TheSalafi movement orSalafism (Arabic:السلفية,romanized: al-Salafiyya) is afundamentalistrevival movement withinSunni Islam,[1][2][3][4] originating in the late 19th century and influential in theIslamic world to this day.[5][6][7] The name "Salafiyya" is a self-designation,[8] to call for a return to the traditions of the "pious predecessors" (salaf), the first three generations ofMuslims (theIslamic prophetMuhammad and theSahabah [his companions], then theTabi'in, and the third generation, theTabi' al-Tabi'in), who are believed to exemplify the pure form ofIslam.[9] In practice, Salafis claim that they rely on theQur'an, theSunnah and theIjma (consensus) of thesalaf, giving these writings precedence over what they claim as "later religious interpretations".[10][11] The Salafi movement aimed to achieve a renewal of Muslim life, and had a major influence on many Muslim thinkers and movements across the Islamic world.[12][13]
Salafi Muslims opposebid'a (religious innovation) and support the implementation ofsharia (Islamic law).[14] In itsapproach to politics, the Salafi movement is sometimes divided by Western academics and journalists into three categories: the largest group being the purists (orquietists), who avoid politics; the second largest group being the activists (orIslamists), who maintain regular involvement in politics; and the third group being thejihadists, who form a minority and advocate armed struggle to restore early Islamic practice.[14] Inlegal matters, Salafis usually advocateijtihad (independent reasoning) and opposetaqlid (blind faith) to the four or five schools (madhahib) ofIslamic jurisprudence while some remain largely faithful to them, but do not restrict themselves to the "final" edicts of any specificmadhhab.
The origins of Salafism are disputed, with some historians likeLouis Massignon tracing its origin to the intellectual movement in the second half of the nineteenth century that opposedWesternization emanating fromEuropean imperialism (led byAl-Afghani,Muhammad Abduh, andRashid Rida).[15][16] However, Afghani and Abduh had not self-described as "Salafi" and the usage of the term to denote them has become outdated today.[17] Abduh's more orthodox student Rashid Rida followed hardline Salafism which opposedSufism,Shi'ism and incorporated traditionalmadh'hab system. Rida eventually became a champion of theWahhabi movement and would influence another strand of conservative Salafis.[18][19][20] In themodern academia, Salafism is commonly used to refer to a cluster of contemporary Sunnirenewal andreform movements inspired by the teachings of classical theologians—in particularIbn Taymiyya (1263–1328 CE/661–728 AH).[21][22][23] These Salafis dismiss the 19th century reformers asrationalists who failed to interpret scripture in the most literal, traditional sense.[24]
The termSalafi as a proper noun and adjective had been used during the classical era to refer to thetheological school of the earlyAhl al-Hadith movement.[29] The treatises of the medievalproto-Salafist theologianTaqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 C.E/ 728 A.H), which played the most significant role in formalizing the creedal, social and political positions ofAhl al-Hadith; constitute the most widely referred classical works in Salafi seminaries.[30]
It is only inmodern times that the labelSalafi has been applied to a distinct movement and theological creed. Both modernists as well as traditionalists could apply the term. Both movements might have opposite approaches but advocate a belief that Islam has been altered and is in need of a return to a previous form of Islam allegedly practised by theSalafiyya.[31]
According toBernard Haykel, "temporal proximity to the Prophet Muhammad is associated with the truest form of Islam" among manySunni Muslims.[32] Salafis are first and foremost religious and social reformers engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity, both personal and communal. They define [their] reformist project first and foremost through creedal tenets (i.e., a theology). Also important in itsmanhaj (Arabic: منهج i.e. Methodology) are certain legal teachings as well as forms of sociability and politics.[33]
Salafis place great emphasis on practicing actions in accordance with the knownsunnah, not only inprayer but in every activity in daily life. For instance, many are careful always to use three fingers when eating, to drink water in three pauses, and to hold it with the right hand while sitting.[36] The main doctrines ofIbn Taymiyya's school, also referred by various academics as "al-Salafiyyah al-Tarikhiyah" (trans: "Historical Salafism") consist of:[37]
revival of "the authentic beliefs and practices" ofSalaf al-Salih
The Salafi thought seeks the re-orientation ofFiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) away fromTaqlid (adherence to the legal precedent of a particularMadhhab) and directly back to theProphet, hisCompanions and theSalaf. This preferred return to the pure way of the Prophet is termed "Ittiba" (following the Prophet by directly referring to the Scriptures).[38] In legal approach, Salafis are divided between those who, in the name of independent legal judgement (ijtihad), reject strict adherence (taqlid) to the four schools of law (madhahib) and others who remain faithful to these.[39][40][41]
AlthoughMuhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792 C.E/ 1206 A.H) had personally rejected the practice ofTaqlid,Wahhabi scholars favoured following theHanbalimadhhab and generally permitTaqlid in followingFatwas (juristic legal opinions) and encourages following themadhhabs.[42] While they doctrinally condemnedTaqlid and advocatedIjtihad, historically the Wahhabi legal practice was grounded mostly within the confines of Hanbali school, until recently. The doctrinal rejection ofTaqlid by Wahhabis would lead to subsequent emergence of prominent Wahhabiulema such as Sa'd ibn 'Atiq,Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'dii,Ibn 'Uthaymin,Ibn Baz, etc.; who would depart significantly fromHanbali law.[39][43][44][45][46]
Other Salafi movements, however, believe thattaqlid isunlawful and challenge the authority of the legal schools. In their perspective, since themadhhabs emerged after the era ofSalaf al-Salih (pious predecessors); those Muslims who follow amadhhab without directly searching for Scriptural evidences would get deviated.[47][48] These include the scholars ofAhl-i Hadith movement,Muhammad Nasir Al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999),Muḥammad Ḥayāt al-Sindhī (d. 1750),Ibn 'Amir al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 1182),al-Shawkānī (d. 1834), etc.; who completely condemntaqlid (imitation), rejecting the authority of the legal schools, and oblige Muslims to seek religious rulings (fatwa) issued by scholars exclusively based on theQur'an andHadith; with no intermediary involved.[49][50][44] TheAhl-i Hadithulema would distinguish themselves from the Wahhabis who followed the Hanbali school while they considered themselves as following no particular school.[51] In contemporary era, al-Albani and his disciples, in particular, would directly criticise Wahhabis on the issue ofTaqlid due to their affinity towards the Hanbali school and called for a re-generated Wahhabism purified of elements contrary to doctrines of the Salaf.[52][53][49]
Other Salafi scholars likeSayyid Rashid Rida (d. 1935) follow a middle course, allowing the layperson to doTaqlid only when necessary, obliging him to doIttiba when the Scriptural evidences become known to him. Their legal methodology rejects partisanship to the treatises of any particular schools of law, and refer to the books of allmadhhabs. FollowingIbn Taymiyya andIbn Qayyim, these scholars accept the rich literary heritage ofSunniFiqh and consider the literature of the four Sunni law-schools as beneficial resources to issue rulings for the contemporary era.[54][44] At the far end of the spectrum, some Salafis hold that adhering totaqlid is an act ofshirk (polytheism).[55]
Contemporary Salafis generally discard the practice of adhering to the established rulings of any particularMadhhab, condemning the principle ofTaqlid (blind imitation) as abid'ah (innovation) and are significantly influenced by the legal principles of theZahirite school, historically associated with anti-madhhab doctrines that opposed the canonization of legal schools. Early Zahirite scholarIbn Hazm's condemnation ofTaqlid and calls to break free from the interpretive system of the canonized schools by espousing aFiqh directly grounded onQura'n andHadith; have conferred a major impact on theSalafiyya movement.[56] Salafi legalism is most often marked by its departure from the established rulings (mu'tamad) of the four Sunnimadhahib, as well as frequently aligning with Zahirite views mentioned by Ibn Hazm in his legal compendiumAl-Muhalla.[57][44]
Bernard Haykel notes that due to the peculiarity of its methodology, Salafis enjoy a relatively less rigid scholarly hierarchy of authorities (ulema). Most Salafis unlike other traditional and pre-modern Muslims do not subscribe to a hierarchy that rigorously "constrains and regulates... the output of opinions". As an interpretive community, Salafi tradition, "in contrast to other Muslim traditions of learning", is "relatively open, even democratic".[58]
Contemporary proponents of theAthari school of theology largely come from theSalafi movement; they uphold theAthari works ofIbn Taymiyya.[59] Ibn Taymiyya himself, a disputed and partly rejected scholar during his lifetime, became a major scholar among followers of the Salafi movement credited with the titleShaykh al-Islam. Other important figures include major scholars important in Islamic history, such asAhmad ibn Hanbal.[60] While proponents ofKalam revere early generations ofSalaf al-Salih, viewingMuhammad and theSahaba as exemplar role models in religious life, they emulate them through the lens of the classical traditions of themadhahib and itsreligious clergy. On the other hand, Salafis attempt to follow theSalaf al-Salih through recorded scriptural evidences, often bypassing the classical manuals ofmadhahib. Nonetheless, both Salafis andMutakallimun empasize the significance of the Salaf in the Sunni tradition.[61]
Salafi Muslims considerQur'an,Sunnah (which they equate with theKutub al-Sittah) and The Actions or Sayings of The Sahaba as the only valid authoritative source for Islam.[62] While Salafis believe that investigation of novel issues should be understood from the Scriptures in consideration of the context of modern era, they oppose rationalist interpretations of Scriptures. In addition to limiting the usage of logic with regards to textual interpretations, Salafi scholars also reduce the importance given to medieval legal manuals and texts, giving more priority to the texts from the early generations of theSalaf. Salafis favor practical implementation as opposed to disputes with regards to meanings, meaning may be considered either clear or something beyond human understanding.[10] As adherents ofAthari theology, Salafis believe that engagement in speculative theology (kalam) is absolutely forbidden.[63] Atharis engage in strictly literal and amodal reading of theQur'an andhadith (prophetic traditions) and only their clear or apparent meanings have the sole authority in creedal affairs. As opposed to one engaged inTa'wil (metaphorical interpretation), they do not attempt to conceptualize the meanings of theQur'an rationally; and believe that the real meanings should be consigned to God alone (tafwid).[64] Following the Salafi hermeneutic approach, Salafis differ from that of non-Salafis in some regards of permissibility.[10]
Ibn Taymiyya was known for making scholarly refutations of religious groups such as theSufis,Jahmites,Asha'rites,Shias,Falsafa etc., through his numerous treatises.[65] Explaining the theological approach of "Salafiyya", Ibn Taymiyya states in afatwa:
"The way of theSalaf is to interpret literally the Koranic verses and hadiths that relate to the Divine attributes [ijra' ayat al-sifat wa ahadith al-sifat 'ala zahiriha], and without attributing to Him anthropomorphic qualities [ma' nafy al-kayfiyya wal tashbih]."
— Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyah,Al-Fatawa al-Kubra (Great Religious Edicts), vol. 5, p. 152,[65]
The followers of theSalafiyya school look to the medieval juristIbn Taymiyya as the most significant classical scholarly authority in theology and spirituality. Ibn Taymiyya's theological treatises form the core doctrinal texts ofWahhabi,Ahl-i Hadith and various other Salafi movements. According to the monotheistic doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya,Tawhid is categorised into three types:At-tawḥīd ar-rubūbiyya (Oneness in Lordship),At-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya (Oneness in Worship) andAt-tawhid al-assmaa was-sifaat (Oneness in names and attributes). Ibn Taymiyya's interpretation of theShahada (Islamic testimony) as the testimony to worship God alone "only by means of what He has legislated", without partners, is adopted by the Salafis as the foundation of their faith. In the contemporary era, Ibn Taymiyya's writings on theology and innovated practices have inspired Salafi movements of diverse kinds.[66][67] The increased prominence of these movements in the twentieth century has led to a resurgence in interest of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya far beyond traditional Salafi circles. Salafis commonly refer to Ibn Taymiyya by the titleShaykh al-Islām. Alongside Ibn Taymiyya, his disciplesIbn Qayyim al-Jawziyya,Ibn Kathir,Al-Dhahabi, etc. constitute the most referenced classical scholarship in Salafi circles.[68][69][70][71][72]
The scholarly works of Ibn Taymiyya, which advocateTraditionalist Creedal positions and intensely critique other theological schools, embody the theology of theSalafiyya school.[73] Ibn Taymiyya also cited a scholarly consensus (Ijma), on the permissibility of ascribing ones self to the beliefs of the Salaf, stating:
"There is no shame in declaring oneself to be a follower of the salaf, belonging to it and feeling proud of it; rather that must be accepted from him, according to scholarly consensus. The madhhab of the salaf cannot be anything but true. If a person adheres to it inwardly and outwardly, then he is like the believer who is following truth inwardly and outwardly."[74][75]
Syro-EgyptianSunni theologianSayyid Rashid Rida (d. 1935), leader of the ArabSalafiyya movement
Historians and academics date the emergence ofSalafiyya movement to the late 19th-centuryArab world, an era whenEuropean colonial powers were dominant.[76][3][77][78][79][80] Notable leaders of the movement includedJamal al-Din Qasimi (1866–1914), 'Abd al-Razzaq al Bitar (1837–1917),Tahir al-Jazai'iri (1852–1920)[81] andMuhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935).[82] Until theFirst World War, religious missions of the Salafi call in theArab East had operated secretively. Following the First World War, the Salafi ideas were spread and established among the intelligentsia.[83] Politically oriented scholars like Rashid Rida had also emphasized the necessity to establish anIslamic state that implementsSharia (Islamic law) and thus laid the intellectual foundations for a more conservative strand ofSalafiyya, which would also influence the ideologues of theMuslim Brotherhood inEgypt.[84]
The usage of the term "Salafiyya" to denote a theological reform movement based on the teachings of theSalaf al-Salih; was popularised by theSyrian disciples ofTahir al-Jaza'iri who were active in Egypt during the 1900s. They opened the famous "al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya" ("The Salafi Bookshop") inCairo in 1909.Rashid Rida co-operated with the owners of the library starting from 1912 and together published classical works,Hanbali treatises, pro-Wahhabi pamphlets, etc. as well as numerous articles through their official journal "Al-Majalla al-Salafiyya". The immense popularity of the term at the time caused theCatholicOrientalist scholarLouis Massignon to mistakenly associate the label with Jamal al-Din Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, which became the standard practice for Western scholars for much of the 20th century, at the expense of conceptual veracity.[85]
Salafis believe that the label "Salafiyya" existed from the first few generations of Islam and that it is not a modern movement.[79] To justify this view, Salafis rely on a handful of quotes from medieval times where the term "Salafi" is used. One of the quotes used as evidence and widely posted on Salafi websites is from the genealogical dictionary ofal-Sam'ani (d. 1166), who wrote a short entry about the surname "al-Salafi" (the Salafi): "According to what I heard, this [surname indicates one's] ascription to the pious ancestors and [one's] adoption of their doctrine [madhhabihim]."[86][87] In his biographical dictionarySiyar a`lam al-nubala,Athari theologianAl-Dhahabi described his teacher Ibn Taymiyya as a person who "supported the pureSunna andal-Tariqa al-Salafiyah (Salafiyah way or methodology)"; referring to hisnon-conformist juristic approach that was based on direct understanding of Scriptures and his practice of issuingfatwas that contradicted themadhabs.[65]
At least one scholar, Henri Lauzière, casts doubt on al-Sam'ani, claiming he "could only list two individuals—a father and his son—who were known" as al-Salafi. "Plus, the entry contains blank spaces in lieu of their full names, presumably because al-Sam'ani had forgotten them or did not know them."[87] In addition, Lauzière claims "al-Sam'ani's dictionary suggests that the surname was marginal at best, and the lone quotation taken fromAl-Dhahabi, who wrote 200 years later, does little to prove Salafi claims."[88]
The Salafi movement emphasizes looking up to the era of theSalaf al-Salih; who were the early three generations of Muslims that succeededProphet Muhammad. They consider the faith and practices ofsalaf al-salih as virtuous and exemplary. By seeking to capture values of the Salaf in their own lives, Salafis attempt to recreate a 'golden age', and revive a pristine version of Islam, stripped of all later accretions, including the fourschools of law as well aspopular Sufism. The emergence of Salafism coincided with the rise ofWestern colonialism across many parts of theIslamic world. Between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, thesereformist movements called for a direct return to the Scriptures, institutional standardisations andjihad against colonial powers.[89]
These movements had advocated the belief that theQur'an andSunnah are the primary sources ofsharia and the legal status quo should be scrutinized based onQur'an andHadith. Far from being novel, this idea was a traditionist thesis kept alive within theHanbali school of law. The Wahhabi movement, under the leadership ofMuhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, forcefully revived Hanbali traditionism in 18th centuryArabia. Influenced by the Hanbali scholarsIbn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) andIbn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350); the teachings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab were also closely linked to the formulation of proto-Hanbalism expounded by early Hanbali writers 'Abd Allah ibn Ahmad (d. 290/903),Abu Bakr al-Khallal (d. 311/923) as well as non-Hanbali scholars likeIbn Hazm, whom he cited frequently.Indian Hadith specialistShah Waliullah Dehlawi, while rejectingTaqlid, also emphasised on involving theFuqaha (jurisconsultants) in the study ofhadith, their interpretations and rationalisation. Thus, he was accommodative towards classical structures ofFiqh. InYemen, influential scholarMuhammad ibn Ali Al-Shawkani (1759–1834) condemnedTaqlid far more fiercely, and his movement advocated radical rejection of classicalFiqh structures. The promotion ofIjtihad of these movements was also accompanied by an emphasis on strict adherence toQur'an andHadith.[96][97]
Kadızadelis (alsoQādīzādali) was a seventeenth-century puritanical reformist religious movement in theOttoman Empire that followedKadızade Mehmed (1582-1635), a revivalist Islamic preacher. Kadızade and his followers were determined rivals ofSufism andpopular religion. They condemned many of the Ottoman practices that Kadızade felt werebidʻah "non-Islamic innovations", and passionately supported "reviving the beliefs and practices of the first Muslim generation in the first/seventh century" ("enjoining good and forbidding wrong").[98]
Driven by zealous and fiery rhetoric, Kadızade Mehmed was able to inspire many followers to join in his cause and rid themselves of any and all corruption found inside theOttoman Empire. Leaders of the movement held official positions as preachers in the major mosques of Baghdad, and "combined popular followings with support from within the Ottoman state apparatus".[99] Between 1630 and 1680 there were many violent quarrels that occurred between the Kadızadelis and those that they disapproved of. As the movement progressed, activists became "increasingly violent" and Kadızadelis were known to enter "mosques,tekkes andOttoman coffeehouses in order to mete out punishments to those contravening their version of orthodoxy."
During the mid-nineteenth centuryBritish India, theAhl-i Hadith movement revived the teachings of Shah Waliullah and Al-Shawkani; advocating rejection ofTaqlid andstudy of hadith. They departed from Shah Waliullah's school with a literalist approach tohadith, and rejected classical legal structures; inclining towards theZahirite school. In the 19th century, Hanbali traditionism would be revived inIraq by the influential Alusi family. Three generations of Alusis,Mahmud al-Alusi (d. 1853), Nu'man al-Alusi (d. 1899) and Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (1857–1924); were instrumental in spreading the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhabi movement in the Arab world. Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi, a defender and historian of the Wahhabi movement, was also a leader of theSalafiyya movement. All these reformist tendencies merged into the earlySalafiyya movement, a theological faction prevalent across theArab world during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, which was closely associated with the works ofSayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935).[100]
The first phase of theSalafiyya movement emerged amidst the reform-mindedulema of the Arab provinces of theOttoman Empire during the late nineteenth century. The movement relied primarily upon the works ofHanbali theologianAhmad Ibn Taymiyya, whose call to follow the path ofSalaf, inspired their name. The early phase of this tradition sought a middle-way that synthesised between'ilm andTasawwuf.Damascus, a major centre of Hanbali scholarship in the Muslim World, played a major role in the emergence and dissemination of the ideas of this early trend of theSalafiyya. Some scholars in this phase likeAmir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, re-interpretedIbn Arabi's mystical beliefs and reconciled them with the opposing theological doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya to address new challenges. Other major figures in the movement included'Abd al-Razzaq Al-Bitar,Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi,Tahir al-Jazairi, etc. 'Abd al-Razzaq Al-Bitar (the grandfather ofMuhammad Bahjat al Bitar, a disciple of Rashid Rida) was the leader of the more traditional branch of the reform trend, which would become theSalafiyya of Damascus. Years later, Rashid Rida would describe him as the "mujaddid madhhab al-salaf fil-Sham" (the reviver of the ancestral doctrine in Syria). While these reformers were critical of various aspects of popularSufism, they didn't deny Sufism completely. TheCairene school ofMuhammad Abduh emerged as a separate trend in 1880s, and would be influenced by the DamasceneSalafiyya, as well asMu'tazilite philosophy. Abduh's movement sought a rationalist approach to adapt to the increasing pace of modernisation. While 'Abduh was critical of certain Sufi practices, his writings had Sufi inclinations and he retained love for "true Sufism" as formulated byAl-Ghazali.[101][89]
The DamasceneSalafiyya was also influenced by their reformist counterparts inBaghdad, especially the scholars of theAlusi family.Abu Thana' Shihab al-Din al-Alusi (1802–1854) was the first of the Alusi family ofulama to promote reformist ideas, influenced byWahhabism through his teacher 'Ali al-Suwaydi. He also combined the theological ideas ofSufis andMutakallimun (dialecticians) likeRazi in his reformist works. Shihab al-Din's son,Nu'man Khayr al-Din al-Alusi, was also heavily influenced by the treatises ofSiddiq Hasan Khan, an early leader of theAh-i Hadith movement. He regularly corresponded with him and received anIjazat (license to teach) from Siddiq Hasan Khan, and became the leader of the Salafi trend in Iraq. Later he would also send his son 'Ala' al-Din (1860–1921) to study under Hasan Khan. Khayr al-Din Alusi would write lengthy polemics and treatises advocating the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya. The Iraqi reformers rejected the validity ofTaqlid injurisprudence, calling forIjtihad and condemned ritualinnovations like tomb-visitations for the purpose ofworship.[102]
Tahir al-Jazai'ri (1920), one of the early leaders of the Salafi movement
Salafiyya tradition had become dominant inSyria by the 1880s, due to its popularity amongst the reformistulema in Damascus. Furthermore; most of the medieval treatises of the classical Syrian theologian Ibn Taymiyya were preserved in various Damascene mosques. Salafi scholars gathered these works and indexed them in the archives of the Zahiriyya Library (Maktabat Zahiriyya), one of the most prominent Islamic libraries of the 19th century. Most influential Salafi scholars during this period were Tahir al-Jazai'ri, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar andJamal al-Din Qasimi. These scholars took precedent from the 18th-century reformers influenced by Ibn Taymiyya, such as Al-Shawkani, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Shah Waliullah etc. and called for a return to the purity of the early era of theSalaf al-Salih (righteous forebears). Like Ibn Taymiyya during the 13th century; they viewed themselves as determined preachers calling to defendTawhid (Islamic monotheism), attackingbid'ah (religious innovations), criticising the Ottoman monarchy and its clerical establishment as well as relentlessly condemning Western ideas such asnationalism.[103][104] According tohistorianItzchak Weismann:
"The Salafi trend of Damascus constituted a religious response to the political alliance forged between the Ottoman State under the modernizing autocracy ofSultan Abdül Hamid II and orthodox sufi shaykhs andulama who were willing to mobilize the masses in his support."
