The Spanish were opposed by an English fleet based inPlymouth. Faster and more manoeuvrable than the larger Spanishgalleons, its ships were able to attack the armada as it sailed up the Channel. Several subordinates advised Medina Sidonia first to enterPlymouth Sound and attack the English fleet before it could leave harbour and then to anchor inthe Solent and occupy theIsle of Wight, but he refused to deviate from his instructions to join with Parma. Although the armada reachedCalais largely intact, while awaiting communication from Parma, it was attacked at night by Englishfire ships and forced to scatter. The armada suffered further losses in the ensuing Battle of Gravelines and was in danger of running aground on the Dutch coast when the wind changed, allowing it to escape into theNorth Sea. Pursued by the English, the Spanish ships returned home viaScotland andIreland. Up to 24 ships were wrecked along the way before the rest managed to get home. Among the factors contributing to the defeat and withdrawal of the armada were bad weather conditions and the better employment of naval guns and battle tactics by the English.
The expedition was the largest engagement of theundeclaredAnglo-Spanish War. The following year, England organized a similar large-scale campaign against Spain, known as the "English Armada", and sometimes called the "counter-armada of 1589", which failed. Three further Spanish armadas were sent against England and Ireland in1596,1597, and1601,[23] but these likewise ended in failure.
The wordarmada is fromSpanish:armada, which is cognate with Englisharmy. It is originally derived fromLatin:armāta, the past participle ofarmāre, 'to arm', used inRomance languages as a noun forarmed force,army,navy,fleet.[24]Armada Española is still the Spanish term for the modernSpanish Navy.
England had been strategically in alliance with Spain for many decades prior to England and Spain entering into war. In the mid to late 15th century, France underLouis XI was the strongest power in western Europe. England still had possessions in what today is called Northern France, and Spain was under constant threat.Henry VII of England therefore formed a strategic relationship withFerdinand II, of Spain. Whilst the threat from France remained, England and Spain enjoyed many decades of peace which included a number of strategic marriages to retain the alliance. There were many causes of jealousy between the two royal houses over the years, but theFrench Wars of Religion were the ultimate cause of the alliance breaking betweenPhilip II of Spain andElizabeth I, and this led to war between the two countries.[citation needed]
By the mid sixteenth centuryHapsburg Spain under Philip II was a dominant political and military power in Europe, with a global empire which became the source of her wealth. It championed theCatholic cause and its global possessions stretchedfrom Europe, theAmericas and to thePhilippines. This was expanded further in 1580 when Portugalwas annexed thus forming theIberian Union, greatly expanding the empire. Philip became the first monarch who ruled over anempire upon which the sun did not set, and he did so from his chambers in theEscorial Palace by means of written communication.[25]
In comparison, England was only a minor European power with no empire and it could exercise little influence outside of its shores, although in alliance with Spain, it had gone to war three times against France duringHenry VIII's reign. The last of these conflicts was theSiege of Boulogne. Henry VIII began theEnglish Reformation as a political exercise over his desire to divorce his first wife,Catherine of Aragon. Over time, England became increasingly aligned with theProtestant reformation taking place in Europe, especially during the reign of Henry's son,Edward VI. Edward died childless, and his half-sisterMary ascended the throne in 1553. Three years later Mary married Philip II, becomingqueen consort of Spain and began to reassertRoman Catholic influence over church affairs. Her attempts led to more than 260 people beingburned at the stake, earning her the nickname "Bloody Mary".[26]
Philip now persuaded Mary to enter into a disastrous war against France. England landed forces in the Low Countries and with the failing support of Spain, won theBattle of St. Quentin. Though this brought victory for Spain, England had neglected her French defenses, and France took English Calais in theSiege of Calais (1558). Thus England lost her last possession in France, which she had held for over 500 years. This was undoubtedly a huge blow to Mary's prestige, who is reported as stating "When I am dead and opened, you shall find 'Calais' lying in my heart." England's wealth further suffered, not just from the cost of the war, but also from the reduced revenues from alum and the Antwerp cloth trade, caused by the loss of the port. The Kingdom of Spain had strengthened its hold on the Low Countries, weakening France with no cost to itself, but at great cost to England. Just before Mary's death, Philip and Elizabeth looked to come to an alliance and settlement, between England and Spain, and there is evidence even marriage between Philip and Elizabeth was explored, but the question of faith, and the unequal relationship between the two Kingdoms made this extremely unlikely. Until then, Spain and England had remained in an alliance – one that had lasted for over 70 years.[citation needed]
Mary's death in 1558 led to her half-sisterElizabeth taking the throne. Unlike Mary, Elizabeth was firmly in the reformist camp and quickly re-implemented many of Edward's reforms. Philip, no longer co-monarch, deemed Elizabeth aheretic and illegitimate ruler of England. In the eyes of the Catholic Church, Henry had never officially divorced Catherine, making Elizabeth illegitimate. Philip supported plots to have Elizabeth overthrown in favour of her Catholic cousin andheir presumptive,Mary, Queen of Scots. These plans were thwarted when Elizabeth had Mary imprisoned in 1567. Mary was forced to abdicate the crown of Scotland in favour of her sonJames VI. The first documented suggestion of what was called theEnterprise of England was in the summer of 1583 when, flushed with pride of his victory in the Azores,Álvaro de Bazán, 1st Marquess of Santa Cruz addressed the suggestion to Philip II of taking advantage of it to attack England.[27]
Elizabeth finally had Mary executed in February 1587, due to constant plots against the queen carried out in Mary's name. Elizabeth also retaliated against Philip by supporting theDutch Revolt against Spain, as well as funding privateers to raid Spanish ships across the Atlantic. She also negotiated an enduring trade and politicalalliance with Morocco.[citation needed]
In retaliation, Philip planned an expedition to invade England to overthrow Elizabeth and, if the armada was not entirely successful, at least negotiate freedom of worship for Catholics and financial compensation for war in theLow Countries.[28] "If the Armada is not as successful as we hoped but yet not entirely defeated, then you may offer England peace on the following terms. The first is that in England the free use and exercise of our Holy Catholic faith shall be permitted to all Catholics, native and foreign, and that those that are in exile shall be permitted to return. The second is that all the place in my Netherlands which the English hold shall be restored to me and the third that they shall recompense me for the injury they have done me, my dominions and my subjects, which will amount to an exceeding great sum. With regard the free exercise of Catholicism, you may point out to them that since freedom of worship is permitted to the huguenots of France, there will be no sacrifice of dignity in allowing the same privilege to Catholics in England." April 1588, Philip II to the Duke of Parma. Through this endeavour, English material support for theUnited Provinces, the part of the Low Countries that had successfully seceded from Spanish rule, and English attacks on Spanish trade and settlements[b] in theNew World would end. Philip was supported byPope Sixtus V, who treated the invasion as acrusade, with the promise of a subsidy should the Armada make land.[30][c] Substantial support for the invasion was also expected from English Catholics, including wealthy and influential aristocrats and traders.[31]
The Marquis of Santa Cruz originally drew up plans in 1586 to transport an invading army from Spain. The requirements proved to be astronomical; 556 ships of all sizes, an army of 94,222 men and victuals for this force for eight months. The cost was more than one and a half billionmaravedis, clearly beyond even Spain's resources.[32] Philip then substituted a more realistic plan, for a fleet to sail from Spain and escort Parma's army from the Low Countries as the actual invasion force.[33]
Araid on Cádiz, led by privateer Francis Drake in April 1587, had captured or destroyed about 30 ships and great quantities of supplies, setting preparations back by a year.[34][35] There is also evidence that a letter from Elizabeth's security chief and spymaster, SirFrancis Walsingham, to her ambassador in Constantinople,William Harborne, sought to initiateOttoman Empire fleet manoeuvres to harass the Spaniards,[36] but there is no evidence for the success of that plan.
