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Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD, pronounced/ˈsiː-æd/), also known in the United States as "Wild Weasel" and (initially) "Iron Hand" operations, are military actions to suppress enemy surface-basedair defenses, including not onlysurface-to-air missiles (SAMs) andanti-aircraft artillery (AAA) but also interrelated systems such asearly-warning radar andcommand, control and communication (C3) functions, while also marking other targets to be destroyed by an air strike. Suppression can be accomplished both by physically destroying the systems or by disrupting and deceiving them throughelectronic warfare. In modern warfare, SEAD missions can constitute as much as 30% of allsorties launched in the first week of combat and continue at a reduced rate through the rest of a campaign.[1] One quarter of American combat sorties in recent conflicts have been SEAD missions.[2] Despite generally being associated with aircraft, SEAD missions may be performed using any means, including through actions by ground forces.
In some contexts,Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) is used to reference physical destruction of air defense targets, while SEAD applies to sorties which discourage enemy use of their air-defense radar assets out of fear of placing the assets in jeopardy.
Primitive operations akin to SEAD emerged during theSecond World War, during which multiple participants made attempts to degrade enemy ground radar stations. However, SEAD missions performed by dedicated aircraft first undertook combat missions during theVietnam War, theUnited States Air Force'sEF-105F/F-105G Thunderchief andUnited States Navy'sA-6B Intruder being amongst these pioneers;Operation Linebacker intentionally incorporated SEAD actions to improve the survivability of bombers and increase overall effectiveness. Other early conflicts that saw SEAD missions conducted included the 1982Falklands War, overPort Stanley, and the1982 Lebanon War, in theBeqaa Valley. The tactical awareness, or lack thereof, of air defense operators proved to be a decisive factor in the success rate of these missions. During the1986 United States bombing of Libya, while Libya's integrated air defense network was not destroyed, it was damaged without major losses incurred by US forces.
During the 1990s, extensive use of SEAD was made, particularly during theGulf War of the early 1990s. Intense aerial attacks of Iraq's integrated air defenses were conducted duringOperation Instant Thunder, the Coalition's aerial attacks at the start of the conflict; Iraqi SAM operators regularly resorted to firing missiles with minimal or no guidance due to fears that radar use brought quick retaliation.All Iraqi air defenses in the south were destroyed, although the skies remained unsafe for low altitude flight. In the 1999NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the defender's air defences proved to be less vulnerable and more effective; although only two aircraft were reportedly lost to Yugoslavian SAMs, thedowning of an F-117A Nighthawk marked the first combat loss ever of a stealth aircraft. In theIraq War of the 2000s, coalition aircraft repeatedly targeted Iraqi SAMs during the opening phase of the conflict, despite this, aerial strikes were usually performed from stand-off distances to avoid these defenses, and low level flight was avoided. In the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, while many Ukrainian air defence facilities were reportedly destroyed or damaged in the first days of the war by Russian air strikes, Russia may not have been able to gain aerial superiority; it has been alleged that Ukrainian mid-range SAM sites have forced planes to fly low, but this makes them vulnerable toshoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.
Prior to the Vietnam War, SEAD was an undefined mission: although attempts to destroy enemy air defense sites were undertaken, they were done so on an individual aircraft basis and in relation to specific targets or operations rather than as part of an overall strategy or doctrine of defense suppression.[3] Near the end of the Second World War, US Navy pilots developed a doctrine that could be considered the first example of SEAD. When attacking enemy warships, US Navy fighters would attack enemy warships with machine guns and rockets to distract and or kill the enemy anti aircraft gunners While the torpedo and dive bombers could move in and more accurately target the ship. While crude, these tactics were frequently effective for their time.[4]
During theBattle of Britain, theGermanLuftwaffe attempted to destroy Great Britain'sChain Home radar stations in order to degrade the British air defense network. However,German High Command failed to realize the efficiency of not only the radar stations themselves but thecommand and control system directing Britain's air defenses. After initial optimism regarding the radar sites' destruction, it was eventually decided to halt these attacks altogether except for exceptional circumstances.[5] As the air war inEurope shifted in favor of theAllies, the Germans relied heavily on their AAA to defend against bombing attacks. This was borne out in Allied aircraft losses between 1943 and 1944, where losses to enemy fighters were cut in half but losses toflak increased tenfold.[6]
