Special Clerical Court, orSpecial Court for Clerics (Persian:دادگاه ویژه روحانیت ,dādgāh-e vizheh-ye ruhāniyat) is a specialIranian judicial system for prosecuting crimes, both ordinary and political, committed by Islamicclerics and scholars. The Special Clerical Court candefrock anddisbarIslamic jurists, give sentences of imprisonment, corporal punishment, execution, etc. The court functions independently of theregular Iranian judicial framework, with its own security and prison systems,[1] "generally secret and confidential" cases, proceedings and procedures,[2] and is accountable only to theSupreme Leader of Iran, (Ali Khamenei as of 2024).[3] The most senior Islamic politician to be prosecuted and sentenced to prison since the Iranian Revolution wasAbdollah Nouri (Persian: عبدالله نوری) who was sentenced to five years in prison for political and religious dissent by the court in 1999.
The Court was established in the early 1980s on anad hoc basis, subsequently phased out, and then re-established in 1987. It was fully institutionalized and endowed with a "code" in 1991 under Supreme Leader Khamenei.[4] This code was revised and expanded in 2005. In addition to a Special Court for the Clerics, there is also a Special prosecutor for the clerics who is also appointed by the Supreme Leader and sometimes conflated with the court.
According to scholarMirjam Künkler, "since the mid-1990s ... the court has been usedincreasingly as an instrument for the suppression ofdissident clerics,andat times even non-clerical culprits."[1]
Leader of theIslamic Revolution AyatollahRouhollah Khomeini began to set up a "special clerical court" (SCC) to "defend Islam" and deal with those whom he called "corrupt clerics" within months of the February–March 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.[5]
During the early years of the Iranian revolution (the "first phase" of the court),[2] ad hoc courts were established to deal with "criminal" acts committed by members of the clergy. These were to be "tribunals formed of three clerics and two local elders" according toRadio Farda.[5] In 1979 clergies were punished "under charges such as dependence on the Former Royal Court, the praising the Pahlavi dynasty, or the cooperation with SAVAK."[6] In the Court's "second phase", from the beginning of 1980, it pursued its work with more discipline. In the late 1980s, the court was officially established in Qom.[6]
Crimes prosecuted were acts aimed against the consolidation of power under AyatollahKhomeini, as well asthose committed by "black sheep" who broke traditional rules and harmed "the image of the clergy", according toRadio Farda.[5]
As thenew judicial structure of the Islamic Republic was devised and formalized, the SCC were not conceived as part of it. However, in 1987, the courts were revived by a decree ofAyatollahKhomeini in order to try an outspoken critic of theIran–Contra affair,Mehdi Hashemi.[note 1] Faced with disapproval of the unconstitutionality of the SCC, Khomeini sent a letter to theMajles of Iran in 1988, recommending that the special courts start operating within constitutional perimeters after the end of theIran–Iraq War.[note 2]
In 1990-91, a year after Khomeini's death, the "Special Clerical Court" was established by the new Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei,[5] (the "third phase").[2]On November 7, 1990, Mohammad Salimi was appointed the head of the Second Branch of the Special Court for the Clerics.[6]Khamenei "significantly expanded the SCC. While the courts had hithertofunctioned on the basis of nospecific code, Khamenei commissioned an extraordinary ordinance of 47 articles, which was expandedin2005.[7] There had been one court in Tehran, he added ten other branches throughout the country (Tehran, Qom, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Sari, Ahvaz, Kerman and Hamedan).[6] "A separate prisonnetwork" was commissioned for the SCC.[8] However, not included in all these new changes was the legalization or integration of the court intothe official Iranian justice system per Khomeini's letter. The court remained under the direct jurisdiction of theSupreme Leader.
The cases and procedures before the SCC "are generally secret and confidential", so there is no official information about how many people the court has put on trial, what charges have been brought or sentences passed.[2]However, according to one estimate (by Wilfried Buchta), in the year 2000 there were about 3000 prisoners in the SCC system, 6000 people in its employment. Over a twelve year period from 1988 to2000, about 600 people were sentenced to death and executed, 2000 clergywere defrocked and another 4000 punished with prison sentences,fines or beatings[9] While this may seem to involve an unusually large number of offenders and punishments, the SCC chief justice Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Salimi stated in 2006 (to the effect) that about 2000 complaints areregisteredwith the SCC per year.[10]
Heads of the Special Clerical Court since its inception (as of 1987) are:
Special Prosecutor of the Clerical Court since its inception (as of 1987) are:
The former Special Prosecutor of Clergy Court wasEbrahim Raisi, who was appointed by the supreme leader in 2012.[6]
The clerical courts were not legalized or integrated into the official justice system, and remain under the direct jurisdiction of the Supreme Leader, and not, as all other courts in Iran, under the judiciary (i.e. theJudicial system of the Islamic Republic of Iran). This gives the clerical courts unique features that often limit the rights of the accused under the courts' jurisdiction.