Jamal al-Din Qasimi (d. 1914), a major scholar of the Syrian Salafiyya movement
By the 1900s, the reformers had already become commonly known as "Salafis", which in-part was also used to deflect accusations from their opponents; to emphasize that they were different from theWahhabis ofNajd. The Salafi turn againstIbn 'Arabi andSufism would materialize a decade later, after theFirst World War, under the leadership ofRashid Rida. This second-stage ofSalafiyya was championed by Rashid Rida and his disciples across the Islamic World, advocating a literalist understanding of the Scriptures. They were also characterised by a militant hostility toWestern imperialism and culture. In addition to condemnations of tomb visits, popular Sufi practices, brotherhoods, miracles and mystical orders; Rida's criticism of Sufism extended to all of it and beyond the critiques of his fellow Salafi comrades. He questioned themurid-murshid relationship inmysticism, as well as theSilsilas (chains of transmission) upon whichTariqah structures were built. In particular, Rida fiercely rebukedpolitical quietism and pacifist doctrines of various Sufi orders. TheSalafiyya of Rida and his disciples held onto an ideal of the complete return to the religious and political ways of thesalaf.[106][107] In calling for a return to theSalaf, Rashid Rida emphasised the path of the first four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Khulafa Rashidin) and the revival of their principles. Rida's revivalist efforts contributed to the construction of a collective imagined Salafi community operating globally, transcending national borders. For this reason, he is regarded as one of the founding pioneers of theSalafiyya movement and his ideas inspired manyIslamic revivalist movements.[108][109]
Rashid Rida's religious approach was rooted in reviving Ibn Taymiyya's theology as the solution to rectify the decline and disintegration of the Islamic World.Salafiyya movement took a much more conservative turn under Rida's mantle and became vehemently critical of the clerical establishment. Rida's doctrines deeply impactedIslamist ideologues of theMuslim Brotherhood such asHasan al-Banna (d. 1949) andSayyid Qutb (d. 1966) who advocated a holistic conception ofIslamic state and society; similar to theWahhabi movement.[84][110][111]Muslim Brotherhood'sSyrian leaders likeMustapha al-Siba'i and'Isam al-'Attar were also influential in the movement and their ideas influenced numerousJordanian students. TheDamasceneSalafiyya consisted of major scholarly figures likeMuhammad Bahjat al-Bitar al-Athari,'Ali al-Tantawi,Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 'Abd al-Fattah al-Imam, Mazhar al-'Azma, al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi,Taqiy al-Din al-Hilali, Muhiy al-Din al-Qulaybi, 'Abd Allah al-Qalqayli, etc. Numerous books of the movement were printed and published through the Islamic Bookstore inLebanon owned by Zuhayr Shawish.[112]
The early leaders ofSalafiyya likeSayyid Rashid Rida (d. 1935),Jamal al-Din Qasimi (d. 1914), etc. had consideredtraditionalist theology as central to their comprehensive socio-political reform programme. Rashid Rida, for instance, argued that Athari theology representedSunniorthodoxy, was less divisive and provided a more reliable basis of faith thanAsh'arism. According to Rida, Salafi creed was easier to understand thanKalam (speculative theology) and hence granted a stronger bulwark against the dangers posed byatheism and other heresies. Salafi reformers also hailed the medieval theologianIbn Taymiyya as a paragon of Sunni orthodoxy and emphasized that his strict conception ofTawhid was an important part of the doctrine of the forefathers (madhhab al-salaf). Despite this, the Salafi reformers during this era were more concerned withpan-Islamic unity and hence refrained from accusing the majority of their co-religionists of being heretics; professing their creedal arguments with moderation. Jamal al-Din Qasimi decried sectarianism and bitter polemics between Atharis and followers of othercreedal schools, despite considering them unorthodox. For Rashid Rida, intra-Sunni divisions between Atharis and Ash'arites, were an evil that weakened the strength of theUmmah (Muslim community) and enabled foreigners to gain control overMuslim lands. Hence, Rida held back from adopting an exclusivist attitude against Asharis during the first two decades of the 20th century.[113]
Beginning from the mid-1920s, this leniency gradually disappeared from Salafi activists and scholars to give way to a more partisan stance. Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, for example, was more uncompromising in his defense of Salafi theology than Rida and Qasimi.[114] The hardening of Salafi stance was best represented by Rashid Rida's discipleMuhammad Bahjat al Bitar (1894–1976) who made robust criticisms ofspeculative theology, by compiling treatises that revived the creedal polemics of Ibn Taymiyya. One such treatise titled "Al-Kawthari wa-ta'liqatuhu" published in 1938 strongly admonishes theOttomanMaturidite scholarMuhammad Zahid al-Kawthari (1879–1952); accusing him of heresy. In the treatise, Bitar vigorously advocates Ibn Taymiyya's literalist approach to the theological question of the Divine attributes (Al- Asma wa-l-Sifat) and seemingly anthropomorphic expressions in theQur'an. At the height of his career, Bitar enjoyed the respect of Syrianulema and laypersons of all groups. For his studentNasir al-Din Albani (1914–1999) and his purist Salafi followers, Bitar was a master oftheology andhadith. For the IslamistMuslim Brotherhood, Bitar's studies of Islam and theArabic language were an asset forIslamic Renaissance.[115]
SyrianSalafiyya tradition that emerged in late nineteenth century consisted of two divergent tendencies: an apolitical Quietist trend and a "Salafi-Islamist hybrid". The earlySalafiyya led by Rashid Rida was dominated by revolutionaryPan-Islamists who had socio-political goals and advocated for the restoration of anIslamic Caliphate through military struggle againstEuropean colonial powers. However, contemporarySalafiyya are dominated byPurists who eschew politics and advocateIslamic Political Quietism. ContemporaryPurist Salafism, widely known as "theSalafi Manhaj" emerged from the 1960s as an intellectual hybrid of three similar, yet distinct, religious reform traditions: the Wahhabi movement inArabia,Ahl-i Hadith movement inIndia andSalafiyya movement in theArab world of the late-19th and early 20th centuries. The person most responsible for this transformation was the Albanian Islamichadith scholarMuhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a protege of Rashid Rida, who is generally considered as the "spiritual father" of the Purist Salafi current and respected by all contemporary Salafis as "the greatest hadith scholar of his generation".[116][117][118][119]
As of 2017, journalist Graeme Wood estimated that Salafi "probably" make up "fewer than 10%" of Muslims globally,[120] but by the 21st century, Salafi teachings and ideas had become so mainstreamised that many modern Muslims, even those who do not self-identify as Salafi, have adopted various aspects of Salafism.[121]
In the modern era, some Salafis tend to take the surname "Al-Salafi" and refer to the label "Salafiyya" in various circumstances to evoke a specific understanding of Islam that is supposed to differ from that of otherSunnis in terms of'Aqidah (creed) and approach toFiqh (legal tradition).[88]
Some Western analysts, most prominently Quintan Wiktorowicz in an article published in 2006, have classified Salafis into three groups – purists, activists, andJihadis – based on their approach to politics.[135][136] Purists focus on education and missionary work to solidify theTawhid; activists focus on political reform and re-establishing aCaliphate through the means of political activities, but not violence (sometimes called Salafist activism); and jihadists share similar political goals as the politicians, but engage in violent Jihad (sometimes calledSalafi jihadism and/orQutbism).[135]
Following the Arab Spring, Salafis across theArab World have formed various political parties that actively advocate for Islamic social and political causes in the region.[137]
"Purists" are Salafists who focus on non-violentda'wah (preaching of Islam), education, and "purification of religious beliefs and practices", who follow the Salafi 'aqida (creed).[138] They dismiss politics as "a diversion or even innovation that leads people away from Islam".[139] Also known as conservative Salafism, its adherents seek to distance themselves from politics. This strand focuses its attention on the study of Islamicsharia, educating the masses and preaching to the society. This methodology is seen as attracting a significant section of pious Muslims who seek to be driven solely by religious objectives but not political objectives. Conservative Salafis are disinterested in getting entangled in the problems and consequences that accompany political activism. According to them, a prolonged movement of "purification and education" of Muslims is essential for Islamic revival through reaping a "pure, uncontaminated Islamic society" and thereby establish an Islamic state.[140]
Some of them never oppose rulers.Madkhalism, as an example, is a strain of Salafists viewed as supportive ofauthoritarian regimes in the Middle East.[141][142][143] Taking its name from the controversial Saudi Arabian clericRabee al-Madkhali, the movement lost its support in Saudi Arabia proper when several members of thePermanent Committee (the country's clerical body) denounced Madkhali personally.[144] Influence of both the movement and its figureheads have waned so much within the Muslim world that analysts have declared it to be a largely European phenomenon.[144]
Further along the spectrum are the Salafi-Activists (orharaki) who advocate the transformation of societies through political action. They include Islamist organizations such as theMuslim Brotherhood,EgyptianHizb al-Nour (Party of Light), theAl Islah Party of Yemen, theAl Asalah of Bahrain, and theulema affiliated to the movement known asAl-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening). Committed to advancing "the Islamic solution" for all socio-political problems; Salafi-Activists are vehemently hostile tosecularism,Israel, andthe West. Their strategy involves working within the established order, to achieve the ultimate objective of replacing that order with anIslamic state.[145]
Activists are different from theSalafi-jihadists in that they eschew violence and differ from Salafi purists in that they engage in modern political processes.[146] Salafi-Activists have a long tradition of political activism in majorArabIslamist movements like theMuslim Brotherhood and its various branches and affiliates.[147] Salafi activism originated in the 1950s to 60s Saudi Arabia, where manyMuslim Brothers took refuge from the prosecution by theNasser regime.[148] There, they synthesized their Muslim Brotherhood beliefs with Salafism, which led to the creation of the Salafi activist trend exemplified by theSahwa movement in the 80s,[149] promulgated bySafar Al-Hawali andSalman al-Ouda.
In addition to being strong advocates ofSunni empowerment in the post-Arab Spring context, Salafi parties regularly warn against Iran's interventionist and expansionist ambitions in theArab World. Salafi activist scholars have attacked theKhomeinistShia Crescent project and attempts to Shi'itization through demographic shifts in countries like Iraq,Syria,Lebanon, etc. As early as the 1980s Syrian Salafi Islamist clerics likeMuhammad Surur had launched staunch critiques ofKhomeini, denouncing him as a proponent of Iranian domination over the Arab World.[150]
Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood,Jamaat-e Islami, etc. are heavily influenced by the Activist Salafi thought.[151] The movement is very popular amongst the followers of the Salafiyya school, and is often referred to as "mainstream Salafism". The activist Salafis condemn violence, yet engage actively in the political processes of their societies to advocate forshari'a.[152] As of 2013, this school makes up the majority of Salafism.[143]
The movement is fiercely attacked by the followers of theMadkhalist strand of Quietist Salafism; who totally withdraw themselves from politics.[153] Many Salafi activists are critical of the policies ofGulf kingdoms and have attacked Madkhalis for blindly toeing the political line of the Gulf monarchs.[154] The Activist trend, who some call "politicos", see politics as "yet another field in which the Salafi creed has to be applied" in order to safeguard justice and "guarantee that the political rule is based upon the Shari'a".[139]Al–Sahwa Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening), as example, has been involved in peaceful political reform.Safar Al-Hawali,Salman al-Ouda,Abu Qatada,Zakir Naik, etc. are representatives of this trend. Because of being active on social media, they have earned some support among youth.[153][155][156]
It's very simple. We wantsharia. Sharia in economy, in politics, in judiciary, in our borders and our foreign relations.
After the eruption ofArab Spring, Salafi Muslims have been becoming increasingly active in the political sphere, championing various Islamic causes. Salafi activists are highly critical of the foreign policies of Western countries as well as Iran's aggressive activities in the region, such as itsmilitary intervention in Syria that backed the Alawite-dominated regime ofBashar al-Assad against Sunnis. Some Quietist Salafis have also began organizing political parties, in response to threats posed by wars and external interference in Arab countries. These include theAl-Nour Party in Egypt and Ansar al-Sunna in Sudan.[158]
"Salafi Jihadism" was a term invented byGilles Kepel[159][160] to describe those self-claiming Salafi groups who began developing an interest in (armed)jihad during the mid-1990s. Practitioners are often referred to as "Salafi jihadis", "Salafi jihadists", "Revolutionary Salafis" or "armed Salafis". Journalist Bruce Livesey estimates that Salafi jihadists constitute less than 1.0 percent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims (i.e., less than 10 million).[159][161]
All Salafi-Jihadists agree on the revolutionary overthrow of existing ruling order through armedJihad; and its replacement with aGlobal Caliphate. They believe that Jihad is essential to Islamic piety and belief, an individual obligation (fard 'al-Ayn) on allMuslims; which thePalestinian Jihadist scholar'Abdallah 'Azzam (1941–89) asserted as "the most excellent form of worship". Salafi-Jihadists regard themselves as the heirs ofSayyid Qutb, an influential Islamist scholar who led the radical wing of theMuslim Brotherhood during the 1960s. Inspired by their reading ofIbn Taymiyya, they are strong advocates oftakfir(excommunication) and the principles ofAl-Wala' wa'l- Bara'. Like Qutb, they also made the belief in the exclusive sovereignty (Hakimiyya) of Allah central toTawhid, and condemn all other political doctrines asJahiliyya. Sayyid Qutb'sAl-Ma'alim Fi'l-tariq (The Milestones), a short tract which outlined his militant strategy of destroyingJahiliyya and replacing it withIslam, would become an influential treatise in the Salafi-Jihadi intellectual circles.[167]
American invasion of Iraq in 2003 became An analysis of theCaucasus Emirate, a Salafi jihadist group, was made in 2014 by Darion Rhodes.[168] It analyzes the group's strict observance oftawhid and its rejection ofshirk,taqlid andbid'ah, while believing thatJihad ( holy war) is the only way to advance the cause ofAllah on the Earth.[168] The purist and Activist Salafis often strongly disapprove of the Jihadists and rejects its Islamic character.[169] Although rooted in certain fringe interpretations of theQur'an andHadith, scholars point out that Salafi-Jihadi views are not representative of the broader Islamic tradition. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals from across the Islamic spectrum –Sunni,Shi'a, Salafi,Sufi,Wahhabi,modernists andIslamic neo-traditionalists – have come out strongly against various Salafi-jihadi groups and their doctrines; regarding them as "a perversion" of Islamic teachings.[170]
Wiktorowicz's typology has largely been discarded by recent scholarship due to its simplistic assumptions regarding religion, in addition to other limitations, such as its neglect of the changing social, political and cultural realities occurring across theMuslim World. Several researchers have criticised the classification for being unobservant regarding the dynamism of theSalafiyya, such it's evolving relations withIslamic politics; as well as for its rigid compartmentalisation of Salafi Muslims.[171][172] According to Samir Amghar and Francesco Cavatorta:
"studies question fundamentally the theoretical and scientific relevance of the typology between quietists, politicians and revolutionaries and argue that it is crucial to refine this typology by affirming that it is no longer apt in explaining Salafism in the contemporary age... If Wiktorowicz's categorisation has the merit of shedding light on the plural and contradictory character of a movement that is too often caricatured, it prevents us from thinking about its dynamic and evolving character. The changing reality on the ground across theArab world and beyond demands that traditional categories be revisited."[172]
By making a case study of Egyptian Salafis and the "quietist"Al-Nour party, one scholar Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, demonstrates that Wiktorowicz's "non-dynamic typology" merely denotes "time-bounded pragmatic political strategies" rather than any solid identity. Laurence proposes re-defining the triple classification of "Quietist, Activist and Jihadist" into "proselytizing, politico and revolutionary"; and re-conceptualise these categories as "temporal strategies" instead of a solid spiritual identity. She further calls for a holistic approach that accounts for the "fluidity, diversity, and evolution of Salafi groups" and focus more on the strategic adaptation of Salafi Muslims in their respective environments rather than creedal issues.[163] Based on his study of European Salafi movements, Samir Amghar asserts thatJihadism no longer can be classified as part of proper Salafism since, according to Amghar, both movements have diverged significantly over the course of decades and have no "shared doctrinal background".[172]
Wiktorowicz's proposition that all self-professed Salafi groups have the same "Aqidah" (creed) has also been challenged. According to scholar Massimo Ramaioli:
