Sectarian violence orsectarian strife is a form ofreligious violence which is inspired bysectarianism, that is,discrimination,hatred orprejudice between differentsects of a particular mode of anideology or different sects of areligion within a nation or community.Religious segregation often plays a role in sectarian violence. The concept can be applied to both inter- as well as intra-group violence and is context dependent for instance considering political, social, and cultural factors. Strategies for ending violence include theinter-group contact theory and thedemocratic peace theory.
A sect, in one of its oldest definitions byMax Weber, is a form of social-religious grouping that co-exists along religious institutions.[1]Sectarianism therefore is the adherence to one of such groups based on the religious values that one ascribes to them.[2] This therefore constitutesreligious sectarianism. However, sectarianism does not need to be attached to religion per se. It can also be connected to a moralised identification with a political group which would thereby transform it intopolitical sectarianism.[3] Both definitions therefore entail the creation of an in- and out-group perspective that hinges upon identity.
Furthermore, such groups are not necessarily homogenous in their internal opinions or characteristics.[4] The differences within and among these groups makes then susceptible to conflict both across and within groups. For instance, as according to Raymond Hinnebusch, a patrimonial regime within a multi-sectarian society may favour elites which in turn may exploit sectarian dynamics to foster inter-sectarian conflict which in turn would lead tointer-sectarian violence.[5] On the other hand, exploiting the differences within one such group could thereby insist internal divide andintra-sectarian violence. This difference can therefore also influence how and why violence emerges and can shape the character of resulting conflict.
More generally, according to theStockholm International Peace Research Institute:
Traditionally, sectarian violence implies a symmetrical confrontation between two or more non-state actors representing different population groups.
Sectarian violence differs from the concept ofrace riot. It may involve the dynamics ofsocial polarization, thebalkanization of a geographic area along the lines of self-identifying groups, andprotracted social conflict.
The occurrence of sectarian violence is not solely based on inert characteristics of sectarianism but is further catalysed by enabling environmental factors of political, economic, social, and cultural nature. Political factors can include reforms which may favour or disadvantage certain groups compared to others, increasing sectarian divide and creating increased potential for sectarian violence such as in the example ofPakistan and its political reforms of the 1970s and 1980s.[6] Socio-economic factors can encompass economic trends favouring sectarian divide such as the policies created by the French Colonial Government ofMandate Syria of the 1920s.[7] Lastly, cultural factors such as the movement of unarmed european jesuit priests withinLebanon in the late 19th century created a cultural climate in which local sectarian elites were favoured and thereby could exacerbate sectarian divide and the potential for violence among them.[8]
For further examples see:
In the Japanese Middle Ages, different Buddhist sects hadwarrior monks and private armies that frequently clashed.[9] SeeBuddhism and violence.
Although the First Crusade was initially launched in response to an appeal from Byzantine EmperorAlexios I Komnenos for help in repelling the invadingSeljuq Turks fromAnatolia, one of the lasting legacies of the Crusades was to "further separate the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity from each other."[10]
Following the onset of theProtestant Reformation, a series of wars were waged in Europe startingcirca 1524 and continuing intermittently until 1648[citation needed]. Although sometimes unconnected, all of these wars were strongly influenced by the religious change of the period, and the conflict and rivalry that it produced. According toMiroslav Volf, theEuropean wars of religion were a major factor behind the "emergence of secularizing modernity"[citation needed].
In theSt. Bartholomew's Day massacre followers of the Roman Catholic Church killed up to 30,000Huguenots (French Protestants) in mob violence. The massacres were carried out on the national day celebratingBartholomew the Apostle.Pope Gregory XIII sent the leader of the massacres aGolden Rose, and said that the massacres "gave him more pleasure than fiftyBattles of Lepanto, and he commissionedGiorgio Vasari to paint frescoes of it in the Vatican".[11] The killings have been called "the worst of the century's religious massacres",[12] and led to the start of thefourth war of theFrench Wars of Religion.
Since the 16th century there has been sectarian conflict of varying intensity between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. This religious sectarianism is connected to a degree with nationalism.Northern Ireland has seen inter-communal conflict for more than four centuries and there are records of religious ministers or clerics, the agents forabsentee landlords, aspiring politicians, and members of thelanded gentry stirring up and capitalizing on sectarian hatred and violence as far back as the late 18th century.
