Secretariat of Intelligence
of the State

Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado
The Secretariat's main building in Buenos Aires
Agency overview
Formed	1946
Type	Intelligence
Jurisdiction	Argentina
Headquarters	Buenos Aires
Agency executive	Sergio Neiffert[1], Secretary
Website	argentina.gob.ar/inteligencia

Secretariat of Intelligence of the State (Spanish:Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado, mostly known by its acronymSIDE) is the premierintelligence agency of theArgentine Republic and head of itsNational Intelligence System.

Chaired by theSecretary of State Intelligence, a special member of theCabinet of Ministers, the Secretariat of Intelligence was a technical and operational service charged with the collection and production ofintelligence andcounterintelligence in internal and foreign areas, as well as the analysis and formation of a national intelligence strategy in order to handle state affairs. The Secretariat was charged with the duty of producing a completeintelligence cycle^[2] for the government. Structurally, S.I. had the biggest intelligence-gathering capabilities in Argentina, as it has numerous delegations withinArgentina as well as foreign operational bases and delegations.

Under law, the Secretariat was subordinated to thePresidency^[3] and is ruled by secret decrees and laws.^[4] Even though the official acronym was renamed to S.I. as the newintelligence system became active,^[5] during most of its history it was called Secretaría de Inteligencia de Estado (Secretariat of State Intelligence, SIDE) and it still is referred to as SIDE by the public.

On January 26, 2015, after the case of the prosecutorAlberto Nisman's death, PresidentCristina Fernandez de Kirchner announced she was proposing legislation that would dissolve the (SI) and opening a new intelligence agency called theFederal Intelligence Agency (AFI).^[6] PresidentJavier Milei closed the AFI and restored the SIDE in 2024.^[7][8]

The Secretariat of Intelligence was created in 1946 whenJuan Perón's first presidency established it by Executive Decree 337/46 under the denomination ofCoordinación de Informaciones de Estado (State Intelligence Coordination, CIDE). Its mission was to act as a nationalintelligence agency to be run by civilian personnel and to handle foreign and domesticintelligence operations for thefederal government.

Before CIDE was established, nationalintelligence was jointly handled by theDivisión de Informaciones (Information Division, DI) of thePresidency, and the military intelligence services such as theServicio de Inteligencia del Ejército (Army Intelligence Service, SIE) and theServicio de Inteligencia Naval (Naval Intelligence Service, SIN). Even though throughout Argentina's history military intelligence organs have been involved in handling both internal and external intelligence, reforms enacted in the last few decades have legally given them a role alongside civilian managed services in theNational Intelligence System.^[9]

The Secretariat (as it is commonly referred) had its first structural and functional reform in 1956, under thePedro Aramburu government when by Executive Decree 776/56 of January 20, CIDE adopted the nameSecretaría de Informaciones de Estado (Secretariat of State Information), and the subsequent famousacronym "SIDE". The newly restructuredagency was closely modeled on theBritish intelligence system.

DuringJuan Carlos Onganía's government, SIDE was under the administration of General Señorans, one of the most well regardedsecretaries of intelligence of all time. During those years, SIDE started to orchestrate its first complex foreign espionage missions, the staff was increased substantially to about 1,200, and the knowledge and operational capabilities were dramatically improved.

During Señorans administration, many Argentine women began participating in what was then a male-only field. The Secretariat began appreciating certain advantages of the female sex, especially when operations required the exploitation of human weaknesses. However, in 1966, Señorans restructured the Secretariat, expelling 900 employees (of about 1,200 total), including all of the female intelligence operatives contracted at the time. It has been noted that Señorans had a phobia of females, and would not tolerate women working in administrative positions.^{[citation needed]}

In that same year, a failed kidnapping attempt of the Soviet Consul in Buenos Aires, led theUSSR to enact a formal protest, threatening to take the matters to international organizations.^{[citation needed]} Onganía, against his will, had no other choice but to ask Señorans to resign, the Secretary in his final statement exposed that"Consul Petrov commands a group of spies of theKGB in Argentina".

After Señorans departure, women regained their positions in the civil intelligence community, but it was at that time, with the onset of theCold War, that theCIA began taking special interest in SIDE. The growth ofcommunist groups and guerrillas in Latin America, backed byFidel Castro's regime, as well as the special interest the Soviet Union began to take in Latin America, made the Americanintelligence community influence what was then thought as an area of minor concern to American interests in the war. The Secretariat of Intelligence was no exception, the 'communist problem' was made a priority, and surveillance of foreign embassies and delegations of communist countries became common.

Secret law Nº 20.195/73 came into effect on February 28, 1973 during the government of General Lanusse, literally establishing the mission, functions, personnel, and other important aspects of the agency; it is also known as the secret decree Nº 1.792/73, dated March 9, 1973.

On May 13, 1976, PresidentJorge Rafael Videla issued Executive Decree 416 changing the name of the agency toSecretaría de Inteligencia de Estado or "SIDE".^[5] Under theNational Reorganization Process, SIDE transformed itself into asecret police conducting espionage onguerrilla organizations,labor unions, or any other organization or person considered subversive, or a supporter of subversive activities. SIDE also took part in coordinatingOperation Condor with otherLatin American intelligence services.

