Clockwise from top left: Italian Blackshirts atDire Dawa; Ethiopian soldiers on horseback; Italian bombers in flight; Ethiopian soldiers holding rifles en route to the northern front; Italian soldiers with a machine gun; Ethiopian soldiers on a trench.
Date
3 October 1935 – 19 February 1937[a] (1 year, 4 months, 2 weeks and 2 days)
TheSecond Italo-Ethiopian War, also referred to as theSecond Italo-Abyssinian War, was awar of aggression waged byItaly againstEthiopia, which lasted from October 1935 to February 1937. In Ethiopia it is often referred to simply as theItalian Invasion (Amharic:ጣልያን ወረራ,romanized: Ṭalyan warära;Oromo:Weerara Xaaliyaanii), and in Italy as theEthiopian War (Italian:Guerra d'Etiopia). It is seen as an example of the expansionist policy that characterized theAxis powers and the ineffectiveness of theLeague of Nations before the outbreak ofWorld War II.
On 3 October 1935, two hundred thousand soldiers of the Italian Army commanded by MarshalEmilio De Bono attacked fromEritrea (then an Italian colonial possession) without prior declaration of war.[13] At the same time a minor force under GeneralRodolfo Graziani attacked fromItalian Somalia. On 6 October,Adwa was conquered, a symbolic place for the Italian army because of the defeat at theBattle of Adwa by the Ethiopian army during theFirst Italo-Ethiopian War. On 15 October, Italian troops seizedAksum, and anobelisk adorning the city was torn from its site and sent to Rome to be placed symbolically in front of the building of theMinistry of Colonies.
Exasperated by De Bono's slow and cautious progress, Italian prime ministerBenito Mussolini replaced him with GeneralPietro Badoglio. Ethiopian forces attacked the newly arrived invading army and launched acounterattack in December 1935, but their poorly armed forces could not resist for long against the modern weapons of the Italians. Even the communications service of the Ethiopian forces depended on foot messengers, as they did not have radio. It was enough for the Italians to impose a narrow fence on Ethiopian detachments to leave them unaware of the movements of their own army.Nazi Germany sent arms and munitions to Ethiopia because it was frustrated over Italian objections to its attempts to integrate Austria.[14] This prolonged the war and sapped Italian resources. It would soon lead to Italy's greater economic dependence on Germany and less interventionist policy on Austria, clearing the path forAdolf Hitler'sAnschluss.[15]
The Ethiopian counteroffensive managed to stop the Italian advance for a few weeks, but the superiority of the Italians' weapons (particularly heavyartillery and airstrikes with bombs andchemical weapons) prevented the Ethiopians from taking advantage of their initial successes. The Italians resumed the offensive in late January. On 31 March 1936, the Italians won a decisive victory at theBattle of Maychew, which nullified any possible organized resistance of the Ethiopians. EmperorHaile Selassie was forced to escape into exile on 2 May, and Badoglio's forces arrived in the capitalAddis Ababa on 5 May. Italy announced the annexation of the territory of Ethiopia on 7 May and Italian KingVictor Emmanuel III was proclaimed emperor on 9 May. The provinces of Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) were united to form theItalian province of East Africa. Fighting between Italian and Ethiopian troops persisted until 19 February 1937.[16] On the same day, an attempted assassination of Graziani led to the reprisalYekatit 12 massacre in Addis Ababa, in which between 1,400 and 30,000 civilians were killed.[17][18][19] Italian forces continued to suppress rebel activity by theArbegnoch until 1939.[20]
Italian troops usedmustard gas in aerial bombardments (in violation of theGeneva Protocol andGeneva Conventions) against combatants and civilians in an attempt to discourage the Ethiopian people from supporting the resistance.[21][22] Deliberate Italian attacks against ambulances and hospitals of theRed Cross were reported.[23] By all estimates, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian civilians died as a result of the Italian invasion, which have been described by some historians as constitutinggenocide.[24] Crimes by Ethiopian troops included the use ofdumdum bullets (in violation of theHague Conventions), the killing of civilian workmen (including during theGondrand massacre) and the mutilation of capturedEritrean Ascari and Italians (often with castration), beginning in the first weeks of war.[25][26]
TheKingdom of Italy began its attempts to establish colonies in theHorn of Africa in the 1880s. The first phase of the colonial expansion concluded with the disastrousFirst Italo-Ethiopian War and the defeat of the Italian forces in theBattle of Adwa, on 1 March 1896, inflicted by the Ethiopian Army ofNegusMenelik II.[27] In the following years, Italy abandoned its expansionist plans in the area and limited itself to administering the small possessions that it retained in the area: the colony ofItalian Eritrea and the protectorate (later colony) ofItalian Somaliland. For the next few decades, Italian-Ethiopian economic and diplomatic relations remained relatively stable.[28]
On 14 December 1925, Italy's fascist government signed a secret pact with Britain aimed at reinforcing Italian dominance in the region. London recognised that the area was of Italian interest and agreed to the Italian request to build a railway connecting Somalia and Eritrea. Although the signatories had wished to maintain the secrecy of the agreement, the plan soon leaked and caused indignation by the French and Ethiopian governments. The latter denounced it as a betrayal of a country that had been for all intents and purposes a member of theLeague of Nations.[29]
As fascist rule in Italy continued to radicalise, its colonial governors in the Horn of Africa began pushing outward the margins of their imperial foothold. The governor of Italian Eritrea,Jacopo Gasparini, focused on the exploitation ofTeseney in an attempt to win over the leaders of theTigre people against Ethiopia. The governor of Italian Somaliland,Cesare Maria de Vecchi, began a policy of repression that led to the occupation of the fertileJubaland, and the cessation in 1928 of collaboration between the settlers and the traditional Somali chiefs.