Understanding the importance ofGermany's radar sites, the Allies directed attacks against these installations and introduced new technology to counteract the effects of radar-directed AAA, includingCARPET (US) and WINDOW (UK). A change in tactics saw bomber formations flying higher and more spread out to avoid the effects of flak. Bombing missions were also carried out to accomplish the physical destruction of AAA sites, usingimagery intelligence to locate the weapons and employing bothheavy bombers andfighter-bombers to destroy them. TheP-47 Thunderbolt in particular was chosen for this task due to its ability to survive enemy fire. The effect of these missions varied, with losses suffered by fighter-bombers much higher—up to 40% in some cases—on account of their low-altitude attacks.[7]Artillery also played a major role in suppressing air defenses, with theBritish Army the first to develop what became known as counterflak or "Apple Pie" missions. These missions were first employed to limited effect during theBattle of France but matured as the war progressed. The largest SEAD mission in history took place on March 24, 1945, when artillery forces of theBritish XII Corps attempted to knock out the local German air defense network in support ofOperation Varsity. Although twenty-four thousandartillery shells were fired over the course of twenty-two minutes at some one hundred targets, the mission was unsuccessful due to inaccurate targeting data and insufficient firepower.[8]
In thePacific Theater, theJapanese had made only limited progress in developing radar for air defense and what systems they did have were primitive and easy to avoid. Nevertheless, as the Americans began thebombing campaign against Japan there was concern over the large number of radar sites located on the home islands. For this purposeB-24 Liberators andB-29 Superfortresses were fitted with radar-homing devices to conduct "ferret" missions to locate and identify radar transmissions. The information brought back from these missions was used to outfit other B-29s with radar jammers andchaff to confuse Japanese air defense radars as they conducted their missions.[9]B-25 Mitchells were also outfitted with radar-homing equipment and used to lead "hunter-killer" teams of other B-25s in locating and destroying Japanese early-warning radar sites.[10]
While there were some technological changes between World War II and theKorean War, many of the tactics for dealing with enemy air defenses remained the same. For aircraft performing missions at low altitudes, AAA remained a constant danger; in fact, it was less dangerous for aUNC pilot to engage in air-to-air combat than it was to attack ground targets.[11] The terrain and weather of theKorean Peninsula also contributed to the dangers associated with ground-attack missions. Nevertheless, the advent ofjet aircraft brought about many changes. Compared topropeller aircraft, jets were much faster, could climb more steeply, were more resistant to damage and were quieter in operation. They were thus able to more effectively attack ground targets and escape, and while both jet- and propeller-driven aircraft participated in the Korean War the latter suffered heavier losses and were largely phased out by the end of the conflict.[12]
As the war progressed, the Communists developed a highly centralized integrated air defense network, incorporating early-warning radars,ground-controlled interception (GCI) and AAA. The potency of this network compelled UNC bombers to conduct bombing missions at altitudes beyond the reach of ground-based weapons, although this impacted the accuracy of their bombs. The UNC also possessed an effective air defense network, but theNorth Korean Air Force had been largely destroyed early in the war and theChinese Air Force was almost exclusively focused on the mission ofair superiority rather than attacking UNC ground forces.[13]
The Vietnam War saw the evolution of what would become known as SEAD over the course of the conflict. At the start ofOperation Rolling Thunder,North Vietnam's air defenses were only dealt with in a piecemeal fashion, in spite of intelligence indicating that theNorth Vietnam Army was developing an integrated air defense system (IADS) dedicated toair deniability. This included the construction of sixtySA-2 Guideline SAM sites by the end of 1965 which, though only accomplishing one hit for every thirteen missiles fired, were responsible for shooting down nearly 15% of American aircraft lost that year. Early attempts to counter this system consisted of modifiedF-100 Super Sabres using crude homing equipment to locate and bomb radar-guided SAM and AAA sites, but these missions incurred heavy losses and the threat to American aircraft continued to grow.[14] In 1966 a task force was put together to analyze the challenges presented by the NVA's air defense network and recommend ways to counter it. One of these was for aircraft to operate at low altitudes (below 500 meters) where the missiles were less effective. This also put the aircraft well within range of AAA, which would account for nearly 85% of all American aircraft losses during Rolling Thunder.[15]
