This article includes a list ofgeneral references, butit lacks sufficient correspondinginline citations. Please help toimprove this article byintroducing more precise citations.(October 2008) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |


TheSilesian offensives (Russian:Силезские наступления) were two separate offensives conducted inSilesia in February and March 1945 by theSovietRed Army against theGermanWehrmacht on theEastern Front inWorld War II, to protect the flanks of the Red Army during its push to Berlin to prevent aWehrmacht counterattack. It delayed the final push toward Berlin by 2 months.
TheLower Silesian offensive ran from 8–24 February 1945, and theUpper Silesian offensive from 15–31 March. Designed to flank the Soviet main advance onBerlin, the two operations pushed theWehrmacht out ofSilesia.
According to Soviet information, the Germans lost 54,000 soldiers: 40,000 dead and 14,000 captured in the Upper Silesian offensive.[1]
The1st Ukrainian Front underIvan Konev’s command—having completed theVistula–Oder offensive—was to advance westward toward Silesia with the primary objective of protecting the left flank of the1st Belorussian Front, which was pushing toward Berlin. Similarly, theEast Pomeranian offensive of the2nd Belorussian Front in the north was tasked with protecting the 1st Belorussian Front's right flank.
The need to secure the flanks delayed till April the Soviets' finalpush toward Berlin, which had originally been planned for February. By mid-April, the East Pomeranian offensive—carried out by the 2nd, and elements of the 1st, Belorussian Fronts—had succeeded in its objectives, reaching the important German port city ofStettin (now Szczecin).
Joseph Stalin's decision to delay the push toward Berlin from February to April 1945 has been a subject of controversy among Soviet generals and military historians, with one side arguing that in February the Soviets had a chance of securing Berlin much faster and with far fewer losses, and the other arguing that the possibility of large German formations (remnants of theCzech fortification system) remaining on the flanks could have resulted in a successful German counterattack and further prolonged the war. Stalin's aim in delaying the advance on Berlin had likely been political, as it allowed him to occupy substantial parts ofAustria in theVienna offensive.