TheItalo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928 stated that the border between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia was 21leagues parallel to theBenadir coast (approximately 118.3 kilometres [73.5 miles]). In 1930, Italy built a fort at theWelwel oasis (alsoWalwal, Italian:Ual-Ual) in theOgaden and garrisoned it with Somalidubats (irregular frontier troops commanded by Italian officers). The fort at Welwel was well beyond the 21-league limit and inside Ethiopian territory. On 23 November 1934, an Anglo–Ethiopian boundary commission studying grazing grounds to find a definitive border between British Somaliland and Ethiopia arrived at Welwel.[30]
The party contained Ethiopian and British technicians and an escort of around 600 Ethiopian soldiers. Both sides knew that the Italians had installed a military post at Welwel and were not surprised to see anItalian flag at the wells. The Ethiopian government had notified the Italian authorities in Italian Somaliland that the commission was active in the Ogaden and requested the Italians to co-operate. When the British commissioner Lieutenant-ColonelEsmond Clifford, asked the Italians for permission to camp nearby, the Italian commander, Captain Roberto Cimmaruta, rebuffed the request.[30]
Fitorari Shiferra, the commander of the Ethiopian escort, took no notice of the150 Italian and Somali troops and made camp. To avoid being caught in an Italian–Ethiopian incident, Clifford withdrew the British contingent to Ado, about 20 mi (32 km) to the north-east, and Italian aircraft began to fly over Welwel. The Ethiopian commissioners retired with the British, but the escort remained. For ten days both sides exchanged menaces, sometimes no more than 2 m apart. Reinforcements increased the Ethiopian contingent to about 1,500 men and the Italians to about 500, and on 5 December 1934, shots were fired. The Italians were supported by an armoured car and bomber aircraft. The bombs missed, but machine gunfire from the car caused about 110 Ethiopian casualties.[31] 30 to 50 Italians and Somalis were killed. The incident led to theAbyssinia Crisis at the League of Nations.[32] On 4 September 1935, the League of Nations exonerated both parties for the incident.[33]
Britain and France, preferring Italy as an ally against Germany, did not take strong steps to discourage an Italian military buildup on the borders ofItalian Eritrea andItalian Somaliland. Because of theGerman Question, Mussolini needed to deter Hitler from annexingAustria while much of the Italian Army was being deployed to theHorn of Africa, which led him to draw closer to France to provide the necessary deterrent.[34] KingVictor Emmanuel III shared the traditional Italian respect for British sea power and insisted to Mussolini that Italy must not antagonise Britain before heassented to the war.[34] In that regard, British diplomacy in the first half of 1935 greatly assisted Mussolini's efforts to win Victor Emmanuel's support for the invasion.[34]
On 7 January 1935, aFranco-Italian Agreement was made that gave Italy essentially a free hand inAfrica in return for Italian co-operation inEurope.[35]Pierre Laval told Mussolini that he wanted a Franco-Italian alliance againstNazi Germany and that Italy had a "free hand" in Ethiopia.[34] In April, Italy was further emboldened by participation in theStresa Front, an agreement to curb further German violations of theTreaty of Versailles.[36] The first draft of the communique at Stresa Summit spoke of upholding stability all over the world, but British Foreign Secretary,Sir John Simon, insisted for the final draft to declare that Britain, France and Italy were committed to upholding stability "in Europe", which Mussolini took for British acceptance of an invasion of Ethiopia.[34]
In June, non-interference was further assured by a political rift, which had developed between the United Kingdom and France, because of theAnglo-German Naval Agreement.[37] As 300,000 Italian soldiers were transferred to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland over the spring and the summer of 1935, the world's media was abuzz with speculation that Italy would soon be invading Ethiopia.[34] In June 1935,Anthony Eden arrived in Rome with the message that Britain opposed an invasion and had a compromise plan for Italy to be given a corridor in Ethiopia to link the two Italian colonies in theHorn of Africa, which Mussolini rejected outright.[34] As the Italians had broken the British naval codes, Mussolini knew of the problems in the British Mediterranean Fleet, which led him to believe that the British opposition to the invasion, which had come as an unwelcome surprise to him, was not serious and that Britain would never go to war over Ethiopia.[38]
The prospect that an Italian invasion of Ethiopia would cause a crisis in Anglo-Italian relations was seen as an opportunity inBerlin. Although Hitler did not want to seeHaile Selassie win, Germany provided some weapons to Ethiopia out of fear of quick victory for Italy.[39] The German perspective was that if Italy was bogged down in a long war in Ethiopia, that would probably lead to Britain pushing theLeague of Nations to impose sanctions on Italy, which the French would almost certainly not veto out of fear of destroying relations with Britain; that would cause a crisis in Anglo-Italian relations and allow Germany to offer its "good services" to Italy.[39] In that way, Hitler hoped to win Mussolini as an ally and to destroy theStresa Front.[39]
A final possible foreign ally of Ethiopiawas Japan, which had served as a model to some Ethiopian intellectuals. After the Welwel incident, several right-wing Japanese groups, including the Great Asianism Association and theBlack Dragon Society, attempted to raise money for the Ethiopian cause. The Japanese ambassador to Italy, Dr. Sugimura Yotaro, on 16 July assured Mussolini that Japan held no political interests in Ethiopia and would stay neutral in the coming war. His comments stirred up a furor insideJapan, where there had been popular affinity for the fellow nonwhite empire in Africa,[40] which was reciprocated with similar anger in Italy towards Japan combined with praise for Mussolini and his firm stance against the "gialli di Tokyo" ("Tokyo Yellows").[40] Despite popular opinion, when the Ethiopians approached Japan for help on 2 August, they were refused, and even a modest request for the Japanese government for an official statement of its support for Ethiopia during the coming conflict was denied.[41]
All men and boys able to carry a spear go toAddis Ababa. Every married man will bring his wife to cook and wash for him. Every unmarried man will bring any unmarried woman he can find to cook and wash for him. Women with babies, the blind, and those too aged and infirm to carry a spear are excused. Anyone found at home after receiving this order will be hanged.[42][43]
Selassie's army consisted of around 500,000 men, some of whom were armed with spears and bows. Other soldiers carried more modern weapons including rifles, but many of them were equipment from before 1900 and so were obsolete.[3] According to Italian estimates, on the eve of hostilities, the Ethiopians had an army of 350,000–760,000 men. Only about 25% of the army had any military training, and the men were armed with a motley collection of 400,000 rifles of every type and in every condition.[5] The Ethiopian Army had about 234 antiquated pieces ofartillery mounted on rigid gun carriages as well as a dozen3.7 cm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns.[44]
The army had about 800 lightColt andHotchkiss machine-guns and 250 heavyVickers andHotchkiss machine guns, about 100 .303-inch Vickers guns on AA mounts, 4820 mm Oerlikon Santi-aircraft guns and some recently purchasedCanon de 75 CA modèle 1917 Schneider75 mm field guns. The arms embargo imposed on the belligerents by France and Britain disproportionately affected Ethiopia, which lacked the manufacturing industry to produce its own weapons.[44] The Ethiopian army had some 300trucks, sevenFord A-basedarmoured cars and four World War I eraFiat 3000 tanks.[5]
The best Ethiopian units were the emperor's "Kebur Zabagna" (Imperial Guard), which were well-trained and better equipped than the other Ethiopian troops. The Imperial Guard wore a distinctive greenish-khaki uniform of theBelgian Army, which stood out from the white cotton cloak (shamma), which was worn by most Ethiopian fighters and proved to be an excellent target.[5] The skills of theRases, the Ethiopian generals armies, were reported to rate from relatively good to incompetent. After Italian objections to theAnschluss, the German annexation ofAustria,Germany sent three aeroplanes, 10,000Mauser rifles and 10 million rounds of ammunition to the Ethiopians.[44]
The serviceable portion of theEthiopian Air Force was commanded by a Frenchman, André Maillet, and included three obsoletePotez 25 biplanes.[45] A few transport aircraft had been acquired between 1934 and 1935 for ambulance work, but the Air Force had 13 aircraft and four pilots at the outbreak of the war.[7]Airspeed in England had a surplusViceroy racing plane, and its director,Neville Shute, was delighted with a good offer for the "white elephant" in August 1935. The agent said that it was to fly cinema films around Europe. When the client wanted bomb racks to carry the (flammable) films, Shute agreed to fit lugs under the wings to which they could attach "anything they liked". He was told that the plane was to be used to bomb the Italian oil storage tanks at Massawa, and when the CID enquired about the alien (ex-German) pilot practices in it Shute got the impression that the Foreign Office did not object. However, fuel, bombs and bomb racks from Finland could not reach Ethiopia in time, and the paid-for Viceroy stayed at its works. The emperor of Ethiopia had £16,000 to spend on modern aircraft to resist the Italians and planned to spend £5000 on the Viceroy and the rest on threeGloster Gladiator fighters.[46]
There were 50 foreign mercenaries who joined the Ethiopian forces, including French pilots like Pierre Corriger, American pilotJohn Robinson (aviator), the Trinidadian pilotHubert Julian, an official Swedish military mission under CaptainViking Tamm, theWhite Russian Feodor Konovalov and the Czechoslovak writer Adolf Parlesak. Several Austrian Nazis, a team of Belgian fascists, and the Cuban mercenary Alejandro del Valle also fought for Haile Selassie.[47] Many of the individuals were military advisers, pilots, doctors or supporters of the Ethiopian cause; 50 mercenaries fought in the Ethiopian army and another 50 people were active in the EthiopianRed Cross or nonmilitary activities.[48] The Italians later attributed most of the relative success achieved by the Ethiopians to foreigners, orferenghi.[49] (The Italian propaganda machine magnified the number to thousands to explain away theEthiopian Christmas Offensive in late 1935.)[50]
A formerOttoman general namedWehib Pasha also served as a military advisor with the Ethiopian army during the war, notably designing a defensive line for Ethiopian troops known as the "Hindenburg Wall", which was broken through by Italian troops during theBattle of the Ogaden in 1936.
