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Sheikh Said rebellion

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Kurdish rebellion following the abolition of the Caliphate

Sheikh Said rebellion
Part ofKurdish rebellions in Turkey

Art depicting: Turkish soldiers encirclingPalu,Çapakçur (present-day: Bingöl),Genc (present-day: Kaleköy, Solhan),Piran,Hani,Lice,Ergani,Eğil andSilvan,Cumhuriyet, 30 March 1925.
Date13 February 1925 – March 1925[1]
Location
Result

Turkish victory

Belligerents
TurkeyKurdistan RegionAzadî
Commanders and leaders
Mustafa Kemal Pasha
Kâzım Pasha (Third Army)
Ali Saip Bey (Third Army)
Muğlalı Bey (Third Army)
Mürsel Pasha (VII Corps)
Naci Pasha (V Corps)
Kurdistan RegionSheikh Said Executed
Kurdistan RegionAbdulkadir Ubeydullah Executed
Kurdistan RegionHalid Beg Cibran Executed
Kurdistan RegionAlişer Ağa
Kurdistan RegionIbrahim Heski
Kurdistan RegionBaytar Nuri
Strength
February–March:
25,000 men (fewer than 12,000 are armed troops; the rest are unarmed logistical troops)[1]
April:
52,000 men (25,000 are armed troops)[1]
15,000 men[1]
Casualties and losses
Total: 15,000–20,000 killed[2]
1.Alevi+Kurdish rebellion[3]
2.Zaza rebellion[4]

TheSheikh Said rebellion (Kurdish:Serhildana Şêx Seîd;[5]Turkish:Şeyh Said İsyanı) was aKurdishnationalist andIslamist rebellion inSoutheast Anatolia from February to March 1925 led bySheikh Said and with support of theAzadî[6] movement and local religious and feudal leaders against the newly-founded secularTurkish Republic.[7] The rebellion was mostly led byZaza speakers, but also gained support among some of the neighboringKurmanji-speakingKurds in the region.[8]

The religious and nationalist background of the Sheikh Said rebellion has been debated by the scholars.[9] The rebellion was described as "the first large-scalenationalist rebellion by the Kurds" by Robert W. Olson.[10]

Background

In the first years of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish state carried out modernist and nationalist reforms on its citizens includingKurdish minority.Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in his speech inEskişehir on 14 January 1923 about theMosul-Kirkuk area also addressed the Kurdish issue mentioning:the second issue is the problem of Kurdishness. The British wanted to establish a Kurdish state there (in northernIraq). If they do, this thought spreads to the Kurds within our borders. To prevent this, we need to cross the border South.[11] In the report the British spokesman sent toLondon on the 28 November 1919 he allegedly stated; "Even though we don't trust the Kurds, it is our interests to use them."[12] The British Prime MinisterLloyd George, on the 19 May 1920 at theSan Remo Conference also allegedly stated that "the Kurds cannot survive without a large state behind them," he says, for the British policy towards the region said: "A new protective admission to all Kurds accustomed to the Turkish administration It will be difficult to bring the British interests to Mosul, where the Kurds live in the mountainous regions andSouthern Kurdistan in which they live. It is thought that the region of Mosul could be separated from other parts and connected to a new independent Kurdistan State. However, it would be very difficult to resolve this issue by agreement.[13]

Mosul dispute between the UK and Turkey inLausanne conference dealt with the bilateral talks, if this were to fail it was decided to have recourse the subject to theLeague of Nations. On 19 May 1924, the results of the negotiations in Istanbul could not be reached and Britain took the issue on 6 August 1924 to the League of Nations. The Sheikh Said uprising emerged during the days when British occupation forces declared martial law in northern Iraq, removed their officer's permits, and carried their troops to Mosul. In those days, the Colon of Ministers was increasingly under scrutiny, and a powerful British fleet was moving toBasra.[14]

Prior to Sheikh Said's rebellion, the prominent Pashas of theWar of Independence worried about the anti-religious and autocratic policy ofAtatürk's government and therefore on 17 November 1924, theTerakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (TCF), the first opposition party in the history of the Republic was established.[15] There was a general consensus that Atatürk's actions were against religion. In the TCF's article which led by Kazım Karabekir it says that "The political party is respectful to the religious beliefs and thoughts". One of the TCF officials, Fethi Bey, said "The members of the TCF are religious. CHF is messing up with the religion, we will save the religion and protect it".[clarification needed][16]