After the return of democracy in 1983, duringRaúl Alfonsín's government, SIDE began renewing its staff, thus becoming a civilian intelligence agency focusing its activities entirely on national interests.^[10] In December 2001, the Intelligence Reform Law was approved,^[11] changing the structure, denomination and functions to adapt it to the newNational Intelligence System.

In February 2001, during theFernando de la Rúa government, SIDE was suffering from budget cuts (reduced by half) and political pressures to renew itself. The staff was reduced by half, 1,300 personnel were laid off. One of the reasons given for the clean-up were that many staff members had been involved inhuman rights violations during theNational Reorganization Process. This restructuring included laying off personnel who were past their retirement age according to the agency's standards, and removing most of the personnel from the return to democracy under the Alfonsín administration.

During October 2003, underNéstor Kirchner's government, a crackdown on illegalphone taps, as well as political and ideological espionage was ordered to Secretary of IntelligenceSergio Acevedo. More than 160 personnel were expelled from the organization for violations of regulations. An internal security review was also conducted, later producing a report stating several security holes and cases of corruption and theft in the organization (i.e., theft of food, extraction of gasoline from cars and poor security at facilities).

In the aftermath of the 1992Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires, SIDE augmented its focus onterrorist activities in theTriple border region. The lingering threat of another act of Islamic terrorism on Argentine soil, especially against Jewish entities in Buenos Aires, required the Secretariat to adapt to a previously unknownnational security threat.

Foreign intelligence agencies cooperated in training on subjects such asIslamic terrorism and how to neutralize it. The U.S.Central Intelligence Agency provided SIDE with extensive training, and experts from all over the world were contracted to teach classes in theNational Intelligence School. SIDE also began instructing its personnel onPersian andArabic languages and history, and how to handle operations with people and organizations pertaining to such cultures.

After the 1994AMIA Bombing, SIDE recognized that Islamic terrorism had become an extremely serious threat to national security. A plan codenamed Operation Centaur (Operación Centauro) to monitor terrorist organizations on theTriple border was orchestrated in cooperation with the CIA, and included phone taps, mail interceptions, and covert surveillance of many suspects.^[12]

Its reports detailed the existence and activities of terrorist organizations in the area, which benefited from the huge black market inParaguay and served as a financial laundering center for other organizations abroad. A 1997 report including evidence of such activities was shared with the intelligence agencies of theUnited States,Brazil,Paraguay,France andGermany. The Sala Patria group,^[13] formed to investigate clues about the AMIA bombing outside of Argentina, started operating in Paraguay and gave crucial information that led to the capture of many suspected terrorists and the neutralization of a suspected plan to bomb the U.S. Embassy inAsunción,Paraguay.

SIDE is the head of theNational Intelligence System, and also the largest intelligence agency of Argentina.^[14] It depends on the Presidency. It reports to the President of Argentina, who is required to set the national intelligence plan and policy.^[11]

Besides being an intelligence agency that handles foreign and internal intelligence, it also assists nationwide criminal investigations,^[15] somewhat like the AmericanFederal Bureau of Investigation, SIDE frequently collaborates with theJustice Ministry.

The Secretariat embodies special internal suborganizations that aid its duties. TheEscuela Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence School, ENI) acts as the main intelligence academy, training and recruiting agents for SIDE, and providing tuition and assistance for personnel of other intelligence andlaw enforcement agencies.^[16] The ENI also analyzesArgentine intelligence doctrine and gives specialized intelligence post-graduate formation to students in the country, including courses given over theInternet.

In 2001, the Intelligence Reform Law 25.520^[17] came into effect, subsequently making significant modifications to SIDE's traditional internal organization, as well as branching out some of its tasks to other newly created organizations such as theNational Directorate of Criminal Intelligence.^[15][18]

The President of Argentina is charged to assign the positions of Secretary and Undersecretary of Intelligence, but restrictions apply on the Secretary of Intelligence's authority to assign his or her own contracted staff to this organ.^[19]

The Secretariat itself has three Undersecretariats of Interior and Exterior Intelligence, and Apoyo (support). They are subsequently codenamed A, B and C, or withnumbers. In the foreign field, officers are usually disguised with diplomatic immunity in Argentine embassies and consulates around the world (practice common to the world of espionage). The positions of 'Media consultant', 'Cultural attaché', or 'Tourism consultant' are the most frequently used.

The current Secretary of Intelligence isHéctor Icazuriaga and the Undersecretary isFrancisco Larcher, both appointed by PresidentNéstor Kirchner. The third most-important position in SIDE is the Director General de Operaciones (General Director of Operations), which administers all intelligence and covert operations inside and outside the country; legendary secret agentHoracio Antonio Stiusso(Alias: Jaime Stiles) currently holds the position.

Silvia Fornasaro is in charge of the Dirección de Finanzas (Finances Directorate), which handles all of the Secretariat's accounting and budget balancing.