IranianConservatives have argued that Iran's Supreme Leader has the power to make new courts if he wishes on the grounds that according to Iran's Constitution, the Supreme Leader has absolute power, and so is not limited by the rules of the constitution.[15]
A number of sources have questioned the constitutionality of the SCC system.The Human Rights Activist's News Agency of Iran (NRANA) complains that the court is not mentioned in the constitution, and has not been approved of by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Several points of the constitution indicate the court's illegality (according to the NRANA):[6]
Two Iranian reformist Islamic scholars who have served time in prison at the hands of the court --Mohsen Kadivar,[note 4] andHasan Yousefi Eshkevari—also cast doubt on its legitimacy. Like the News Agency of Iran, Kadivar argues that the SCC is a violation of several articles of the IRI's constitution (articles 57, 177, 110, 172, and 19), while three other articles (57, 177, and 110) make no reference to a court functioning under the authority of the Supreme Leader—which the SCC does.[2]
According to Kadivar, there is no doubt" the Special Clerical Court is currently and always has been "illegal". "The only way" to legalize it would be to add "a new article (amendment) to it and change "all the aforementioned articles".[2]
Eshkevari, (who was defrocked and served several years in prison after being convicted by the Court of "spreading lies and insulting Islamic sanctities” among other charges) states the SCC "contradicts the modern law system” and "is clearly" guilty of "discrimination against the justice". Eshkevari states that the court acts very much like an inquisitional court of medieval times,[2]—meeting in secret, doing without juries, wielding arbitrary powers, dealing severely with opponents of the ruler who may be too powerful for ordinary laws.
The SCC do not only sentence criminal and dissident clerics. They also censor and confiscate works that might challenge the Supreme Leader's theological and jurisprudential authority, notably those works authored by senior Ayatollahs who oppose thevelayate faqih or particular policies of the regime.[16]
On June 25, 2000, the SCC ordered the Tehran dailyBayan, run by HojjatoleslamAli Akbar Mohtashemi, to cease publishing. Mohtashemi was a formerinterior minister and aide to PresidentMohammad Khatami.[17]
In early August 1999, the Clergy court "imposed a five-year ban" on the newspaperSalam. Salam was founding in 1991 after a group of left-wing but "veteran revolutionary" pro-regime clerics, were not only banned by the conservativeGuardian Council from running for theAssembly of Experts, but could find no newspaper even willing to print that news and their protest. (Despite its limited circulation and focus on influencing policy, the paper became very popular and helped elect reformistMuhammad Khatami president in 1997.)[18]Prior to this ban, at least one of the clerics,Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, publisher ofSalam, was convicted for defamation and spreading false information.[19]
The leader of theIranian Islamic Revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic, AyatollahRouhollah Khomeini, also created the religious/political concept ofvelāyat-e faqih or "Guardianship of the (Islamic) Jurist", which held that since government should/must be run in accordance with traditional Islamic law (sharia), the rightful ruler (until the reappearance of the "infallible Imam") would be the leading Islamic jurist (faqih, an expert in sharia) to rule over the people and nation. He (males only) would provide political "guardianship". In Iran the post ofSupreme Leader was established to fulfill this role. Though Khomeini's massive popularity paved the way for this system of government, seven of the eight leading Shi'i jurists at the time (the eighth jurist was Khomeini), did not accept "the status thevali-e faqih was accorded in the 1979 Iranian constitution.[note 5]
ScholarMirjam Künkler sees a connection between this lack of clerical support for the theological basis of the Supreme Leader, and the special powers (direct control by the Supreme Leader, being outside of thejudiciary system of the Islamic Republic and theConstitution of Iran, trials that are not open to the public and do not allow the accused to choose theirown defense counsel, and whose verdict cannot be appealed to theSupreme Court of Iran, etc.), of a court of law devoted just to religious clerics. If the reason for being of the Guardian ruler is based on the principle ofvelāyat-e faqih, and dissident cleric theologians are exactly the people who could "prove the extent towhich thevelāyat-e faqih is inconsistent with Shiʿi traditions and the extent towhich it isa theological novelty whose primary function is to justify the exercise of authoritarian rule";[21][note 6] then
"it is not difficult to see how the SCC, given their legal status outside any accountable, transparent check by a governmental office other than the Office of the Supreme Leader, could transform into the Supreme Leaders’ primary instrument to discipline and prosecute dissident clerics."[23]
Among at least somewhat prominent Clerics who have been "dealt with" in the Islamic Republic:[6]
Have spent sometime in the prisons of the Clerical Court.
Clerics executed ("for dependence on the former regime" or activities forbidden by the Islamic republic) on orders of the Clerical Court:[6]
Sentenced to death and were executed for indecent behavior (adultery):