The Russian military is a hybrid system that combinesconscripts with contractedvolunteers;[14] with certain exceptions,Russian law mandates one year of military service for all male citizens aged 18–27.[1][15] Despite efforts to professionalize its ranks since the early 2000s,[16] it remains heavily reliant on conscripts, with contract soldiers being concentrated incadre andelite units. In the years before the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Ground Forces were ordered to createbattalion tactical groups out of enlisted soldiers, separating them from conscript units. These were kept at a higher state of readiness and could be deployed outside of Russia under Russian law.[17]
Despite its perceived military strength,[18] deficiencies have been noted in Russia's overall combat performance and its ability to effectively projecthard power.[19] The ongoingRusso-Ukrainian war has exposed weaknesses such as endemiccorruption,[20][21][22] rigidcommand and control structure,[23] inadequate training,[24] and poor morale.[25] The Russian Armed Forces have experienced successive losses ofoccupied/annexed territory, the large-scale destruction and squandering of their equipment, and a notably high casualty rate.[26][27][28] Researchers from the U.S.-fundedRAND Corporation have observed that Russia continues struggling with military professionalization,[29] but remains capable of rapidly reconstituting its capabilities.[30]
TheSoviet Union officiallydissolved on 25 December 1991. For the next year various attempts to keep its unity and to transform the Soviet Armed Forces into the military of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) failed. Over time, some units stationed in the newly independent republics swore loyalty to their new national governments, while a series of treaties between the newly independent states divided up the military's assets.[31]MarshalYevgeny Shaposhnikov worked to create a unified CIS armed forces,[32] but PresidentBoris Yeltsin established the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in May 1992.[33]
On 7 May 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Russian Armed Forces and assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.[34]Colonel GeneralPavel Grachev became the Minister of Defense, and was promoted as Russia's firstgeneral of the army on assuming the post. By the end of 1993, the CIS military structures had become military cooperation structures.[35] Grachev and his allies worked to undermine Shaposhnikov,[32] and there was opposition to his efforts from the newly independent states.[36] The May 1992 creation of the Russian Ministry of Defense was the practical end of the Soviet military; Shaposhnikov and his small staff were evicted from the Soviet General Staff and Defense Ministry buildings in central Moscow, being sent to the formerWarsaw Pact headquarters on the city's outskirts. The pretense of the CIS armed forces continued until June 1993, when the Russian Defense Ministry refused to provide necessary funding for it, and Shaposhnikov resigned as its commander-in-chief.[37]
Apart from assuming control of the bulk of the former SovietInternal Troops and theKGB Border Troops, seemingly the only independent defence move the newRussian government made before March 1992 involved announcing the establishment of aNational Guard.[38] Until 1995, it was planned to form at least 11brigades numbering 3,000 to 5,000 each, with a total of no more than 100,000. National Guard military units were to be deployed in 10 regions, including in Moscow (three brigades), (two brigades), and a number of other important cities and regions. In Moscow alone 15,000 personnel expressed their desire to service in the new Russian Army, mostly formerSoviet Armed Forces servicemen. In the end, PresidentYeltsin tabled adecree "On the temporary position of the Russian Guard", but it was not put into practice.[39] During the 1990s twelve other agencies besides the Ministry of Defense also had military formations, and were known as "power ministries."[40]
In the next few years, Russian forces withdrew from central and eastern Europe, as well as from some newly independentpost-Soviet states. Under agreements signed with several states, the last forces were withdrawn from most of these regions by 31 August 1994.[41] Soviet nuclear forces were either dismantled or returned to Russia under agreements withBelarus,Kazakhstan, andUkraine, while the conventional forces caused more issues.[42] Although the withdrawal was largely peaceful, and entire units were moved piecemeal to the Russian Federation, some units remained in newly independent countries, such as theBlack Sea Fleet in Ukraine'sCrimea, the14th Army inMoldova'sTransnistria, and other units inGeorgia andTajikistan. Some of them became involved in local ethnic or political conflicts.[43] Russia continues to haveseveral bases in foreign countries, especially in the former Soviet republics.