The Secretariat's objectives in the functions of intelligence as mandated by law are:

• Protect the general well being of society, prioritizing the safeguarding of individual and collective rights in a frame of legality, integrity and objectivity.
• Identify and interpret, anticipated and coherently, threats against national territory as well as individual and collective human security, in function of the nation's vital interests.
• Assist the different areas of the national government about the capacities and vulnerabilities of the different actors -in the national and international spectrum- who might prevent the attainment of national objectives, thus collaborating in the process of decision making.
• Identify acts and processes that could be taken advantage of as "opportunities" in function of national interests.
• Promote and strengthen the relations with the greater possible number of foreign agencies and/or intelligence services, in order to create fluid channels of information exchange and intelligence.

Other more specific objectives of the Secretariat:

• Formulate the National Intelligence Plan (as mandated by Law 25.250)^[11]
• Coordinate the functional relations with the different members of the National Intelligence System.
• Collaborate with other areas of the government providing information and intelligence in order to detect and neutralize potential terrorist acts.
• Produce information in time and opportunity on important actors, events and processes of the regional, continental and worldwide frame with incidence on the country.
• Elaborate hypothesis on international terrorism, drug trafficking, traffic of arms, etc., in the worldwide, continental and regional frames.
• Carry out intelligence in the regional scope to forecast of important processes.
• Respond to the requirements of the Bilateral Commission on Control of Intelligence Organisms and Activities of theNational Congress (as per Law 25.520)^[11]
• Elaborated prospective scenarios in the international spectrum and evaluate its impact on the country.
• Collaborate with the Justice system providing information necessary to fight crimes such as smuggling, organized crime, money laundering, fiscal evasion, etc.
• Assist different investigations authorized or ordered by competent judicial authorities referred from crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, smuggling, drug trafficking, copyright infringement of information technology material, falsification of money, etc.
• Plan and execute programs of qualification, training and improvement for the personnel of the Secretariat of Intelligence, theNational Intelligence System, as well as for civil employees of other areas of the National Government.
• Expand the bonds with public and private studies centers and NGOs, both in the national and international scope.

The Secretariat's main interest points are the following:

• Internationalterrorism, including the terrorist attacks against theArgentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) and theIsraeli Embassy inBuenos Aires.
• Religious fundamentalism.
• Organized crime, includingmafias,drug trafficking,arms trafficking and identity falsification.
• Evolution of integration developments (North American Free Trade Agreement,Mercosur,Free Trade Area of the Americas,Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,European Union, etc.) and analysis of international economic negotiations regardingfree market.
• Legal and illegalmigrations and development ofnatives of the Americas.
• Proliferation ofmassive destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological).
• Ecological problems that can be considered potential risks fornational security.
• National and foreign advances inscientific areas.
• Evolution of the official policies on national defense and security.
• Current situation in theSouth Atlantic, includingArgentine Antarctica and theFalkland Islands (Spanish: Islas Malvinas).
• Analysis of political situations in majorLatin American andEuropean countries with the purpose of identifying instability, conflicts and crises which may cause a direct or indirect repercussion on national interests.

Internally composed of three Subsecretarías (Undersecretariats): Interior, Exterior (Foreign), and Apoyo (Support). all of its divisions have specific identificationnumbers assigned.

• Subsecretaría de Inteligencia Interior (Undersecretariat of Interior Intelligence) (8):responsible for production and dissemination ofintelligence in internal areas. For this purpose, it is subdivided into several Direcciones (Directorates) which are in charge of specific political, economic and social factors.
  • Dirección de Inteligencia Interior (Directorate of Interior Intelligence):responsible for searching and collecting of information on national affairs, for which task it has technical, operational and management areas.
  • Dirección de Reunión Interior (Directorate of Internal Collection):responsible for the collection and diffusion of intelligence corresponding to the internal areas. For the achievement of its mission it is subdivided in Departments assigned to specific political, economic and social issues.
  • Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales (Directorate of Judicial Surveillance) (84):responsible for carrying out telephone, mail, and other communication interceptions mandated by judicial officers.
  • Dirección de Contrainteligencia (Directorate of Counterintelligence) (85):responsible forcounterintelligence andcounterespionage activities. It hasintelligence and technical-operational areas which carry out specific duties.
  • Dirección de Comunicación Social (Directorate of Social Communication):responsible for the analysis and collection of public information (i.e.:mass media).
• Subsecretaría de Inteligencia Exterior (Undersecretariat of Foreign Intelligence) (3):responsible of the collection and production ofintelligence on foreign areas.
  • Dirección de Reunión Exterior (Directorate of Foreign Collection):responsible for the collection and diffusion ofintelligence on facts and/or processes pertaining to foreign affairs. It comprises different areas with different technical and operational targets. It is responsible for the liaison with foreign services (i.e.: intelligence delegates in foreign countries).
  • Dirección de Inteligencia Exterior (Directorate of Foreign Intelligence) (32):responsible for the production of stateintelligence on the foreign area. For this purpose, it has specific areas analyzing different issues and the continental and global frameby country/country by country/in each country.
    • International Political, Economical and Social Processes.
    • Transnational Crime and International Terrorism (34)^[13]
    • Processes of the Proliferation of Weapons of Massive Destruction.
• Subsecretaría de Apoyo de Inteligencia (Undersecretariat of Support Intelligence):responsible for logistical support, staff, communications and data-processing centers of the Secretariat. In order to achieve this it has several directorates in charge of these specific areas.