William E.H. Lecky, an Irish historian, wrote in 1892 that, "If the characteristic mark of a healthy Christianity be to unite its members by a bond of fraternity and love, then there is no country where Christianity has more completely failed than Ireland".[13]
Steve Bruce, a sociologist, wrote;
The Northern Ireland conflict is a religious conflict. Economic and social considerations are also crucial, but it was the fact that the competing populations in Ireland adhered and still adhere to competing religious traditions which has given the conflict its enduring and intractable quality.[14]: 249 Reviewers agreed "Of course the Northern Ireland conflict is at heart religious".[15]
John Hickey wrote;
Politics in the North is not politics exploiting religion. That is far too simple an explanation: it is one which trips readily off the tongue of commentators who are used to a cultural style in which the politically pragmatic is the normal way of conducting affairs and all other considerations are put to its use. In the case of Northern Ireland the relationship is much more complex. It is more a question of religion inspiring politics than of politics making use of religion. It is a situation more akin to the first half of seventeenth century England than to the last quarter of twentieth‑century Britain.[16]
The period from 1969 to 1998 is known as "The Troubles", a period of frequent violence and tense relations between Northern Ireland's communities. About one in eight females and one in five males in Northern Ireland identified themselves as belonging to no religion.[17] However, people of no religion and are still generally attributed a Catholic or Protestant identity based on their ancestry and upbringing, both by the community in general and the state. Government advice recommends that in situations where an individual chooses not to identify as a member of the Catholic or Protestant community, individuals responsible for Equal Opportunities monitoring should determine communal affiliation on the basis of information such as name, address, schools attended or hobbies.[18] People of no religion are less likely to support the main, constitution-oriented main political parties, or more likely to support a more neutral political party such as theAlliance Party of Northern Ireland.[19]
About two-thirds of people with no religion tend to think of themselves as neitherunionist ornationalist, although a much higher percentage of those with no religion tend to think of themselves as unionist than nationalist.[20]
For people who describe themselves as Protestant or Roman Catholic, a small majority of them appear to favour one of the two main political parties on either side: theDemocratic Unionist Party or theUlster Unionist Party for Protestants; andSinn Féin or theSocial Democratic and Labour Party for Roman Catholics. In each case, the percentage in theNorthern Irish Life & Times Survey in 2015 was 57%.[19] Roman Catholics are more likely to reject the label British (59%) than Protestants are to reject the label Irish (48%).[21]
Protestants are more likely to consider theBritish identity as the 'best' single way to describe themselves, at 67%, with Roman Catholics close behind at 63% who consider the best single way to describe themselves as Irish. There is an equal level of support for the more neutral Northern Irish identity, with 25% of people from each religion likely to choose that label as the best description. Over a third of people with no religion prefer to be described as Northern Irish.[22]
There are organizations dedicated to the reduction of sectarianism in Northern Ireland. TheCorrymeela Community (inBallycastle, County Antrim), operates a retreat centre on the northern coast of Northern Ireland to bring Catholics and Protestants together to discuss their differences and similarities. TheUlster Project works with teenagers from Northern Ireland and the United States to provide safe,non-denominational environments to discuss sectarianism in Northern Ireland. These organizations are attempting to bridge the gap of historical prejudice between the two religious communities.[citation needed]
Althoughstate schools in Northern Ireland are non-denominational, most Catholic parents still send their children to specifically Catholic schools or Irish-language medium schools, thus ensuring that state school students are almost wholly Protestant. There are some integrated schools and theSociety of Friends (Quakers) have long been an advocate of co-education in terms of religion, operating theFriends' School in Lisburn (first established in 1774).[citation needed]
Howard Goeringer criticizes both the "Catholic Pope and the Orthodox Patriarch" for failing to condemn the "deliberate massacre of men, women and children in the name of 'ethnic cleansing' as incompatible with Jesus' life and teaching."[23]
