollars.[281] The move was done to enable Syria to resume access to the services of the World Bank after being suspended in 2011. The World Bank announced in May 2025 that Syria no longer had outstanding debts to theInternational Development Association (IDA), its fund dedicated to low-income countries.[282]
Despite HTS's efforts to publicly distance itself from al-Qaeda and present itself as a legitimate governing body through the Syrian Salvation Government, reports from the United Nations, United States, European Union and human rights organizations document its continued involvement in serious human rights violations and war crimes.[283][284][285][286][287]
HTS carried out extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances.[283][288] Political opponents, journalists, activists, and civilians perceived as critical of HTS are unlawfully detained.[288] Torture and mistreatment were widespread in detention facilities operated by HTS, with at least 22 documented methods of torture being employed by HTS, including physical and psychological abuse.[289] Confessions obtained under torture are admitted as evidence in HTS courts, while detainees have no legal recourse to challenge their imprisonment.[283][289][286] In 2019 aHuman Rights Watch report accused the group of torturing locals who were documenting their abuses in areas they controlled.[290]
HTS enforced strict, religiously motivated dress codes for women and girls, and significantly restricts their freedom of movement and access to education. Women are only allowed to travel when accompanied by a male relative (mahram), with violations of religious decrees possibly leading to arrest and punishment.[283][289] A U.S. State Department report in 2023 asserted that women in HTS-controlled regions of Idlib faced widespread discrimination and violence, including arbitrary detention, sexual abuse in custody, and death sentences for charges such as "adultery" or "blasphemy".[283] It also alleged that women were also denied the right to file for divorce and are forbidden from wearing makeup in public and living alone.[283] US government agencyUSCIRF alleged in 2022 that the education ministry of theSyrian Salvation Government gave instructions to block married female students – including underage girls who were forced intochild marriage – from attending public schools and universities.[287]
Women activists, especially those working in humanitarian or media roles, have been particularly targeted.[283][285] Many are accused of high treason or other charges as a pretext to pressure them into ceasing activities critical of HTS.[285] HTS also arrested women with family ties to rival groups or opposition factions as a tactic to extract leverage or force cooperation.[285] Female detainees were subjected to degrading conditions, including isolation, threats, lack of medical care, and abuse.[283][285]
A 2022 report issued by theUnited States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) alleged that while HTS publicly claimed to be tolerant and made official overtures towards religious minorities in Idlib like Druze and Christians, it continued to commit widespread violations of religious freedom and human rights, targeting religious minorities and dissenting Sunni Muslims. According to the USCIRF report, the group forcibly converted Druze to Sunni Islam and that properties of Christians and Druze were systematically confiscated in HTS-controlled territories. Arbitrary arrests, torture, and executions under fabricated religious charges are routine in HTS-controlled territories, with detainees often subjected to abuse and denied legal recourse. The USCIRF concludes that HTS promoted an ideologically driven administration that undermines the region's religious diversity.[287]Since 2020, the Islamist organization has been less repressive toward religious minorities. Some churches are allowed to hold mass again, but they are prohibited from ringing bells or erecting crosses on their buildings.[291]
HTS systematically suppressed dissent through violent repression, arbitrary arrests and severe mistreatment of critics, including journalists, activists, and civilians.[283][288][286] Protests against HTS were rarely tolerated and often met with violent repression.[283][286] Journalists faced significant risks, including threats, imprisonment, and physical abuse, forcing many to flee the region.[283] HTS employed arbitrary detentions and torture to silence perceived political opponents.[283][288][286]
According to a report issued byUS State Department in 2023, HTS significantly obstructed humanitarian aid in areas under its control, severely hindering assistance to those in need, particularlyinternally displaced persons.[283] The group imposes arbitrary taxes on humanitarian shipments and interferes with the distribution of aid.[283] HTS regulates the flow of assistance, exerting control over the selection of beneficiaries and ensuring that aid is diverted for its own benefit.[283]
According to reports by the U.S. Department of State, HTS committed severe violations ofchildren's rights, exploiting them in ways that contravene international law. These reports alleged that HTS used children ashuman shields,suicide bombers,child soldiers, andexecutioners, forcing them into violent roles in the conflict.[284][292][293]
The HTS supported and advocated forprotectionism[294] andfree market policies.[295] The group was pro-tariffs[294] and pro-price controls.[296] The HTS favored theTurkish lira over theSyrian pound in order to reverse the economic damage of the pound's severe depreciation.[297] The economy ofIdlib under the rule of the HTS got described byAhmed al-Sharaa as afree market model.[298] The HTS weightedIslamic capitalism.[299] The HTS'sIslamic economic model is seen as closer tocapitalism thancommunism, but with a strongsocial welfare system, some other describe it as economic system in some ways similar to the one ofErdoğan.[300] The Islamic capitalism of the HTS also got described aspro-liberal economics or even asneoliberal.[301][302]
Jurists who support the Salafist cause and personalities from civil society constitute a minority.