The Secretariat is a nationwide intelligence agency, and has delegations and bases in mostprovinces of Argentina, as well as representations in most important countries. Reports state that SIDE has about 24 operation bases around the world.

Its main building is located in Ave. 25 de Mayo 11 (with a backdoor access through Ave. Leandro N. Alem 10), at the heart of DowntownBuenos Aires, near to thePresidential Palace andPlaza de Mayo. Although the central base is the 25 de Mayo building and annexes, many buildings, known as bases or operation centers, are spread throughout the city of Buenos Aires. There are reports that the main building is also connected to the Casa Rosada, which is across the street, through an underground passage.

The main building was built in 1929 by architectAlejandro Bustillo, for the original ownerFederico L. Martínez de Hoz. Inaugurated in 1930, was originally used as a housing called "Martinez de Hoz Building". In 1940 thefederal government bought it. Valued at US$1,607,022, its street surface is 413 square meters, inside it is 5430 square meters; and it has ten floors, the fifth floor being the Secretary of Intelligence's office, and the tenth floor thespecial operations division.

Security on the facility is meticulously strict, the whole building is covered with dark tinted windows, and when a person approaches the door, guards inquire the visitor for his or her name and the reason of visit. Once they are approved to enter, they must go through a metal detector and be accompanied throughout the visit by a staff member who will guide the visitor through the building and provide the necessary magnetic card to access restricted areas.

Two annexes in Ave. 25 de Mayo are internally connected to the main facility thus extending the Secretariat's offices. Surveillance around the whole surroundings of thePresidential Palace andPlaza de Mayo is tight for obvious reasons. In the late 1960s, there was a serious incident when members ofMontoneros breached the building and stayed inside for a whole weekend, taking objects, folders, and other sensitive material.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the tenth floor of the Correo Central building was provided to the Secretariat to be used for mail interception.

Other facilities of unknown status:

Communications in the agency are a crucial infrastructure and policy issue. For the southern bases in Patagonia, communications is provided by theServicios y Tecnologia S.R.L. (SyT) company. The rest of SIDE's communications, phone tapping abilities, data transfer, etc. are handled byTelecom andTelefónica of Argentina,Movistar,Nextel, CTI Móvil, andCompañía de Radiocomuncaciones Móviles, S.A. Data processing computers for SIDE are provided by Bull.^[20]

In 2001, under Secretary of IntelligenceFernando de Santibañes, the Secretariat began a major upgrade of its computer infrastructure.

Recent reports (since the Secretariat does not declare the exact number of personnel it embodies) state that about 2,500 to 3,000 agents are currently working both inside and outside ofArgentina for the Secretariat.^[21] Only the Secretary and the Undersecretary of Intelligence are public functionaries, the rest of SIDE personnel must act and work secretly, as stated by the Intelligence Reform Law 25.520.

About 80% of the personnel works in areas dependant of the Interior Undersecretariat, and the remaining on the Exterior and Support Undersecretariats. According to the agent's rank, they get paid from 1.800 to 2.678Argentine Pesos a month; directors, reach $3.000 ARS.

Delegates abroad are inserted in the frame of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, but receive monthly salaries by the Secretariat. Their job mainly consists of producing reports on current events of interests in the country they are stationed in, as well as establishing links with the local intelligence services.

Citizens are recruited into SIDE using a well-known and widely used method by worldwideintelligence agencies during theCold War. The procedure was simple, recruiting students from national universities based on an assessment of their character, behavior and intelligence.

The method was first used during theOnganía government, under the command of Secretary of Intelligence Gral. Señorans, who himself said"a person who enters at 20 years of age having studied in a university, should be an excellent professional at 30 years of age". During the process of recruitment, experts focused on four essential points when assessing their targets:

• Language and expressivity.
• Discretion in the way they dress.
• A meticulous way of life.
• Possession of personal life experiences allowing them to adapt their personality to different situations.

When students accepted the invitation to join SIDE, they were sent to be trained in theNational Intelligence School. Nevertheless, not all spies were chosen from universities; it was common that experienced agents recommended people they dealt with their personal life, and who they thought were apt to develop a career in the world of intelligence.

Spies recruited that way were classified as "confidents", they received a monthly pay while their abilities to carry out espionage activities were being tested. Once confidents proved that they could be trusted they were promoted to the "contracted collaborators" category. In those cases, agents were targets of specific controls, an "ambiental" surveillance on them done by thecounter-intelligence division.

If agents met their superiors' expectations, they signed a temporary work contract which was renewable periodically. In the "confident" career, the third step was denominated "temporary personnel" (Personal Temporario, inSpanish), as soon as they reached that stage, they were allowed to take courses in theNational Intelligence School.

Finally, after two years of being assigned as temporary personnel, they were reassigned as permanent "civil personnel" (PC, in Spanish). There was not a specified period of time between the steps of a "confident" and "civil personnel", there were cases of people who took 15 years before they were fully integrated. Today SIDE is rumored to be a"very closed family", one which nobody enters without a recommendation. Interviews with agents state that"the first rule is to forget your name", and that new personnel are baptized with a fake identity.