During thepresidency of Boris Yeltsin, reforms to the military focused on reductions in personnel and restructuring of the armed services. In 1992 there were five branches: the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Strategic Missile Forces, and the Air Defense Forces. By 2001, the Air Defense Forces were combined into the Air Force, and the Strategic Missile Forces were reduced to an independent combat arm. In the late 1990s there was a debate between Chief of the General StaffAnatoly Kvashnin and Minister of DefenseIgor Sergeyev on whether to prioritize funding to conventional or nuclear forces. The nuclear forces were deemed more important, and a result, the Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Forces were cut in half, and the Ground Forces saw the largest reduction, by two-thirds.[44] The military's overall strength was reduced from 2,720,000 in 1992 to 1,004,000 in 2000. In the same time period, the Ground Forces were cut from 1,400,000 to 348,000; the Air Force and Air Defense Forces from 300,000 and 356,000, respectively, to a combined 184,600; the Navy from 320,000 to 171,500; and the Strategic Missile Forces from 181,000 to 149,000.[45] The Airborne Forces were reduced from 64,300 to 48,500 in the late 1990s.[46] In 1998 the post ofGround Forces Commander-in-Chief was temporarily abolished, and replaced by a Ground Forces directorate.[47]
There were widespread social and economic problems caused by the sudden arrival of troops at bases in Russia that did not have accommodations for them, and by drastic military spending cuts as Russia faced an economic crisis during its transition to amarket economy. This led to a severe decline in discipline, with crime and the already-existing hazing of conscripts (dedovshchina) becoming more common, which in turn led to draft dodging. Many officers and sergeants left the military. Equipment maintenance and training also drastically declined. As of 1998, there had been no exercises above the division level since 1992, and annual flight hours for pilots were reduced to 25, far less than in NATO states. The military's decline was evident during theFirst Chechen War from 1994 to 1996, when it was unable subdue separatists in Russia'sChechnya and theNorth Caucasus.[47][48][49] Internationally, Russia deployed forces toCroatia andBosnia and Herzegovina for peacekeeping starting from 1992, and toKosovo from 1999.[50]
The Russian Armed Forces inherited the Soviet era mass mobilization structure, designed to use reservists to fight a major war involving mechanized deep operations. Pavel Grachev, who was the defense minister until 1996, proposed the creation of a fully manned and equipped high-readiness "mobile force" that could be quickly deployed to conflict zones, but this was unsuccessful. What did occur in the second half of the 1990s was the creation of "permanent ready forces," which had better manning and equipment levels, and these were used with success during theSecond Chechen War from 1999 to 2004.[51]
The military in the early presidency ofVladimir Putin still largely had the mass mobilization structure and Soviet era equipment.[52] Under Putin, the Security Council became the dominant institution coordinating national security policy, limiting the influence of the Defense Ministry and General Staff, and creating a more unified command than had existed in the Yeltsin years.[53] The state armaments program of 2002 recognized that most orders went unfulfilled during the 1990s, and instead prioritized research and development, with procurement of new equipment scheduled to begin after 2008.[54] Corruption is also a significant impediment to the Armed Forces. In January 2008, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Tor Bukkvoll said "The change from Yeltsin to Putin had minimal effect on Russian military corruption. Putin, despite his desire to rebuild Russian strength, has not shown himself willing or able to seriously deal with corruption.″[55]
In October 2008,Anatoly Serdyukov, the Minister of Defense from 2007 to 2012, launched the "New Look" military reform, along with the Chief of the General Staff, GeneralNikolai Makarov. These have been described as "the most radical changes in the Russian military since the creation of the Red Army in 1918"[56] and as "driving the transformation from a conventional mobilization army to a permanently combat-ready force."[57] Previous attempts at major reforms during the 1990s had been largely undermined, with the most notable change being the merger of theRussian Air Defence Forces with the Russian Air Force.[56] The groundwork for the New Look reform was laid bySergey Ivanov, the Minister of Defense from 2001 to 2007, who called for a reduction in conscripts and officers, and an increase in professional volunteer soldiers.[58] Among the changes that took place from 2008 were the creation of four new military districts from the previous nine, which now had a combat command role in addition to their previous force generation and support function.[59] Most divisions in the Ground Forces were abolished in favor of separate maneuver brigades, intended to be fully manned and at a higher state of readiness, and equipped with modernized or new equipment.[58][60] The Navy received new submarines and small surface combatants, and the Aerospace Forces also benefited from increased investment.[58] Multiple logistical support arms were merged under one command, theLogistical Support of the Russian Armed Forces.[61]Battalion tactical groups, fully manned by enlisted soldiers, were established, though for every two such battalions, there was one manned by conscripts.[62]
Rearmament and wars in Syria and Ukraine (2012–2022)