"Salafis do not vary, as Wiktorowicz claimed, only at the level of reading social reality and its attendant socio-political manifestations (theirmanhaj), while retaining sameness and coherence at the theoretical level. From a philosophy of praxis perspective, we can account for the variations of 'aqīdah that we witness. On issues such asimān (faith),kufr (unbelief) andtakfīr (excommunication),al-wala' wa al-bara', and of course violence andjihād, Salafis clearly do not hold the same views precisely because they read social reality, and consequently behave, so differently... Negotiating the constraints and opportunities of the political prods Salafis to engage in thorough and at times painful ideological (re)positioning... the political affects Salafism on both levels: ideational and methodological/practical."[173]
Modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholarMuhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis.[174] He started a reform movement in the remote, sparsely populated region ofNajd.[175] He invited people toTawhid (monotheism) and advocated the purging of animist rituals and practices associated with shrine and tomb veneration, which were widespread among the nomadic tribes of Najd.[176][177] Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered such practices as aspects ofidolatry, representative of impurities and inappropriate innovations inIslam which contradictedTawhid.[178] While Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab stressed on the importance of obedience tosharia, he also obliged Muslims to upholdsharia by reading and following the Scriptures. Like their paragon scholarIbn Taymiyya, Wahhabis did not believe in blind-adherence (Taqlid) and advocated engaging with theQur'an andHadith throughIjtihad (legal reasoning), emphasizing simplicity in religious rituals and practices. Thus, classical-eralegal works byFuqaha were not considered as authoritative as theScriptures themselves, since the former were human interpretations while theQur'an is the Universal, Eternal Word of God.[179]
The Salafi movement inSaudi Arabia is the result ofMuhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's reform movement. Unlike otherreform movements, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his disciples were also able to secure a religio-political pact withMuhammad Ibn Saud andhis House; which enabled them to engage in military expansionism and establish anIslamic state in theArabian Peninsula. While the mainstream constituency believed inIslamic revival through education and welfare reforms, the militant elements of the movement advocated armed campaigns to eradicate local practices considered asinnovation and demolished numerous shrines and tombs of saints (awliya).[180] It is believed that theWahhabism is a more strict, Saudi form of Salafism,[181][182] according toMark Durie, who states that Saudi leaders "are active and diligent" using their considerable financial resources "in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world".[183] Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree with the view that Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis".[184]
However, many scholars and critics distinguish between the old form of Saudi Salafism (termed as Wahhabism) and the new Salafism in Saudi Arabia. Stéphane Lacroix, a fellow and lecturer atSciences Po inParis, also affirmed a distinction between the two: "As opposed to Wahhabism, Salafism refers [...] to all the hybridations that have taken place since the 1960s between the teachings of Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and other Islamic schools of thought". Hamid Algar andKhaled Abou El Fadl believe, during the 1960s and 70s, Wahhabism rebranded itself as Salafism knowing it could not "spread in the modern Muslim world" as Wahhabism.[185][186]
Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.[187] It extended to young and old, from children'smadrasas to high-level scholarship.[188] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[189] It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses aroundEgypt forAl Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[190] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools"[191] at a cost of around $2–3bn annually since 1975.[192] To put the number into perspective, the propaganda budget of theSoviet Union was about $1bn per annum.[192]
This spending has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian andLee Kuan Yew,[187] and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam"[193]) to be perceived as the correct interpretation – or the "gold standard" of Islam – in many Muslims' minds.[194][195]
Salafis are sometimes labelled "Wahhabis", often in a derogatory manner by their sectarian opponents.[196] Some Western critics often conflate Wahhabis and Salafis, although numerous Western academics have challenged such depictions. While Wahhabism is viewed as a Salafist movement inArabian Peninsula that took inspiration fromMuhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his successors in theAal al-Shaykh, the broader Salafist movement have deeper roots across theMuslim World. Often times, other Salafis oppose the stance of Gulf-based Wahhabis on various issues and engage in a variety of political activities.[197]
In Indian subcontinent, a number of Salafi streams exist including Ahl i Hadith andKerala Nadvathul Mujahideen.Ahl-i Hadith is a religious movement that emerged in Northern India in the mid-nineteenth century.[198] Adherents of Ahl-i-Hadith regard the Quran,sunnah, andhadith as the sole sources of religious authority and oppose everything introduced in Islam after the earliest times.[199] In particular, they rejecttaqlid (following legal precedent) and favorijtihad (independent legal reasoning) based on the scriptures.[198] The movement's followers call themselvesSalafi, while others refer to them asWahhabi,[200] or consider them a variation on the Wahhabi movement.[201][202] In recent decades the movement has expanded its presence inPakistan,Bangladesh, andAfghanistan.[198][199]
Shah Waliullah Dehlawi (1703–1762) is considered as the intellectual forefather of the movement and its followers regard him asShaykh al-Islam. Waliullah 's rejection ofTaqlid would be emphasized by his sonShah Abdul Aziz (1746–1824) and later successors likeShah Ismail (1779–1831) in a puritanical manner; stripping it of their eclectic and rational aspects. This tendency culminated in the Jihad movement ofSayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786–1831). This iconoclastic movement expanded Shah Waliullah's rejection ofTaqlid as a fundamental creedal doctrine. They focused on wagingphysical Jihad againstnon-Muslims and banishing syncretic rituals prevalent amongst Muslims. Although the IndianMujahidin movement led by Sayyid Ahmad shared close parallels with the Arabian Wahhabi movement and hence labelled as "Wahhabi" by the British; both movements mostly evolved independently. After the death of Sayyid Ahmad in 1831; his successors Wilayat ali, Inayat Ali, Muhammad Hussain, and Farhat Hussain continued Jihad activities of the "Wahhabi" movement throughoutBritish India; spreading acrossChittagong toPeshawar and fromMadras toKashmir. They played an important role in theRebellion of 1857 and their anti-British Jihad has been described as "the most strident challenge" faced by the British during the 1850s. After the defeat of the revolt, the British would fully crush theMujahidin through a series of expeditions, "Wahhabi" trials and sedition laws. By 1883, the movement was fully suppressed and no longer posed any political threat. Many adherents of the movement abandoned physical Jihad and opted forpolitical quietism. The Ahl-i-Hadith movement emerged from these circles of religious activists.[203][204][205]
In19th century British India, the revivalist Ahl-i Hadith movement had descended as a direct outgrowth andquietist manifestation of the IndianMujahidin. The early leaders of the movement were the influential hadith scholarsSayyid Nazir Hussein Dehlawi (1805–1902) andSiddiq Hasan Khan ofBhopal (1832–1890) who had direct tutelage under the lineage of Shah Waliullah and the IndianMujahidin movement. Syed Nazeer Hussein was a student ofShah Muhammad Ishaq, the grandson of Shah Waliullah, and held the title ''Miyan Sahib'', which was strongly associated with the spiritual heirs of Shah Waliullah. Siddiq Hasan Khan was a student of Sadar al-Din Khan (1789–1868) who inturn, had studied underShah 'Abd al-Azeez and Shah 'Abd al-Qadir, the sons of Shah Waliullah. His father was also a direct disciple of Shah 'Abd al Aziz. Yemeni scholars were also active in theBhopal court of Siddiq Hasan Khan and he became a student of Muhaddith 'Abd al-Haqq of Benarus, who was a disciple ofShawkani in Yemen. He became profoundly influenced by the works Al-Shawkani; claiming frequent contacts with him via visions and in this way, anijaza (permission) to transmit his works. Thus, the Ahl-i Hadith movement drew directly from the teachings of Shah Waliullah and Al-Shawkani; advocating rejection ofTaqlid and revival of hadith. However, they departed from Shah Waliullah's conciliatory approach to classical legal theory; aligning themselves withZahirite (literalist) school and adopted a literalist hadith approach. They also rejected the authority of the four legal schools and restrictIjma (consensus) to thecompanions. Their ideal was to lead a pious and ethical life in conformity to theProphetic example in every aspect of life.[206]
Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen (KNM) was founded in 1950 inKerala as a popular reform movement by the Kerala Jamiyat al Ulama (KJU). It traces its root to Kerala Aikya Sangam established in 1922 byVakkom Moulavi.[207] KNM witnessed a number of splits since 2002 and all existing fractions maintain a good connection with Arab Salafi groups especially inSaudi Arabia andKuwait.[208]
Folk Islam andSufism, popular amongst the poor and working classes in the region, are anathema to Ahl-i Hadith beliefs and practices. This attitude towardsSufism has brought the movement into conflict with the rivalBarelvi movement even more so than the Barelvis' rivals, theDeobandis.[209] Ahl-i Hadith followers identify with theZahiri madhhab.[210] The movement draws both inspiration and financial support fromSaudi Arabia.[211][212]Jamia Salafia is their largest institution in India.
TheEgyptian Salafi movement is one of the most influential branches of the Salafi movement which profoundly impacted religious currents across theArab world, including the scholars ofSaudi Arabia.[213] Salafis inEgypt are not united under a single banner or unified leadership. The main Salafi trends in Egypt are Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, The Salafist Calling, al-Madkhaliyya Salafism, Activist Salafism, and al-Gam'eyya Al-Shar'eyya.[214] Salafi-Wahhabi doctrines were introduced in Egypt by the Syrian scholarMuhammad Rashid Riḍā starting from the 1920s.[215] Rashid Riḍā opposed theWesternising cultural trends adopted by Egyptianliberal elite and denouncednationalist ideas as a plot to undermineIslamic unity. Riḍā and his disciples campaigned for the establishment of anIslamic state based on Salafi principles; thus becoming the biggest adversary of theEgyptian secularists andnationalists.[216]
Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, also known asAnsar Al-Sunna, was founded in 1926 by Sheikh Mohamed Hamed El-Fiqi, a 1916 graduate ofAl-Azhar and a student of the famed Muslim reformerMuhammed Abduh. It is considered the main Salafi group in Egypt. El-Fiqi's ideas were resentful ofSufism. But unlike Muhammed Abduh, Ansar Al-Sunna follows theTawhid as preached byIbn Taymiyya.[214] Many Saudi scholars became disciples of prominentulema ofAnsar al Sunna like ʿAbd al-Razzaq ʿAfifi and Muhammad Khalil Harras.[217]
Majority of Egyptian Salafis are affiliated toAnsar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya. Established by Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi (a student of Salafi scholar Rashid Rida) to defend traditionalist Salafism, the movement shares a warm relationship with Arabian Wahhabi scholars and was a major benefactor of Salafi resurgence since the 1970s. The movement traces its initial Wahhabi contacts to Rashid Rida.Al-Azhar shares a close relation with Ansar al-Sunna. Most of the early leaders ofAnsar al-Sunna were Azhari graduates and many of its contemporary scholars studied under Al-Azhar. Prominent scholars in the movement include Rashid Rida, Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi, Abd al-Razzaq 'Afifi, Sayyid Sabiq, Muhammad Khalil Harass, etc.[218]
Salafist Call (al-daʿwa al-salafiyya) is another influential Salafist organisation. It is the outcome of student activism during the 1970s. While many of the activists joined theMuslim Brotherhood, a faction led by Mohammad Ismail al-Muqaddim, influenced by Salafists of Saudi Arabia established the Salafist Calling between 1972 and 1977.[219] Salafist call is the most popular and localised of the Salafi organisations in Egypt. Due to it being an indigenous mass movement with strong political stances on various issues, it doesn't enjoy good relationship with Saudi Arabia. Emphasising its Egyptian heritage more robustly thanAnsar al-Sunna,Da'wa Salafiyya traces its history through the persecution andimprisonment of Ibn Taymiyya in Egypt, to the trials faced by theMuwahhidun movement inArabia and then finally to scholars like Sayyid Rashid Rida, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, etc. who popularised Ibn Taymiyya's thought during the early twentieth century Egypt. UnlikeAnsar al-Sunna which preachespolitical quietism, Salafist call is a politically activist movement.[213]
TheAl-Nour Party was created bySalafist Call after the2011 Egyptian Revolution. It has an ultra-conservativeIslamist ideology, which believes in implementing strictSharia law.[220] In the2011–12 Egypt parliamentary elections, theIslamist Bloc led by Al‑Nour party received 7,534,266 votes out of a total 27,065,135 correct votes (28%). TheIslamist Bloc gained 127 of the 498 parliamentary seats contested,[221] second-place after the Muslim Brotherhood'sFreedom and Justice Party. Al‑Nour Party itself won 111 of the 127 seats. From January 2013 onward, the party gradually distanced itself fromMohamed Morsi's Brotherhood regime, and was involved in thelarge-scale protests in late June against Morsi's rule that subsequently led to amilitary coup removing him from office in July that year.[222] A lawsuit against the party was dismissed on 22 September 2014 because the court indicated it had no jurisdiction.[223] A case on the dissolution of the party was adjourned until 17 January 2015.[224] Another court case that was brought forth to dissolve the party[225] was dismissed after the Alexandria Urgent Matters Court ruled on 26 November 2014 that it lacked jurisdiction.[226]
According to Ammar Ali Hassan ofAl-Ahram, while Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood agree on many issues such as the need to "Islamize" society and legally requiring all Muslims to give alms, the former has nevertheless rejected the flexibility of the latter on the issue of whether women and Christians should be entitled to serve in high office, as well as its relatively tolerant attitude towardsIran.[227]
In 1980, PrinceMohammed bin Faisal Al Saud of Saudi Arabia offeredMalaysia $100 million for an interest-free finance corporation, and two years later the Saudis helped finance the government-sponsoredBank Islam Malaysia.[228] In 2017 it was reported that Salafi doctrines are spreading among Malaysia's elite, and the traditional Islamic theology currently taught in Government schools is shifted to a Salafi view of theology derived from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia.[229][230] The Saudi-backed Salafist wave in Malaysia has particularly manifested itself in the growing trends of anti-Shi'a Muslim rhetoric and the encroachingArabization of Malay culture.[231][232][233][234][235]
Islamic scholarMuhammad Ibn 'Ali ash-Shawkani (1759–1839 C.E) is regarded as their intellectual precursor by the Salafis inYemen, upholding his works to promote Salafi revivalist ideas.[236] Beyond Yemen, his works are widely used in Salafi schools.[237] He also profoundly influenced other Salafi movements across the world such as theAhl-i Hadith in theIndian subcontinent.[238]
Turkey has been largely absent from the growing literature on the phenomenon of transnational Salafism. Salafism is a minority strand ofTurkish Islam that evolved in the context of the state's effort in the 1980s to recalibrate religion as a complement toTurkish nationalism. Although Salafism became a topic of discussion in media and scholarly writing in Turkish religious studies faculties, a continued lack of orthographic stability (variously, Selfye, Selefiyye, Selfyyecilik, Selefizm)" gives an indication both of the denial of its relevance to Turkey and the success ofrepublican secularism in clearing religion from public discourse. Yet since the 1980s Salafi preachers trained in Saudi Arabia have been able to find a niche through publishing houses that have endeavoured to translate Arabic texts from the Saudi Salafi scene in an attempt to change the discursive landscape of Turkish Islam. In 1999, the Turkish Directorate of Religious AffairsDiyanet, recognized Salafism as a Sunni school of thought.[240] Salafist preachers then started to make inroads into the Turkish society. With the implication of Turkish citizens and theJustice and Development Party (AKP) government inSyrian civil war, public discussion began to question the narrative of Salafism as a phenomenon alien to Turkey. Salafism becomes an observable element of religious discourse in Turkey in the context of the military regime's attempt to outmanoeuvre movements emerging as a challenge to theKemalist secular order, namely the left,Necmettin Erbakan's Islamism,Kurdish nationalism, and Iran. Through the Turkish—Islamic Synthesis (Turk islam Sentezi), the scientific positivism that had been the guiding principle of the republic since 1923 was modified to make room for Islam as a central element ofTurkish national culture. The military authorities oversaw an increase of more than 50 percent in the budget of the religious affairs administration (known asDiyanet), expanding it from 50,000 employees in 1979 to 85,000 in 1989. Pursuing closer ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey involved itself in a more meaningful manner in thepan-Islamic institutions under Saudi tutelage, and Diyanet receivedMuslim World League funding to send officials to Europe to develop outreach activities in Turkish immigrant communities." A network of commercial and cultural links was established with Saudi businesses and institutions in banking and financial services, publishing houses, newspapers, magazines, and children's books.