The Duke ofParma was initially consulted by Philip II in 1583.[27] Parma stressed that three conditions would need to be met to achieve success; absolute secrecy, secure possession and defense of the Dutch provinces, and keep the French from interfering either with a peace agreement or by sowing division between theCatholic League and theHuguenots.[37][38] Secrecy could not be maintained which made the enterprise vastly more complicated. Philip ultimately combined Parma's plan with that of Santa Cruz, initially entertaining a triple attack, starting with a diversionary raid on Scotland, while the main armada would capture either theIsle of Wight orSouthampton to establish a safe anchorage inThe Solent. Parma would then follow with a large army from the Low Countries crossing the English Channel.
The appointed commander of the naval forces of the armada was the highly experienced Marquis of Santa Cruz while Parma would be in command of the invasion forces.[39] Unfortunately, Santa Cruz died in February 1588 and the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a high-born courtier, took his place. While a competent soldier and distinguished administrator, Medina Sidonia had no naval experience. He wrote to Philip expressing grave doubts about the planned campaign, but his message was prevented from reaching the King by courtiers on the grounds that God would ensure the armada's success.[40]
Prior to the undertaking, Pope Sixtus V allowed Philip to collect crusade taxes and granted his menindulgences. The blessing of the armada's banner on 25 April 1588, was similar to the ceremony used prior to theBattle of Lepanto in 1571. On 21 July 1588 (N.S), the armada set sail from Lisbon and headed for the English Channel. When it left Lisbon, the fleet was composed of 141 ships,[41] with 10,138 sailors and 19,315 soldiers. There were also 1,545 non-combatants (volunteers, officers' servants, friars, artillerists etc.)[42] The fleet carried 1,500 brass guns and 1,000 iron guns.[9] The full body of the fleet took two days to leave port.
The armada was delayed by bad weather. Storms in theBay of Biscay along theGalician coast forced four galleys commanded by CaptainDiego de Medrano and one galleon to turn back, and other ships had to put in toA Coruña for repairs, leaving 137 ships that sailed for the English Channel.[43] Nearly half of the ships were not built as warships and were used for duties such as scouting and dispatch work, or for carrying supplies, animals and troops.[44] The armada included 24 purpose-built warships, 44 armed merchantmen, 38 auxiliary vessels and 34 supply ships.[7][44]
In the Spanish Netherlands, Parma had mustered a polyglot army of 60,583 soldiers; Spanish, Italians, Burgundians, Irish, Scottish, Walloon and German, with 3650 cavalry.[45] He ordered hundreds of flyboats to be built to carry them across the channel[11][d] while awaiting the arrival of the armada. Since the element of surprise was long gone,[47] the new plan was to use the cover of the warships to convey the army on barges to a place near London. In all, 55,000 men were to have been mustered, a huge army for that time. On the day the armada set sail, Elizabeth's ambassador in the Netherlands,Valentine Dale, met Parma's representatives in peace negotiations.[48] The English made a vain effort to intercept the armada in theBay of Biscay. On 6 July, negotiations were abandoned,[49] and the English fleet stood prepared, if ill-supplied, at Plymouth, awaiting news of Spanish movements.
Only 122 ships from the Spanish fleet entered the Channel; the fourgalleys, onenao, fivepataches and the 10 Portuguesecaravels had left the fleet before the first encounter with the English fleet. An additional 5 pataches, dispatched to deliver messages to Parma, should be deducted which brings the number to 117 Spanish ships facing the roughly 226-strong English fleet.[50] The Spanish fleet outgunned that of the English with 50% more available firepower than the English.[51] The English fleet consisted of the 34 ships of the Royal Fleet, 21 of which were galleons of 200 to 400 tons, and 163 other ships, 30 of which were of 200 to 400 tons and carried up to 42 guns each. Twelve of the ships were privateers owned byLord Howard of Effingham,John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake.[51]
In the beginning of June, Parma had sent Captain Moresin with some pilots to Admiral Sedonia. Upon Moresin's return on 22 June, the report he made to Parma caused him distress. Medina Sedonia was under the impression that Parma could simply sail out into the channel with his barges filled with troops.[52] Parma had continually informed the king that his passage to the channel was blocked by English and Dutch ships, and the only way he could bring his boats out was if the armada cleared the blockade.[53]
The fleet was sighted in England on 29 July (N.S), when it appeared offthe Lizard inCornwall. The news was conveyed to London by a system ofbeacons that had been constructed along the south coast. The same day the English fleet was trapped in Plymouth Harbour by the incoming tide. The Spanish convened acouncil of war, where it was proposed to ride into the harbour on the tide and incapacitate the defending ships at anchor.[54] From Plymouth Harbour the Spanish would attack England, but Philip explicitly forbade Medina Sidonia from engaging, leaving the armada to sail on to the east and towards the Isle of Wight. As the tide turned, 55 English ships set out to confront the armada from Plymouth under the command of Lord Howard of Effingham, with Sir Francis Drake as vice admiral. Therear admiral was John Hawkins.