'Associates' are companies used for support in covert operations, known cases detailed by Argentine justice include masquerade companies such as: Tecnit, CF COM, OSGRA S.R.L, Tiumayú S.A, AMSUD S.A, EMCOSUD S.A, IDIS (Instituto de Investigaciones y Servicios) S.R.L, andCanteras Brandsen S.R.L. Apparently all of them are run by SIDE personnel, and are used for covert operations inside of Argentina, and as well to set up agents in foreign countries. One known example is that of an agent acting as a broker of EMCOSUD inSantiago de Chile.

The Secretary and Undersecretary of Intelligence are referred as "Señor Cinco" (Mr. Five) and "Señor Ocho" (Mr. Eight) respectively, because of the location of their offices, the fifth and eight floor of the 25 de Mayo building. Other aliases include "Señor Tres" (Mr. Three) for the Undersecretary of Foreign Intelligence and "Señor Nueve" (Mr. Nine) for the Undersecretary of Logistics.Cafeterias in buildings of the Secretariat are referred to as "casinos".

Although unconfirmed, the name "Señor Cinco" is alleged to the 1956 restructuring of SIDE, closely modelled on theBritishMI6 whose first director was Captain SirGeorge Mansfield Smith-Cumming. Often dropping the "Smith", Cumming used his initial "C" as a codename which was also used by all subsequent directors ofMI6. The name "SeñorCinco" was allegedly adapted from it.

The main building in Ave. 25 de Mayo is referred to as "Central". Agents working for SIDE call the Secretariat simply "La Casa" (The House). Foreign personnel whose function is to act as a link between their agency and SIDE are referred as "COI". Also, spies are sometimes referred by politicians as "Servis", meaning somebody pertaining to"The Service" (in English).

The officialmascot of SIDE is theFox (Zorro). Among SIDE personnel theDirección de Observaciones Judiciales (Directorate of Judicial Surveillance, DOJ) is referred to as "Ojota" (Sandal); furthermore, "Ojota" implies "Ojo" (Eye).

An interesting and sometimes confusing fact about the Secretariat's internal organization is the use of a specially structured sequence of numbers to refer to different internal divisions. For example, the Undersecretariat of Interior Intelligence is numbered '8', and its dependencies, such as the Directorates of Counterintelligence and Judicial Surveillance are numbered '84' and '85' respectively. The same case applies for the Undersecretariat of Exterior Intelligence, or '3', its divisions go from '32' for the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence to '34' for the Division of Transnational Crime and International Terrorism.

Even though it is still hard to discern how exactly SIDE's number sequence is structured because of the lack of an official explanation, it is known that single numbers used to refer to a certain director, '3', '5', '8', '9'. Sometimes the numbers represent their location in the 25 de Mayo buildings.

As with most intelligence agencies, the Secretariat only makes public statements when dealing with national issues or scandals. For the Secretariat, the AMIA investigation, the Sofía Fijman incident, and the participation in the Senate Bribes scandal were the most notorious episodes of media attention.

During the AMIA investigation,Claudio Lifschitz, a judicial employee involved in the investigation wrote a book about his experiences and theories that the Secretariat knew beforehand about the bombing and could not stop it.^[22]

In 2005,Tiempo de Valientes, a comedy made byDamián Szifron dealt with the age old rivalry between the Secretariat and theFederal Police. The Secretariat had a major role in the film's plot, it was portrayed as containing very sinister and corrupt individuals for the most part. In the end, the movie vindicates the role of intelligence in the national government.^[23]

In theAmericanABCTV showAlias,Nadia Santos (Mía Maestro) is an ex-SIDEagent who now works for theCIA. 'Argentine intelligence' was referenced several times in the show.

Every three months, SIDE publishes an officialmagazine through theNational Intelligence School.

Books dedicated to the Secretariat's history and scandals includeLos sospechosos de siempre: Historia del espionaje en la Argentina^[24] by Jorge Boimvaser. The book was to be published in 1995, but then Secretary of IntelligenceHugo Anzorreguy allegedly made a monetary deal with its author andEditorial Planeta to hold off on the book's publication. The book was finally published in 2001, and actually is one of the most complete sources of information about historical SIDE facts, even though it elegantly evades a clear definition of its inner structure.

In July 2006,SIDE: La Argentina secreta^[25] byGerardo Young was published. Young's book is aimed towards more personal aspects of the Secretariat, such as its most famous members, internal rules, and details about its management and operations.

The SIDE played a role during the Dirty War and participated inOperation Condor, the international network of South American intelligence agencies. A secret detention camp for Operation Condor in Buenos Aires, known asAutomotores Orletti (also known asTactical Operations Centre 18), functioned under the orders of SIDE from May to November 1976.

One of the most important operations carried out by SIDE was the planning of a triple assassination attempt inEurope with the collaboration of theChileanDINA, and theUruguayanintelligence service. The objective was to murder, if possible at the same time, three special personalities living inParis, France:Isabel Allende (daughter ofSalvador Allende,Chile),Rodolfo Matarollo (member of theERP,Argentina), andEnrique Erro (ex-senator,Uruguay), all of them opposed theSouth Americande facto regimes, and well known dissidents. The idea was originally suggested byDINA directorManuel Contreras, and was planned out in the Billinghurst base in Buenos Aires, previous approval of Argentine dictatorJorge Rafael Videla.