Two weeks before the Sheikh Said incident, in late January 1925, the TCF Erzurum deputy Ziyaeddin Efendi, with heavy criticism of the actions of the ruling CHF in the chair of theGrand National Assembly, said that 'innovation' (bida) had led to the encouragement of "isret" (getting drunk), an increase in prostitution, Muslim women losing their decency and, most important of all, religious customs being dishonored and disregarded by the new regime.[17] TheAzadî forces under the lead ofHalid Beg Cibran[6] were dominated by the former members of the late Ottoman eraHamidiyeregiments, a Kurdishtribalmilitia established during the reign of SultanAbdul Hamid II to deal with theArmenians, and sometimes even to keep theQizilbash under control. According to various historians, the main reason the revolt took place was that various elements of the Turkish society were unhappy with theTurkish Parliament'sabolition of theOttoman Caliphate on 3 March 1924. According toBritish intelligence reports, the Azadî officers had 11 grievances.[18] Apart from Kurdish cultural demands and complaints of Turkish maltreatment, this list also detailed fears of imminent massdeportations of Kurds. They also registered annoyance that the nameKurdistan did not appear on maps, at restrictions on theKurdish language and on Kurdish education and objections to alleged Turkish economic exploitation of Kurdish areas, at the expense of Kurds.[18] The revolt was preceded by the smaller and less successfulBeytüssebap revolt in September 1924, led by Cibran[19] andIhsan Nuri on the orders by the prominent Azadî memberZiya Yusuf Bey.[20] The revolt was subdued, and its leaders Cibran and Ziya Yusuf Bey were captured and courtmartialed inBitlis.[21]

Participation in the rebellion

Front row, left to right: Sheikh Sherif, Sheikh Said, back row: Sheikh Hamid, Major Kasim (Kasım Ataç), Sheikh Abdullah.

For the rebellion

Sheikh Said appealed to all Muslims ofTurkey to join in the rebellion being planned. The tribes which actually participated were mostlyKurds andZazas. Kurds of theXormak andHerkî, two Kurdish-Qizilbash tribes were the most active and effective opponents of this rebellion since they had experience in confronting the Turkish government.[22] The Azadî, and several Kurdish officers from the Ottoman Empire also supported the rebellion. Historian Robert Olson states that viewing the several sources, an estimated number of 15,000 rebels is about the average of the number of involved rebels which took part in the revolt.[23]

Against the rebellion

That some Alevi tribes who participated in theKoçgiri rebellion refused to join the rebellion was a major setback as they had a lot of other tribes also desisted from supporting the rebellion, as their leaders preferred to be in good standing with the Turkish government.[24] Some claim British assistance was sought realizing that Kurdistan could not stand alone.[25] The Kurdish population in around Diyarbakır, farmers as well as Kurdish notables, also desisted.[26] The influential Kurdish Cemilpasazade family even supported the Turkish Government.[27] Also the ruler ofCizre, Sheikh Saida and the powerful Sheikh Ziyaettin fromNorşin would not support the rebellion and preferred an arrangement with theKemalists.[28] Despite Sheikh Said's religious identity, there was no significant participation in the rebellion among Turkish Muslims. Sheikh Said's statement that "killing one Turk is better than killing seventy infidels" shows that the rebellion created a new type of radicalism by combining Islamist extremism and hostility towards Turks.[29] This also explains why the rebellion was strong only in a few Kurdish-majority cities.

During this rebellion, the Turkish government used its airplanes for bombing raids inPalu-Bingöl area. In the course of this operation, the airfield nearElâzığ was used.[30]

However, according to the BritishAir Ministry there are few reports on the use of Turkish airplanes in suppressing the Sheikh Said rebellion.[31] The reports originate from the British Air Command atMosul, which was in charge of intelligence for all ofIraq.[31]

At the beginning of the rebellion the Turks had one squadron (filo) consisting of seven airplanes. Of these only 2 were serviceable.[32] But In the course of the rebellion more than 70 aircraft have been involved in subduing the rebellion.