Preachers who had studied at theIslamic University of Madinah, and applied the Salafi designation, also established publishing houses and charity organizations (dernek), the most prominent example is Iraqi-Turkish descent Salafi scholar and preacherAbdullah Yolcu, who preaches under the banner of Guraba publishing house.[241] Subject to periodic harassment and arrest by security forces, they adopted markedly more public profiles with AKP ascendancy over the military following a resounding electoral victory in 2002. The Turkish Salafis became active onYouTube,Twitter, andFacebook, complementing websites for their publishing enterprises. Saudi-based scholars such asBin Baz,al-Albani,Saleh Al-Fawzan (b. 1933), andMuhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925-2001) form the core of their references, while they avoid contemporary 'ulama' associated with theMuslim Brotherhood such asYusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), an Egyptian scholar based inQatar. Turkish is their prime language of communication, but Arabic is prominent in special sections on websites, Arabic-language Salafi texts in their bookshops, and heavy use of Arabic terminology in their Turkish texts. The most well-established among them is Ablullah Yolcu, who is said to do "production of Turkish Salafism from Arabic texts". While Turkey has been outside the discussion on transnational Salafism,Meijer's observation that Salafism may succeed `when its quietist current can find a niche or the nationalist movement has failed' seems to speak surprisingly well to the Turkish case."[242]
Salafism is opposed by a number ofHuiMuslims Sects in China such as by theGedimu, SufiKhafiya andJahriyya, to the extent that even the fundamentalistYihewani (Ikhwan) Chinese sect, founded byMa Wanfu after Salafi inspiration, condemned Ma Debao and Ma Zhengqing as heretics when they attempted to introduce Salafism as the main form of Islam. Ma Debao established a Salafi school, called theSailaifengye (Salafi), inLanzhou andLinxia. It is completely separate from otherMuslim sects in China.[243]
The number of Salafis in China are not included on percentage lists of Muslim sects in China.[244] TheKuomintang Sufi Muslim GeneralMa Bufang, who backed the Yihewani (Ikhwan) Muslims, persecuted the Salafis and forced them into hiding. They were not allowed to move or worship openly. The Yihewani had become secular and Chinese nationalists; they considered the Salafiyya to be "heterodox" (xie jiao) and people who followed foreigners' teachings (waidao). After theCommunists took power, Salafis were allowed to worship openly again.[245]
An attempt at Salafist expansion among the MuslimChams in Vietnam has been halted by Vietnamese government controls, however, the loss of the Salafis among Chams has been to be benefit ofTablighi Jamaat.[246]
Similar to Saudi Arabia, most citizens of Qatar adhere to a strict sect of Salafism referred to as Wahhabism.[247] The national mosque of Qatar is theImam Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab Mosque named after the founder of Wahhabism.[248] Similar to Saudi Arabian sponsorship of Salafism, Qatar has also funded the construction of mosques that promote the Wahhabi Salafism.[citation needed]
Unlike the strict practice of Wahhabi Salafism in Saudi Arabia, Qatar has demonstrated an alternative view of Wahhabism. In Qatar, women are allowed by law to drive, non-Muslims have access to pork and liquor through a state-owned distribution center, and religious police do not force businesses to close during prayer times.[249] Also, Qatar hosts branches of several American universities and a "Church City" in which migrant workers may practice their religion.[250][251] The adoption of a more liberal interpretation of Wahhabism is largely credited to Qatar's young Emir,Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.
Yet, Qatar's more tolerant interpretation of Wahhabism compared to Saudi Arabia has drawn backlash from Qatari citizens and foreigners.The Economist reported that a Qatari cleric criticized the state's acceptance of un-Islamic practices away from the public sphere and complained that Qatari citizens are oppressed.[249] Although Qatari gender separation is less strict than that found in Saudi Arabia, plans to offer co-ed lectures were put aside after threats to boycott Qatar's segregated public university.[249] Meanwhile, there have been reports of local discontent with the sale of alcohol in Qatar.[252]
Qatar has also drawn widespread criticism for attempting to spread its fundamental religious interpretation both through military and non-military channels. Militarily, Qatar has been criticized for funding rebel Islamist extremist fighters in the Libyan Crisis and the Syrian Civil War. In Libya, Qatar funded allies ofAnsar al-Sharia, the jihadist group thought to be behind the killing of former U.S. ambassadorChristopher Stevens, while channeling weapons and money to the IslamistAhrar al-Sham group in Syria.[253] In addition, Qatar-based charities and online campaigns, such asEid Charity andMadid Ahl al-Sham, have a history of financing terrorist groups in Syria.[254][255] Qatar has also repeatedly provided financial support to theGaza government led by the militantHamas organisation while senior Hamas officials have visitedDoha and hosted Qatari leaders in Gaza.[256][257] Qatar also gave approximately $10 billion to the government of Egypt duringMohamed Morsi's time in office.[258]
Non-militarily, Qatar state-funded broadcasterAl Jazeera has come under criticism for selective reporting in coordination with Qatar's foreign policy objectives.[259] The nearby Persian Gulf States of Saudi Arabia,Bahrain, and theUnited Arab Emirates have been among the countries that have condemned Qatar's actions. In 2014, the three Persian Gulf countries withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar referencing Qatar's failure to commit to non-interference in the affairs of otherGulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.[260] Saudi Arabia has also threatened to block land and sea borders with Qatar.[261]This blockade came to an end on 5 January 2021, when authorities from both Saudi and Qatar came on common grounds, with the midmanship of Kuwait.[262]
TheSalafiyya movement has also gained popular acceptance as a "respectedSunni tradition" inTurkey starting from the 1980s, when the Turkish government forged closer ties toSaudi Arabia. This paved the way for cooperation between the SalafiMuslim World League and the TurkishDiyanet, which recognised Salafism as a traditional Sunni theological school, thus introducing Salafi teachings to Turkish society. Globally, Salafisation of Islamic religious discourse occurred simultaneously alongside the rise ofpan-Islamist Movements, with an emphasis on the concept ofTawhid.[268][269]
As opposed to the traditionalist Salafism discussed throughout this article, some Western academics and historians have used the term "Salafism" to denotemodernists, "a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas" and "sought to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization".[123][124] They are also known asModernist Salafis.[270][271][272] This trend, which was also known asAl-Salafiyya Al-Tanwiriyya (Enlightened Salafism) was represented by the Islamic scholarsJamal al-Din Afghani (1839–1897 C.E/ 1255–1314 A.H) andMuhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905 C.E/ 1265–1323 A.H ); whose writings had distinctMu'tazilite andSufi mystical inclinations opposed by Salafism.[273]
The origins of contemporary Salafism in the modernist "Salafi Movement" of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh is noted by some,[274][275] while others say Islamic Modernism only influenced contemporarySalafism.[276] However, the former notion has been rejected by majority.[277][278][279] According to Quintan Wiktorowicz:
There has been some confusion in recent years because both the Islamic modernists and the contemporary Salafis refer (referred) to themselves as al-salafiyya, leading some observers to erroneously conclude a common ideological lineage. The earlier salafiyya (modernists), however, were predominantly rationalist Asharis.[135]
The second stage of Arab Salafiyya movement emerged after theFirst World War and was championed by the Syrian-Egyptian Islamic scholarMuhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), who called for a purist return to theQur'an and theSunnah. These Salafis favoured a literalist understanding of scriptures rather than the allegorical readings of Afghani and ʿAbduh, and were characterised by a deep resistance and hostility toWestern imperialism andWestern ideologies. Rida'sSalafiyya also championed pan-Islamist fraternity encompassingAhl-i Hadith inSouth Asia to theArabianWahhabis; and clashed withnationalist andsecular trends throughout the Islamic World. These themes would be re-inforced and popularised by a number of similar-mindedIslamic revivalists likeHassan al-Banna (1906-1949 C.E/1324-1368 A.H) in Egypt and other Islamic fundamentalists likeAbul A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979 C.E/1321-1399 A.H) in India.[280][216]
In terms of their respective formation, Wahhabism and Salafism are quite distinct. Wahhabism was a pared-down Islam that rejected modern influences, while Salafism sought to reconcile Islam with modernism. What they had in common is that both rejected traditional teachings on Islam in favor of direct, 'fundamentalist' reinterpretation. Although Salafism andWahhabism began as two distinct movements, Faisal's embrace of Salafi (Muslim Brotherhood) pan-Islamism resulted in cross-pollination between ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings onTawhid,Shirk andbid'ah andSalafi interpretations of ahadith (the sayings of Muhammad). Some Salafis nominated ibn Abd al-Wahhab as one of the Salaf (retrospectively bringing Wahhabism into the fold of Salafism), and theMuwahidun began calling themselves Salafis.[283]
In a broad sense, Salafism is similar toNon-denominational Islam (NDM), in the sense some of its adherents do not follow a particular creed.[284] Salafi (follower ofSalaf) means any reform movement that calls for resurrection ofIslam by going back to its origin. In line withWahhabism they promote a literal understanding of the sacred texts of Islam and reject other more liberal reformist movements such as those inspired for example by[285]Muhammad Abduh or byMuhammad Iqbal.[278]
Due to its approach of rejectingtaqlid, Salafiyya school is considered as deviant by certainulema (clerics) of theAsh'arite andMaturidite schools, who portray themselves as theSunni Islamic orthodoxy and believeTaqlid of the fourmadhabs to bewajib (obligatory) for the matter ofFiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).[286][287] Some of these scholars also accuse Salafis of falling into certain forms of unapparenttajsim andtashbih[288][289][290] in'Aqidah which they consider asdeviation from orthodox Sunni doctrines, while clarifying that this deviancy does not expel them from the fold ofIslam.[291][292]
Some scholars of theAl-Azhar University ofCairo produced a work of religious opinions entitledal-Radd (The Response) to refute various views of the Salafi movement.[293]Al-Radd singles out numerous Salafi aberrations – in terms of ritual prayer alone it targets for criticism the following Salafi claims:[294]
The claim that it is prohibited to recite God's name during the minor ablution [Fatwa 50];
The claim that it is obligatory for men and women to perform the major ablution on Friday [Fatwa 63];
The claim that it is prohibited to own a dog for reasons other than hunting [Fatwa 134];
The claim that it is prohibited to use alcohol for perfumes [Fatwa 85].