Italian soldiers recruited in 1935 inMontevarchi to fight the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.
There were 400,000 Italian soldiers in Eritrea and 285,000 in Italian Somaliland with 3,300 machine guns, 275 artillery pieces, 200tankettes and 205 aircraft. In April 1935, the reinforcement of theRoyal Italian Army (Regio Esercito) and theRegia Aeronautica (Royal Air Force) in East Africa (Africa Orientale) accelerated. Eight regular, mountain andblackshirt militia infantry divisions arrived in Eritrea, and four regular infantry divisions arrived in Italian Somaliland, about 685,000 soldiers and a great number of logistical and support units; the Italians included 200 journalists.[51] The Italians had 6,000 machine guns, 2,000 pieces of artillery, 599 tanks and 390 aircraft. TheRegia Marina (Royal Navy) carried tons of ammunition, food and other supplies, with the motor vehicles to move them, but the Ethiopians had only horse-drawn carts.[8]
The Italians placed considerable reliance on their Corps of Colonial Troops (Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali, RCTC) of indigenous regiments recruited from the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somalia andLibya. The most effective of the Italian commanded units were the Eritrean native infantry (Ascari), which was often used as advanced troops. The Eritreans also provided cavalry and artillery units; the "Falcon Feathers" (Penne di Falco) was one prestigious and colourful Eritrean cavalry unit. Other RCTC units during the invasion of Ethiopia were irregular Somali frontier troops (dubats), regular Arab-Somali infantry and artillery and infantry from Libya.[52]
The Italians had a variety of local semi-independent "allies" in the north, and theAzebu Galla were among several groups induced to fight for the Italians. In the south, the Somali sultanOlol Dinle commanded a personal army, which advanced into the northern Ogaden with the forces of ColonelLuigi Frusci. The sultan was motivated by his desire to take back lands that the Ethiopians had taken from him. The Italian colonial forces even included men fromYemen, across theGulf of Aden.[53]
The Italians were reinforced by volunteers from the so-calledItaliani all'estero, members of theItalian diaspora fromArgentina,Uruguay andBrazil; they formed the 221st Legion in theDivisione Tevere, which a specialLegione Parini fought under Frusci near Dire Dawa.[54] On 28 March 1935, GeneralEmilio De Bono was named the commander-in-chief of all Italian armed forces in East Africa.[55] De Bono was also the commander-in-chief of the forces invading from Eritrea on the northern front. De Bono commanded nine divisions in the Italian I Corps, the Italian II Corps and the Eritrean Corps. GeneralRodolfo Graziani was commander-in-chief of forces invading from Italian Somaliland on the southern front.[56]
Initially, he had two divisions and a variety of smaller units under his command: a mixture of Italians, Somalis, Eritreans, Libyans and others. De Bono regarded Italian Somaliland as a secondary theatre, whose primary need was to defend itself, but it could aid the main front with offensive thrusts if the enemy forces were not too large there.[56] Most foreigners accompanied the Ethiopians, butHerbert Matthews, a reporter and historian who wroteEyewitness in Abyssinia: With Marshal Bodoglio's forces to Addis Ababa (1937), andPedro del Valle, an observer forUS Marine Corps, accompanied the Italian forces.[57]
A map showing the military actions from 1935 to February 1936A map showing the military actions from February to May 1936Italian notice, signed by generalEmilio De Bono, proclaiming the abolishment of slavery inTigray inItalian andAmharic. The abolition of slavery was one of the first measures taken by the Italian occupation government in Ethiopia.
At 5:00 am on 3 October 1935, De Bono crossed theMareb River and advanced into Ethiopia from Eritrea without adeclaration of war.[58] General De Bono's attack force included I East African Army Corps, under GeneralRuggero Santini, on the left; II East African Army Corps, under Lieutenant General Pietro Maravigna, on the right, and the Eritrean Army Corps (Corpo d'Armata Indigeni), under GeneralAlessandro Pirzio Biroli, in the center. On De Bono's flanks, the eastern lowlands included the 13th and 26th Colonial battalions, a Libyan battalion, and three irregular bands in the regions of Massawa, northern Danakil, and southern Danakil. The western lowlands included the 27th and 28th Colonial battalions, a unit of irregulars and Libyan volunteers supported by the 17th Colonial Battalion.[59]
At this point in the campaign, the lack of roads represented a serious hindrance for the Italians as they crossed into Ethiopia. On the Eritrean side, roads had been constructed right up to the border. On the Ethiopian side, these roads often transitioned into vaguely defined paths,[58] and the Italian army usedaerial photography[60] to plan its advance, as well as mustard gas attacks.
On 5 October the Italian I Corps tookAdigrat, and by 6 October,Adwa (Adowa) was captured by the Italian II Corps. Haile Selassie had orderedDuke (Ras)Seyoum Mangasha, the Commander of the EthiopianArmy of Tigre, to withdraw a day's march away from the Mareb River. Later, the Emperor ordered his son-in-law and Commander of the Gate (Dejazmach)Haile Selassie Gugsa, also in the area, to move back 89 and 56 km (55 and 35 mi) from the border.[58]
On 11 October, Gugsa surrendered with 1,200 followers at the Italian outpost atIdaga Hamus. Italian propagandists lavishly publicised the surrender but fewer than a tenth of Gugsa's men defected with him.[61] On 14 October, De Bono proclaimed the end ofslavery in Ethiopia but this liberated the former slave owners from the obligation to feed their former slaves, in the unsettled conditions caused by the war.[b] Much of the livestock in the area had been moved to the south to feed the Ethiopian army and many of the emancipated people had no choice but to appeal to the Italian authorities for food.[61] By 15 October, De Bono's forces had advanced from Adwa and occupied the holy capital ofAxum. De Bono entered the city riding on a white horse and then looted theObelisk of Axum.[63] To Mussolini's dismay, the advance was methodical and on 8 November, the I Corps and the Eritrean Corps capturedMekelle. The Italian advance had added 56 mi (90 km) to the line of supply and De Bono wanted to build a road from Adigrat before continuing.[64][65]
In early October 1935,Rodolfo Graziani began the southern campaign by deploying mobile columns of motorized troops supported by tanks and theRegia Aeronautica. The Italians faced steady Ethiopian resistance by the troops ofAfawarq Walda Samayat in the valley of River Fafan, at Gorahai. Only after Afawarq was mortally wounded on 7 November, the Italians captured Gorahai, a victory that facilitated the future advance on Harar andJijiga. Graziani hoped that the occupation of these two towns would allow his soldiers to prevent weapons’ shipments destined for the Emperor’s forces from entering Ethiopia from British Somaliland. From Gorahai, the Italians deployed 120 miles up the Fafan valley toDegehabur. Attacks of the troops ofNasibu Zeamanuel against Graziani’s rear units forced the column to return to Gorahai. Meanwhile, another Italian column advanced to Degehabur but had to withdraw just north of Gorahai. By late 1935, Graziani, disposing over a small number of troops, remained largely on the defensive, also being effectively blocked by the army of Nasibu inHararghe and the army ofDesta Damtew inDolo. Heavy rains also contributed to Graziani’s lack of progress.[66]