Turkey also obtained the permission to use theBaghdad Railway to transport their soldiers throughSyria fromFrance.[33]

The rebellion

Following the suppression of theBeytüşşebab rebellion, the Turkish government attempted to prevent an other rebellion. In February 1925, they moved into thePiran (today called Dicle) area to detain some Kurdish notables,[1] but were prevented by men loyal to Sheikh Said. The intrusion by the Turkish army provoked Kurds around Sheikh Said, who reportedly killed or arrested all the Turkish military officers in the areas under their control.[21] On 13 February 1925, Sheikh Said addressed the people in a sermon in the Piran mosque and stating:

"Themadrasahs were closed. The Ministry of Religion and Foundations was abolished and the schools of religion were connected to the National Education. In the newspapers, a number of irreligious writers dare to insult the Prophet and extend the language of our Prophet. If I can do it today, I will start fighting myself and try to raise religion."[clarification needed][34]

Sheikh Said was elected as the next commander of the Kurdish independence movement gathered around Azadî, and Darhini was declared the capital of Kurdistan on the 14 February 1925.[21] Sheikh Said, who had taken the governor and the other officers captive while charging against Darhini (16 February), tried to bring the movement together in a single center with a declaration urging the people to rise up in the name of Islam. In this statement, he called on everyone to fight for the sake of religion, using his seal which declared its user to be 'the leader of the fighters for the sake of religion'. Initially, the rebellion was initiated on behalf of the IslamicSharia, and only later converted to the Kurdish independence movement.[35] The rebellion soon expanded and by 20 February, the town Lice, the headquarters of the 5th Army corps, was captured.[36]

After receiving the support of the tribes of Mistan, Botan and Mhallami, he headed to Diyarbakır via Genç and Çapakçur (today known asBingöl) and capturedMaden,Siverek andErgani. Another uprising, directed by Sheikh Abdullah attempted to captureMuş coming fromHınıs. But the rebels were defeated near Murat bridge and retreated. On 21 February, the government declared martial law in the eastern provinces. Army troops sent to fight Sheikh Said's insurgents forces on 23 February but were forced to retreat to Diyarbakir in the Winter Plain. The next day, another uprising under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif, who entered Elazığ, kept the city under his control for a short time. Elazığ was looted by rebels for several days.[37] On the first of March, the Kurds managed to assault theDiyarbakır airport and destroy three airplanes.[32]

One of the bigger engagements began on the night of 6–7 March, when Sheikh Said, with a force of 5,000–10,000 men, laid siege to the city ofDiyarbakır[38][39] where the headquarters of the Seventh Army Corps was located.[40] Unfortunately for the rebellion neither the Kurdish notables nor the Kurdish farmers in the region in and around Diyarbakır were willing to support Sheikh Said.[26] The Muslim revivalists attacked the city at all four gates simultaneously. All of their attacks were repelled by the numerically inferior Turkish garrison, using machine gun fire and mortar grenades. When the rebels retreated the next morning, the area around the city was full of dead bodies.[38] When a second wave of attacks failed, the siege was finally lifted on 11 March.[38] After a large consignment, a mass attack (26 March) and a suppression operation by the Turkish troops compelled many of the enemy troops to surrender. Insurgency leaders were squeezed while preparing to retreat to Iran in Boğlan (today known as Sohlan). Sheikh Sharif and some of the tribal leaders were captured in Palu, and on 15 April 1925, Sheikh Said was seized at Carpuh Bridge in Varto.

By the end of March, most of the major battles of the Sheikh Said rebellion were over. The Turkish authorities, according toMartin van Bruinessen, crushed the rebellion with continual aerial bombardments and a massive concentration of forces.[41]

Hasan Hayri Efendi, who was Dersim Deputy and Alevi Zaza, joined Sheikh Sharif, and was appointed by Sheikh Said as Commander of the Elaziz Front. A joint letter with Sheikh Sharif in Elaziz was sent to all the tribal leaders of Dersim on 6 March 1925.[42] But the rebels were unable to penetrate beyondHınıs -- one of the two major areas where Sheikh Said was well known and enjoyed considerable influence (he had atekke inHınıs) -- preventing a wider rebellion.[43]