On 30 July, the English fleet was offEddystone Rocks with the armada upwind to the west. To execute its attack, the Englishtacked upwind of the armada, thus gaining theweather gage, a significant advantage. At daybreak on 31 July, the English fleet engaged the armada off Plymouth near the Eddystone Rocks. The armada was in a crescent-shaped defensive formation, convex towards the east. The galleons and great ships were concentrated in the centre and at the tips of the crescent's horns, giving cover to the transports and supply ships in between. Opposing them, the English were in two sections, with Drake to the north inRevenge with 11 ships, and Howard to the south inArk Royal with the bulk of the fleet.
Given the Spanish advantage in close-quarter fighting, the English kept beyond grappling range and bombarded the Spanish ships from a distance with cannon fire. The distance was too great for the manoeuvre to be effective and, at the end of the first day's fighting neither fleet had lost a ship in action. The English caught up with the Spanish fleet after a day of sailing.
The Spanish fleet off the coast of Cornwall on 29 July 1588 (N.S.)
The Spanish and English fleets near Plymouth on 30–31 July 1588 (N.S.)
The English engage the Spanish fleet near Plymouth on 31 July 1588 (N.S)
The English pursue the Spanish fleet east of Plymouth on 31 July – 1 August 1588 (N.S.)
The Surrender of Pedro de Valdés (commander of the Squadron of Andalusia) to Francis Drake aboard theRevenge during the attack of the Spanish Armada, 1588, byJohn Seymour Lucas
The English fleet and the armada engaged once more on 1 August, offPortland. A change of wind gave the Spanish theweather gage, and they sought to close with the English, but were foiled by the smaller ships' greater manoeuvrability. While the Spanish center manoeuvred to support theSanta Ana, theNuestra Señora del Rosario collided with a number of ships, losing herbowsprit and setting in motion a series of mishaps. She began to drift, and was taken off by the current in the opposite direction to the fleet and closer to the English. Drake in theRevenge sailed to theRosario during the night and she was taken in action; AdmiralPedro de Valdés [es] (commander of the Squadron of Andalusia) surrendered along with his entire crew. On board, the English seized supplies of much-neededgunpowder and 50,000 goldducats.[55] Drake had been guiding the English fleet by means of a lantern, which he snuffed out to slip away from the Spanish ships, causing the rest of his fleet to become scattered and disarrayed by dawn. At one point, Howard formed his ships into aline of battle to attack at close range, bringing all his guns to bear, but he did not follow through with the manoeuvre and little was achieved. During a lull in battle,San Salvador's gunpowdermagazine exploded, perhaps as a result of sabotage by a disgruntled gunner,[56] setting a portion of the ship on fire. The Spanish attempted toscuttle the ship, but this failed when theGolden Hind came up. The Spanish evacuated the vessel and theGolden Hind promptly captured her.[57]
If the armada could create a temporary base in the protected waters of the Solent, the strait separating the Isle of Wight from the English mainland, it could wait there for word from Parma's army; Parma did not get news of this until 6 August.[58] However, in a full-scale attack, the English fleet broke into four groups withMartin Frobisher of the shipAid given command over a squadron, and Drake coming with a large force from the south. Medina Sidonia sent reinforcements south and ordered the Armada back to open sea to avoid theOwers shoals.[59] There were no other secure harbours further east along England's south coast, so the Armada was compelled to make forCalais, without being able to wait for word of Parma's army.[citation needed]
Starting on 1 August, Sidonia began sending Parma messages detailing his position and movements. However, couriers landed on the French shore or despatched in small vessels could make their way to Parma little faster than the armada itself. It was not until the following day that Parma received the first report from the Admiral.[60]
The English and Spanish fleets on 1–2 August 1588 (N.S.)
The English and Spanish fleets between Portland Bill and the Isle of Wight on 2–3 August 1588 (N.S.)
The battle off the Isle of Wight on 4 August 1588 (N.S.)
On 7 August, the armada anchored off Calais in a tightly packed defensive crescent formation,[61] not far fromDunkirk (Parma only learned of this on that same afternoon)[62] where Parma's army, reduced by disease to 16,000, was expected to be waiting, ready to join the fleet in barges sent from ports along the Flemish coast. An essential element of the plan of invasion, as it was eventually implemented, was the transportation of a large part of Parma'sArmy of Flanders as the main invasion force in unarmed barges across the English Channel. These barges would be protected by the large ships of the armada. However, to get to the armada, they would have to cross the zone dominated by the Dutch navy, where the armada could not go due to the ongoingEighty Years' War with the Dutch Republic. This problem seems to have been overlooked by the armada's commanders, but it was insurmountable. Communication was more difficult than anticipated, and word came too late that Parma's army had yet to be equipped with sufficient transport or to be assembled in the port, a process that would take at least six days.[49] As Medina Sidonia waited at anchor, Dunkirk wasblockaded by a Dutch fleet of 30 flyboats under Lieutenant-AdmiralJustinus van Nassau.[63] The Dutch flyboats mainly operated in the shallow waters offZeeland andFlanders where larger warships with a deeper draught, like the Spanish and English galleons, could not safely enter. Parma expected the armada to send its lightpataches to drive away the Dutch, but Medina Sidonia would not send them because he feared he would need these ships for his own protection. There was no deep-water port where the fleet might shelter, which had been acknowledged as a major difficulty for the expedition, and the Spanish found themselves vulnerable as night drew on.