Themajority of Rwandans, andTutsis in particular, are Catholic, so shared religion did not prevent genocide. Miroslav Volf cites a Roman Catholic bishop from Rwanda as saying, "The best cathechists, those who filled our churches on Sundays, were the first to go with machetes in their hands".[24] Ian Linden asserts that "there is absolutely no doubt that significant numbers of prominent Christians were involved in sometimes slaughtering their own church leaders."[25] According to Volf, "what is particularly disturbing about the complicity of the church is that Rwanda is without doubt one of Africa’s most evangelized nations. Eight out of ten of its people claimed to be Christians."[24]
When the Catholicmissionaries came to Rwanda in the late 1880s, they contributed to the "Hamitic"theory of race origins, which taught that the Tutsi were a superior race. The Church has been considered to have played a significant role in fomenting racial divisions betweenHutu and Tutsi, in part because they found more willing converts among the majority Hutu.[26] TheOrganisation of African Unity (OAU) report on the genocide states,
In the colonial era, under German and then Belgian rule, Roman Catholic missionaries, inspired by the overtly racist theories of 19th century Europe, concocted a destructive ideology of ethnic cleavage and racial ranking that attributed superior qualities to the country's Tutsi minority, since the missionaries ran the colonial-era schools, these pernicious values were systematically transmitted to several generations of Rwandans...[27]
The Catholic Church argues that those who took part in the genocide did so without the sanction of the Church.[28] Although the genocide was ethnically motivated and religious factors were not prominent,Human Rights Watch reported that a number of religious authorities in Rwanda, particularly Catholic, failed to condemn the genocide publicly at the time.[29]
Some Christian leaders have been convicted by theInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for their roles in the genocide.[28] These include Rwandan Roman Catholic priests and nuns as well as aSeventh-day Adventist Church pastor.[30]
Scotland suffers from a spill-over of sectarianism, largely owing tothe Troubles in neighbouring Northern Ireland as many people, particularly in the West of Scotland, have links to Northern Ireland by genealogy or immigration.
Scotland's two largest and best supported football clubs—Glasgow Rangers, which, for many generations, has largely been identified with Protestants and unionism, andGlasgow Celtic, which, since its founding in the late 19th century, has been identified with Roman Catholics and Irish nationalism or republicanism—both subscribe, with varying degrees of success, to government initiatives and charities like theNil by Mouth campaign are working in this area.
Celtic previously sent letters to every season ticket holder reminding supporters that no form of sectarianism is welcome atCeltic Park.[31] Rangers' anti-sectarian policy is calledFollow With Pride.[32]
Sectarian violence between the two major sects of Islam, Shia and Sunni, has occurred arising out of differences over thesuccession to Muhammad.Abu Bakr, acompanion of Muhammad, was nominated byUmar and elected as the first SunniRightly Guided Caliph. However another group felt thatAli, the cousin and son-in-law ofMuhammad, had been designated by Muhammad and is considered by Shia as the firstImam.
According to Sunnis, Abu Bakr was followed by Umar ascaliph of theRashidun Caliphate, then byUthman ibn Affan and finally by Ali. Ali's right to rule was challenged byMuawiyah bin Abu Sufian, governor of Syria.
In February 2006, a full-scale civil war erupted in Iraq, when violence between the two Muslim rival sects erupted. It has left tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of people dead and dozens of mosques and homes destroyed.[33]
In Pakistan sectarianism exhibited its first organized nature in early 1980 when two rival organizations were established:Tehrik-e-Jafaria (TFJ) (Organization of the Jafri (Shia) Law) represented Shia communities, andSipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Guardian of the Companions of the Prophet) representing Sunnis. The first major incident of this sectarian violence was killing of theArif Hussain Hussaini, founding leader of TFJ in 1986.
In retaliationHaq Nawaz Jhangvi, founder of the (SSP) was murdered. Since then internecine bloody vendetta has ensued. The focus of this violence has beenKurram,Hangu,Dera Ismail Khan,Bahawalpur,Jhang,Quetta,Gigit- Baltistan andKarachi.
The transformation of the sectarian conflict to a violent civil war in Pakistan coincided[citation needed] with the establishment of theIslamic republic in Iran and promotion of the Sunni religion and its incorporation in the state institutions by GeneralMuhammad Zia-ul-Haq, regime in Pakistan.