Political measures by the Turkish Government

Turkish troops with the detained Sheik Said

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk foresaw the seriousness of the rebellion and urged İsmet İnönü, who had been resting on vacation at an island near Istanbul, to come to Ankara. Atatürk welcomed İnönü and his family at theAnkara Station and explained to him how serious the situation had become.[44] Mustafa Kemal, Ali Fethi (Okyar) and İsmet İnönü met on the 24 February 1925, for 7 1/2 hours, mainly to discuss the rebellion.[45] The following day, the government of Ali Fethi issued a circular vowing strict measures against the rebels.[46] He announced the reign of martial law in the eastern provinces and classified the use of religious aims against the government as treason. The Turkish Parliament was not pleased with this action and in response, the Turkish prime ministerAli Fethi was criticized by the politicians of theRepublican People's Party.[44] However, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, advocated for the resignation of Prime Minister Ali Fethi against the rapid rise of the incidents and appointed İsmet Pasha to establish a new government on 2 March. Ali Fethi resigned on the 3 March and was replaced by Ismet Inönü.[47] Within days, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted theMaintenance of Order Law [tr] (Turkish:Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu) and granted the government emergency powers. The ban on the uprising has been extended to include other measures. In addition, it was decided to re-establish theIndependence Courts in Ankara and Diyarbakır.[48]

Financial cost

Hamit Bozarslan estimates that about 35% of the budget went into the suppression of the revolt.[49]The sum of 7 Mio.Turkish Pounds was reported by the US military attaché in Turkey.[clarification needed][49]

Aftermath

Seyit Abdülkadir, the leader of theKurdish Teali Society and several of his friends who were accused of supporting the rebellion, were arrested in Istanbul and taken to Diyarbakır to be tried. As a result of the trial, Seyit Abdulkadir and five of his friends were sentenced to death by theIndependence Tribunal in Diyarbakır on 23 May 1925 and executed four days later. A journalist for a Kurdish newspaper inBitlis, the poetHizanizâde Kemal Fevzi, was also among the executed.[50]

The Independence Tribunal in Diyarbakir also imposed a death sentence on Sheikh Said and 47 riots rulers on the 28 June 1925. Penalties were carried out the next day, by Sheikh Said coming up first.[51] The President of the Independence Tribunal in Diyarbakır that sentenced the rebels stated on 28 June 1925:

Certain among you have taken as a pretext for revolt the abuse by the governmental administration, some others have invoked the defence of theCaliphate.

— 28 June 1925[52][53]

In total over 7,000 people were prosecuted by the Independence tribunals and more than 600 people were executed.[54] The suppression of the Shaykh Said Uprising was an important milestone in the control of the Republican administration in Eastern Anatolia and South East Anatolia. On the other hand, the developments that emerged with the uprising led to the interruption of the steps towards transition to multi-party life for a long while. Also against the Progressive Republican Party (Turkish:Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) was opened an investigation on the grounds that it was involved in the riot and was soon closed under a government decree.

After the uprising, the Turkish state prepared aReport for Reform in the East (Şark Islahat Raporu) in 1925, which suggested that the Kurds shall beTurkified.[55] Thousands of Kurds fled their homes in southeastern Turkey andcrossed the border to Syria, where they settled and were granted citizenship by theFrench mandate authorities.[56]

In the fall of 1927, Sheikh Abdurrahman, the brother of Sheikh Said, began a series of revenge attacks on Turkish garrisons in Palu and Malatya.[57] In August 1928 Sheikh Abdurrahman and another brother of Sheikh Said, Sheikh Mehdi, turned themselves in and made use of the amnesty law issued by the Turkish Government in May of the same year.[58]

Reception

In the Turkish press the suppression of the revolt was praised and according to Günther Deschner for quite some time also the western historians seemed to see the suppression as a pacification of a rebellious region.[59] In Turkey it was assumed that the Sheikh Said revolt was supported by the British Empire who wanted to achieve certain concessions with regards to theMosul dispute between Turkey and the British.[60] The British on the other side assumed the Kemalists could have engineered the revolt, assuming that if the Kurdish revolt in Turkey was temporarily to succeed it would lead to a prolonged conflict over the Mosul Vilayet in Iraq with Turkey eventually able to occupy it.[61] One of the early observers who criticized the way the Turkish Government treated the Kurdish people was the IndianJawaharlal Nehru, who deemed the Kurds to have wanted to achieve something similar the Turks had achieved for themselves and questioned how a struggle for freedom could turn into an oppressive regime.[62]