Eventually new SEAD-dedicated aircraft were introduced, theAir Force'sEF-105F/F-105G Thunderchief andNavy'sA-6B Intruder, which mounted more sophisticated detection equipment and carried theAGM-45 Shrike andAGM-78 Standardanti-radiation missiles (ARMs). These fighter-bombers became very adept at tracking down and destroying ground-based air defense weapons, such that it became common for a vast majority of NVA SAM operators to turn off their radars whenever an F-105G was spotted. While this prevented the SAM from physically being destroyed, it essentially accomplished the same mission of suppressing air defenses around the target.Electronic warfare aircraft were also used to suppress air defenses by jamming NVA radars, with first theEB-66 Destroyer joined later by theEA-6B Prowler.[15] By the end of Rolling Thunder these changes had caused a significant degradation in the effectiveness of SAMs: only one SA-2 missile out of every forty-eight fired resulted in a hit.[16] In spite of these changes, SEAD remained a primarily tactical function throughout Rolling Thunder, with American leadership either unaware or unappreciative of North Vietnam's IADS.[15]
Losses suffered by F-105 Wild Weasels spurred on the development of a new variant based on theF-4C Phantom II, the EF-4C Phantom Wild Weasel IV. The first thirty-six of these were delivered to Southeast Asia in 1969 and so missed taking part in Rolling Thunder. While carrying the same electronics as in the F-105G, the dense internal structure of the F-4 Phantom prevented the EF-4C from efficiently mounting this equipment, which meant it could not carry the superior AGM-78 Standard missile.[17][18] By the start ofOperation Linebacker, Wild Weasel missions were both more and less effective. Tactics and technology had evolved which improved the suppression of individual SAM sites, however the American military still failed to consider the integrated nature of North Vietnam's air defense network. Not only did the network possess thousands of radar- and optical-guided AAA and SAM sites, it also consisted of early-warning radars, intelligence-gathering agencies, and hundreds of ground-controlled interceptors. Thus, while fewer American aircraft were lost to SAMs during Linebacker, many more were lost in air-to-air combat.[19]
Operation Linebacker II started off similarly to Linebacker I with regards to SEAD tactics but was remarkable for the introduction ofB-52 Stratofortress bombers in the defense-suppression role. During the early part of the operation, a combination of poor tactical employment and overconfidence on the part ofStrategic Air Command resulted in the loss of a number of B-52s to SA-2 missiles, enough to force a rethink in how to counteract the enemy's air defenses. The latter part of Linebacker II finally saw a concerted effort made to suppress the entire North Vietnamese IADS and significantly reduced the losses suffered.[20] Only one SA-2 missile for every sixty-eight fired resulted in a hit, the lowest ratio of the entire war.[16] The SEAD tactics displayed at the end of Linebacker II, involving the combination of traditional understanding of SEAD withelectronic warfare and C3 countermeasures, laid the groundwork for future development.[20]
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With the phase-out of the F-105G, the US Air Force was in need of a new SEAD-dedicated aircraft. This effort was given more urgency in 1973 when, during theYom Kippur War,Egypt employed a Soviet-built IADS that severely mauled theIsraeli Air Force. After a series of tests, the new F-4G 'Wild Weasel V' first took flight in 1975 and became operational in 1978. Built on the F-4E airframe, the F-4G removed theM61 Vulcan pod to make room for specialized detection and jamming equipment and could carry the latest anti-radiation missile, theAGM-88 HARM.[18][21] The F-4G Wild Weasel was then joined byEF-111A Raven andEC-130H Compass Call to become part of the USAF's "triad" of electronic combat aircraft. Each aircraft performed its own role in the overall mission of SEAD: the F-4G with seeking out and destroying enemy air defenses, the EC-130 with degrading the enemy's C3 capabilities, and the EF-111A with jamming enemy early-warning and target-acquisition radars. Additional aircraft often part of SEAD missions included theE-3 Sentry,EC-130E Commando Solo andRC/EC-135.[22]
On the other hand, theSoviets did not treat SEAD as an independent air operation but as a tactical role to be performed as part of a larger mission, namely an overwhelming air assault againstNATO. This role was not carried out by SEAD-specific aircraft but normal bombers and fighter aircraft, such as theTupolev Tu-16 andTupolev Tu-22M, which could carry Soviet anti-radiation missiles. These aircraft would be organized into several strike groups whose mission was to lay down "chaff corridors" 40–50 kilometers across at intervals of 10 kilometers, including directly on top of suspected SAM sites. A small number of aircraft in these groups would be equipped with ARMs to physically destroy the sites. These missions were conducted against pre-planned targets which had been previously identified bysignals intelligence and other reconnaissance efforts, rather than having aircraft seek out targets of opportunity. The closest the Soviets came to dedicated SEAD platforms were modified stand-offinterceptors like theMikoyan MiG-25BM andattack aircraft like theSukhoi Su-24M.[23]
