TheSoutheast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was aninternational organization forcollective defense inSoutheast Asia created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed in September 1954 inManila, Philippines. The formal institution of SEATO was established on 19 February 1955 at a meeting of treaty partners inBangkok, Thailand. The organization's headquarters was also in Bangkok. A total of eight members joined the organization in its lifetime.
Primarily created to block furthercommunist gains in Southeast Asia, SEATO is generally considered a failure, as internal conflict and dispute hindered general use of the SEATO military; however, SEATO-funded cultural and educational programs left longstanding effects in Southeast Asia. SEATO was dissolved on 30 June 1977, after many of its members lost interest and withdrew.
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed on 8 September 1954 inManila,[1] as part of the AmericanTruman Doctrine of creating anti-communist bilateral and collective defense treaties.[2] These treaties and agreements were intended to create alliances that would keep communist powers in check (Communist China, in SEATO's case).[3] This policy was considered to have been largely developed by American diplomatGeorge F. Kennan. PresidentDwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of StateJohn Foster Dulles (1953–1959) is considered to be the primary force behind the creation of SEATO, which expanded the concept of anti-communist collective defense to Southeast Asia.[1] Vice PresidentRichard Nixon advocated an Asian equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) upon returning from his Asia trip of late 1953,[4] and NATO was the model for the new organization, with the military forces of each member intended to be coordinated to provide for the collective defense of the member states.[5]
The organization, headquartered inBangkok,[6] was created in 1955 at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers set up by the treaty. This was contrary to Dulles's preference to call the organization "ManPac" (Manila Pact) to avoid public identification of the pact with NATO.[7] Organizationally, SEATO was headed by the Secretary General, whose office was created in 1957 at a meeting inCanberra,[8][9] with a council of representatives from member states and an international staff. Also present were committees for economics, security, and information.[9] SEATO's first Secretary General wasPote Sarasin, a Thai diplomat and politician who had served as Thailand's ambassador to the U.S. between 1952 and 1957,[10][11] and asPrime Minister of Thailand from September 1957 to 1 January 1958.[12]
Unlike theNATO alliance, SEATO had no joint commands with standing forces.[13] In addition, SEATO's response protocol in the event of communism presenting a "common danger" to the member states was vague and ineffective, though membership in the SEATO alliance did provide a rationale for alarge-scale U.S. military intervention in the region during theVietnam War (1955–1975).[14]
1966 SEATO conference inManilaPhilippine PresidentFerdinand Marcos, First LadyImelda Marcos, and US PresidentLyndon Johnson conversing at the Manila Conference of SEATO members on the Vietnam War in Manila in October 1966
ThePhilippines and Thailand were the onlySoutheast Asian countries that actually participated in the organization. They shared close ties with the United States, particularly the Philippines, and they faced incipient communist insurgencies against their own governments.[15]Thailand became a member upon the discovery of the newly founded "Thai Autonomous Region" inYunnan (theXishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture inSouth West China) – apparently feeling threatened by potentialMaoist subversion on its land.[16] Other regional countries likeBurma andIndonesia were far more mindful of domestic internal stability rather than any communist threat,[15] and thus rejected joining it.[17]Malaya (independence in 1957; includingSingapore between 1963 and 1965) also chose not to participate formally, though it was kept updated with key developments due to its close relationship with the United Kingdom.[15]
The states newly formed fromFrench Indochina (North Vietnam,South Vietnam,Cambodia andLaos) were prevented from taking part in any international military alliance as a result of theGeneva Agreements signed 20 July of the same year concluding the end of theFirst Indochina War.[15] However, with the lingering threat coming from communistNorth Vietnam and the possibility of thedomino theory withIndochina turning into a communist frontier, SEATO got these countries under its protection – an act that would be considered to be one of the main justifications for the U.S. involvement in theVietnam War.[18] Cambodia, however rejected the protection in 1956.[19]