In November 1935, Brigadier General Oreste Mariotti penetrated theDanakil Desert from Kulul after being assembled at the Eritrean port of Fatima Eri. Securing the left flank of the Italian army, Mariotti and his troops marched across the desert, ascended up the Tigrean plateau, where they repelled an attack ofDejazmach Kasa Sebhat’s troops on 12–13 November atAtsbi. The force then continued toMekelle, where it joined the troops of I Corps.[67]
In early December 1935, theHoare–Laval Pact was proposed by Britain and France. Italy would gain the best parts of Ogaden and Tigray and economic influence over all the south. Abyssinia would have a guaranteed corridor to the sea at the port ofAssab; the corridor was a poor one and known as a "corridor for camels".[68] Mussolini was ready to play along with considering the Hoare-Laval Pact, rather than rejecting it outright, to avoid a complete break with Britain and France, but he kept demanding changes to the plan before he would accept it as a way to stall for more time to allow his army to conquer Ethiopia.[69] Mussolini was not prepared to abandon the goal of conquering Ethiopia, but the imposition of League of Nations sanctions on Italy caused much alarm in Rome.[70]
The war was wildly popular with the Italian people, who relished Mussolini's defiance of the League as an example of Italian greatness. Even if Mussolini had been willing to stop the war, the move would have been very unpopular in Italy.[69] Kallis wrote, "Especially after the imposition of sanctions in November 1935, the popularity of the Fascist regime reached unprecedented heights".[69] On 13 December, details of the pact were leaked by a French newspaper and denounced as a sellout of the Ethiopians. The British government disassociated itself from the pact and British Foreign Secretary SirSamuel Hoare was forced to resign in disgrace.[71]
Haile Selassie with Red Cross members
In December 1935, the Ethiopian army completed its mobilization and prepared to launch theChristmas Offensive. The Christmas Offensive was intended to split the Italian forces in the north with the Ethiopian centre, crushing the Italian left with the Ethiopian right and to invade Eritrea with the Ethiopian left.Ras Seyum Mangasha held the area aroundAbiy Addi with about 30,000 men. Selassie with about 40,000 men advanced fromGojjam toward Mai Timket to the left ofRas Seyoum.Ras Kassa Haile Darge with around 40,000 men advanced fromDessie to supportRas Seyoum in the centre in a push towards Warieu Pass.Ras Mulugeta Yeggazu, the Minister of War, advanced from Dessie with approximately 80,000 men to take positions on and aroundAmba Aradam to the right ofRas Seyoum. Amba Aradam was a steep sided, flat topped mountain directly in the way of an Italian advance on Addis Ababa.[72] The four commanders had approximately 190,000 men facing the Italians.Ras Imru and hisArmy of Shire were on the Ethiopian left.Ras Seyoum and his Army of Tigre andRas Kassa and his Army ofBeghemder were the Ethiopian centre.Ras Mulugeta and his "Army of the Center" (Mahel Sefari) were on the Ethiopian right.[72]
On 15 December, a battle took place in the region of May Timket, not far fromTekeze River, where the soldiers ofRas Imru advancing fromBegemder attacked a unit ofCamicie Nere led by Major Criniti. In the following days, there were fierce battles at the Dembeguina Pass along the Gondar-Adwa track, with heavy losses for both sides (the Italians lost some 15 tankettes).Ras Imru's troops failed to widen the assault; however, the Italians also had to withdraw from large territory, withdrawing closer to their main positions at Aksum.Ras Seyoum's army attempted an assault inTembien, atAbiy Addi, which the Italians repelled thanks to their superior fire power, but they had to withdraw their positions to the north again.[73]
The Ethiopian counteroffensive managed to stop the Italian advance for a few weeks, but the superiority of the Italian's weaponry (artillery and machine guns) as well as aerial bombardment withchemical weapons, at first withmustard gas prevented the Ethiopians from taking advantage of their initial successes. The Ethiopians in general were very poorly armed, with few machine guns. Having spent a decade accumulating poison gas in East Africa, Mussolini gave Badoglio authority to resort toSchrecklichkeit (frightfulness), which included destroying villages and using gas (OC 23/06, 28 December 1935). Mussolini was even prepared to resort to bacteriological warfare as long as these methods could be kept quiet. Some Italians objected when they found out but the practices were kept secret, the government issuing denials or spurious stories blaming the Ethiopians.[74][c]
As the progress of the Christmas Offensive slowed, Italian plans to renew the advance on the northern front began as Mussolini had given permission to usepoison gas (but notmustard gas) and Badoglio received the ItalianIII Corps and the ItalianIV Corps in Eritrea during early 1936. Late in the year,Ras Desta Damtu assembled up his army in the area aroundDolo to invade Italian Somaliland. Between 12 and 16 January 1936, the Italians defeated the Ethiopians at theBattle of Genale Doria. TheRegia Aeronautica destroyed the army ofRas Desta, Ethiopians claiming that poison gas was used.[76] On 20 January, the Italians resumed their northern offensive at theFirst Battle of Tembien (20 to 24 January) in the broken terrain between the Warieu Pass and Makale. The forces of Ras Kassa were defeated, the Italians usingphosgene gas and suffering 1,082 casualties against 8,000 Ethiopian casualties according to an Ethiopian wireless message intercepted by the Italians.[77] Despite these impressive victories, on 30 January 1936, Mussolini warned the Italian public that at least another year would be required to complete the conquest of Ethiopia.[78]
[It]...was at the time when the operations for the encircling of Makale were taking place that the Italian command, fearing a rout, followed the procedure which it is now my duty to denounce to the world. Special sprayers were installed on board aircraft so that they could vaporize, over vast areas of territory, a fine, death-dealing rain. Groups of nine, fifteen, eighteen aircraft followed one another so that the fog issuing from them formed a continuous sheet. It was thus that, as from the end of January 1936, soldiers, women, children, cattle, rivers, lakes, and pastures were drenched continually with this deadly rain. To systematically kill all living creatures, to more surely poison waters and pastures, the Italian command made its aircraft pass over and over again. That was its chief method of warfare.