The first example of a post-Vietnam SEAD campaign was by the United Kingdom during the 1982Falklands War. The RAF Avro Vulcan B.Mk-2 was initially planned to be retired in early 1982 but the outbreak of the Falklands War, in April that year postponed it.[24] The Falklands conflict was the only time that the Vulcan performed SEAD missions, flying very long-range missions against Port Stanley, armed with AGM-45 Shrike missiles mounted on makeshift underwing pylons and carrying a AN/ALQ-101 pod for jamming.[25]
Shortly afterwards was Israel'sOperation Mole Cricket 19, launched at the start of the1982 Lebanon War. During the priorYom Kippur War of 1973, Egyptian and Syrian SAM batteries proved to be costly to attack for theIsraeli Air Force (IAF), such as duringOperation Model 5; during the first three days of the war alone, the IAF lost 50 aircraft in about 1,220 sorties, a loss rate of four percent.[26] The IAF found it challenging to provide air support to ground forces. Shortly after the conflict's end, the service stated a multiyear project, active between 1973 and 1978, specifically to devise an effective counter to the SAM threat.[26] By 1982, theBekaa Valley had been heavily reinforced by theSyrian Armed Forces with a modern Soviet-style air defense network consisting of multiple radar installations, GCI facilities, SAM and AAA sites, and a redundant C3 network. Prior to the start of the operation, Israel conducted an extensive intelligence-gathering effort, consisting ofreconnaissance aircraft,remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and electronic surveillance aircraft, to paint an expansive picture of where Syrian air defense sites were located and which radar frequencies they were using.[27][28]
Israel's attack on the SAMs was inadvertently assisted by the Syrians, who often placed their sites in sub-optimal positions and failed to relocate their equipment, use dummy radars or maintain activecombat air patrol. When the operation began, efficient coordination of jamming/deception efforts with attacks against air defense sites effectively neutralized the ground component of the Bekaa Valley IADS. In response to the attacks, the Syrians launched a large number of fighter aircraft, however without the aid of their radar and GCI facilities, these forces were "flying blind" and suffered crippling losses in the resulting air-to-air combat. So complete and disturbing was the Israeli dismantling of the Bekaa Valley IADS that the deputy commander of theSoviet Air Defense Forces was sent to investigate what had gone wrong. Part of Israel's success was due to extensive reconnaissance and preparations prior to the battle, incompetence on the part of the Syrians, and desert conditions conducive to SEAD operations.[29][28]
Operation El Dorado Canyon, the United States' response to the1986 Berlin discotheque bombing, employed lessons learned from the Bekaa Valley campaign, including extensive planning and practice runs. In contrast to the Israeli mission though the goal of El Dorado Canyon was not the destruction ofLibya's IADS itself but to conduct apunitive strike againstMuammar Gaddafi.[30][31] Suppressing the IADS through non-lethal means would help accomplish this mission and, just as important after the Vietnam War, reduce casualties suffered by the strike group. For this reason, electronic jamming played a more prominent role in the operation than at Bekaa Valley and was carried out by both EF-111A Ravens and EA-6B Prowlers in the first ever joint US Air Force-Navy SEAD operation. For several reasons, F-4G Wild Weasels could not take part in El Dorado Canyon, requiring the use of the Navy's carrier-borneA-7E Corsair IIs andF/A-18 Hornets to attack Libyan SAM sites. Their lack of the Wild Weasel's specialized equipment required these fighters to fire their HARMs preemptively at Libyan SAM sites, a costly and wasteful method which nevertheless was effective due to the limited nature of the raid. For their part, the Libyans and their Soviet advisers had also learned lessons from the Bekaa Valley campaign: their IADS was constructed with multiple redundancies (including overlapping radar coverage and hardened landlines between defense sites) and a wider array of both Soviet and Western radar systems able to operate on multiple frequencies to avoid jamming. In the end, US forces succeeded in suppressing the Libyan IADS and conducted their punitive strike with minimal casualties suffered.[32][33]