See also

References

  1. ^abcdeOlson 1989, p. 107.
  2. ^The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom, Vera Eccarius-Kelly, page 86, 2010
  3. ^Martin van Bruinessen, "Zaza, Alevi and Dersimi as Deliberately Embraced Ethnic Identities" in '"Aslını İnkar Eden Haramzadedir!" The Debate on the Ethnic Identity of The Kurdish Alevis' in Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, Anke Otter-Beaujean,Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East: Collected Papers of the International Symposium "Alevism in Turkey and Comparable Sycretistic Religious Communities in the Near East in the Past and Present" Berlin, 14-17 April 1995, BRILL, 1997,ISBN 9789004108615,p. 13.
  4. ^Martin van Bruinessen, "Zaza, Alevi and Dersimi as Deliberately Embraced Ethnic Identities" in '"Aslını İnkar Eden Haramzadedir!" The Debate on the Ethnic Identity of The Kurdish Alevis',p. 14.
  5. ^Zülküf, Ergün (2015)."Gotara Dijkolonyal û Wêneyê Serdestiya Tirkan Di Kovara Hawarê De"(PDF).Monograf (in Kurdish) (3). Artuklu University:400–437.
  6. ^abOlson 1989, p. 42.
  7. ^Hassan, Mona (10 January 2017).Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History. Princeton University Press.ISBN 978-1-4008-8371-4.
  8. ^Mehmed S. Kaya (15 June 2011).The Zaza Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern Minority in a Globalised Society. I.B.Tauris. pp. 64–.ISBN 978-1-84511-875-4.was led specifically by the Zaza population and received almost full support in the entire Zaza region and some of the neighbouring Kurmanji-dominated regions
  9. ^Özoğlu, Hakan (2009)."Exaggerating and exploiting the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 for political gains".New Perspectives on Turkey.41:181–210.doi:10.1017/s0896634600005410.ISSN 0896-6346.S2CID 152152964.
  10. ^Olson 1989, p. 153.
  11. ^"Eskişehir İzmir Konuşmaları" Kaynak Yay., İst.-1993, sf.95
  12. ^"İngiliz Belgelerinde Türkiye" Erol Ulubelen, Çağdaş Yay., 1982, sf.195; ak. U.Mumcu, "Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması" Tekin Yay., 19. Bas., 1995, sf.24
  13. ^Sevr Anlaşmasına Doğru Osman Olcay, SBF Yay., Ankara-1981, s.121; ak. U. Mumcu, "Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması" Tekin Yay., 19.Bas. 1995, s. 28
  14. ^"Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Anlaşmalar 1924–1938" Genelkurmay Yay., Nak.-1972, ss.43–44; ak. U.Mumcu, "Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması" sf.53
  15. ^Hakan Ozoglu (24 June 2011).From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic. ABC-CLIO. p. 147.ISBN 978-0-313-37957-4.
  16. ^Nurşen Mazıcı, Belgelerle Atatürk döneminde Muhalefet (1919-1926), Dilem Yayınları, İstanbul 1984, s. 82.
  17. ^Metin Toker, Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı, Akis Yayınları, Ankara 1968, s. 21.
  18. ^abOlson 1989, pp. 43–45.
  19. ^Üngör, Umut (2009)."Young Turk social engineering : mass violence and the nation state in eastern Turkey, 1913- 1950"(PDF).University of Amsterdam. p. 231. Retrieved9 April 2020.
  20. ^Olson 1989, pp. 48–49.
  21. ^abcChaliand, Gérard (1993).A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. Zed Books. pp. 52–53.ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5.
  22. ^Olson 1989, pp. 97–98.
  23. ^Olson 1989, p. 102.
  24. ^Olson 1989, p. 96.
  25. ^Olson 1989, p. 45.
  26. ^abOlson 1989, pp. 98–99.
  27. ^Behrendt, Günter (1993).Nationalismus in Kurdistan: Vorgeschichte, Entstehungsbedingungen und erste Manifestationen bis 1925 (in German). Deutsches Orient-Institut. p. 367.ISBN 978-3-89173-029-4.
  28. ^Günter Behrendt. (1993). pp. 373–374
  29. ^Örgeevren, Ahmet Süreyya (2002).Şeyh Sait İsyanı Ve Şark İstiklâl Mahkemesi: Vesikalar, Olaylar, Hatıralar. İstanbul: Temel Yayınları. p. 225.