The majority of SEATO members were not located inSoutheast Asia. To Australia and New Zealand, SEATO was seen as a more satisfying organization thanANZUS – a collective defense organization with the U.S.[20] The United Kingdom and France joined partly due to having long maintained colonies in the region, and partly due to concerns over developments inIndochina. The U.S., upon perceiving Southeast Asia to be a pivotal frontier forCold War geopolitics, saw the establishment of SEATO as essential to itsCold Warcontainment policy.[15]
The membership reflected a mid-1950s combination of anti-communist Western states and such states in Southeast Asia. The United Kingdom, France and the United States, the latter of which joined after theU.S. Senate ratified the treaty by an 82–1 vote,[21] represented the strongest Western powers.[22]Canada also considered joining, but decided against it in order to concentrate on its NATO responsibilities with its limited defense capabilities.[18]
Australian No. 79 Squadron Sabres atUbon Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand, deployed as part of Australia's commitment to SEATO
After its creation, SEATO quickly became insignificant militarily, as most of its member nations contributed very little to the alliance.[18] While SEATO military forces held joint military training, they were never deployed because of internal disagreements. SEATO was unable to intervene inconflicts in Laos because France and the United Kingdom rejected the use of military action.[19] As a result, the U.S. provided unilateral support for Laos after 1962.[19] Though sought by the U.S., involvement of SEATO in theVietnam War was denied because of lack of British and French cooperation.[19][21]
Both the United States and Australia cited the alliance as justification for involvement in Vietnam.[18] U.S. membership in SEATO provided the United States with a rationale for a large-scale U.S. military intervention in Southeast Asia.[14] Other countries, such as the UK and key states in Asia, accepted the rationale.[14] In 1962, as part of its commitment to SEATO, theRoyal Australian Air Force deployedCAC Sabres of itsNo. 79 Squadron toUbon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. The Sabres began to play a role in the Vietnam War in 1965, when their air defense responsibilities expanded to include protection ofUSAF aircraft using Ubon as a base for strikes against North Vietnam.[24][25]
In addition to joint military training, SEATO member states worked on improving mutual social and economic issues.[26] Such activities were overseen by SEATO's Committee of Information, Culture, Education, and Labor Activities, and proved to be some of SEATO's greatest successes.[26] In 1959, SEATO's first Secretary General, Pote Sarasin, created theSEATO Graduate School of Engineering (currently theAsian Institute of Technology) in Thailand to train engineers.[10] SEATO also sponsored the creation of the Teacher Development Center in Bangkok, as well as the Thai Military Technical Training School, which offered technical programs for supervisors and workmen.[27] SEATO's Skilled Labor Project (SLP) created artisan training facilities, especially in Thailand, where ninety-one training workshops were established.[27]
SEATO also provided research funding and grants in agriculture and medical fields.[28] In 1959, SEATO set up the Cholera Research Laboratory in Bangkok, later establishing a second Cholera Research Laboratory inDacca,East Pakistan.[28] The Dacca (now Dhaka) laboratory soon became the world's leadingcholera research facility and was later renamed theInternational Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh.[29] SEATO was also interested in literature, and a SEATO Literature Award was created and given to writers from member states.[30]
Though Secretary of StateJohn Foster Dulles considered SEATO an essential element in U.S. foreign policy in Asia, many historians have considered the pact a failure.[1] InThe Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, SirJames Cable, a British diplomat and naval strategist,[31] cabled theForeign Office and described SEATO as "a fig leaf for the nakedness of American policy", citing the Manila Pact as a "zoo ofpaper tigers".[1] As early as the 1950sAneurin Bevan unsuccessfully tried to block SEATO in theBritish Parliament, at one point interrupting a parliamentary debate between Foreign SecretaryAnthony Eden and Leader of the OppositionClement Attlee to excoriate them both for considering the idea.[32]
PrinceNorodom Sihanouk of Cambodia reported that Foster Dulles went to great efforts to convince him to join SEATO; however, he refused because "I considered SEATO an aggressive military alliance directed against neighbors whose ideology I did not share but with whom Cambodia had no quarrel".[33] In the early 1970s, the question of dissolving the organization arose.Pakistan withdrew in 1973, afterEast Pakistanseceded and becameBangladesh on 16 December 1971.[9]South Vietnam was defeated in war and annexed byNorth Vietnam and France withdrew financial support in 1975,[13] and the SEATO council agreed to the phasing-out of the organization.[34] After a final exercise on 20 February 1976, the organization was formally dissolved on 30 June 1977 during theCarter administration.[13]
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