One of the authors ofal-Radd, the Professor of Law Anas Abu Shady states that, "they [the Salafis] want to be everything to everyone. They're interested not only in the evident (al-zahir), although most of their law goes back to theMuhalla [of theẒāhirī scholarIbn Hazm], but they also are convinced that they alone understand the hidden (al-batin)!"[295]
Sunni critics of Salafism accuse Salafis of altering the actual teachings ofAhmad ibn Hanbal and that of the other eponyms of the four Sunni legal schools.[60] The term "Wahhabi" is sometimes used by opponents of the movement in a sectarian manner to label Salafi Muslims.[296] The SyrianAsh'arite scholarMohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti wrote a number of works refuting Salafism includingAl-La Madhhabiyya (Abandoning the Madhhabs) is the most dangerous Bid'ah Threatening the Islamic Shari'a (Damascus: Dar al-Farabi 2010) andAl-Salafiyyawas a blessed epoch, not a school of thought (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1990).[293] The latter is perhaps the most widespread refutation of Salafism in the twentieth century.[297]
Numerous academic rebuttals of Salafism have been produced in the English language bymodernists such asKhaled Abou El Fadl of theUCLA School of Law, and bySufi intellectuals likeTimothy Winter ofCambridge University and G.F. Haddad.[293] According to El Fadl, Islamist militant groups such asAl-Qaeda "derive their theological premises from the intolerant Puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds".[298] He claimed that the intolerance and alleged endorsement of terrorism manifest in the fringe elements of Wahhabism and Salafism was due to a deviation fromMuslim historical traditions.[298] El-Fadl also argued that the Salafi methodology "drifted into stifling apologetics" by the 1960s, marked by "anxiety" to "render Islam compatible with modernity". These apologetic efforts sought the defense of Islamic traditions from the onslaught ofWesternization; while simultaneously maintaining the supremacy ofIslam and its compatibility with modernity. However, according to El Fadl, such efforts were being increasingly tainted by political opportunism and an unwillingness for critical engagement with the Islamic traditions.[299]
TheSaudi government was criticised by Jerome Taylor in the British tabloidThe Independent, for its role in thedestruction of early Islamic heritage sites in Arabia. There has been controversies over the recent expansionist projects inMecca andMedina that destroyed historically important Islamic heritage sites to make way for "skyscrapers, shopping malls and luxury hotels". The actions of the Saudi government stirred controversy across theMuslim world and Islamic activists across all sects, including Salafis,Sufis,Shias, etc. ;condemned the actions of the Saudi government.[300][301]
Abu Ammaar Yasir Qadhi, an American Islamic cleric and former Salafi, has critiqued what he perceived as the hostility of the movement against non-SalafiMuslims, as well as its lack of intellectualism.[302][303][304] While noting his own belief that the of following the generations of theSalaf is "a fundamental part" ofIslamic faith, he has stated his disagreement with the methodological approach of Salafism.[305]
In 2012,German government officials[306] alleged that Salafi Muslims in Germany had links to various Islamist militant groups but later clarified that it does not consider all Salafis are terrorists. The statements by German government officials criticizing Salafism were televised byDeutsche Welle during April 2012.[307][308]According to the German political scientist Thorsten Gerald Schneiders, despite the Salafi claims to re-establish Islamic values and defendIslamic culture, some members of the movement interpret it in a manner which does not match with Islamic traditions and regard certain elements of Muslim culture such as poetry, literature, singing, philosophy, etc. as works of the devil.[309] According to the French political scientistOlivier Roy, most of the third generation Western Muslim immigrants tend to adopt Salafism and some of them may break off from their family heritage, marrying other converts, rather than a bride from their country of origin, chosen by their parents.[310] According to ex-CIA officerMarc Sageman, sections of the Salafi movement are linked to some Jihadist groups around the world, like Al-Qaeda.[311]
However, according to other analysts, Salafis are not inherently political. Salafis may exhibit all sorts of diverse relations with the state depending on the environment, like the general populations to which they belong. They exhibit no demonstrable proclivity toward violence as a monolithic group. Those Salafis who engage in political participation or armed insurgencies, do so as part of a wider umbrella of political projects.[312] Historian Roel Meijer has asserted that attempts to associate Salafi Muslims with violence by certain Western critics stem from the literature related to the state-sponsored "security studies" conducted by various Western governments during the early 2000s, as well as fromOrientalist depictions that attempted to linkIslamic revivalists with violence during thecolonial era.[313]
^Mahmood, Saba (2012). "2: Topography of the Piety movement".Politics of piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton University Press. p. 61.ISBN978-0691149806.'The Salafi movement emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth in the context of European intellectual and political dominance in the Muslim World'
^E. Curtis, Edward (2010).Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History. Infobase Publishing. p. 499.ISBN978-1438130408.Salafi Muslims: As a social movement within Sunni Islam, Salafi Muslims ARE a global revivalism movement
^L. Esposito, El-Din Shahin, John, Emad, ed. (2013).The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 38.ISBN978-0195395891.Salafism, in its varying guises, has been an important trend in Islamic thought for more than a century.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
^Ali, Mohamed. "Understanding Salafis, Salafism and Modern Salafism." Islamiyyat: International Journal of Islamic Studies 41.1 (2019).
^abcBin Ali MohamedRoots Of Religious Extremism, The: Understanding The Salafi Doctrine Of Al-wala' Wal Bara World Scientific, 2015ISBN978-1783263943 p. 61
^L. Esposito, John (1995).The Oxford encyclopedia of the modern Islamic world. Vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 463.ISBN0195096142.Salafiyah ... It aimed at the renewal of Muslim life and had a formative impact on many Muslim thinkers and movements across the Islamic world."
^L. Esposito, El-Din Shahin, John, Emad, ed. (2013).The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 38.ISBN978-0195395891.Salafism has evolved under a number of key reformers, each of whom has brought his own unique insights and vision to the movement in response to the challenges of his national context.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
^Bennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements".The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 163,169–70.ISBN978-1441127884.It is common to distinguish two kinds of Salafism, which are quite different in many ways. One may be called "modernist" Salafism, or some would say "enlightened" Salafism. This form was... associated with such figures as Muhammad 'Abduh. ... The other form may be called "conservative" or "text-oriented" Salafism. This was the form of Salafism before the mid-nineteenth century and variants of it have become prominent since the mid-twentieth century... Muhammad 'Abduh's views.. are not usually labeled Salafi today... al-Afghani and 'Abduh referred to the salaf and have been called Salafi, they did not themselves adopt Salafi as a label for their thinking in general.
^Bennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements".The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 170–71.ISBN978-1441127884.Rashid Rida (1865–1935), moved in the direction of a conservative Salafism... He was more polemical than 'Abduh and more rigid in his thinking. Where al-Afghani stressed the dynamism of early Islam and 'Abduh stressed its rationalism, Rida wanted to apply the model of the salaf as precisely as possible. He was more strongly opposed to Sufi practices and very critical of Shi'is. His basic concerns were Muslim activism (jihad in the broadest sense), unity of the umma (at least moral if not political), and truth, the true Islam that had been taught by the salaf. He did not reject the madhhabs but hoped for their gradual approximation and amalgamation... In the face of the growing secularism of the early twentieth century he welcomed and supported the Wahhabi movement
^Djait, Hicham (2011).Islamic Culture in Crisis: A Reflection on Civilizations in History. Translated by Fouli, Janet. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. p. 77.ISBN978-1412811408.
^Wahba, Mourad (2022).Fundamentalism and. Translated by K. Beshara, Robert. London: Bloomsbury Academic. p. 69.ISBN978-1350228689.Religious fervor crystallized in the writings of Rashid Rida, the pioneer of the new Wahhabi Salafi movement and the editor-in-chief of al-Manar
^C. Martin, Richard (2016).Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (2nd ed.). Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Publishers. p. 1008.ISBN978-0-02-866269-5.SALAFIYYA.. Contemporary Salafism can be defined as a Sunni reform movement that finds its roots in the Middle Ages, especially in the teachings of Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328)
^E. Campo, Juan (2009).Encyclopedia of Islam. New York: Infobase Publishing. p. 601.ISBN978-0816054541.Salafism (Arabic: al-Salafiyya) Salafism refers to a cluster of different Sunni renewal and reform movements and ideologies in contemporary Islam
^Bennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements".The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 163,169–70.ISBN978-1441127884.
^abBennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements".The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 170–71.
^Wagemakers, Joas (2016). "3: The Transnational History of Salafism in Jordan".Salafism in Jordan: Political Islam in a Quietist Community. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 96–97, 101.ISBN978-1107163669.
^Haroon, Sana (2021). "1: Tajpur, Bihar 1891: Leadership in Congregational Prayer".The Mosques of Colonial South Asia: A Social and Legal History of Muslim Worship. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 33.ISBN978-0-7556-3444-6.
^Qasim Zaman, Muhammad (2002). "II: Constructions of Authority".The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 40.ISBN0691096805.
^Bennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements".The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. London: Bloomsbury. p. 179.ISBN978-1441127884.
^Meijer, Roel; Lacroix, Stéphane (2013). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 38.ISBN978-0199333431.
^G. Rabil, Robert (2014). "1: The Creed, Ideology, and Manhaj (Methodology) of Salafism: A Historical and Contemporaneous Framework".Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. pp. 27, 28.ISBN978-1626161160.
^Hamdeh, Emad.Salafism and traditionalism: Scholarly authority in modern Islam. Cambridge University Press, 2021. p. 25–29
^Haykel, Bernard (2009). "1: On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action". In Meijer, Roel (ed.).Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. p. 34.ISBN978-0231154208.
^Haykel, Bernard (2009). "1: On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action". In Meijer, Roel (ed.).Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. pp. 34–35.ISBN978-0231154208.Salafis are first and foremost religious and social reformers who are engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity, both personal and communal. Indeed, Salafis are determined to create a distinct Muslim subjectivity, one with profound social and political implications.It is important to understand Salafis as constituting a group that defines its reformist project first and foremost through credal tenets (i.e., a theology). Also important, though secondary, for their self-definition are certain legal teachings as well as forms of sociability and politics. I hope to show in this study that Salafism is a term that is heuristically useful because it is a marker of a distinctive form of engagement with the world, and one that is identifiable as such to many Muslims
^Asadullah al-Ghalib, Muhammad (2012).AhlenHadeeth Movement – What and Why?. Kajla, Rajshahi, Bangladesh H.F.B. Publication: 35: Oxford University Press. pp. 625–43.ISBN978-9843347992.In different books of Hadeeth and in reliable books of Fiqh, the Ahle hadeeth have been described as Ahle hadeeth, Ashabul Hadeeth, Ahle Sunnah wal Jama'at, Ahlul Athar, Ahlul Haq, Muhadditheen, etc. As the followers of Salaf-i-Saleheen, they are also known as Salafi.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
^Schmidtke, Sabine (2016).The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 625–43.ISBN978-0199696703.
^G. Rabil, Robert (2014). "1: The Creed, Ideology, and Manhaj (Methodology) of Salafism: A Historical and Contemporaneous Framework".Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. pp. 25,27–28.ISBN978-1626161160.
^The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, p. 484
^H. Warren, David (2021).Rivals in the Gulf. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: Taylor & Francis. p. 5.ISBN978-0367280628.While Wahhab personally rejected the practice of adhering (taqlīd) to a particular legal school, the Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ who follow his thought do, in effect, practice a taqlīd of the Hanbali school...
^Lacroix, Stéphane (2011). "3: Resistance to Sahwa Ascendancy".Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press. pp. 83–84.ISBN978-0674049642.
^abcdQadhi, Dr. Yasir (22 April 2014)."On Salafi Islam".Muslimmatters.Archived from the original on 17 January 2017.
^Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 43,61–62, 63.ISBN978-0-19-933343-1.
^Gauvain, Richard (2013).Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God. New York:Routledge. pp. 8, 293.ISBN978-0710313560.
^Olidort, Jacob (2015).The Politics of "Quietist Salafism"(PDF). Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press. pp. 7, 8.Archived(PDF) from the original on 3 March 2017. Retrieved27 September 2021.
^Cooke, B. Lawrence, Miriam, Bruce (2005). "10: The Salafi Movement".Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop. London: The University of North Carolina Press. pp. 212–13.ISBN0807829234.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^ab"From there he [Albani] learned to oppose taqlid in a madhab." Bennett,The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 174. "Al-Albani had denounced Wahhabi attachment to the Hanbali school." Stephane Lacroix, George Holoch,Awakening Islam, p. 85
^Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62–63.ISBN978-0199333431.
^Krawietz, Tamer, Birgit, Georges (2013).Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. pp. 165–66.ISBN978-3110285345.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 43.ISBN978-0199333431.
^Lacroix, Stéphane (2011). "3: Resistance to Sahwa Ascendancy".Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press. pp. 84–85, 220.ISBN978-0674049642.
^Shaham, Ron (2018).Rethinking Islamic Legal Modernism. Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Publishers. p. 37.ISBN978-9004369542.In setting forth these premises, Rida appears to prepare the ground to steer a middle course.. Rida did not ignore the rich heritage of Islamic law, as did a number of his strict Salafi contemporaries. Instead, following Ibn Taymiyya and especially his student Ibn al-Qayyim, he viewed the literature of the four Sunni law-schools (without committing himself to the teachings of one school in particular) as a resource from which to draw guidance and inspiration for adapting the law to changing circumstances.