The New Look reform during Serdyukov's tenure was controversial among many in the military establishment.[63] After 2012, whenSergey Shoigu and GeneralValery Gerasimov were appointed as Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, they began to dismantle some of the reforms.[61] Shoigu continued the essence of the reform, including the broad structural and procurement changes, while going back on the more controversial aspects.[63] Some divisions were restored, such as the famedTamanskaya andKantemirovskaya divisions,[64] though they were not as large as in the past.[60] Many of the shortcomings that had been revealed in the 2008Russo-Georgian War were addressed by the reform, as seen during the2014 Russian annexation of Crimea.[59] In early 2014, Russian special forces, Airborne Forces, and Naval Infantry rapidly took control ofCrimea. The Russian military also worked to mobilize, train, and equippro-Russian separatist forces during thewar in Donbass starting in early 2014.[63]
In July 2015,Syria requested military assistance from Russia after advances made by theIslamic State. In August, an agreement was signed between them on the use ofKhmeimim Air Base andTartus naval base by the Russian military, and starting from September, aircraft and warships began arriving. Russian airstrikes began on 30 September 2015. Russian forces assisted theSyrian Arab Armed Forces in the fall of 2015 with offensives inHama,Homs, andAleppo regions. After a pause in hostilities for several months, in the summer and fall of 2016 Russia assisted Syria with aseries of offensives that retook Aleppo city from theSyrian opposition. Russian forces also assisted inretaking Palmyra from ISIS in March 2016 andagain in May 2017, and with amajor campaign against ISIS in central Syria, up to theEuphrates river valley, until the end of 2017. A draw down of Russian forces in Syria was announced in November 2017, and it was followed by a decline in operations. In August 2019 it was announced that Russian military flights were "reduced to a minimum and performed only for combat training and reconnaissance".[65] The armed forces gained significant experience during theintervention in theSyrian civil war, which also allowed them to test new equipment and command and control systems. The aircraft carrierAdmiral Kuznetsov was used in combat for the first time. As of 2017, over 48,000 personnel had been deployed to Syria, and by 2021, 90% of Aerospace Forces pilots had been rotated through there.[66]
During its intervention in Syria, Russia was accused of committing war crimes alongside the Syrian government forces, including indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and structures such as hospitals, schools and markets. In one of the incidents, theIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic described a series of Russian air strikes on a market in the densely populatedMaarat al-Numan as a ″double tap″ strike, where after the initial strike, a second bombing wave struck the same target as rescue workers were on the scene, resulting in 43 deaths, including four children, and at least 109 injured civilians.[67][68][69]
The main focus of Shoigu and Gerasimov during the 2010s were rearmament and improving coordination between the military, civilian agencies, and the military-industrial complex.[64]Russia spent $66.4 billion on arms in 2015,[70] then $69.2 billion in 2016, surpassing Saudi Arabia to take 3rd place globally (after the U.S. and China).[71] According to theStockholm International Peace Research Institute, by 2014, Russian exports of major weapons increased by 37 percent.[72]
As of 2020 the Ground Forces were considered "smaller and more capable than they were in the mid-1990s" by theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Airborne Forces and reorganized Special Operations Forces were also part of Russia's high-readiness capability.[58] However, after needing to rapidly increase force generation to replace growing losses in thefull-scale war with Ukraine,[73] a reform plan announced by Shoigu in December 2022 has been described by some U.S. military observers as the "nail in the coffin" to the 2008 New Look reform. It puts emphasis on mobilization and the creation of more units manned by both conscripts and contract soldiers, and "essentially recreates the Soviet Armed Forces in the present-day Russian Federation."[74]
Invasion of Ukraine (2022–present)
Russian stamps honoring soldiers killed in theinvasion of Ukraine. As of February 2023, the number of Russian soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine was estimated at nearly 200,000.[75] As of July 2025,Russian casualties in Ukraine were estimated at 1 million.[76]
On 24 February 2022, Russian presidentVladimir Putin gave the execute order to for the Armed Forces to begin theRussian invasion of Ukraine.[77][78] The Russian General Staff provided five strategic directions to its four groups of forces[b] involved in the operation. The directions wereKyiv for the Eastern Group of Forces, which was the main strike;Brovary for the Central group; andPoltava for the Western group. The Southern Group of Forces had two directions: towardsMariupol in Donetsk Oblast, and west of Crimea towardsKherson. After theKyiv offensive was abandoned in March 2022, theattack toward Mariupol became the main strike. The Southern group was the only one to achieve its initial objectives, outmaneuvering theArmed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) insouthern Ukraine and amassing firepower at Mariupol. By May 2022, the Eastern and Central groups were withdrawn and sent to southeast Ukraine after being reconstituted, while the Western group was shifted to theKharkiv Oblast.[79]
On 10 April 2022 GeneralAleksandr Dvornikov assumed field command of the operation.[80] However, the General Staff initially led the operation from Moscow, before a separate Joint Group of Forces (temporary operational command) was established in October 2022.[81] In July 2022, at the same time as the Armed Forces began sufferingsevere casualties, the Ground Forces began to site ammunition in or near structures which are frequented by civilians due to thehuman shield benefit, ostensibly because UkrainianHIMARS had tilted the odds of his strategy of attrition by artillery.[82] Within hours after Defence MinisterSergei Shoigu's signature on the UN-brokered deal to resume Ukraine's Black Sea grain exports, Russia bombed thePort of Odesa.[83][84]