The assassinations were to be carried with 9 mm or .22 caliber guns brought to France via Argentinediplomatic carriage. The operation failed due to the Argentine Ambassador in Paris's reluctance to give the bag to the agents without first revealing what was in it.

WhenHéctor José Cámpora assumed the presidency of Argentina on May 25, 1973,Cuba sent a wave of diplomats and official delegates to Argentina, proposing that was the time to resume cultural interchanges with the Argentine government. However, the Argentine intelligence services distrusted the real motives for the influx of the Cubans.

It was then that an analyst in the Secretariat discovered a human weakness in the Cuban delegates: their extreme sensitivity for blonde women that stood out. TheCafé La Biela in the neighbourhood ofRecoleta was a common place for the Cubans to be spotted hunting for their female counterparts by SIDE agents.

The Secretariat orchestrated a plan to infiltrate, assess and obtain information as fast as can be possible. In this operation, the main actors would be blonde women, SIDE began recruiting capable women in known 'hot' spots of the city, some of them managed by people closely connected with the Secretariat.

Three women were cited for an interview in downtown Buenos Aires, proposed a job opportunity that involved establishing a solid and stable link with the Cuban delegates, all accepted. They would be paid almost the same money they earned at their previous jobs, plus a few honoraries for the services provided. During a week, the agents were taught basic intelligence theories and practices, they observed photographs of the Cubans they were going to 'mark', and they had time to elaborate complex backstories for their supposed identities.

The director in charge of Operation Marylin selected divorced women with children on purpose, so they would not raise any suspicions in their families or targets. The three females claimed to work doing 'sales' for a living, allowing them to be available at many hours in which to be in direct contact with the Cubans. Finally, after a subtle approximation scene played out in Café La Biela, two of the Cuban delegates fell for thetrap, but the third one apparently was not interested in establishing relations.

After six weeks of observations and wire-taps (the spies made sure to plant the Cubans' rooms withmicrophones), the Cuban embassy unexpectedly ordered its delegates to return toLa Habana. SIDE did not obtain any relevant information about their suspicions that the Cubans were assisting and supporting Argentine leftists groups, but the agency realised that women are a very useful tool in the espionage world. All three females that participated in the operation were offered permanent jobs in SIDE; only one accepted, the rest went back to the Buenos Aires night scene.

Operation Marylin proved that using women to exploit weaknesses in men was a feasible and convenient method of extracting information, and observating both foreign and internal adversaries of Argentina. Although the real insertion of females into the Argentine espionage community started in the mid-1960s, during the 70s, one of Argentina's most agitated eras, the women of SIDE started playing a crucial role in its operations.

On October 28, 1995,Enrique Gorriarán Merlo, Argentina's most wantedterrorist, was captured in the little town ofTepoztlán, 60 miles awayMexico City, and extradited back toArgentina. Merlo had been involved in numerous criminal activities during the 1970s and 1980s, most notably the assassination ofAnastasio Somoza Debayle on September 17 inParaguay, and for orchestrating the1989 attack on the La Tablada military barracks by theMTP group.

Merlo, who claims it was a kidnapping orchestrated by SIDE,^[26] had traveled toMexico to meet with Mexican politicians of thePRD, who were cooperating in an international push to free the guerrillas responsible for the La Tablada attack who were, and still are, serving prison term in Argentine jails. Merlo arrived in the Mexicancapital with a fake Uruguayan passport, where he soon realized that the Mexican security forces were following him. He thought they were just doing basic surveillance on him to see if he was doing any illegal activity in Mexican territory.

On Saturday, October 28, he spotted three Argentine-looking men inTepoztlán Square, "one of which -he said-looked like he was from the Argentine intelligence service or the police". Merlo was driving a friend's truck, after spotting the Argentines, he tried to lose his entourage of followers by driving into the town of Cuatula. A few minutes later, Merlo claims he was stopped, surrounded, and shot several times until he put his hands out the truck's destroyed window.

Merlo goes on to claim that the Mexican security services handcuffed him, and made him face the Argentine, who nodded silently (affirming that he was who they were looking for).

Merlo was taken into the Mexican Migrations Department, where he claims was interrogated three times by SIDE agents. The last time they interrogated him, they asked if he was Gorriarán Merlo, he answered back"yes", and simultaneously asked for asylum. (Mexico has a tradition for giving asylum to politically prosecuted people in other Latin American countries). One of the Mexican police man told them that there was "receptiveness" about his request, but at five in the morning, Mexican authorities took him to the airport and put in him in SIDE's plane, where the same SIDE agent fromTepoztlán and the interrogation was present.

The operation was allegedly carried out by the Sala Patria^[13] group of the Secretariat.^[27] Gorrarián Merlo served prison time in Argentina for his crimes, and was later pardoned in 2003 byPresidentEduardo Duhalde.