HTS's domination was followed by a policy of gradual opening and mainstreamisation. The group has had to open up to local communities and make concessions, especially in the religious sphere. HTS is seeking international acceptance with the development of a strategic partnership with Turkey and desires to open dialogue with Western countries. Overall, HTS has transformed from formerly being a salafi jihadi organisation into having a new mainstream approach to political Islam.
Over the decade of Syria's conflict, HTS has morphed from an al-Qa'ida affiliated transnational jihadist group that was one of many opposition units to a locally rooted, conservative Islamist movement that is the de facto state power in one corner of the country.
The issuance and distribution of legal identity documen-tation is central to the group's efforts to organise and regulate Idlib and surrounding areas. ... It also exemplifies the group's shift from transnational jihad to a conservative, locally rooted Islamist nationalist defacto government.
HTS's most important foreign relationship at present is with Ankara. HTS has a close relationship with its northern neighbour, allowing Turkish soldiers' presence in Idlib to uphold an unstable stalemate with Assad's forces.
Ahrar al-Sham (and later HTS) established close relations with Turkey. ... In Syria, Turkey managed to establish close relations first with Ahrar al-Sham and subsequently with HTS.
HTS declared that only it or al-Fatah al-Mubin, which it leads together with Turkish-backed factions (though it is the dominant force), could conduct military operations in Idlib.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)HTS's domination was followed by a policy of gradual opening and mainstreamisation. The group has had to open up to local communities and make concessions, especially in the religious sphere. HTS is seeking international acceptance with the development of a strategic partnership with Turkey and desires to open dialogue with Western countries. Overall, HTS has transformed from formerly being a salafi jihadi organisation into having a new mainstream approach to political Islam.
The new formation was announced on 28 January 2017. He emphasizes that HTS 'is an independent entity and not an extension of previous organizations or factions.' Instead, he claims, 'it is a merger where all factions and titles were dissolved and disintegrated.'
This cease-fire capped off the deadliest week for Syrian regime forces in recent years. Turkish drone and artillery strikes, alongside rebel fighters, killed at least 405 pro-regime fighters between February 27 and March 5. Damascus also lost at least 73 armored vehicles to drone strikes and rebel anti-tank guided missile operators during the Turkish operation...These internal crises coupled with Turkey's recent massive show of force and the continued influx of Turkish military hardware into Idlib make a new regime offensive to seize the remainder of the greater Idlib pocket in the near future unlikely.
Turkey shot down two warplanes and inflicted heavy losses on ground forces in northwestern Syria on Sunday as the two countries edged closer to an all-out war...The situation on the ground was fluid, and the progress of the Turkish-backed offensive was difficult to assess. But it appeared the Turkish intervention had succeeded in halting, and in some places reversing, weeks of Syrian government advances into the last enclave of rebel-held territory that have sent nearly a million people fleeing toward Turkey for safety.
Employing its domestically-produced KORAL land-based transportable electronic warfare system that can create ghost images on enemy radar, Turkey was able to inflict an impressive amount of damage to Syrian as well as Russian military assets using its Bayraktar TB2 and Anka combat drones...Turkey's overriding interest to entrench its influence northern Syria compel Ankara to yield to Moscow and seek a new equilibrium somewhere between war and peace in Idlib.
The Syrian regime has expressed its desire to reclaim the (Idlib) province, but ever since a March 2020 offensive ended in a disastrous defeat at the hands of Turkey, the territory has not changed hands
Turkey's intervention in Idlib Province changed the military balance in northwest Syria... Turkey has compelled Russia to enter a new de-escalation agreement, but that agreement is unlikely to hold... Russia opted to de-escalate in Idlib in September 2018 after attempting but failing to compel Turkish-backed opposition groups to surrender...Turkey's response indirectly but significantly weakened Russia's military position in Idlib. The casualties and equipment losses badly depleted the ability of pro-regime forces to launch further offensives...Turkey's targeting of regime aircraft and airbases also forced Russia to face even greater material and manpower costs to sustain an air campaign, either by expanding its own air campaign or offsetting the regime's losses. Finally, Turkey's targeting of the regime's air force also delivered a significant morale victory for the Syrian opposition and the displaced Syrian populations who have suffered years of unmitigated aerial bombardment.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)He emphasizes that HTS 'is an independent entity and not an extension of previous organizations or factions.' Instead, he claims, 'it is a merger where all factions and titles were dissolved and disintegrated.' With these lines, Abu Jaber undoubtedly intends to distance HTS from the legacy of al Qaeda's official arm, which he and others now argue no longer exits.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)PRESENTER-I'm assuming you've had interactions with the HTS, its leader, Ahmed el-Sharaa, as he's known there. Have they been useful to fight actually terrorist groups like DAESH or Al-Qaeda? Have they collaborated with you and with Western officials to show that they're not terrorists anymore, but actually cooperate against terrorist groups? FOREIGN MINISTER HAKAN FİDAN- Yes, indeed, to a great extent. We've had excellent cooperation on sharing intelligence to fight against especially DAESH leadership. They helped us a lot, but because of the sensitivities, we didn't make it public at that time. But over the years they cooperated with us in providing intelligence on DAESH and Al-Qaeda related organizations.