From 10 to 19 February, the Italians captured Amba Aradam and destroyedRas Mulugeta's army in theBattle of Amba Aradam (Battle of Enderta). The Ethiopians suffered massive losses and poison gas destroyed a small part ofRas Mulugeta's army, according to the Ethiopians. During the slaughter following the attempted withdrawal of his army, bothRas Mulugeta and his son were killed. The Italians lost 800 killed and wounded while the Ethiopians lost 6,000 killed and 12,000 wounded. From 27 to 29 February, the armies ofRas Kassa andRas Seyoum were destroyed at theSecond Battle of Tembien. Ethiopians again argued that poison gas played a role in the destruction of the withdrawing armies.[80]
In early March, the army ofRas Imru was attacked, bombed and defeated in what was known as theBattle of Shire. In the battles of Amba Aradam, Tembien and Shire, the Italians suffered about 2,600 casualties and the Ethiopians about 15,000; Italian casualties at the Battle of Shire being 969 men. The Italian victories stripped the Ethiopian defences on the northern front, Tigré province had fallen most of the Ethiopian survivors returned home or took refuge in the countryside and only the army guarding Addis Ababa stood between the Italians and the rest of the country.[80]
On 20 March the East African Fast Column (Colonna Celere dell'Africa Orientale) of GeneralAchille Starace, composed of some 3,000 troops on more than 400 vehicles, entered Ethiopia fromOmhajer. After a difficult 380 km march, on 1 April the Italians occupiedGondar without a fight, and soon took the region aroundLake Tana. Another Italian column went along the Sudanese border, closing British supply routes. The troops of II Corps reached Gondar via May Timket andDebarq. Additionally, an Italian column of 17,000 men deployed fromAssab capturedAussa on the same day, a town that controlled one of the main caravan routes to Addis Ababa.[81]
On 31 March 1936 at theBattle of Maychew, the Italians defeated an Ethiopiancounter-offensive by the main Ethiopian army commanded by Selassie. The Ethiopians launched near non-stopattacks on the Italian and Eritrean defenders but could not overcome the well-prepared Italian defences. When the exhausted Ethiopians withdrew, the Italians counter-attacked. TheRegia Aeronautica attacked the survivors atLake Ashangi with mustard gas. The Italian troops had 400 casualties, the Eritreans 874 and the Ethiopians suffered 8,900 casualties from 31,000 men present according to an Italian estimate.[82] The defeat at Maychew caused the Ethiopian army to disintegrate, the demoralized troops began to desert in large numbers, and various tribal chiefs accepted Italian bribes and turned against the Imperial forces.[83]
Column of Italian colonial troops and vehicles in Ethiopia
After a lull in the Southern front, the Italians in the south prepared an advance towards the city ofHarar. On 22 March, theRegia Aeronautica bombed Harar andJijiga, reducing them to ruins even though Harar had been declared an "open city".[84] On 14 April, Graziani launched his attack againstRasNasibu Emmanual to defeat the last Ethiopian army in the field at theBattle of the Ogaden. The Ethiopians were drawn up behind a defensive line that was termed the "Hindenburg Wall", designed by the chief of staff of Ras Nasibu, andWehib Pasha, a seasoned ex-Ottoman commander. After ten days, the last Ethiopian army had disintegrated; 2,000 Italian soldiers and 5,000 Ethiopian soldiers were killed or wounded.[85]
Column of Italian troops marchingItalian colonial troops advance on Addis Ababa
On 7 April 1936, an increasingly desperateHaile Selassie issued a proclamation that called to arms all Ethiopian males capable of military service. However, most of those who responded lacked military training and, at best, had antiquated weapons. This disparity was coupled with vicious Italian tactics like mass executions of Ethiopian soldiers and civilians and the use of chemical weapons. On 26 April 1936, Badoglio began the "March of the Iron Will" from Dessie to Addis Ababa, an advance with a mechanised column against slight Ethiopian resistance.[86][87]
Meanwhile, Selassie conducted a disorganized retreat towards the capital. There, government officials operated without leadership, unable to contact the Emperor and unsure of his whereabouts.[88] Realizing that Addis Ababa would soon fall to the Italians, Ethiopian administrators met to discuss a possible evacuation of the government to the west. After several days, they decided that they should relocate toGore, though actual preparations for their departure were postponed.[89] Addis Ababa became crowded with retreating soldiers from the front while its foreign residents sought refuge at various European legations.[90] Selassie reached the capital on 30 April. That day hisCouncil of Ministers resolved that the city should be defended and a retreat to Gore conducted only as a last resort.[90]
The following day an ad hoc council of Ethiopian nobles convened to re-examine the decision, where RasAberra Kassa suggested that the Emperor should go to Geneva to appeal to the League of Nations for assistance before returning to lead resistance against the Italians. The view was subsequently adopted by Selassie and preparations were made for his departure.[91] On 2 May, Selassie boarded a train fromAddis Ababa toDjibouti, with the gold of the Ethiopian Central Bank. From there he fled to the United Kingdom, with the tacit acquiescence of the Italians who could have bombed his train, into exile (Mussolini had refused a request from Graziani to mount such an attack.[92])
Before he departed, Selassie ordered that the government of Ethiopia be moved to Gore and directed the mayor of Addis Ababa to maintain order in the city until the Italians' arrival.Imru Haile Selassie was appointedPrince Regent during his absence. The city police, underAbebe Aregai and the remainder of the Imperial Guard did their utmost to restrain a growing crowd but rioters rampaged throughout the city, looting and setting fire to shops owned by Europeans. Most of the violence occurred between looters, fighting over the spoils and by 5 May, much of the city lay in ruins.[93] At 04:00 Badoglio drove into the city at the head of 1,600 lorries and patrols of Italian tanks, troops and Carabinieri were sent to occupy tactically valuable areas in the city, as the remaining inhabitants watched sullenly.[94]
After the occupation of Addis Ababa, nearly half of Ethiopia was still unoccupied and the fighting continued for another three years until nearly 90% was "pacified" just beforeWorld War II, although censorship kept this from the Italian public.[1] Ethiopian commanders withdrew to nearby areas to regroup; Abebe Aregai went toAnkober,Balcha Safo toGurage, Zewdu Asfaw toMulo, Blatta Takale Wolde Hawariat toLimmu and the Kassa brothers—Aberra,Wondosson andAsfawossen—to Selale. Haile Mariam conductedhit-and-run attacks around the capital.[95] About 10,000 troops remaining under the command of Aberra Kassa had orders from Selassie to continue resistance.[95]
On 10 May 1936, Italian troops from the northern front and from the southern front met atDire Dawa.[96] The Italians found the recently released Ethiopian Ras,Hailu Tekle Haymanot, who boarded a train back to Addis Ababa and approached the Italian invaders in submission.[97] Imru Haile Selassie fell back to Gore in southern Ethiopia to reorganise and continue to resist the Italians. In early June, the Italian government promulgated a constitution forAfrica Orientale Italiana (AOI,Italian East Africa) bringing Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland together into an administrative unit of six provinces. Badoglio became the firstViceroy andGovernor General but on 11 June, he was replaced by Marshal Graziani.[98]
On 21 June Kassa held a meeting with BishopAbune Petros and several other Patriot leaders atDebre Libanos, about 70 km (43 mi) north of Addis Ababa. Plans were made to storm parts of the capital but a lack of transport and radio equipment prevented a co-ordinated attack.[95] In July, Ethiopian forces attacked Addis Ababa and were routed. Numerous members of Ethiopian royalty were taken prisoner and others were executed soon after they surrendered.[98] The exiled government in Gore was never able to provide any meaningful leadership to the Patriots or remaining military formations but sporadic resistance by independent groups persisted around the capital.[95]
On the night 26 June, members of theArbegnoch destroyed three Italian aircraft inNekemte and killed twelve Italian officials, including Air MarshalVincenzo Magliocco and aviatorAntonio Locatelli, after the Italians had sent the party to parley with the local populace. Graziani ordered the town to be bombed in retaliation for the killings (Magliocco was his deputy). Local hostility forced out the Patriots and Desta Damtew, commander of the southern Patriots, withdrew his troops toArbegona. Surrounded by Italian forces, they retreated toButajira, where they were eventually defeated. An estimated 4,000 Patriots were reportedly killed in both engagements, 1,600 of whom—including Damtew—after being taken prisoner.[99] On 19 December, Wondosson Kassa was executed nearDebre Zebit and on 21 December, Aberra Kassa and Asfawossen Kassa were executed inFikke. In late 1936, after the Italians tracked him down in Gurage,Dejazmach Balcha Safo was killed in battle.[98] On 19 December, Ras Imru surrendered at the Gojeb river.[100]