TheIranian Revolution was led by Shia clerics, and it influenced Shia communities all over the world. In Pakistan Tehrik-e-Jafaria was established with the demands of enforcing the Sharia Law.[citation needed] This demand was viewed as detrimental by the Sunni religious leaders. In response SSP was established by the Sunni extremist clerics. Many of these clerics had a background in the sectarian strife against the Ahmadis (a heterodox sect considered non-Muslim by majority of the Muslims)
Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a is aSomali paramilitary group consisting ofSufis and moderates opposed to the radicalIslamist groupAl-Shabaab. They are fighting in order to preventWahhabism from being imposed on Somalia and to protect the country's Sunni-Sufi traditions and generally moderate religious views.[34]
TheSyrian civil war gradually shifted towards a more sectarian nature. Pro-Assad militant groups are largely[citation needed] Shia, while anti-Assad militant groups are Sunni.
In Yemen, there have been many clashes betweenSunnis and ShiaHouthis. According toThe Washington Post, "In today’s Middle East, activated sectarianism affects the political cost of alliances, making them easier between co-religionists. That helps explain why Sunni-majority states are lining up against Iran, Iraq andHezbollah over Yemen."[35]
In 1978,KhalsaSikhs consisting ofDamdami Taksal,Akhand Kirtani Jatha andAkali-Nihangs led byFauja Singh andJarnail Singh Bhindranwale clashed with members of theSant Nirankari Mission, a hereticalSikh sect inAmritsar,Punjab after the Sant Nirankari Guru,Gurbachan Singh committed blasphemy by calling himself the reincarnation ofGuru Nanak, made blasphemous statements onGuru Gobind Singh,Guru Granth Sahib, and created sacrilegious versions of Sikh rituals. The clashes ended with 3 Sant Nirankaris and 13 Khalsa Sikhs dead.[36][37]
Piara Singh Bhaniara started his own hereticalSikh sect anddera with about 600,000 followers in the 1980s resulting in him beingex-communicated by theAkal Takht. In the summer of 2000, a local gurudwara disallowed one of Bhaniara's followers from carrying the Sikh religious holy book Guru Granth Sahib. This prompted Bhaniara's followers to write their own holy book (granth), resulting in the creation of theBhavsagar Samudra Amrit Vani Granth. Orthodox Sikhs alleged that Bhavsagar Granth copied several portions from the Guru Granth Sahib, and that Bhaniara insultingly imitated the Sikh Guru Gobind Singh in several photos in the book. In September 2001, during a religious ceremony organized by Bhaniara's followers, a newly-formed organization called Khalsa Action Force attacked the function, seized the Bhavsagar Granth and burned it. This was followed by several instances of Guru Granth Sahib being burnt in the ruralgurudwaras of Punjab. ThePunjab Police arrested and presented before media some young men, who stated that they had burned Guru Granth Sahib at the insistence of Bhaniara. The arrests sparked off violence against Bhaniara's followers. In October 2001, Bhaniara was arrested under theNational Security Act, and charged with several crimes. His followers were put in jail, where they were attacked with acid and knives by Sikhs. Some of Bhaniara'sderas were converted intoSGPC-administered gurudwaras. No action was taken against the Sikhs who attacked Bhaniara's followers. In 2001, theParkash Singh Badal-ledGovernment of PunjabbannedBhavsagar Granth and confiscated all its copies, arresting those who were found in possession of these copies. The print copy was probably destroyed by thePunjab Police. In 2003, a Sikh man named Gopal Singh attempted to stab Bhaniara, when he was inAmbala to appear in the court in connection with his alleged involvement with the burning of the copies of Guru Granth Sahib. A member ofBabbar Khalsa, Gurdeep Singh Rana was arrested for trying to assassinate Bhaniara using a bomb in January 2005.[38]
Among many theories, two strategies have been prominently debated within contemporary peace and conflict studies regarding the ending of violence and the creation of peace:
Inter-Group Contact
The theory ofinter-group contact posits that through increased social interaction amongst (formerly) conflicting groups, their enmity may be decreased. An example that has been cited within contemporary research of religious sectarian violence is the case ofNorthern Ireland and the engagement in programs to foster new connections between catholic and protestant youth.[39]
Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic peace theory assumes that through thedemocratization of conflict societies the tendency for conflict by violent means may be decreased.[40] An example for this strategy is the case ofBosnia and Herzigovina and the establishment of democratically modelled institutions after itsinternal conflict after 1995.[41]
{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link){{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link)