Coalition forces made extensive use of SEAD during theGulf War againstIraq in order to counter its – at least on paper – formidable IADS. By 1990 Iraq was protected by approximately 3,700 SAMs, organized into 105 firing batteries, and approximately 7,000 AAA pieces, supported by hundreds of overlapping early warning, search and acquisition radars. In the air theIraq Air Force was the sixth largest in the world, including hundreds ofinterceptors which were housed and protected within hardenedbunkers. At the center of the Iraqi IADS was Kari, an automatedcommand and control system developed by Iraq and built by French contractors in the wake ofOperation Opera (Kari in turn is the French spelling of Iraq backwards). Kari tied the entire IADS to a single location, the national Air Defense Operations Center (ADOC) located in an underground bunker inBaghdad, and in turn divided the country into four defense sectors each overseen by a Sector Operations Center (SOC) located atH-3,Kirkuk,Taji andTalil; a fifth SOC was added atAli Al Salem to cover the recently conquered Kuwait. Each SOC oversaw the local airspace and commanded anywhere from two to five Intercept Operations Centers (IOCs) per sector. The IOCs were located in bunkers constructed at Iraqi Air Force bases and tied into local radar systems, whose information they could pass on to their SOC and thence on to Baghdad. In this way a SOC was capable of simultaneously tracking 120 aircraft and selecting for the appropriate weapon system to engage them. The SOC could automatically target for SA-2 andSA-3 SAM systems in their sector, which meant the SAMs did not have to turn on their own radar and reveal their position, or an IOC could direct local interceptors to engage the targets. Baghdad itself was one of the most heavily defended cities in the world – more heavily defended several times over thanHanoi during the Vietnam War – protected by 65% of Iraq's SAMs and over half of its AAA pieces.[34][35]
However, the Iraqi IADS had several fatal flaws of which Coalition air forces were able to take advantage. The system was primarily oriented towards defending against much smaller attacks from Iraq's most likely enemies –Iran, Syria and Israel – and focused onpoint defense rather than area defense. This meant there were significant gaps in its coverage, particularly on the orientation fromSaudi Arabia straight to Baghdad, and attacking aircraft would be able to approach their target from multiple directions. Much of the Iraqi air defense equipment was also quite outdated: Iraqi SA-2 and SA-3 systems were nearing the end of their operational lifespan and their countermeasures well known at this point, while whatSA-6,SA-8 andRoland systems they possessed weren't much younger either. Likewise a majority of Iraq's interceptor force were less-capableMiG-21s, with fewer more modern variants including export versions of theMiG-29 andF1 Mirage. Furthermore, the IADS was centralized to a fault. Although each IOC was datalinked to their respective SOC and in turn back to the ADOC, the defense sectors couldn't share information between each other. If a SOC was knocked out of action the attached air defense weapons lost all ability to coordinate their response; its respective SAM batteries would be forced to rely on their own radar systems while most AAA guns lacked any radar guidance. Training was also poor, with Iraqi pilots overly reliant on ground-control instructions such that if the IOCs were disabled they lostsituation awareness and became easy targets.[34][35]
Suppression of the Iraqi IADS played a prominent role inOperation Instant Thunder, the preliminary air campaign plan against Iraq which served as the basis for Operation Desert Storm'sair campaign. In its initial limited form, Instant Thunder called for three dedicated SEAD squadrons which would significantly degrade the IADS enough to allow decimating strikes against Iraq's military and political leadership and other strategic targets.[36] This role for SEAD was further expanded as the mission grew in scope, involving a larger number of aircraft to completely destroy the air defenses protecting southern Iraq and Kuwait.[37] Planning for this mission was helped when theCIA contacted the French engineer responsible for designing the Kari IADS and passed along information about its vulnerabilities and limitations.[38] In its final form, Phase II of the Desert Storm air campaign sought to decimate the southern Iraqi IADS within two days of the start of hostilities. F-4G Wild Weasels and other aircraft capable of carrying HARM missiles would destroy air defense sites themselves, electronic warfare aircraft would disrupt radars and other systems, and additional targets would be struck in order to support this mission, such as temporarily knocking out Iraq's electrical infrastructure.[38][39] In addition to traditional SEAD systems the Persian Gulf War would also see the use of unconventional assets in knocking out Iraq's air defenses, in particularcruise missiles andF-117A Nighthawks, which would be used to attack sensitive targets.[40]