After the end of the rainy season, an Italian column left Addis Ababa in September and occupied Gore a month later. The forces ofRas Imru were trapped between the Italians and the Sudan border and Imru surrendered on 19 December. Imru was flown to Italy and imprisoned on the Island ofPonza, while the rest of theEthiopian prisoners taken in the war were dispersed in camps in East Africa and Italy. A second column went south-west to attackRas Desta and theDejasmatch Gabre Mariam who had assembled military forces in the Great Lakes district. The Ethiopians were defeated on 16 December and by January, the Italians had established a measure of control over the provinces of Jimma, Kafa and Arusi. After another two months, the remaining Ethiopians were surrounded and fought on, rather than surrender. Mariam was killed.[101] On 19 February 1937 the last battle of the war occurred when remnants of the Armies of Sidamo and Bale clashed with Italian forces at Gogetti, and were defeated.[2]
That same date, 19 February 1937 – Yekatit 12 according to theGe'ez calendar – saw the attempted assassination of Marshal Graziani by Eritrean rebelsAbraham Deboch andMogos Asgedom inAddis Ababa. The campaign of reprisals visited by the Italians upon the population of Addis Ababa has been described as the worst massacre in Ethiopian history.[102] Estimates vary on the number of people killed in the three days that followed the attempt on Graziani's life. Ethiopian sources estimated that 30,000 people were killed by the Italians, while Italian sources claimed that only a few hundred were killed. A 2017 history of the massacre estimated that 19,200 people were killed, 20 percent of the population of Addis Ababa.[17] Over the following week, numerous Ethiopians suspected of opposing Italian rule were rounded up and executed, including members of theBlack Lions and other members of the aristocracy. Many more were imprisoned, even collaborators such asRas Gebre Haywot, the son ofRasMikael of Wollo, Brehane Markos, and Ayale Gebre, who had helped the Italians identify the two men who made the attempt on Graziani's life.[103]
According to Mockler, "Italiancarabinieri had fired into the crowds of beggars and poor assembled for the distribution of alms; and it is said that the Federal Secretary, Guido Cortese, even fired his revolver into the group of Ethiopian dignitaries standing around him."[104] Hours later, Cortese gave the fatal order:
Comrades, today is the day when we should show our devotion to our Viceroy by reacting and destroying the Ethiopians for three days. For three days I give you ''carte blanche'' to destroy and kill and do what you want to the Ethiopians.[104]
Italians doused native houses withpetrol and set them on fire. They broke into the homes of localGreeks andArmenians and lynched their servants. Some even posed on the corpses of their victims to have their photographs taken.[104] The first day of the massacre has been commemorated as "Yekatit 12" (19 February) by Ethiopians ever since. There is aYekatit 12 monument in Addis Ababa in memory of these Ethiopian victims of Italian aggression.
In 1968, Colonel A. J. Barker wrote that from 1 January 1935 to 31 May 1936, the Italian army and Blackshirt units lost1,148 men killed,125 men died of wounds and thirty-one missing; about1,593 Eritrean troops and453 civilian workmen were also killed, a total of3,319 casualties.[18] In a 1978 publication, Alberto Sbacchi wrote that these official Italian casualty figures of about3,000 were an underestimate.[105] Sbacchi wrote that the official total of Italian casualties was unreliable, because the regime desired to underestimate Italian losses.[106]Angelo Del Boca estimates the total Italian losses up to 31 December 1936 (including more than six months of guerrilla warfare after the end of the conflict) speak of 2,317 dead for the Italian army, 1,165 for theBlackshirts, 193 from the air force, 56 from the navy, 78 civilians in the Gondrand shipyard massacre, 453 factory workers and 88 merchant marines, for a total of 4,350 Italians killed.[9] To these figures must be added approximately 9,000 injured and 18,200 repatriated due to illness.[10] Estimates on the losses of the askaris, however very vague, he puts it at 4,500 killed.[9] From 1936 to 1940, there was an additional9,555 men killed and144,000 sick and wounded.[107] Total Italian casualties from 1935 to 1940 according to these calculations were about 208,000 killed or wounded. Based on1,911 Italians killed in the first six months of 1940, Ministry of Africa figures for 6 May 1936 to 10 June 1940 are8,284 men killed, which Sbacchi considered to be fairly accurate.[25]
There was a lack of reliable statistics because confusion during the invasion made it difficult to keep accurate records and theStatistical Bulletin had ceased to provide data on fatalities. Field hospital records had been destroyed, inventories dispersed, individual deaths were not reported and bodies were not repatriated to Italy. Unpublished reports listed3,694 military and civilian fatalities among44,000 casualties and from May 1936 to June 1940, there were another12,248 military and civilian fatalities in144,000 casualties.[108] The Italian estimation of Ethiopian losses are50,000 men killed in the Northern front and20,000 men killed in the Southern front for a total of70,000 battle deaths. Conversely, in a memorandum submitted to the Paris conference in 1946, the Ethiopian government enumerated275,000 men killed in action,78,500 Patriots killed in hostilities during the occupation from 1936 to 1941,17,800 women and children killed by bombing,30,000 people killed in the massacre of February 1937,35,000 people died in concentration camps,24,000 Patriots killed in obedience to orders from summary courts,300,000 people died after their villages had been destroyed, a total of760,300 deaths.[109] However, Del Boca claims that these figures are unreliable and were likely exaggerated to extract more reparations. He asserts that the Italian estimation is more accurate.[9]
Italian military forces used between 300 and 500 tons of mustard gas to attack both military and civilian targets,[110] despite being a signatory to the 1925Geneva Protocol banning the practice. This gas had been produced duringWorld War I and subsequently transported to East Africa.J. F. C. Fuller, who was present in Ethiopia during the conflict, stated that mustard gas "was the decisive tactical factor in the war."[111] HistorianWalter Laqueur estimates that up to one-third of Ethiopian casualties of the war were caused by chemical weapons.[112]
The Italians claimed that their use of gas was justified by the execution ofTito Minniti and his observer in Ogaden by Ethiopian forces.[113] However, the use of gas was authorized by Mussolini nearly two months before Minniti's death on 26 December 1935, as evidenced by the following order:
Rome, October 27, 1935. To His Excellency Graziani. The use of gas as anultima ratio to overwhelm enemy resistance and in case of counter-attack is authorized. Mussolini.[22]
After Minniti's death, the order was expanded to use of gas "on a vast scale":
Rome, December 28, 1935. To His Excellency Badoglio. Given the enemy system I have authorized Your Excellency the use even on a vast scale of any gas and flamethrowers. Mussolini.[22]
Military and civilian targets were gas bombed and on 30 December, aRed Cross unit was bombed at Dolo and an Egyptian ambulance was attacked at Bulale; a few days later an Egyptian medical unit was bombed at Daggah Bur. There were more attacks in January and February, then on 4 March 1936, a British Red Cross camp near Quoram appeared to be subject to the most deliberate attack of all, when low-flying Italian aircraft crews could not have missed the big Red Cross signs.[57] Mustard gas was also sprayed from above on Ethiopian combatants and villages. The Italians tried to keep their resort to chemical warfare secret but were exposed by the International Red Cross and many foreign observers. The Italians claimed that at least 19 bombardments of Red Cross tents "posted in the areas of military encampment of the Ethiopian resistance", had been "erroneous".[citation needed]
The Italians delivered poison gas bygas shell and in bombs dropped by theRegia Aeronautica. Though poorly equipped, the Ethiopians had achieved some success against modern weaponry but had no defence against the "terrible rain that burned and killed".[114]
In general, historians concluded that the use of chemical weapons was effective and devastating to morale and manpower, though some disagree and argue that they had negligible effect in battle.[115] HistorianAngelo Del Boca condemned the use of gas, but argued that it had only a minimal effect on Italian war aims.[116] An analysis by theStockholm International Peace Research Institute argued that the use of chemical weapons shifted the war in favor of the Italians, and dealt a major blow to Ethiopian morale.[117]
American and British military analysis came to similar conclusions. The US military concluded that "Chemical weapons were devastating against the unprepared and unprotected Ethiopians."[118] British Major General J. F. C. Fuller, assigned to the Italian army, noted that "In place of the laborious process of picketing the heights, the heights sprayed with gas were rendered unoccupiable by the enemy, save at the gravest risk. It was an exceedingly cunning use of this chemical."[118]
Haile Selassie in his report to the League of Nations described it:
....Special sprayers were installed on board aircraft so they could vaporize over vast areas of territory a fine, death-dealing rain. Groups of 9, 15, or 18 aircraft followed one another so that the fog issuing from them formed a continuous sheet. It was thus that, as from the end of January 1936, soldiers, women, children, cattle, rivers, lakes, and pastures were drenched continually with this deadly rain. In order more surely to poison the waters and pastures, the Italian command made its aircraft pass over and over again. These fearful tactics succeeded. Men and animals succumbed. The deadly rain that fell from the aircraft made all those whom it touched fly shrieking with pain. All those who drank poisoned water or ate infected food also succumbed in dreadful suffering. In tens of thousands the victims of Italian mustard gas fell.