^"For many Salafis, both modernist and conservative, "worship" of created beings includes practicing taqlid within a madhab of fiqh." Bennett,The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 165
^Gauvain, Richard (2013).Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God. New York: Routledge. pp. 8, 11,229–30, 328, 347.ISBN978-0710313560.the identity of many modern Salafis is dependent upon their departure from the established rulings of the four Sunni law schools (madhahib), including that of Ibn Hanbal. Modern Salafis generally dislike the practice of following the established rulings of any particular law school and view the principle of legal "imitation" (taqlid) as a significant factor in the overall decline of the Muslim Umma... Zahiri influence on modern Salafi legal thought occurs almost entirely through the Muhalla of Ibn Hazm, .... more important than Ibn Hazm's individual opinions to the Salafi scholars and ritual practitioners mentioned here is the unyielding Zahiri-style logic that underscores them... modern Salafis are endeavouring to shift Zahiri legal from the margins of orthodoxy into its centre
^Haykel, Bernard (2009). "1: On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action". In Meijer, Roel (ed.).Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. pp. 35–36.ISBN978-0231154208.And because of their adherence to a particular form of textual interpretation-one that emphasises a direct interfaçe with the texts of revelation.Salafis enjoy a relatively shallow and limited hierarchy of scholarly authoritics. Most Salafis – though not all – are unlike traditional, and pre-modern, Muslinms in that they do not subscribe to a developed and layered scholastic tradition of religious interpretation, which otherwise constrains and regulates, in rigorous tashion, the output of opinions. As such, it is striking how relatively easy it is to become an authority figure among the Salafis. In fact, as an interpretive community Salafıs are, in contrast to other Muslim traditions of learning, relatively open, even democratic.
^Evstatiev, Simeon. "Salafism as a contested concept." Knowledge, Authority and Change in Islamic Societies. Brill, 2021. p. 187
^Halverson,Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36 "For the Atharis, the "clear" (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur'an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden. A strictly literal, or perhaps amodal, reading of the Qur'an, as opposed to one engaged in ta'wil (metaphorical interpretation), or an attempt to rationally conceptualize its meanings, cannot be questioned and the "real" meanings should be consigned to God."
^Halverson,Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36–37 "For the Atharis, the "clear" (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur'an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden. A strictly literal, or perhaps amodal, reading of the Qur'an, as opposed to one engaged in ta'wil (metaphorical interpretation), or an attempt to rationally conceptualize its meanings, cannot be questioned and the "real" meanings should be consigned to God."
^abcG. Rabil, Robert (2014). "1: The Creed, Ideology, and Manhaj (Methodology) of Salafism: A Historical and Contemporaneous Framework".Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. p. 26.ISBN978-1626161160.
^Hoover, Jon (2019).Ibn Taymiyya (Makers of the Muslim World). London: Oneworld Academic. pp. 11, 19,46–47, 88, 140.ISBN978-1786076892.
^Schmidtke, Sabine (2016).The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 635.ISBN978-0199696703.Ibn Taymiyya also speaks of the priority of worship and ethics over metaphysics in theological terms that later became widespread among Wahhābīs and modern Salafīs. He distinguishes two tawḥīds, or two ways of confessing God's unity. Ibn Taymiyya's first tawḥīd is that of God's divinity (ulūhiyya). Al-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya signifies God's sole worthiness to be a god, that is, God's sole right to be an object of worship (ʿibāda). Al-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya is exclusive worship of God that refuses to give devotion and love to anything or anyone else. Then flowing out from this is the second tawḥīd, the tawḥīd of God's lordship (rubūbiyya). God's lordship refers to His creative power, and al-tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya means confessing that God is the only source of created beings
^Schmidtke, Sabine (2016).The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 427, 626,641–42.ISBN978-0199696703.
^C. Martin, Richard (2004).Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. New York: Macmillan Reference. p. 468.ISBN0028656032.
^C.E. Bosworth; E. van Donzel; W.P. Heinrichs; G. Lecomte (1997).The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. IX (New ed.). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. p. 400.ISBN9004104224.
^Leaman, Oliver (2006).The Qur'an: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis. pp. 631–33.ISBN0415326397.
^Leaman, Oliver (2006).The Qur'an: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis. p. 282.ISBN0415326397.Ibn Taymiyya's works extend to almost every area of contemporary intellectual life... Nearly all of his works are in the style of a refutation or a critique,... He embodies the theology of the Salafi (Traditionalist) movement and all his works are intense, focused and well-argued.
^Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad.Majmu al-Fatawa Vol.1. Cairo: Dar al-Hadith. p. 141.
^S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999).Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. pp. 258–59.ISBN0810836092.
^abcDubler, Joshua (2010)."Salafi Muslims". In Edward E. Curtis (ed.).Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History. Infobase Publishing. p. 499.ISBN978-1438130408.
^S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999).Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. pp. 258–59.ISBN0810836092.Al-Salafiyya ... Among the movement's notables were Shaykh Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Shaykh 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, and Shaykh Tahir Bin al-Tazairy.
^Mattar, Philip (2004).Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa. Vol. IV (2nd ed.). Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference. p. 1923.ISBN002865773X.Rida made the Islamic umma (community) his central concern, asking why it had declined relative to the modern West and blaming the decline on medieval additions to Islam—such as the reverence for Sufi saints—which had obscured the pure religion of the ancestors (salaf, from which comes the name for the Salafiyya movement)
^S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999).Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. p. 259.ISBN0810836092.Al-Salafiya ... The Salafi call in Arab East was secretive until the end of World War I. After that, the Salafi ideas spread and were established among the intelligentsia.
^abC. Martin, Richard (2016).Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (2nd ed.). Farmington Hills, MI: Gale. p. 955.ISBN978-0-02-866269-5.He was also much more politically oriented... seeing the institution of an Islamic state as the precursor to the application of Islamic law and the promotion of Islamic social mores. Rida thus laid the intellectual foundations for a more conservative strand of Salafi reformism, one that is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The reformism of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), the principal ideologues of the Brotherhood, reflects Rida's influence in its advocacy of a holistic conception of Islamic state and society, in which sharia regulates all spheres of life.
^Bennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements".The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. London: Bloomsbury. p. 171.ISBN978-1441127884.
^abLauzière, Henri (2008).The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the life and thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. Phd Dissertation Georgetown University. p. 63.
^abLauzière, Henri (2008).The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the life and thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. Phd Dissertation Georgetown University. p. 65.
^abRidgeon, Lloyd (2015).Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 3, 15.ISBN978-1472523877.
^Ágoston, Masters, Gábor, Bruce (2009). "Salafiyya".Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Facts on File. pp. 500–01.ISBN978-0816062591.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^W. Brown, Daniel (1999). "2: The emergence of modern Challenges to tradition".Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge, MA; London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 22–26.ISBN978-0521653947.
^Ahsan, Sayyid (1987). "IV Foundations of the Saudi State – II : Reforms of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab".Trends in Islam in Saudi Arabia. Department of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University. pp. 141–42.
^Cook, Michael (2003).Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. p. 91.
^W. Brown, Daniel (1999). "2: The emergence of modern Challenges to tradition".Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge, MA; London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27–30.ISBN978-0521653947.
^Dean Commins, David (1990).Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 24–26.ISBN0195061039.
^Weismann, Itzchak (2001).Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. pp. 263–71,273–76.ISBN9004119086.
^Mubarak, Hadia (2022). "1: Ruptures and Continuities in Modern Islamic Thought".Rebellious Wives, Neglectful Husbands: Controversies in Modern Qurʾanic Commentaries. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 39–41.ISBN978-0197553305.
^Weismann, Itzchak (2001).Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. pp. 273–74.ISBN9004119086.
^Ridgeon, Lloyd (2015).Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 3, 16.ISBN978-1472523877.
^Frampton, Martyn (2018).The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement. Cambridge, MA; London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 22–23.ISBN978-0674970700.
^Ismail, Raihan (2021). "Transnational Networks".Rethinking Salafism: The Transnational Networks of Salafi ʿUlama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 180.ISBN978-0190948955.
^Mubarak, Hadia (2022). "1: Ruptures and Continuities in Modern Islamic Thought".Rebellious Wives, Neglectful Husbands: Controversies in Modern Qurʾanic Commentaries. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 39–40.ISBN978-0197553305.
^Weismann, Itzchak (2001). "Introduction".Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. p. 7.ISBN9004119086.
^S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999).Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. p. 259.ISBN0810836092.Al-Salafiya ... In Damascus, many Jordanian students were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's Shaykh Mustapha al-Siba'i and 'Isam al-'Attar, both with a long history in al-Salafiyya. In Damascus, the movement had a large following, including Allama Shaykh Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, 'Ali al-Tantawi, Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Shaykh 'Abd al-Fattah al-Imam, Mazhar al-'Azma, Shaykh al-Bashir al Ibrahimi, Dr. Taqiy al-Din al-Hilal, Shaykh Muhiy al Din al-Qulaybi and Shaykh 'Abd Allah al-Qalqayli. The Islamic Bookstore in Lebanon owned by Zuhayr Shawish printed many of the movement's books.
^Lauziere, Henri (2016).The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 46–49.ISBN978-0231175500.
^Lauziere, Henri (2016).The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 49.ISBN978-0231175500.
^Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 47,59–60,63–64, 73.ISBN978-0199333431.
^Olidort, Jacob (2015). "A New Curriculum: Rashīd Riḍā and Traditionalist Salafism".In Defense of Tradition: Muhammad Naşir Al-Dīn Al-Albānī and the Salafī Method. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. pp. 49,52–54.
^Mubarak, Hadia (2022). "1: Ruptures and Continuities in Modern Islamic Thought".Rebellious Wives, Neglectful Husbands: Controversies in Modern Qurʾanic Commentaries. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 40–41.ISBN978-0197553305.
^Murray-Miller, Gavin (2022). "3: Pan-Islamism and Ottoman Imperialism".Empire Unbound: France and the Muslim Mediterranean, 1880–1918. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 74.ISBN978-0192863119.
^Wood, Graeme (2017).The Way of the Strangers. Random House. p. 22.
^Haykel, Bernard (2009). Meijer, Roel (ed.).Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. p. 35.ISBN978-0231154208.Salafi teachings and ideas have become pervasive in recent decades so that many modern Muslims – even ones who do not identify formally as being Salafi – are attracted to certain aspects of Salafism, namely its exclusive emphasis on textual forms of authority, its theology that attacks Ashari voluntarism, its pared down version of legal interpretation and its call for reform of Muslim belief and practice by, among other things, returning to the model of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.
^abFor example: "Salafism originated in the mid to late 19th-century as an intellectual movement at al-Azhar University, led by Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935)." fromUnderstanding the Origins of Wahhabism and SalafismArchived 3 March 2011 at theWayback Machine, by Trevor Stanley.Terrorism Monitor Volume 3, Issue 14. 15 July 2005
^Haykel, Bernard."Sufism and Salafism in Syria".11 May 2007. Syria Comment. Archived fromthe original on 19 October 2013. Retrieved22 May 2013.The Salafis of the Muhammad Abduh variety no longer exist, as far as I can tell, and certainly are not thought of by others as Salafis since this term has been appropriated/co-opted fully by Salafis of the Ahl al-Hadith/Wahhabi variety.
^Meijer, Roel; Haykel, Bernard (2013). "On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 45–47.ISBN978-0199333431.
^Gauvin, Richard (2013).Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God. New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis. pp. 38, 47, 274, 291, 298, 348.ISBN978-0203124826.
^Lauziere, Henri (2016).The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press.ISBN978-0231175500.
^Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism, Salafism In Pakistan".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 58–78,127–42.ISBN978-0199333431.
^Natana J. DeLong-Bas, inWahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad,
^Abdo, Geneive (2017). "2: The Sunni Salafists".The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 45–46,48–49.ISBN978-0190233143.
^Hamid, Sadek. "The development of British salafism." Isim Review 21.1 (2008): 10–11.
^Abu Rumman, Abu Hanieh, Mohammad, Hassan (2010).Jordanian Salafism: A Strategy for the "Islamization of Society" and an Ambiguous Relationship with the State. Amman, Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. pp. 74–77,138–40.ISBN978-9957484132.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Richard Gauvain,Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God, p. 41.New York: Routledge, 2013.
^abGeorge Joffé,Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism, p. 317. London:I.B. Tauris, 2013.
^abThe Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki, eds. Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort,Kees Versteegh and Joas Wagemakers, p. 382.Leiden:Brill Publishers, 2011.
^Morrissey, Fitzroy (2021). "Epilogue: Islam Today".A Short History of Islamic Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 209.ISBN978-0197522011.
^Commins, David,The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, I. B. Tauris, 2006, p. 152
^Mohie-Eldin, Fatima.The Evolution of Salafism A History of Salafi Doctrine. Al-Noor, Fall 2015. pp. 44–47.
^Abdo, Geneive (2017). "2: The Sunni Salafists".The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 45–46, 49,55–56.ISBN978-0190233143.
^Sazanov, Ploom, Vladimir, Illimar (2021)."Some Remarks on the Ideological Core and Political Pillars of the So-Called Islamic State".Modern Management Review.26 (1):59–80.doi:10.7862/rz.2021.mmr.06.S2CID237957039.Archived from the original on 11 April 2022. Retrieved2 November 2021 – via Academia.edu.The third Salafi branch is the most populous branch of the Salafi movement, usually referred to as mainstream Salafism or political Salafism. It condemns violence, but contrary to the Purist and Madkhalist branches, they are quite actively engaged in the political processes in their home countries and societies..{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Abdo, Geneive (2017). "2: The Sunni Salafists".The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 50.ISBN978-0190233143.