The opening shots of Operation Desert Storm were fired on January 17 in pursuit of defense-suppression: at 2:20AM local time Task Force Normandy, a group of twelve American helicopters, infiltrated into Iraq with the goal of destroying two early-warning radar sites. ThreeMH-53J Pave Lows guided nineAH-64 Apaches to the targets, which the gunships destroyed, opening a hole in the Iraqi IADS for the initial wave of aircraft to exploit. Two F-117As knocked out theNukhayb IOC, further widening the gap, although their next attack against the H-3 SOC was unsuccessful. Among the first targets hit by F-117As attacking into Baghdad, bombs damaged theAl Taqaddum IOC and Talil SOC, shortly followed byTomahawk strikes that disabled the electrical grid upon which Kari depended; reportedly some used specialwarheads filled with carbon fiber bundles to short-circuit the network. For the next several hours dozens of Coalition aircraft poured into Iraq. Those which weren't specifically directed to suppress air defenses had significant SEAD escort, including the use ofBQM-74 drones andADM-141 TALD decoys which would both "take the hit" for the manned airplanes and cause the Iraqis to reveal their position when they tracked or fired upon the lure. The first night's largest sortie was a joint US Air Force-Navy SEAD mission consisting of fifty aircraft designed to look like a bombing raid on Baghdad but which instead were fitted out with decoys, drones and HARMs to destroy air defenses protecting the city. With Kari degraded due to the disabling of the civilian electrical grid the Iraqi SAMs were forced to use their organic radar, producing what one pilot called "HARM Heaven". A total of 67 HARMs were fired over the course of twenty minutes, causing a significant reduction in Iraqi air defenses around the capital based on follow-up missions.[41]
Throughout the rest of the first night additional air-defense targets were hit by Coalition aircraft with varying levels of success while strikes against other targets consisted of a high ratio of SEAD and escort to strike aircraft. This pace of attack against air-defense and other targets continued into the first day, involving a variety of different aircraft, and spread to targets in Kuwait.A-10 Thunderbolt IIs were used to attack early-warning radars and similar sites along the border in operations known humorously as "Wart Weaseling" (a play on the Wild Weasel and the A-10 "Warthog" nicknames).[42] Unable to use Kari and fearful of turning their own radars on, Iraqi SAM operators resorted to firing their missiles with minimal or no guidance. Furthermore, units of theIraqi Army – even the eliteRepublican Guard – possessed inadequate SAM defenses by NATO or Soviet standards. This allowed Coalition aircraft to attack them from the relative safety of higher altitudes.[43]
By the end of the first forty-eight hours of Desert Storm, the Coalition had achieved its goal of significantly degrading Kari, including the destruction of all air defenses in the south. Although the Iraqis would replace most destroyed radars and bring back many IOCs and SOCs to at least partial operation, this was done so in an unorganized manner, with the Coalition continuing to bomb any reactivated sites.[44] In effect, combined with the failure of Iraq's air force to defend its airspace, the Coalition had gained air supremacy in the skies over Iraq from nearly the outset of the conflict.[44]
Coalition aircraft conductingstrategic bombing andinterdiction inside Iraq were now free to operate at medium altitudes of 10,000 ft (3,000 m) and higher with no danger of SAM activity. This also put them beyond the effective range of most of Iraq's AAA pieces, which remained a threat.[45] Baghdad's heavy AAA defenses also continued to make it a difficult target to attack, as Coalition forces found out during an attemptedstrike on January 19 against theTuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. A variety factors, including the threat of AAA and ballistic SAMs, resulted in the strike's failure and loss of two aircraft.[46]
By January 27, no C3 activity was detected at the SOC level by Coalition forces, and only limited activity at the IOC level. At the end of the conflict, theDIA estimated Kari was operating at 25% its original capacity, and that it would take at least ten years to rebuild the system and another five to retrain the personnel needed to operate it. In total, the SEAD campaign by the Coalition was an unequivocal success, allowing Coalition aircraft to fly at medium and high altitudes over Kuwait and Iraq with impunity. The only losses Coalition aircraft suffered to Iraqi air defenses after the first two days occurred when they operated at low altitudes, primarily conductingclose air support or other missions to assist ground forces.[47]
The bombing campaign of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia during mid-1999, dubbedOperation Allied Force, was an overall success for NATO forces, but the mission to suppress Yugoslav air defenses proved to be more difficult than prior operations during the Gulf War. SEAD operations for NATO were principally carried out by the US Air Force, with fiftyF-16CJ Block 50 Fighting Falcons, and the US Navy and Marines, with 30 EA-6B Prowlers; additional support was provided by Italian and GermanTornado ECRs, a purpose-developed SEAD model.[48] Many NATO aircraft were furnished with newtowed decoys designed to lure away any missiles fired at them, and reportedly for the first timecyberwarfare was used to target Yugoslav air defense computer systems.[49]