Ethiopian troops useddum-dum bullets, which had been banned by declaration IV, 3 of theHague Convention (1899) and began mutilating capturedEritrean Askari (often withcastration) beginning in the first weeks of war.[26] Some hundreds of colonial Eritrean Ascari and dozens of Italians suffered these amputations, often done before death as allegedly happened to 17 Italian workers emasculated inGondrand in February 1936.[119]
During the first months of the invasion, Italian forces adopted an unofficial policy of "take no prisoners" and frequently executed surrendering enemy combatants, including their commanders. In May 1936, Mussolini issued an order to Graziani stating that “all rebels taken prisoner must be shot," which he followed up weeks later with further instructions to commit mass murder of "rebels" by saying “I repeat my authorization to Your Excellency to initiate and systematically conduct a policy of terror and extermination.”[120]
Medal commemorating the role of the Italian Eritrean colonial troops in the warHaile Selassie's resistance to the Italian invasion made himTime Man of the Year 1935.
Italy's military victory overshadowed concerns about the economy.[121][122] Mussolini was at the height of his popularity in May 1936 with the proclamation of the Italian empire.[69] His biographer,Renzo De Felice, called the war "Mussolini's masterpiece" as for a brief moment he had been able to create something resembling a national consensus both in favor of himself and his regime.[123] When Badoglio returned to Italy, he received a snub, as Mussolini made certain that the honours bestowed on Badoglio received fell short of those granted to an Italian "national hero", in order to present the victory as an achievement of the Fascist system rather than as an achievement of the traditional Italian elites, of which Badoglio was a member.[124] A sign of Mussolini's increased power and popularity after the war was his creation of a new military rank; First Marshal of the Italian Empire, to which he promoted both himself and King Victor Emmanuel III, thus putting the prime minister on a theoretical level of equality with the king.[124]
Haile Selassie passes throughJerusalem on his way to exile in England.
We have decided to bring to an end the most unequal, most unjust, most barbarous war of our age, and have chosen the road to exile in order that our people will not be exterminated and in order to consecrate ourselves wholly and in peace to the preservation of our empire's independence... we now demand that the League of Nations should continue its efforts to secure respect for the covenant, and that it should decide not to recognize territorial extensions, or the exercise of an assumed sovereignty, resulting from the illegal recourse to armed force and to numerous other violations of international agreements.[125]
The Ethiopian Emperor's telegram caused several nations to temporarily defer recognition of the Italian conquest.[125]
How the Italian public felt about being against or for the war has a degree of uncertanty surrounding it as the general public did not have freedom of expression and censorship was practied. Punishments for speaking out against the war varied. No sizeable resistance movement developed in Italy toward the war although a number of acts of resistance did occur with several mutinies and acts of sabotage happening. Initially the public was concerned about the risk of the British intervening in the conflict.[126]
On 30 June, Selassie spoke at the League of Nations and was introduced by thePresident of the Assembly as "His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia" ("Sa Majesté Imperiale, l'Empereur d'Ethiopie"). A group of jeering Italian journalists began yelling insults and were expelled before he could speak. In response, theRomanian chairman,Nicolae Titulescu, jumped to his feet and shouted "Show the savages the door!" ("À la porte les sauvages!").[127] Selassie denounced Italian aggression and criticised the world community for standing by. At the conclusion of his speech, which appeared onnewsreels throughout the world, he said "It is us today. It will be you tomorrow". France appeased Italy because it could not afford to risk an alliance between Italy and Germany; Britain decided that its military weakness meant that it had to follow France's lead.[128][129] Selassie's resolution to the League to deny recognition of the Italian conquest was defeated and he was denied a loan to finance a resistance movement.[130] On 4 July 1936, the League voted to end the sanctions imposed against Italy in November 1935. By 15 July, the sanctions were at an end.[131][d]
On 18 November 1936, theItalian Empire was recognised by theEmpire of Japan and Italy recognised the Japanese occupation ofManchuria, marking the end of theStresa Front.[133][134] Hitler had supplied the Ethiopians with 16,000 rifles and 600 machine guns in the hope that Italy would be weakened when he moved against Austria.[14] By contrast, France and Britain recognised Italian control over Ethiopia in 1938.Mexico was the only country to strongly condemn Italy's sovereignty over Ethiopia, respecting Ethiopian independence throughout. Including Mexico, only six nations in 1937 did not recognise the Italian occupation:China, New Zealand, the Soviet Union,Republican Spain and the United States.[135][136] Three years later, only the USSR officially recognised Selassie and the United States government considered recognising the Italian Empire with Ethiopia included.[137] The invasion of Ethiopia and its general condemnation by Western democracies isolated Mussolini and Fascist Italy until 1938. From 1936 to 1939, Mussolini and Hitler joined forces to support the fascist camp during theSpanish Civil War. In April 1939, Mussolini launched theItalian invasion of Albania. In May, Italy and Nazi Germany joined in thePact of Steel. In September 1940, both nations signed theTripartite Pact along with the Empire of Japan.[citation needed]
The conflict has been described by historian Brenda Plummer as triggering the first "great manifestation" ofAfrican American interest in foreign affairs, despite the financial limitations imposed by theGreat Depression and the US government's interwar commitment toneutrality.[138][139] Largescale organised responses to Italy's attack on Ethiopia included a peaceful demonstration in New York City on 18 August 1935 and Chicago on 1 September.[139][140] HistorianJacquelyn Dowd Hall situates these developments in her chronology of a "long civil rights movement" in which she traces the emergence of a blackpopular front in the 1930s.[141]
On 10 May 1936, Italian troops from the northern front and from the southern front met at Dire Dawa.[96] The Italians found the recently released Ethiopian Ras,Hailu Tekle Haymanot, who boarded a train back to Addis Ababa and approached the Italian invaders in submission.[97] On 21 December 1937, Rome appointedAmedeo, 3rd Duke of Aosta, as the new Viceroy and Governor General of Italian East Africa with instructions to take a more conciliatory line.
Aosta instituted public works projects including 3,200 km (2,000 mi) of new paved roadways, 25 hospitals, 14 hotels, dozens of post offices, telephone exchanges, aqueducts, schools and shops. The Italians decreedmiscegenation to be illegal.[142] Racial separation, including residential segregation, was enforced as thoroughly as possible and the Italians showed favouritism to non-Christian groups.
