TheSèvres syndrome (Turkish:Sevr sendromu)[1][2][3] refers to a popular[4][5] belief in Turkey that dangerous internal and external enemies,[6] especiallythe West,[7][8] are "conspiring to weaken and carve up theTurkish Republic".[9] The term originates from theTreaty of Sèvres of the 1920s, whichpartitioned theOttoman Empire amongArmenia,Greece, theUnited Kingdom,France, andItaly, leaving a small unaffected area aroundAnkara under Turkish rule; however, it was never implemented since it was left unratified by the Ottoman Parliament and due to Turkish victory on all fronts during the subsequentTurkish War of Independence.[10] Turkish historianTaner Akçam describes this attitude as an ongoing perception that "there are forces which continually seek to disperse and destroy us, and it is necessary to defend the state against this danger".[11]
Danish political scientist Dietrich Jung describes the terms as "the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state", and asserts that it remains a significant determinant of Turkish foreign policy.[15] The term has been used in the scope of theKurdish conflict in Turkey,[16][17]accession of Turkey to the European Union[18][19] and therecognition of the Armenian Genocide. Historian Nick Danforth wrote in 2015 that "Sèvres has been largely forgotten in the West, but it has a potent legacy in Turkey, where it has helped fuel a form of nationalist paranoia some scholars have called the 'Sèvres syndrome'".[20]
According to Fatma Müge Göçek, the literature of Sèvres syndrome highlights three development stages of the "syndrome":[21]
"the initial contemporaneous impact of the Sèvres Treaty on state and society in the form of fear and anxiety"
"negotiation during the radical Westernization of the Turkish Republic which is spearheaded by the military and theCHP; internal and external enemies are defined during this stage"
"the institutionalized syndrome becomes radicalized as ultra-nationalist parties try to systematically exclude such perceived enemies from the Turkish body politic"
Nefes reports a strong undercurrent of antisemitism, blaming the treaty on a supposed Jewish conspiracy.[22]
In 2019, hailing Turkey's willingness to once more project power across the Mediterranean, Erdogan said "Thanks to this military and energy cooperation, we overturned the Treaty of Sèvres".[23]
According to aLe Monde article, the opening date of GrandHagia Sophia mosque for worship was not a coincidence, as 24 July marked the 97th anniversary of theLausanne Treaty. "In the minds of Erdogan and his far-right partners who rallied after the failed coup, it is a matter of foiling the trap of a 'new Treaty of Sevres'".[24]
In a column responding to the Le Monde piece,İbrahim Karagül, editor-in-chief ofYeni Şafak, suggested that the Western media was not "wrong" in spotlighting the weight of Sèvres on Turkey's newly assertive foreign policy.[23]
^Uslu, Nasuh (2004).Turkish Foreign Policy In The Post-Cold War Period. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers. p. 15.ISBN9781590337424.
^Abramowitz, Morton (2000).Turkey's Transformation and American Policy. New York: Century Foundation Press. p. 141.ISBN9780870784538.Previously rarely raised, Sevres became acommon word in the Turkish political lexicon in the 1990s.
^Aksakal, Mustafa (2012). "Fatma Müge Göçek . The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era . (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, number 103.) New York: I. B. Tauris. 2011. Pp. viii, 310. £59.50".The American Historical Review.117 (3): 975.doi:10.1086/ahr.117.3.975.
^Kieser, Hans-Lukas (2006).Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities. London: Tauris. p. 232.ISBN9781845111410.The fear of conspiracies directed toward Turkey by international actors is often referred to as the 'Sevres Syndrome'. It is the belief that the international community, and in particular the Western world, aspire to revive the terms of the Sevres Treaty imposed on the Ottoman Empire after the end of the First World War and basically divide up Turkey into smaller ethnic states.
^Akçam, Taner (2005).From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide. London: Zed Books. p. 230.ISBN9781842775271.
^Guida, Michelangelo (2008). "The Sèvres Syndrome and 'Komplo' Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press".Turkish Studies.9 (1):37–52.doi:10.1080/14683840701813994.S2CID144752641.
^Nefes, Türkay Salim (2013). "Political Parties' Perceptions and Uses of Anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theories in Turkey".The Sociological Review.61 (2):247–264.doi:10.1111/1467-954X.12016.S2CID145632390.
^Karlsson, I.; Strom, A. (2006), Türkiye'de Milliyetçi Avrupa Şüpheciliğinin İki Dayanağı: Tanzimat Sendromu ve Sevr Sendromu, Türkiye, İsveç ve Avrupa Birliği: İsveç Araştırma Enstitüsü, pp. 25-45
^Kizner, Stephen (7 December 1998)."Turks See Throwback to Partition in Europe's Focus on Kurds".The New York Times. Retrieved24 July 2013.With the Sevres treaty dead, most of the world forgot it. Turks, though, did not. Many are convinced that the world is still plotting to dismember Turkey. They see every claim for regional or cultural autonomy, including those put forward by Kurdish nationalists, as means to this end. Turkish historians and sociologists call this beliefthe Sevres syndrome.
Drakoularakos, Stavros. "Turkey and Erdoğan's rising 'Lausanne Syndrome'".Digest of Middle East Studies 30.1 (2021): 22–33.doi=10.1111/dome.12224
Göçek, Fatma Müge (2011).The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era. London: I.B.Tauris.ISBN9781848856110.
Sarı, Buğra (2022). "Culture of Insecurity and Production of Foreign Policy Crises: Turkey'sSèvres Syndrome and Syrian Support for the PKK during the 1998 October Crisis".Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies.24 (1):138–157.doi:10.1080/19448953.2021.1992186.S2CID244912298.
Schmid, Dorothée. "Turkey: The Sèvres Syndrome, or the Interminable War".Politique etrangere 1 (2014): 199–213.