^Abdo, Geneive (2017). "2: The Sunni Salafists".The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49, 50.ISBN978-0190233143.
^Wagemakers, Joas (August 2009). "A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi".British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.36 (2). Routledge:281–97.doi:10.1080/13530190903007327.
^Elmaz, Orhan (2011). "Jihadi-Salafist Creed: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's imperatives of faith". In Lohlker, Rüdiger (ed.).In New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism: Online and offline. Vienna University Press. pp. 15–36.ISBN978-3899719000.
^Cakmaktas, Nurullah (14 February 2024). "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir: 'the jurisprudence of blood' and the ideology of ISIS".Politics, Religion & Ideology.25 (1). Routledge:93–110.doi:10.1080/21567689.2024.2315423 – via Taylor&Francis Online.
^Morrissey, Fitzroy (2021).A Short History of Islamic Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201, 209.ISBN978-0197522011.
^W. Stump, Roger (2008).The Geography of Religion: Faith, Place, and Space. US: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. 199, 200.ISBN978-0742510807.
^Ahmad Khan, Jones, Mu'īnuddīn, Harford (March 1968). "A Diplomat's Report on Wahhabism of Arabia".Islamic Studies.7 (1):33–46.JSTOR20832903.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Esposito 2003, p. 333 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFEsposito2003 (help)
^Jackson, Roy (2006). "Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703–1792)".Fifty Key Figures in Islam. New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 162–63.ISBN0415354676.
^Jackson, Roy (2006). "Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792)".Fifty Key Figures in Islam. New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 161–63.ISBN0415354676.
^Murphy, Caryle (5 September 2006)."For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge".Washington Post.Archived from the original on 10 February 2021. Retrieved11 September 2017.The kind of Islam practiced at Dar-us-Salaam, known as Salafism, once had a significant foothold among area Muslims, in large part because of an aggressive missionary effort by the government of Saudi Arabia. Salafism and its strict Saudi version, known as Wahhabism, struck a chord with many Muslim immigrants who took a dim view of the United States' sexually saturated pop culture and who were ambivalent about participating in a secular political system.
^Lewis, Bernard (27 April 2006)."Islam and the West: A Conversation with Bernard Lewis (transcript)".pewforum.org. Pew.Archived from the original on 10 September 2013. Retrieved5 August 2014.There are others, the so-called Salafia. It's run along parallel lines to the Wahhabis, but they are less violent and less extreme – still violent and extreme but less so than the Wahhabis.
^Mark Durie (6 June 2013)."Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum.Archived from the original on 24 March 2015. Retrieved28 March 2015.What is called Wahhabism – the official religious ideology of the Saudi state – is a form of Salafism. Strictly speaking, 'Wahhabism' is not a movement, but a label used mainly by non-Muslims to refer to Saudi Salafism, referencing the name of an influential 18th-century Salafi teacher, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. ... The continuing impact of Salafi dogma in Saudi Arabia means that Saudi leaders are active and diligent in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world. If there is a mosque receiving Saudi funding in your city today, in every likelihood it is a Salafi mosque. Saudi money has also leveraged Salafi teachings through TV stations, websites and publications.
^Dillon, Michael R."Wahhabism: Is It a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?"(PDF).September 2009. Naval Post-Graduate School. pp. 3–4.Archived(PDF) from the original on 7 April 2014. Retrieved2 April 2014.Hamid Algar [...] emphasizes the strong influence of the Saudi petrodollar in the propagation of Wahhabism, but also attributes the political situation of the Arab world at the time as a contributing factor that led to the co-opting of Salafism. [...] Khaled Abou El Fadl, [...] expresses the opinion that Wahhabism would not have been able to spread in the modern Muslim world [...] it would have to be spread under the banner of Salafism.8 This attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was needed as Salafism was a much more 'credible paradigm in Islam'; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism. [...] The co-opting of Salafism by Wahhabism was not completed until the 1970s when the Wahhabis stripped away some of their extreme intolerance and co-opted the symbolism and language of Salafism; making them practically indistinguishable.
^Murphy, Caryle,Passion for Islam – Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon & Schuster, 2002 p. 32
^Coolsaet, Rik (2013)."7. Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism". In Rik Coolsaet (ed.).Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American. Ashgate Publishing Ltd.ISBN978-1409476450.The proliferation of brochures, free qurans and new Islamic centres in Malaga, Madrid, Milat, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; the growth of Internet sites: all of these elements have facilitated access to Wahhabi teachings and the promotion of Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.
^Kuan Yew Lee; Ali Wyne (2012).Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and . MIT Press.ISBN978-0262019125.But over the last 30-odd years, since the oil crisis and the petrodollars became a major factor in the Muslim world, the extremists have been proleytizing, building mosques, religious schools where they teach Wahhabism [...] sending out preachers, and having conferences. Globalizing, networking. And slowly they have convinced the Southeast Asian Muslims, and indeed Muslims throughout the world, that the gold standard is Saudi Arabia, that that is the real good Muslim.
^Laurent Bonnefoy,Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity, Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2011,ISBN978-1849041317, p. 245.
^Abdo, Geneive (2017). "2: The Sunni Salafists".The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 47, 48.ISBN978-0190233143.
^Lieven, Anatol (2011).Pakistan: A Hard Country. New York: PublicAffairs. p. 128.ISBN978-1610390231.Ahl-e-Hadith ... a branch of the international Salafi ... tradition, heavily influenced by Wahabism.
^W. Brown, Daniel (1999). "2: The emergence of modern Challenges to tradition".Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 25, 27.ISBN9780521653947.
^W. Brown, Daniel (1999). "2: The emergence of modern Challenges to tradition".Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27–29.ISBN9780521653947.
^Daniel W. Brown,Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought: Vol. 5 of Cambridge Middle East Studies, p. 32.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996.ISBN978-0521653947. Quote: "Ahl-i-Hadith [...] consciously identified themselves with Zahiri doctrine."
^Sushant Sareen,The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making, p. 282.New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2005.
^abMandaville, Peter; Lacroix, Stéphane (2022). "13: Unpacking the Saudi-Salafi Connection in Egypt".Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 255–64.ISBN978-0197532577.
^"2011: An Arab Springtime?".Monthly Review. 2 June 2011.The introduction of Wahhabite Islam into Egypt was begun by Rachid Reda in the 1920's...
^abYoussef, Michael (1985). "9: Egyptian Nationalism at the Dawn of the Twentieth Century".Revolt Against Modernity: Muslim Zealots and the West. E.J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. p. 57.ISBN9004075593.
^Mandaville, Peter; Lacroix, Stéphane (2022). "13: Unpacking the Saudi-Salafi Connection in Egypt".Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 263.ISBN978-0197532577.
^Gauvain, Richard (2013).Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God. New York: Routledge. pp. 38,46–47,284–86.
^Pipes, Daniel (2009) [1980].In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (5th ed.). Transaction Publishers. p. 314.ISBN978-1412826167. Retrieved30 March 2015.When Prince Muhammad al-Faysal of Saudi Arabia visited Malaysia in December 1980, he offered $100 million for an interest-free finance corporation. Not surprisingly, the Malaysian finance minister responded by announcing that the government would study the possibility of establishing an `Islamic economic system.` Two years later, the Saudis helped finance the government-sponsored Bank Islam Malaysia. These actions led some cynics to argue `that the expanded interest in Islam among Malaysian politicians reflects a desire to obtain economic aid from the Arabs or to guarantee continued oil during future embargoes.`
^Barak A. Salmoni; Bryce Loidolt; Madeleine Wells (2010).Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon. Rand Corporation. p. 72.ISBN978-0833049742.
^Oxford University Press (2010).Islam in Yemen: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide. Oxford University Press. p. 6.ISBN978-0199804351.
^Böwering, Gerhard; Crone, Patricia; Mirza, Mahan, eds. (2013).The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought (ill. ed.). Princeton University Press. p. 507.ISBN978-0691134840.
^Barby Grant."Center wins NEH grant to study Salafism". Arizona State University. Archived fromthe original on 14 July 2014. Retrieved9 June 2014.It also reveals that Salafism was cited in 2010 as the fastest growing Islamic movement on the planet.
^Simon Shuster (3 August 2013)."Comment: Underground Islam in Russia".Slate.Archived from the original on 27 November 2013. Retrieved9 June 2014.It is the fastest-growing movement within the fastest-growing religion in the world.
^Christian, Caryl (12 September 2012)."The Salafi Moment".FP. Archived fromthe original on 2 November 2013. Retrieved9 June 2014.Though solid numbers are hard to come by, they're routinely described as the fastest-growing movement in modern-day Islam.
^"Uproar in Germany Over Salafi Drive to Hand Out Millions of Qurans".AFP. 16 April 2012. Archived fromthe original on 18 August 2014. Retrieved9 June 2014.The service [German domestic intelligence service] said in its most recent annual report dating from 2010 that Salafism was the fastest growing Islamic movement in the world...
^"'Abduh clearly did not claim to be a Salafi nor identified his followers as Salafis. He simply referred al-Salafiyyin in the context of theological debates as Sunni Muslims who differed from Ash'arites based on their strict adherence to 'aqidat al-salaf (the creed of the forefather) (Lauziere, 2010)"
^Lloyd, Ridgeon (2015). "Introduction".Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age. London: Bloomsbury. p. 3.ISBN978-1472523877.
^The split between Qatar and the GCC won't be permanentArchived 17 November 2016 at theWayback Machine "However, the intra-Sunni divides have not been so clear to foreign observers. Those divides include the following: purist Salafism (which many call "Wahhabism"), modernist Salafism (which is the main intellectual ancestor of the Muslim Brotherhood) and classical Sunnism (which is the mainstream of Islamic religious institutions in the region historically"
^Račius, Egdūnas. "Islamic Law in Lithuania? Its Institutionalisation, Limits and Prospects for Application." Exploring the Multitude of Muslims in Europe: Essays in Honour of Jørgen S. Nielsen (2018): p. 109.
^Davis, Rohan (2018).Western Imaginings: The Intellectual Contest to Define Wahhabism. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.ISBN978-9774168642.
^Abou El Fadl, Khaled,The Great Theft, Harper San Francisco, 2005, p. 77
^The IndependentArchived 25 July 2020 at theWayback Machine,Why don't more Muslims speak out against the wanton destruction of Mecca's holy sites?, by Jerome Taylor, 28 October 2012.
^Thorsten Gerald SchneidersSalafismus in Deutschland: Ursprünge und Gefahren einer islamisch-fundamentalistischen Bewegung transcript Verlag 2014ISBN978-3839427118 p. 392
^Stevens, O'hara, David, Kieron (2015).The Devil's Long Tail: Religious and Other Radicals in the Internet Marketplace. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 76.ISBN978-0199396245.They do not represent an Islamic tradition; on the contrary they break with the religion of their parents. When they convert or become born-again, they always adopt some sort of Salafism, which is a scriptualist version of Islam that discards traditional Muslim culture. They do not revert to traditions: for instance when they marry, it is with the sisters of their friends or with converts, and not with a bride from the country of origin chosen by their parents.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Li, Darryl (2015).The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 105–06.ISBN978-1503610873.
^Meijer, Roel (2014). "Introduction". In Meijer, Roel (ed.).Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Oxford University Press. p. 2.ISBN978-0231154208.
^L. Esposito, John (1998).Islam : the straight path. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 193.ISBN0-19-511234-2.
^Lauzière, Henri (2008).The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the life and thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. pp. 126, 136.
^Al Jazeera Studies: "Arab World Journalism in a Post-Beheading Era" by Thembisa FakudeArchived 23 March 2019 at theWayback Machine 2013 |"Al-Munajjid is considered one of the respected scholars of the Salafi movement, an Islamic school of thought whose teachings are said to inspire radical movements in the Arab world, including al-Qaeda and a group called al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wal Sham (also known as the Islamic State, IS or Daesh)."
^Caryle Murphy (15 July 2010)."A Kingdom Divided". GlobalPost. Archived fromthe original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved6 May 2014.First, there is the void created by the 1999 death of the elder Bin Baz and that of another senior scholar, Muhammad Salih al Uthaymin, two years later. Both were regarded as giants in conservative Salafi Islam and are still revered by its adherents. Since their death no one "has emerged with that degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment," said David Dean Commins, history professor atDickinson College and author ofThe Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.
^Frampton, Martyn (2018).The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 22–23.ISBN978-0674970700.(Rida)... is often seen as one of the fathers of the modern Salafist movement.
^Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Trends in Salafism." Taken fromIslamist Radicalisation: The Challenge for Euro-Mediterranean Relations, p. 74. Eds. Michael Emerson, Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs.Brussels:Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009.ISBN978-9290798651
^Swami, Praveen (2011)."Islamist terrorism in India". In Warikoo, Kulbhushan (ed.).Religion and Security in South and Central Asia. London: Taylor & Francis. p. 61.ISBN978-0415575904.To examine this infrastructure, it is useful to consider the case of Zakir Naik, perhaps the most influential Salafi ideologue in India.
Muhammad in History, Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God (2 vols.), Edited by C. Fitzpatrick and A. Walker, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014.ISBN1610691776.
Botobekov, Uran (2021). "How Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Groups are Exploiting the Covid-19 Pandemic: New Opportunities and Challenges". In Käsehage, Nina (ed.).Religious Fundamentalism in the Age of Pandemic. Religionswissenschaft. Vol. 21.Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. pp. 107–48.doi:10.14361/9783839454855-005.ISBN978-3837654851.
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