To isolate the dominantAmhara rulers of Ethiopia, who supported Selassie, the Italians granted theOromos, theSomalis and other Muslims, many of whom had supported the invasion, autonomy and rights. The Italians also definitively abolishedslavery and abrogatedfeudal laws that had been upheld by the Amharas. Early in 1938, a revolt broke out in Gojjam, led by the Committee of Unity and Collaboration, made up of some of the young, educated elite who had escaped reprisals after the assassination attempt on Graziani. The general oversaw another wave of reprisals and had all Ethiopians in administrative jobs murdered, some by being thrown from aircraft, after being taken on board under the pretext of visiting the King inRome, leading to the saying "He went to Rome".[143]
Duke of Aosta
The army of occupation had 150,000 men but was spread thinly; by 1941 the garrison had been increased to 250,000 soldiers, including 75,000Italian civilians. The former police chief of Addis Ababa, Abebe Aregai, was the most successful leader of the Ethiopian guerrilla movement after 1937, using units of fifty men. On 11 December, theLeague of Nations voted to condemn Italy and Mussolini withdrew from the League.[144] Along with world condemnation, the occupation was expensive, the budget for AOI from 1936 to 1937 required 19,136 billionlire for infrastructure, when the annual revenue of Italy was only 18,581 billion lire.[145]
Soldiers of the West African Frontier Force removing Italian frontier markers from the Kenya–Italian Somaliland border, 1941
While in exile in the United Kingdom, Haile Selassie had sought the support of the Western democracies for his cause but had little success until the Second World War began. On 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on France and Britain and attacked British andCommonwealth forces inEgypt,Sudan, Kenya andBritish Somaliland. In August 1940, theItalian conquest of British Somaliland was completed. The British and Selassie incited Ethiopian and other local forces to join a campaign to dislodge the Italians from Ethiopia. Selassie went toKhartoum to establish closer liaison with the British and resistance forces within Ethiopia. On 18 January 1941, Selassie crossed the border into Ethiopia near the village of Um Iddla and two days later rendezvoused withGideon Force. The AlliedEast Africa Command and Ethiopian patriots had largely succeeded in their operations by 6 April 1941, when Addis Ababa was occupied byHarry Wetherall,Dan Pienaar andCharles Christopher Fowkes, who received the surrender of the city; on 5 May, exactly five years after the fall of the capital, Selassie made a formal entry in Addis Ababa.[146] After the Italian defeat, theItalian guerrilla war in Ethiopia was carried out by remnants of Italian troops and their allies, which lasted until theArmistice between Italy and Allied armed forces in September 1943.[147]
The treaty signed in Paris by theItalian Republic (Repubblica Italiana) and thevictorious powers of World War II on 10 February 1947, included formal Italian recognition of Ethiopian independence and an agreement to pay $25,000,000 (equivalent to $352,049,000 in 2024) in reparations. Since the League of Nations and most of its members had never officially recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, Haile Selassie had been recognized as the restored emperor of Ethiopia following his formal entry into Addis Ababa in May 1941. Ethiopia presented a bill to the Economic Commission for Italy of £184,746,023 for damages inflicted during the course of the Italian occupation. The list included the destruction of2,000 churches,535,000 houses, the slaughter or theft of5,000,000 cattle,7,000,000 sheep and goats,1,000,000 horses and mules and700,000 camels.[18]
Ethiopian veterans are seeking an apology and compensation from Italy for war crimes committed during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, particularly the use of chemical weapons like mustard gas.[148] While there is no record of a formal, official apology, Italy did acknowledge the use of chemical weapons in a 1996 statement.[149]
On 20 May 1946, an Ethiopian War Crimes Commission was appointed to investigate and prosecute Italian war crimes committed during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission underPresident Ambaye Wolde Mariam began obtaining evidence to justify the trial of Marshal Badoglio and Marshal Graziani among other high ranking Italian officials.[150]
Ethiopia’s efforts to submit cases to theUN War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) raised a question of whether the Italo-Ethiopian conflict fell within its jurisdiction, as both Italian and British perspectives held that the war had effectively ended with Italy’s annexation by 1936—or at the latest before 1939—thereby framing any subsequent Italian violence as part of colonial administration rather than wartime conduct subject to UNWCC scrutiny.[151] Ethiopia’s Swedish legal adviser, Baron Erik Leijonhufvud, proposed a compromise in which an Ethiopian tribunal would include a majority of foreign judges and follow procedures and legal standards similar to those of theNuremberg International Military Tribunal.[152][153]
Unlike in the Nuremberg Trials in post-Nazi Germany, few Italians were tried for war crimes after 1945. Critically, whatever the position taken by the UNWCC on individual cases, prosecution would require extradition of suspects, and Allied pressure on Italy to achieve this. Thus the Ethiopian War Crimes Commission limited itself to the prosecution of two persons, Badoglio and Graziani.[150] However, Badoglio was never formally tried for war crimes, as the British government, in particular, saw Badoglio as a valuable asset for maintaining order in Italy.[154] Graziani was tried for Nazi collaborationism at the Supreme Court in 1948, but his colonial conduct was left unquestioned.[155]
^Addis Ababa, the capital, was occupied on 5 May 1936 and Haile Selassie fled the country.Resistance movements continued for several years after the Italian victory at Addis Ababa of Ethiopia.[1] The date of the last battle between regular Italian and Ethiopian forces was 19 February 1937.[2]
^Ethiopian emperors sinceTewodros II had issued "superficial" proclamations to end slavery but these had made little difference.[62]
^Years later, Badoglio admitted to using gas once and a former government minister said that three gas bombs had been dropped but these admissions came after copious amounts of records had been published showing that gas had been used to a much greater extent.[75]
^In 1976, Baer wrote that Selassie's resolution requesting loans was defeated by a vote of 23 against, 25 abstentions and 1 vote for (from Ethiopia). In the sanctions vote, 44 delegates approved the ending of sanctions, 4 abstained and 1 (Ethiopian) delegate voted for retention.[132]
^Martel, Gordon (1999).The origins of the Second World War reconsidered: A. J. P. Taylor and the Historians (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. p. 188.ISBN0-203-01024-8.OCLC252806536.
^Sbacchi, Alberto (1977). "Italy and the Treatment of the Ethiopian Aristocracy, 1937–1940".The International Journal of African Historical Studies.10 (2):209–241.doi:10.2307/217347.ISSN0361-7882.JSTOR217347.
^Plummer, Brenda Gayle, ed. (2010).Rising wind: Black Americans and U.S. foreign affairs, 1935-1960. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.ISBN978-0-8078-2272-2.
^Barrera, Giulia (2003). "Mussolini's colonial race laws and state-settler relations in Africa Orientale Italiana (1935–41)".Journal of Modern Italian Studies.8 (3):425–443.doi:10.1080/09585170320000113770.S2CID145516332.
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Candeloro, Giorgio (1981).Storia dell'Italia Moderna [History of Modern Italy] (in Italian) (10th ed.). Milano: Feltrinelli.OCLC797807582.
Clarence-Smith, W. G. (1989).The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century. London: Frank Cass.ISBN978-0-7146-3359-6.
Clark, D. K. (1959).Effectiveness of Toxic Chemicals in the Italo–Ethiopian War. Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office.
Crozier, Andrew J. (2004).The Causes of the Second World War. Oxford: Blackwell.ISBN978-0-631-18601-4.
Del Boca, Angelo; Rochat, Giorgio (1996).I gas di Mussolini: il fascismo e la guerra d'Etiopia [Mussolini's Gas: Fascism and the Ethiopian War]. Primo piano (in Italian). Roma:Editori Riuniti.ISBN978-88-359-4091-3.
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