Judicial reports during the investigation have displayed sufficient evidence of SIDE's involvement in theAMIA case investigation. In 2003,PresidentNéstor Kirchner signed a decree that opened all SIDE's files (about 15,000) and allowed the ex-Secretary of Intelligence,Hugo Anzorreguy, and many intelligence personnel involved in the case (includingHoracio Antonio Stiusso,Patricio Miguel Finnen, andAlejandro Brousson) to be available to declare in the investigation about Judge Galeano's mishandling during his job as official judge of the case.^[13]

Several critics blame SIDE for failing to stall the attack on the AMIA as the warnings of an impending attack on Argentine soil were received. Judicial evidence presented during the AMIA investigation show that theArgentineEmbassy inBeirut, theBrazilian Intelligence Service, and theArgentineConsulate inMilan warned SIDE about the attack on the Jewish organization.

Juan José Galeano, the judge in charge of theAMIA Bombing investigation, askedHugo Anzorreguy to help him advance the investigation by bribing a key witness who refused to testify,Carlos Telledín. The Secretariat provided 400 thousand dollars so he would change his testimony, thus forcing progress on a case that had been stuck for two years.

SIDE explicitly participated in the operation to give the money to Telledín's wife,Ana Boragni in aLloyds Bank located on Ave. Cabildo in Buenos Aires. The public importance about this operation is that it explicitly implied SIDE working to orchestrate a cover-up in the AMIA case.

The operation was described thoroughly by SIDE agents who testified later on, during PresidentNéstor Kirchner's push for new leads on the case.

During the 1960s, SIDE set up constant surveillance on embassies from theEastern bloc as well as othercommunist nations inBuenos Aires.

During the investigation of the AMIA case, then counter-intelligence operations directorHoracio Antonio Stiusso, was asked about why SIDE had been tapping the phone lines and setting bugs in the embassies ofIran andCuba inBuenos Aires. Stiusso alleged that those tasks were simply counter-intelligence operations and had no relationship with the AMIA case. Nevertheless, in 1998, Argentina fired many Iranian diplomats on the basis of "phone taps" that provided evidence Iran was involved in the AMIA bombing.

In the late 1990s, an employee of the Secretariat in charge of theNational Intelligence School's security was convicted of murder. For more information see theSchool's incidents.

In the late nineties,Nasrim Mokhtari anIranianprostitute and hairdresser, who was believed to be involved with an Iranian support group that helped carry out the bombings of theIsraeli Embassy in 1992, and theAMIA building in 1994, was tricked by the Secretariat into coming back to Argentina fromEurope.

The information on her involvement came fromWilson Dos Santos, a suspect in the AMIA case. Dos Santos was a Brazilian taxi boy and thief who did a significant amount of smuggling in theTriple Frontier. Mokhtari had a romantic relationship with Dos Santos in Buenos Aires, and claims he knew about the plot to bomb theAMIA building through her connection in the Buenos Airesislamic community. It is suspected that Dos Santos worked, or works for theBrazilian Intelligence Service, or the BrazilianPolice.

Furthermore, a few weeks before the bombing, Dos Santos entered theArgentine,Israeli, andBrazilian consulates inMilán,Italy, to warn about the upcoming attacks. There was no trace of him until he was captured inSwitzerland years later, holding 8 passports, and extradited to Argentina on charges of false testimony, of which he is currently serving prison time.

When Dos Santos was declared for the Argentine justice ministry, even though there were weak points in his statements, he named Mokhtari and alleged she knew about the bombings (he later testified that he warned the consulates on information he got from her).

The Argentine justice system, needing new leads because of all the pressure put on them to solve both bombings, ordered SIDE to find Mokhtari and bring her back to Argentina for interrogation. A plan codenamedOperation Ciprés was orchestrated to locate her in Europe and bring her back to Argentina. Once located inSwitzerland, she was conned into coming back to Argentina by SIDE agents, who posed as meat businessmen who proposed her a job as a translator to do business with Iran.

The operation was carried out by the Sala Patria^[13] group, and it has been said that the operation cost the Secretariat about half a million dollars, which included locating her, paying costs, agents and buying information inCyprus, France,Belgium andSwitzerland. The French intelligence service also helped SIDE locate Mokhtari while she was living inParis,France.

Mokthari was on an Air France flight toMontevideo,Uruguay, that made a stop inBuenos Aires. When she got off to change planes, she was arrested by aspecial counter-terrorism team of theFederal Police. Mokhtari was eventually set free; there were no sufficient proofs to incriminate her in anything, or even of involvement in the Iranian support group that carried out the AMIA bombing.^[28]

A restriction on leaving the country was imposed on her, and later lifted, but Nasrim Mokhtari had already lost her contacts in Paris, had no money, and become a publicly known 'international terrorist'. The Secretariat declined to provide sufficient accommodations for Mokhtari to stay in Argentina, and Iran did not want her in its territory because of the sufficient international problems she brought to them with Iran being blamed in participating in the AMIA bombing. She is currently hospitalized at a mental institution inBuenos Aires.^[29]

In January 2001,Página/12 newspaper published an article^[30] on the Secretariat's troubled relations with the AmericanCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA). Along with the article was a photo of and personal details aboutRoss Newland, then CIA Station Chief in Buenos Aires, who was expected to become head of theLatin American division in the CIA. Official reports say that the CIA wanted SIDE to investigate the operations of theRussian Mafia and ex-KGB agents who had just arrived in Argentina. The reasons were that the Russian Mafia was using Argentina as an intermediate country for smuggling illegal aliens to the U.S. At the time, Argentina did not requirevisas for tourist visits to the United States, and obtaining Argentine citizenship had recently been relatively easy.