However, a number of deficiencies in NATO's SEAD operations were revealed during the course of the bombing campaign. The US Air Force had allowed its electronic warfare branch to atrophy in the years after the Gulf War, resulting in greater response times to engaging a SAM threat.[50] Airspace restrictions andrules of engagement limited where NATO aircraft could fly and what targets they could hit, leaving some air defense systems untouched.[48][51] Kosovo's mountainous terrain also made it difficult for NATO to locate and target Yugoslav air defenses, while at the same time the region's poor infrastructure limited where Yugoslav SAM and AAA sites could be placed.[52] Furthermore, according to a post-conflict US intelligence report, Yugoslavia had a spy in NATO's headquarters in Brussels who in the early part of the conflict leaked flight plans and target details to the Yugoslav military, allowing Yugoslav military assets to be relocated to avoid detection; NATO responded by limiting the number of people with access to its plans, which appeared to be successful.[53]
Yugoslavia had a much smaller IADS than Iraq during the Gulf War, but took greater steps at preserving it from NATO's bombing campaign. The Yugoslav integrated air defence system (IADS) was extensive, including underground command sites and buried landlines, which allowed for information to be shared between systems; thus, active radar in one area could target NATO aircraft for SAMs and AAA in another area with no active radar, further limiting NATO's ability to target air defences.[54] By focusing on its operational survival, Yugoslav air defenses ceded a certain amount of air superiority to NATO forces. Yet the persistence of their credible SAM threat forced NATO to allocate greater resources to continued SEAD operations rather than conducting other missions, while Yugoslav AAA and MANPADS forced NATO aircraft to fly at 15,000 ft (4,600 m) or higher. NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only three of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. At the same time, over 800 SAMs were fired by Yugoslav forces at NATO aircraft, including 477 SA-6s and 124 confirmed MANPADS, for the downing of only two aircraft and several more damaged. That one of the two aircraft shot down was anF-117A Nighthawk marked the first combat loss ever of a stealth aircraft and typified some of the issues NATO faced during the campaign.[49][55]
At the onset of theIraq War, Iraq's IADS was a fraction of what it had been during the Gulf War, though it was still one of the densest defense networks in the world. Over 200 SAM systems were still operational, mainly the older SA-2s, SA-3s and SA-6s, along with over 2,000 MANPADS and large numbers of AA guns. Improvements had been made to Kari, including greater usage of fiber optic cables, and more advanced equipment such asGPS guidance jammers were acquired. In addition to the ADOC and four original SOCs, a fifth SOC was created in Baghdad and specifically assigned to defend Saddam's palaces, the Republican Guards, and key security facilities.[56]
Still, the defense network was relatively outdated and thus unable to seriously challenge theCoalition's dominance of Iraqi airspace, which had not only succeeded in suppressing Iraqi defenses during the Gulf War but continued to do so during the enforcement ofIraqi no-fly zones.[57][58] Starting on March 1, aggressive "enforcement" of the no-fly zones accounted for the destruction of as many as a third of Iraq's missile launchers and radars by the time the invasion commenced on March 20.[56][59] Numerous aircraft, such as thePanavia Tornado fighter-bomber, penetrated Iraqi airspace to conduct bombing raids during the opening phase of the conflict, striking at Iraqi installations.[60]
During the course of the invasion, there were 1,660 reports of SAM launches and similar numbers of AAA firings, for the loss ofvery few aircraft. While Iraq largely failed to shoot down many Coalition aircraft, the sheer numbers of their air defenses still made them dangerous until the final stages of the invasion. This was true in particular for its large number of short-range missile and AAA weapons, which made low-altitude missions deadly and were harder to suppress. Where possible, Coalition forces conducted stand-off strikes from outside the range of these defenses.[56] The unsuccessful2003 attack on Karbala exemplifies the dangers faced by aircraft operating at low altitudes around air defenses.[61][62]
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Many Ukrainian air defence facilities were reportedly destroyed or damaged in the first days of the invasion by Russian air strikes.[63] On 5 March 2022, theRussian Air Force (VVS) declared that it had achieved air superiority, 11 days after the beginning of the invasion,[64]: minute 17:35 but notair supremacy.[65][a] However, that same day, Russia lost at least ten aircraft.[68] On 11 March 2022, retired United States Air Force Lieutenant GeneralDavid Deptula stated inThe New York Times that the Russian Air Force had not achieved air superiority, noting that supposedly vulnerable Ukrainian drones had continued to operate against Russian forces.[69]
While several early air strikes on Yavoriv in Western Ukraine were performed by Russian bombers, their munitions were firing from a distance while flying within Russian air space, rather than entering Ukrainian air space; on 13 March 2022, dozens of air-launched cruise missiles were launched from within Russia to reach Western Ukraine, because it was allegedly too dangerous for the Russian Air Force to fly over Ukrainian space due to Ukrainian air defenses.[70][71]: 7:00 Ukrainian mid-range SAM sites forced planes to fly low, making them vulnerable toStinger and othershoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, while a lack of training and flight hours for Russian pilots allegedly rendered them inexperienced for the type of close ground support missions typical of modern air forces.[72] On 18 May 2022, nearIzyum, a RussianZhitel electronic warfare apparatus was detected, located, and disabled by Ukraine's ground and air forces.[73]