The Dutch enjoyed an unchallenged naval advantage in these waters, even though their navy was inferior in naval armament. Because Medina Sidonia did not attempt to break the Dutch blockade and Parma would not risk attempting the passage unescorted, the Army of Flanders escaped the trap that Van Nassau had in mind for them.[64][65][verification needed]
Late on 7 August, Howard was reinforced by a squadron under Lord Edward Seymour andWilliam Wynter, which had been stationed inthe Downs as a reinforcement for the Dutch should Parma make any independent move. Their arrival gave Howard a total of 140 ships. He also received a small amount of powder and shot, which the Earl of Sussex had collected from fortresses and garrisons on the South Coast, and some victuals.[66]
The wind and currents were favourable for an attempt to break the armada's formation by sending fireships against it. Walsingham had already sent orders to Dover that fishing smacks and faggots andpitch were to be collected for this purpose. However, the English commanders felt that they could not wait for proper fireships and therefore sacrificed eight of their own warships. Drake, who was a substantial shipowner, offered one of his own ships, the 200-ton "Thomas". Hawkins also offered one of his ships, the 150-ton "Bark Bond". Six other ships, of between 90 and 200 tons, were volunteered. These ships were filled with whatever pitch,brimstone andtar was immediately available. Because of the haste, the loaded guns and stores were left aboard.[67]
In the middle of the night of 7–8 August, the English set these fireships alight and cast them downwind among the closely anchored vessels of the armada. The Spanish feared that these uncommonly large fireships were "hellburners",[68][unreliable source?] specialised fireships filled with large gunpowder charges that had been used to deadly effect at theSiege of Antwerp. Three were intercepted by pataches and towed away,[69] but the remainder bore down on the fleet. Medina Sidonia'sflagship and the principal warships held their positions, but the rest of the fleet cut their anchor cables and scattered in confusion. No Spanish ships were burnt, but the crescent formation had been broken, and the fleet found itself too farleeward of Calais in the rising southwesterly wind to recover its position. Another loss, the effect of which would not be felt until later, was almost every anchor the Armada's ships possessed.[70] The English closed in for battle. Parma learned of this the following day.[71]
The pursuit to Calais, 4–6 August 1588 (N.S.)
The fireship attack on the Spanish Armada, 7 August 1588 (N.S.)
English fireships launched at the Spanish Armada off Calais (N.S.)
The small port ofGravelines was part of Flanders in the Spanish Netherlands close to the border with France, and was the closest Spanish territory to England.
Before dawn on 8 August, Medina Sidonia struggled to regather his fleet after the fireships scattered it, and was reluctant to sail further east than Gravelines, knowing the danger of running aground on the shoals off Flanders, from which his Dutch enemies had removed thesea marks. The English learned of the armada's weaknesses during the skirmishes in the English Channel, and concluded it was possible to close in to within 100 yards (90 m) to be able to penetrate the oak hulls of the Spanish warships. They had spent most of their gunpowder in the first engagements and had, after the Isle of Wight, been forced to conserve their heavy shot and powder for an anticipated attack near Gravelines. During all the engagements, the Spanish heavy guns could not easily be reloaded because of their close spacing and the quantities of supplies stowed between decks, as Drake had discovered on capturing theNuestra Señora del Rosario in the Channel.[72] Instead, the Spanish gunners fired once and then transferred to their main task, which was toboard enemy ships, as had been the practice in naval warfare at the time. Evidence from Armada wrecks in Ireland shows that much of the fleet's ammunition was unused.[73] Their determination to fight by boarding, rather than employing cannon fire at a distance, proved a disadvantage for the Spanish. The manoeuver had been effective in the battles ofLepanto andPonta Delgada earlier in the decade, but the English were aware of it and sought to avoid it by keeping their distance.
While Medina Sidonia was gathering the armada ships together into their traditional crescent formation the English fleet moved in, and at dawn the flagship with four other ships found themselves facing the entire English fleet.[74][69] The English provoked Spanish fire while staying out of range. The English then closed, firing damaging broadsides into the enemy ships, all the while maintaining a windward position, so theheeling armada hulls were exposed to damage below the water line when they changed course later. Many of the Spanish gunners were killed or wounded by the English broadsides, and the task of manning the cannon often fell to foot soldiers who did not know how to operate them. The ships were close enough for sailors on the upper decks of the English and Spanish ships to exchange musket fire. A couple of hours into the battle, a few more armada warships closed in to form wings on either side of the five ships already under attack.[75] After eight hours, the English ships began to run out of ammunition, and some gunners began loading objects such as chains into their cannons. Around 4 pm, the English fired their last shots and pulled back.[76]
Five Spanish and Portuguese ships were lost: the 605 tonMaria Juan, acarrack which had been part of Don Diego Flores de Valdes' Castile Squadron which had attempted to surrender to CaptainRobert Crosse of theHope, sank offBlankenberge with the loss of 275 men – the Spanish only managing to rescue a single boatload of survivors.[77] ThegalleassSan Lorenzo, the flagship of DonHugo de Moncada which had been holed below the waterline, was forced to run aground at Calais to avoid sinking. On sight of this, Admiral Howard ordered a flotilla of ship's boats to carry her by boarding. Moncada was killed during an exchange of small arms fire, a shot to his head from an arquebus. The ship was then taken after murderous fighting between the crew, galley slaves and the English. The French meanwhile could do little except to watch as the ship was plundered, but they opened fire to ward off the English who quickly left to join the rest of the fight.[78] The next day, the severely crippled galleonSan Mateo ran aground in between Sluis and Ostend; it was taken by a combination of Dutch ships and English troops led byFrancis Vere.[79] The captain, Don Diego Pimmental, surrendered along with the survivors of his crew. Later that day, the equally crippledSan Felipe, commanded by Maestre de Campo Don Fransico de Toledo, drifted away as she was sinking and ran aground on the island ofWalcheren. The English troops sortied fromFlushing to the wreck, attacked the stricken vessel, and took the crew prisoners. A Dutch force of flyboats led byJustinus van Nassau then took possession of the ship. A pinnace was also run aground by her crew to prevent her from sinking.[74]
Many other Spanish ships were severely damaged, especially the Portuguese and some Spanish Atlantic-class galleons, including some Neapolitan galleys, which bore the brunt of the fighting during the early hours of the battle:[80] the SpanishNuestra Señora del Rosario,San Salvador, andLa María Juan; the NeapolitanSan Lorenzo; and the PortugueseSão Mateus andSão Filipe. The Spanish plan to join with Parma's army had been frustrated.