Other reasons to investigate the recently arrived ex-KGB and Russian Mafia was that many ex-CIA and ex-FBI personnel had private security businesses in Argentina and in many other Latin American countries. The arrival of the Russian gang in Argentina put their businesses at risk of competition. A few months before, Newland, a 50-year-old who loved living in Buenos Aires^[31] accused SIDE of following him and fellow CIA operatives in Argentina, as well as doing audio surveillance on them.

Information leaked out thatPatricio Finnen andAlejandro Brousson, two old notorious important staff members of the Secretariat, were responsible for carrying out the operation from the Billinghurst base. The Americans were not the only ones affected by the Secretariat's peculiar attention; this was also true of theIsraeliMossad and the GermanFederal Intelligence Service (BND).

American reports state that the Secretariat never helped the CIA on its requests, instead, the U.S. alleged that SIDE helped the "newcomers" insert themselves in the market by selling them information. The CIA became furious since they had historically contributed funds for SIDE to do their operations, and SIDE was indirectly helping the Russians in their smuggling operation. They expected the Secretariat to be on their side, and to make the 'Russian problem' a government issue, therefore putting pressure on the Russians.

The head of the Secretariat's counter-intelligence service at the time, retired MajorAlejandro Broussoun, an ex-military serviceman from theArgentine Army Engineers Corps, and an ex-follower of the ultra-nationalist right wingCarapintadas organization in the 1980s and 1990s, was blamed by the CIA for the leak of the identity of their station chief to the popular newspaper.

The United States investigation into the incident with SIDE, revealed that the picture and information of Ross Newland was given to the newspaper by the Secretariat itself. Meanwhile, SIDE tried to repair relations by explaining the scandal by another theory.

At the end of the scandal, with Ross Newland's identity uncovered and the episode becoming a major embarrassment for the U.S. and Argentina in the worldwide intelligence community, the CIA removed its Station Chief from Argentina, and said they were going to permanently move their offices toMontevideo,Uruguay because of their problems working together with SIDE. Also, as a result of this, the head of the SIDE counter-intelligence service, retired MajorAlejandro Brousson was expelled because of the American diplomatic pressure to punish the responsible of an act they considered "a violation of game rules" (in the intelligence community, that is).

The scandal not only put a stain in the CIA's relations with SIDE, but also made the Americans distrust the Argentine intelligence community which they had come to collaborate extensively during theCarlos Menem administration.

In 2001, the government underPresidentFernando de la Rúa used the Secretariat's reserved funds to orchestrate the bribery of several senators in theArgentine Congress. The motive behind the operation was to assure the promotion of a labor reform law that De La Rúa was promoting. When the level of involvement of the Executive Branch became known to the public, a national scandal broke out and De La Rúa's administration took heavy criticism.

The Secretariat was then under the command of bankerFernando de Santibañes, a close friend of then President De La Rúa, who promised to make sweeping changes to the Secretariat of Intelligence. The opposition parties in Argentina, specially during the government ofCarlos Menem, saw SIDE as a political tool and promised sweeping reforms if they won the 1999 presidential elections.

After the details of the participation of SIDE in the scandal became publicly known, then President Fernando de la Rúa asked Fernando De Santibañes to resign. He was charged with participating in theSenate bribes case.

In 2013, a Federal Jury found that President De la Rua and Fernando de Santibañes, together with other officials and senators, were innocent of the allegations.

The Justice system and the press blame the Secretariat participating in the organization of events in 2002 that led to the deaths ofDarío Santillán andMaximiliano Kosteki, twopiqueteros who were protesting on thePueyrredón Bridge inBuenos Aires. Both men were shot in the back byBuenos Aires Police's officers armed with shotguns.

Months before the tragedy, the Secretariat had produced intelligence reports that the Piqueteros' assemblies and protests were being attended by theColombian extremist groupFARC.^[32] Furthermore, minutes before the assassinations, there were three phone calls, betweenAlfredo Fanchiotti, a policeman involved in the incident, and the Undersecretary of Intelligence, at the time, Oscar Rodríguez.^[32]

During the trial, police officers involved in the scene that day, declared that a man from SIDE approached them and told them that "Today there will be incidents", furthermore incriminating the Secretariat on the assassinations.

Carlos Soria, then Secretary of State Intelligence, later declared that "democracy works in order, we needed to establish order", making the public theory that the assassinations were orchestrated by SIDE to psychologically reduce the Piqueteros movements motivation and their influence in Argentine society.

The assassinations, which sparked outrage by Piquetero groups, made then interim PresidentEduardo Duhalde to call for elections earlier than planned, and since then, thefederal government has established a non-repressive policy towards the Piqueteros.

In 2005, President Néstor Kirchner, signed a decree that released all of the Secretariats's files about the tragedy to the public, and made some SIDE staff and agents available for questioning if necessary.^[33]

Nobody in SIDE has yet been charged with participating in the case. On the second anniversary of the assassinations, protesters and piqueteros marched towards theBillinghurst base were the phone calls originated and proceeded to deface the property and manifest public outrage towards the organization.^[34] It was the first time ever people protested at one of SIDE's facilities.

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