On 30 August 2022, Command ofUkrainian Air Force (KPS ZSU) released a video of its MiG-29 jets firingAGM-88 HARM missiles against Russian air defenses,[74][75] one day after an alleged attack on Russian radar site forS-400 SAM batteries near Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea.[76] Earlier in the Summer, multiple Russian SAM batteries had been hit and the remains of AGM-88 missiles had been found on site.[77][78] The U.S. government acknowledged the previously undisclosed transfer of AGM-88 missiles to Ukraine on August 8, 2022.[79]
There are also suspicions of M31A1 GMLRS guided rockets firing fromM142 HIMARS rocket artillery been used by Ukrainian military against Russian air defense systems.[80]
On 15 February 2023 theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) wrote that neither theRussian Air Force (VVS) nor theUkrainian Air Force (PS ZSU) have gainedair superiority.[81][82]
The weapons most often associated with this mission areanti-radiation missiles (ARMs), which work by homing in on radio emission sources like radar antennae. These missiles are equipped with relatively small warheads, limiting collateral damage, but can easily destroy radar antennae and thus cripple an enemy's air defense system. Early examples of ARMs could be fooled by turning off the radar system, which would cease emitting radiation for the missile to track; more recent missiles are fitted with fire-control systems which "remember" where the source was and continue towards that location.[83] Anti-radiation missiles proved particularly effective during the Vietnam War where, despite the small number carried relative to other munitions, they accounted for 46% of all SA-2 batteries destroyed.[84][85]
However, a weapon need not be designed specifically for SEAD missions to be used to damage or destroy a component of an air defense system. APaveway LGB for example is not a SEAD-specific munition, but when used to destroy a radar antenna it still achieves the desired effect. The AmericanAGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon is a valuable SEAD weapon due to its fairly long standoff range which allows the launching aircraft to avoid being threatened by all but the longest-range missiles, and its relatively large area of destruction against lightly armored targets.[1][86]
Possibly the most effective type of unguided ("dumb") weapon used during SEAD strikes arecluster bombs. This is due to the fact many SAM sites are dispersed over a fairly wide area (in order to increase the difficulty of inflicting serious damage on thebattery) and the relative "softness" of the targets (unarmoredmissile launchers, exposed radar antennas, etc.). TheMk-20 Rockeye II anti-armor cluster munition and theCBU-87 general-purpose cluster munition are typical examples of these types of weapons.[87][88]
Artillery is also used to conduct SEAD missions. After World War II, thecombined arms nature of warfare meant an increased role in ground forces performing SEAD missions in support of air operations. During theCold War the American military developed a joint definition of SEAD responsibilities, with the Army responsible for all SEAD missions within the range of observable fire and the Air Force for all missions further away. TheSoviet Union placed less emphasis on using artillery to conduct SEAD missions, although where possible artillery would be used to clear a path forattack helicopters. Because of their superior range,rocket artillery such asMLRS are the ideal weapon for conducting SEAD operations.[89][90]
Loitering Munitions andUnmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) play an increasingly vital role in conducting SEAD missions. Due to the dangerous nature of attacking air defenses, the use of UAVs can provide a more cost-effective and less risky method of conducting SEAD. This is especially true since the pilot is not directly at risk and so a commander may be more willing to sacrifice UAVs to accomplish the mission.[91] The first UAVs used in the SEAD role occurred during the Vietnam War, when versions of theLightning Bug were adapted to carry chaff and other electronic countermeasures.[92] Modern examples of SEAD-specific loitering munitions include theIAI Harpy which loiters over areas with potential SAM activity, searches for SAM activity, and then crashes (with in-built warhead) into the target.
In theUS Air Force, the aircraft designed for these missions is known as the"Wild Weasel". It describes aircraft tasked with SEAD missions withanti-radiation missiles. Several platforms have fulfilled this role by the past.
[The Russian Air Force's] failure to secure air superiority has been reflected by their slow and ponderous actions on the ground. Conversely, the Ukrainian air force performing better than expected has been a big boost to the morale of the entire country.