Because of the potential invasion from the Netherlands,Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester assembled a force of 4,500 militia atWest Tilbury, Essex, to defend theThames Estuary against any incursion up-river towards London. The result of the English fireship attack and the sea battle of Gravelines had not yet reached England, so Elizabeth went to Tilbury on 18 August to review her forces, arriving on horseback in ceremonial armor to imply to the militia that she was prepared to lead them in the ensuing battle.[e] She gave them her royal address, which survives in at least six slightly different versions.[82] One version is as follows:
My loving people, we have been persuaded by some that are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes for fear of treachery; but, I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear, I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and, therefore, I am come amongst you as you see at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of battle, to live or die amongst you all – to lay down for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king – and of a King of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take up arms – I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. I know already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns, and, we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. In the mean time, my lieutenant general shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject; not doubting but by your obedience to my general, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over those enemies of my God, of my kingdom, and of my people.
On the day after the battle at Gravelines, the disorganized and unmanouvreable Spanish fleet was at risk of running onto the sands of Zeeland because of the prevailing wind. The wind then changed to the south, enabling the fleet to sail north. The English ships under Howard pursued to prevent any landing on English soil, although by this time his ships were almost out of shot. On 12 August, Howard called a halt to the pursuit at about the latitude of theFirth of Forth off Scotland. The only option left to the Spanish ships was to return to Spain by sailing round the north of Scotland and home via the Atlantic or theIrish Sea. As the Spanish fleet rounded Scotland on 20 August, it consisted of 110 vessels and most made it around.[80] TheSan Juan de Sicilia, heavily damaged during the Gravelines engagement, had struggled North and limped intoTobermory bay on theIsle of Mull on 23 September, but was later destroyed by an English agent sent by Francis Walsingham with most of the crew on board.[86]
The Spanish ships were beginning to show wear from the long voyage, and some were kept together by strengthening their damaged hulls with cables. Supplies of food and water ran short. The intention would have been to keep to the west of the coasts of Scotland and Ireland, seeking the relative safety of the open sea. There being no way of accurately measuringlongitude, the Spanish were not aware that theGulf Stream was carrying them north and east as they tried to move west, and they eventually turned south much closer to the coast than they thought. Off Scotland and Ireland, the fleet ran into a series of powerful westerly winds which drove many of the damaged ships further towards thelee shore. Because so many anchors had been abandoned during the escape from the English fireships off Calais, many of the ships were incapable of securing shelter as the fleet reached the coast of Ireland and were driven onto the rocks; local inhabitants looted the ships. The late sixteenth century and especially 1588 was marked by unusually strong North Atlantic storms, perhaps associated with a high accumulation of polar ice off the coast ofGreenland, a feature of the "Little Ice Age".[87] More ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in direct combat.
Most of the 28 ships lost in the storms were along the jagged steep rocks of the western coast of Ireland.[80] About 5,000 men died by drowning, starvation and slaughter by local inhabitants after their ships were driven ashore on the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland. The English Lord DeputyWilliam FitzWilliam ordered the English soldiers in Ireland to kill any Spanish prisoners, which was done on several occasions instead of asking for ransom as was common during that period.[88] Reports of the passage of the remnants of the Spanish Armada around Ireland abound with onerous accounts of hardships and survival.[89] One of the costliest wrecks was that of thegalleassLa Girona, which was driven on toLacada Point inCounty Antrim on the night of 26 October. Of the estimated 1,300 people on board, there were nine survivors. 260 bodies washed ashore, includingAlonso Martínez de Leiva [es], knight and member of the Council of Thirteen (trece) of theOrder of Santiago. CaptainFrancisco de Cuéllar was wrecked on the coast of Ireland and gave a remarkable account of his experiences in the fleet,on the run in Ireland, defeat of an English armybesieging Rosclogher castle, flight through Scotland, surviving a second shipwreck andultimate return to Spain.[90][91]
Destruction of the Invincible Armada by Spanish painter Jose Gartner (1892)
Continental Europe had been anxiously awaiting news of the armada all summer. The Spanish postmaster and Spanish agents in Rome promoted reports of Spanish victory in hopes of convincingPope Sixtus V to release his promise of one millionducats upon landing of troops. In France, the Spanish and English ambassadors promoted contradictory narratives in the press, and a Spanish victory was incorrectly celebrated in Paris, Prague, and Venice. It was not until late August that reliable reports of the Spanish defeat arrived in major cities and were widely believed.[92]
The first rumours of a setback for the armada began to reach Spain when news of the English fireships breaking the Spanish formation at Calais was received, but this was disbelieved. The King noted "I hope God has not permitted so much evil". Nothing was heard for nearly two weeks and it was not until 21 September that the first of the ships of the armada began to arrive into Spain – the first of eight entered into Coruña which included Medina Sidonia'sSan Martin. Over the next few days Diego Flores took 22 more intoLaredo harbour and Miguel de Oquendo brought five more into the port ofGuipuzcoa.[93]
After Medina Sidonia entered Coruña, and following the death of Admiral Miguel de Oquendo, CaptainDiego de Medrano was appointed interim Admiral to command the remaining armada back to Spain.[94] By mid-October it was becoming more apparent for the Spanish that few if any more of the remaining missing ships of the armada would return. Even in November three months after the battles through the Channel, a few Spanish ships were still attempting the journey home.[95] One of the last, the Spanish hospital shipSan Pedro El Mayor, carrying some 200 sick and wounded survivors, came intoHope Cove inDevon on 7 November, the commander trying to find a suitable place to ground her. The crew were taken prisoner and the sick were treated inBodmin andPlympton.[96][97]
After the Duke of Parma was certain that the armada had sailed away from the coast of Flanders and his participation in the invasion project was no longer feasible, he ordered his soldiers to disembark so as to avoid an epidemic of disease.[98] He then assembled his council of war to discuss what endeavours his forces could be used for before the onset of winter. In late September, he divided them into three groups; one was sent to the Rhine, one was to remain in the coastal region and one was led by Parma himself againstBergen-op-Zoom. There, in November, he wasrepelled with heavy losses by the Anglo-Dutch garrison, which, in combination with poor weather, forced him to abandon the siege.[99][100]An attempt to take the Dutch-held island ofTholen was also repelled. From the armada campaign to Bergen, Parma's forces had lost some 10,000 men killed or dead from disease.[101]
Even though the Spanish Armada had failed to invade England it had demonstrated its feasibility and shown that the British Isles overall were vulnerable to attack.[102]