  30. ^Olson 2000, p. 77.
  31. ^abDie Welt des Islams. E.J. Brill. 2000. p. 77.
  32. ^abOlson 1989, p. 120.
  33. ^Gunter, Michael M. (1994)."The Kurdish factor in Turkish foreign politics".Journal of Third World Studies.11 (2): 444.ISSN 8755-3449.JSTOR 45197497.
  34. ^Behçet Cemal, Şeyh Sait İsyanı, Sel Yayınları, İstanbul 1955, p.24.
  35. ^Sulhi Dönmezer,Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'ne Yönelik Bozguncu Hareketler ve Tehditler, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi (Sayı 38, Cilt: XIII, Temmuz 1997)
  36. ^Olson 1989, p. 108.
  37. ^János M. Bak, Gerhard Benecke,Religion and rural revolt", Manchester University Press ND, 1984,ISBN 0719009901, pp. 289–290.
  38. ^abcUğur Ümit Üngör (1 March 2012).The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950. OUP Oxford. p. 125.ISBN 978-0-19-965522-9.
  39. ^Olson 1989, p. 202.
  40. ^Olson 1989, p. 104.
  41. ^Maarten Martinus van Bruinessen (1978).Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan. Utrecht: University of Utrecht.ISBN 1-85649-019-X. (also London: Zed Books, 1992)[page needed]
  42. ^M. Nuri Dersimi, Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Halep 1952, sayfa 180.
  43. ^Olson 1989, p. 115.
  44. ^abUmut Üngör."Young Turk social engineering : mass violence and the nation state in eastern Turkey, 1913- 1950"(PDF). University of Amsterdam. pp. 235–236. Retrieved8 April 2020.
  45. ^Olson 1989, p. 123.
  46. ^Uğur Ümit Üngör (2012). Jorngerden, Joost; Verheij, Jelle (eds.).Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915. Brill. p. 289.ISBN 9789004225183.
  47. ^Olson 1989, pp. 123–124.
  48. ^Üngör, Uğur Ümit (2009)."Young Turk social engineering: mass violence and the nation state in eastern Turkey, 1913- 1950"(PDF). University of Amsterdam. pp. 235–236. Retrieved8 April 2020.
  49. ^abÖzoğlu, Hakan (2009)."Exaggerating and exploiting the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 for political gains".New Perspectives on Turkey.41:184–185.doi:10.1017/S0896634600005410.ISSN 0896-6346.S2CID 152152964 – viaCambridge University Press.
  50. ^Umut Üngör."Young Turk social engineering: mass violence and the nation state in eastern Turkey, 1913- 1950"(PDF). University of Amsterdam. pp. 241–242. Retrieved9 April 2020.
  51. ^Umut Üngör."Young Turk social engineering : mass violence and the nation state in eastern Turkey, 1913- 1950"(PDF). University of Amsterdam. p. 243. Retrieved9 April 2020.
  52. ^Viennot, Jean-Pierre (1974)Contribution á l'étude de la Sociologie et de l'Histoire du Mouvement National Kurde: 1920 á nos Jours. Paris, Institut Nationale des Langues et Civilisations Orientales. p. 108
  53. ^White, Paul J. (1995),"Ethnic Differentiation among the Kurds: Kurmancî, Kizilbash and Zaza",Journal of Arabic, Islamic & Middle Eastern Studies,2 (2):67–90
  54. ^Douglas Arthur Howard (2001).The History of Turkey. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 95.ISBN 978-0-313-30708-9.
  55. ^Derya Bayir (22 April 2016).Minorities and Nationalism in Turkish Law. Routledge. p. 133.ISBN 978-1-4094-2007-1.
  56. ^Dawn Chatty (8 March 2010).Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East. Cambridge University Press. pp. 230–231.ISBN 978-1-139-48693-4.
  57. ^David L. Phillips (2017).The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East. p. 45.
  58. ^Olson 1989, p. 125.
  59. ^Deschner, Günter (1989).Die Kurden Das betrogene Volk (in German). Straube. pp. 88–89.ISBN 3927491020.
  60. ^Özoğlu, Hakan (2009). pp.185–186
  61. ^Özoğlu, Hakan (2009). pp.186–187
  62. ^Deschner, Günter (1989).p.90

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