The day after her Tilbury speech, Elizabeth ordered the army disbanded, the camp at Tilbury dissolved five days later, then discharged the navy, sending them home without pay.[103][104] All the while, the costs of this defensive effort were mounting – the total was nearly £400,000[104] – and measures were put in motion to mitigate it.Typhus,scurvy anddysentery swept through the crews and many died of disease and starvation after landing atMargate. For instance, of theBonaventure's crew of 500, more than 200 had died[105] and theElizabeth Jonas had just one living from the crew that it had sailed with.[106] Howard wrote toLod Burghley, Elizabeth'sLord High Treasurer, "it would grieve any man's heart to see them that have served so valiantly die so miserably". Hawkins also weighed in and accused Burghley "that by death, by discharging of sick men, and such like, that there may be spared something in the general pay".[107] The men had to rely on the charity of their officers, and Howard set an example by doing what he could out of his own purse to help the sailors. Nevertheless, upwards of 3,000 perished.[14][108] As a result, theChatham Chest was set up, its purpose to help pay pensions to disabled seamen.[109][104]
It took some time for the scale of the victory to be realized as news began to filter through by the end of August and beginning of September.[110] As a result, a number of thanksgiving services were held at cathedrals and churches throughout England. AtSt Paul's Cathedral inLondon a series of thanksgiving services took place, the first on 30 August where asermon was preached, followed by another on 18 September. As news of the full scale of the disaster came through, and also news of England's victory against Parma at Bergen-op-Zoom, a biggernational service of thanksgiving took place on 29 November.[111] A second and final thanksgiving took place five days later which saw a royal procession of the Queen in a chariot through the streets of London.[112] Twelve Spanish standards and other trophies which had been captured from the ships of the armada decorated the choir of St Paul during the huge service.[113]
The captured Spanish galleonsNuestra Señora del Rosario and theSan Salvador were studied by the English. TheSan Salvador became known as the "Great Spaniard" but was lost in a wreck in November 1588 offStudland.Nuestra Señora del Rosario was brought toDartmouth. The 397 crew were taken toTorre Abbey nearTorquay where they were held prisoner in a barn (today called the 'Spanish Barn') and spared execution.[114] TheRosario was later sent toChatham where she wasdry docked and eventually sunk to support awharf.[115] Pedro de Valdés was held prisoner in theTower of London for five years, until his ransom was paid by his family for his release back to Spain. He was not blamed for the loss of his ship and was appointed colonial governor ofCuba from 1602 to 1608.[116]
The Dutch also celebrated the victory and their artists were quick to take on commemorative medals and paintings which were soon circulated within the year. The wrecked Spanish galleonsSan Mateo andSan Felipe which had run aground were both found to be riddled with holes by cannonballs that had struck below the waterline. Both ships were too damaged to be salvaged and were therefore broken up; the cannons were used by the Dutch in nearby fortresses. The main-topmast rigging banner from theSan Matteo, part of which depicts Christ on the cross, was taken, hung and displayed in the choir ofSt Peters Church inLeiden. It now resides in theMuseum De Lakenhal.[117]
The news of the disaster brought shock and despair and the nation went into mourning.[118] Its defeat was even more devastating because hopes of its success had been raised by false rumours. These included Drake and Howard being taken prisoner, the Isle of Wight and Plymouth taken and Parma's army even approaching London.[119] The King took the news hard and shut himself away for days. The daily business of government was also brought to an abrupt halt. The King is claimed to have said: "I sent the armada against men, not God's winds and waves".[120] News of the loss ofLa Girona bore more despair for Philip: not only De Leiva but also his[ambiguous] followers from almost every noble house in Spain had drowned with it.[121]
The number of ships lost has been debated. A detailed study by Spanish naval historianFernandez Duro in the mid-1880s claimed that 63 in total were lost.[122] HistorianJosé Luis Casado Soto [es] examined the fate of each ship creating individual dossiers and claimed that 35 ships were lost.[123] In addition it was noted that of the 122 armada ships that entered the English Channel, 87 returned from their voyage through the Channel and around the British isles.[124] These figures do not include eight that were unaccounted for.[125]Other historians have done further research; Neil Hanson, Robert Hutchinson, Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker all researched the armada ships that had returned, coming to the same conclusion of between 44 and 51 ships being lost overall, with more detailed breakdowns in the number of ships that set sail along with their fate.[126][127] That figure represents a third of the fleet having been sunk, captured, wrecked, or scuttled.[128] American historianGarrett Mattingly noted that only 66 ships returned to Spain, with another returning later in the year.[129] The losses did not include the smaller vulnerable ships like the pataches and zarbas,[130] of which around seventeen were lost.[131] Even though most of the ships had returned, many of them were severely damaged from either the storms or English gunfire. One hulk, theDoncella, sank after they had cast anchor in Santander, and theSanta Anna was accidentally burned within a few days of entering San Sebastian.[132] In addition the severely damaged galleonsSan Marcos andSan Francisco were broken up, the guns and the timber being sold off. As many as half of the fleet were unfit for further service and as a result a number were scuttled, broken up or left to rot.[133]
Furthermore, Spanish sources state that no more than 11,000 perished.[134][135][136] Philip's administrators, bureaucrats and secretaries documented, dated and filed everything that went on in all corners of the Spanish empire, and all those records are still kept in theNational Archives of Spain and the Escorial. The number of men lost was extracted from the paymaster distribution lists.[137] A detailed analysis of the human cost of the campaign reveals that 25,696 men left Coruña and 13,399 returned. The lowest estimate is 9,000 dead.[20]
Even after arrival the men were near death from disease, as the conditions were very cramped, and most of the ships had run out of food and water. More armada survivors later died in Spain or on hospital ships in Spanish harbours from diseases contracted during the voyage. A large number of prominent Spanish commanders also died, many after having arrived in port. Vice Admiral of the fleet and commander of the Guipuzcoa Squadron, Miguel de Oquendo, suffering from battle wounds and a fever, died at Coruña two days after arriving. Another was the Biscayan squadron commander Juan Martínez de Recalde, who also succumbed the same way.[138] The Duke of Medina Sidonia also fell ill on his return and nearly succumbed; he was not blamed by Philip, who allowed him to return home to convalesce. Hutchinson claimed that the number of survivors was just over 50%, but these numbers do not include the Portuguese, the Neapolitans and the galley slaves;[139] while Hanson claimed that fewer than 10,000 men (38%) survived the expedition.[f][22]
The following year the English with Dutch conscripts launched theCounter-Armada under Sir Francis Drake andSir John Norris with three tasks:
Destroy the battered Spanish Atlantic fleet, which was being repaired in ports of northern Spain
Make a landing atLisbon, Portugal, and raise a revolt there against King Philip II (Philip I of Portugal) installing the pretenderDom António, Prior of Crato to the Portuguese throne
Take theAzores if possible so as to establish a permanent base.
The expedition ended in a heavy defeat and none of the objectives were achieved.[140][141][142] Dozens of ships were lost, thousands of English soldiers and sailors died, and heavy economic losses were incurred, in a similar disaster to the Spanish Armada.[143] The attempt to restore the Portuguese Crown from Spain was unsuccessful, and the opportunity to strike a decisive blow against the weakened Spanish Navy was lost. The expedition depleted the financial resources of England's treasury, which had been carefully restored during the long reign of Elizabeth I. Through this lost opportunity, Philip II's naval power marked a revival through the next decade.[144] The following year he sent 37 ships with 6,420 men toBrittany where they established abase of operations on theBlavet river. The English and Dutch ultimately failed to disrupt the various fleets of the Indies despite the great number of military personnel mobilized every year.
During the course of the war, the Spanish struggled to gain control of the English Channel or stop the English intervention in Flanders or English privateer transatlantic raids. From their base in Brittany, Spanish corsairs did make several incursions on the English coast and plundered English and Dutch ships.[145] The Spanish launched a number of small scale attacks such as theRaid on Mount's Bay inCornwall on 26 July 1595, where over two days,Penzance,Newlyn,Mousehole, andPaul were raided and torched. Another smallerraid on Cawsand bay, also in Cornwall, took place the following year but ended in failure.[146] In June 1596, England and the United Dutch Provinces sent asecond armada to Spain, where they seized and held Cadiz for two weeks causing economic losses, but failed to seize the treasure fleet. After this, three more armadas were sent by Spain – thesecond sent in 1596 (126–140 ships) was scattered by a storm, as wasthe third sent the following year (140 ships), with a number captured or sunk by the English fleet. Thelast Armada (33 ships) sent in October 1601 to Ireland, ended with thesurrender at Kinsale three months later.[147] The conflict subsequently wound down with diminishing military actions, finally ending with the signing of theTreaty of London in August 1604.
Day seven of the battle with the armada, 7 August 1588, by Hendrick Cornelisz Vroom 1601
The Spanish had 117 ships to go up against more than 200 English ships. The opposing forces were experienced in completely different fighting styles. The Spanish style can be studied from theBattle of Lepanto. Their tactics were to fire one cannon volley, ram and grapple the enemy ship, board, then engage in hand-to-hand combat. In contrast, the English style was taking advantage of the wind (the "weather gage") and line-to-line cannon fire from windward, which exposed the opponent ship's hull and rudder as targets. Also instilled was the use of naval cannon to damage enemy ships without the need to board. Until then, the cannon had played a supporting role to the main tactic of ramming and boarding enemy ships.[148] The failure of the Spanish Armada vindicated the English strategy and caused a revolution in naval tactics. The English also had the advantage of fighting close to home, whence they could be easily and frequently resupplied so as not to be weighed down, unlike the armada ships which were loaded with all themateriel needed for their invasion force to wage a ground-based war. Nevertheless, when the fleets actually came to blows at theBattle of Gravelines, the armada was outnumbered 10:1,[69] and during the 8-hour fight, the English managed to sink one carrack and forced two galleons, a pinnace and an armed merchant to run aground. Despite those odds, not once did the armada turn away from a fight; each time it challenged the English fleet, the latter raised its sails to keep its distance.[149] After the final engagement with the English fleet, the Spanish fleet sailed away, retaining its ability to effectively wage war.[150]
Most military historians hold that the battle of Gravelines reflected a lasting shift in the balance of naval power in favour of the English, in part because of the gap in naval technology and cannon armament which continued into the next century.[151] In the words of historianGeoffrey Parker, by 1588, "the capital ships of the Elizabethan navy constituted the most powerful battlefleet afloat anywhere in the world".[152] The English navy yards were leaders in technical innovation, and the captains devised new battle formations and tactics. The sleeker and more manoeuvrablefull-rigged ship, with ample cannon, was one of the greatest advances of the century and permanently transformed naval warfare.
English shipwrights introduced novel designs, first demonstrated in theForesight in 1570 and theDreadnought in 1573, that allowed the ships to sail faster, manoeuvre better, and carry more and heavier guns.[152] Whereas before warships had tried to grapple with each other so soldiers could board the enemy ship, they were able to stand off and fire broadside cannonades that could sink the vessel. English ships and seamanship had foiled the invasion. The English also benefited from Spain's unworkable strategy that required coordination between the invasion fleet and the Spanish army on shore.[g] The outdated design of the Spanish cannon meant that they were much slower in reloading in a close-range battle, allowing the English to take control. Spain still had numerically larger fleets, but England was catching up.[154]
In England, the battle was followed by the distribution of flyers, pamphlets, the striking of victory medals, and numerous joyous celebrations.[155][156][157] The victory prompted a hugeDavid vs Goliath propaganda offensive,[158] and its exploitation boosted national pride which lasted for years. Elizabeth's legend persisted and grew long after her death. It also may have given heart to theProtestant cause across Europe and the belief that God was behind the Protestants.:[h] This was shown by the striking of commemorative medals that bore variations on the inscription, "1588. Flavit Jehovah et Dissipati Sunt" – with"Jehovah" in Hebrew letters ('God blew, and they are scattered'), or 'He blew with His winds, and they were scattered'. There were also more lighthearted medals struck, such as the one with the play onthe words ofJulius Caesar:Venit, Vidit, Fugit ('he came, he saw, he fled'). The wind that scattered the armada has been calledtheProtestant Wind,[160] a phrase also used for later invasions of England that failed.
The memory of the victory over the armada was evoked during both theNapoleonic Wars and theSecond World War, when Britain again faced a substantial danger of foreign invasion. During theBattle of Britain RAF fighter pilots attracted world attention as the "new Elizabethans".[161] TheArmada Memorial in Plymouth was constructed in 1888 to celebrate the tercentenary of the defeat of the Spanish Armada.[162]
One of the greatest finds of the Spanish Armada was the remains of the wreck ofLa Girona, found by a team ofBelgian divers off the coast ofPortballintrae in 1968. It was the greatest treasure salvaged up until that time.[163] Gold and silver coins, jewelry, armaments and other objects are on permanent display at theUlster Museum (part of the National Museums of Northern Ireland) inStranmillis inBelfast.
Armada Medal, bearing the inscriptionFlavit Jehovah et Dissipati Sunt
TheSpanish Barn atTorre Abbey – it holds aBlue Plaque noting that it held 397 Spanish prisoners of war for fourteen days during the armada campaign
Bronzesaker on carriage and other armament from the Spanish Armada ship,La Girona,Ulster Museum,Belfast
For 150 years, writers relied heavily onAugustine Ryther's translation ofPetruccio Ubaldini'sExpeditionis Hispaniorum in Angliam vera Descriptio (A discourse concerninge the Spanishe fleete inuadinge Englande in the yeare 1588) (1590),[164] which argued that God decisively favoured the Protestant cause. In the 17th century,William Camden additionally pointed to elements of English nationalism and the private enterprise of the sea dogs. He also emphasized that the Duke of Medina Sidonia was an incompetent seaman.[citation needed] In the 18th century,David Hume praised the leadership of Queen Elizabeth.[citation needed] However, the Whig historians, led byJames A. Froude, rejected Hume's interpretation and argued that Elizabeth was vacillating and almost lost the conflict by her unwillingness to spend enough to maintain and supply the Royal Navy's fleet of ships.[citation needed] Scientific modern historiography came of age with the publication of two volumes of primary documents byJohn Knox Laughton in 1894. This enabled the leading naval scholar of the day,Julian Corbett, to reject the Whig views and turn attention to the professionalization of the Royal Navy as a critical factor.[citation needed] Twentieth-century historians have focused on technical issues, such as the comparative power of English and Spanish naval guns and the degree of credit for naval battle tactics that is owed to Francis Drake and Charles Howard. Inclement weather in the English Channel and on the oceans at the time has always been cited as a major factor to the outcome. Historian Knerr has reviewed the main trends inhistoriography over five centuries.[165]
William Adams served on theRicharde Dyffylde, a resupply ship during the campaign. In 1600, he was the first Englishman to reach (and settle in)Japan via the DutchUnited East India Company (VOC) becoming one of the first of few Westernsamurai.[166]
Lope de Vega, one of the key figures in the Spanish Golden Age of Baroque literature, and one of the most prolific authors in the history of literature, served in the shipSan Juan during the Spanish Armada.
The armada has often featured in fictional accounts of the reign of Elizabeth I. Examples are:
The Battle of Gravelines and the subsequent chase around the northern coast of Scotland form the climax ofCharles Kingsley's 1855 novelWestward Ho!, which in 1925 became the first novel to be adapted into a radio drama by theBBC.[167]
John Brunner's 1962 science fiction novelTimes Without Number depicts an alternate history where the Spanish Armada prevailed against England, leading to a global Spanish empire.
The fifth episode of the BBC seriesElizabeth R (1971) is an account of the defeat of the armada.
The 2007 filmElizabeth: The Golden Age contains a heavily fictionalized retelling of the Spanish Armada and the Battle of Gravelines.
^a letter from Wynter to Walsyngham indicates that the ships used as fire-ships were drawn from those at hand in the fleet and not hulks from Dover.
^Hart describes a large privateer fleet of 25 ships commanded by Drake in 1585 that raided about the Spanish Caribbean colonies.[29]
^...the widespread suffering and irritation caused by the religious wars Elizabeth fomented, and the indignation caused by her religious persecution, and the execution of Mary Stuart, caused Catholics everywhere to sympathize with Spain and to regard the Armada as a crusade against the most dangerous enemy of the faith," and "Pope Sixtus V agreed to renew theexcommunication of the Queen, and to grant a large subsidy to the Armada but, given the time needed for preparation and actual sailing of the fleet, would give nothing until the expedition should land in England. In this way, he eventually was saved the million crowns, and did not take any proceedings against the heretic queen."
^Martin & Parker give 30,500 and raised to 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry[46] Also, the hoax paperThe English Mercurie published by Authoritie, Whitehall 23 July 1588, Imprinted at London by Chriss Barker, Her Highness's Printer, 1588, otherwise states fairly accurately, p. 3, "all the Spanish troops in the Netherlands, and consists of thirty thousand Foot and eighteen hundred Horse."
^According to Mattingly "an objective observer would have seen no more than a battered, rather scraggy spinster in her middle fifties perched on a fat white horse, her teeth black, her red wig slightly askew, dangling a toy sword and wearing an absurd little piece of parade armor like something out of a theatrical property box"[81]
^"In the end as many as two-thirds of the armada's original complement of 30,000 died and for every one killed in battle or perishing of their wounds another six or eight died due to [non-combat losses]".
^Although the English attempted the same tactic in Portugal the following year, the army under Norris' command marching on Lisbon expecting Drake to simultaneously attack the city with his ships.Gorrochategui Santos 2018, p. 123[153]
^The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive[159]
^Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P. M. Jones (1985).The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 108.doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
^Motley, John Lothrop (1860). "XVII. 1587".History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Synod of Dort. Vol. 1586–89. London: John Murray. 4194.
^Fernández Duro, Cesáreo (1972).Armada Española desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilla y Aragón.Naval Museum of Madrid,Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, vol. III, chapter III. Madrid. p. 51
^Newman, Aubrey N.; Johnson, David T.; Jones, P. M. (1985). "The Eighteenth Century".Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature.69 (1):93–109.doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.x.
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