According toForbes Moscow had committed, as of the end of July 2022, 10 of itsCombined Arms Armies to the invasion.[85] TheWagner Group has made a name for itself as Putin's "private army."[86] In late 2022, the newly appointed commander of the Joint Group of Forces in Ukraine, GeneralSergey Surovikin, decided to use Wagner forces to fix the AFU atBakhmut while rebuilding Russian military formations in the aftermath of the initial invasion, and Ukraine's successfulKherson andKharkiv counteroffensives.[87] GeneralValery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff, assumed command of the Joint Group of Forces on 11 January 2023, and Surovikin became his first deputy.[88] The Russian military heldZaporozhye Oblast during the summer2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, after which it regained the initiative in Ukraine.[87]
In June 2023, Putin backed the Ministry of Defense's plan to make mercenary groups sign contracts, which Wagner leaderYevgeny Prigozhin pushed against: these contracts would have placed the Wagner Group under the Ministry's command structure as subordinates and limited Prigozhin's own influence.[89] Later in June, the Wagner Groupturned against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense[90][91] until a peace deal was reached. According to Prigozhin, part of the reason for his march against Russia was to stop the government from "[dismantling] PMC Wagner."[92] Russia planned to expand its active personnel to 1.5 million by the end of 2024,[93] which would have made it the second largest active military force after China.[94][95] In February 2024 the Russian militarycaptured Avdiivka and continued advancing over the rest of the year, despite Ukrainian efforts to halt the advance.[96]
By July 2024, U.S. Army GeneralChristopher Cavoli, NATOSupreme Allied Commander Europe said that "[t]he Russians are very cleverly adapting technologically and procedurally to many of the challenges that they run into in Ukraine".[97] Cavoli also said in April 2024 that the Russian military has replaced its troop and equipment losses and is larger than it was before the start of the conflict.[98] On 26 June 2024, theUK-basedRoyal United Services Institutethink tank reported that Russia continues to increase the production and sophistication of its main weapons and its defense industry remained highly dependent on foreign imports of critical components.[99] The Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel GeneralOleksandr Syrskyi said on 24 July 2024 that Russians were much better resourced now but also suffer three times higher losses than Ukraine.[100]
According toNATO and Western military officials, approximately 1,200 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded in Ukraine every day on average in May and June 2024.[101][102] In June 2024, it was estimated that approximately 2% of all Russian men aged 20 to 50 had been killed or seriously wounded in Ukraine since February 2022.[103] As of October 2024, it was estimated that over 600,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded while fighting in Ukraine.[104] Military courts have received thousands ofAWOL cases since Russia's 2022 mobilization.[105]Pro Asyl said in 2024 that at least 250,000 Russian conscripts had fled to other countries since February 2022.[106] After some conscripts had been deployed during the initial invasion in 2022, despite Russian law prohibiting their use outside Russia, Vladimir Putin publicly apologized, and several generals were removed and/or arrested. Conscripts have not been observed in Ukraine since then.[107] Despite Putin's promise that conscripts would not be sent to fight, dozens of conscripts were captured or went missing during theUkrainian Kursk offensive in 2024 according to Russian news outletVyorstka.[108] According to activists and lawyers, there is a legal loophole that allows the combat deployment of conscripts, where after just four months of training, they can sign full volunteer combat contracts, which the conscripts often do not fully understand before singning.[109][110]
In November 2024,The Telegraph reported that Russia had for the first time issued a manual to soldiers instructing how to dig and maintain mass graves amid growing casualties. Russia's use of mass graves to bury its soldiers has been documented in occupied parts of Ukraine's eastern Donbas region.[111]
In April 2025,Oleksandr Syrskyi said that Russian troops in Ukraine were now 623,000, increased fivefold since the start of the invasion, and they are increasing by 8,000-9,000 soldiers each month. He also said that Russia's overall mobilization capacity is 20 million people or 5 million people with military training. However, he noted that Russia's advantage in artillery has dropped from 10 to 1 to 2 to 1, mainly because of Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots.[112]
In June 2025, Secretary General of NATOMark Rutte said that Russians "are reconstituting themselves at a rapid pace" and produce multiple times more ammunition than whole of NATO, despite having a much smaller economy. Rutte also assessed that Russia could attack NATO territory within three to five years and called on member-states to increase defense spending to 5% of their GDP.[113]
Asdrone warfare became a central facet of theRusso-Ukrainian war, Russia increased its investment and development in various types of drones. On 12 November 2025, Russia officially created its newestbranch: theUnmanned Systems Forces.[114] It was created to centralize the development, deployment, and operational command of unmanned aerial, ground, and naval systems, and for integrating autonomous platforms into existing military structures.[115][116]
In October 2025, several sources reported that according to an investigation by the exiled news outlet Vyorstka, Russian military commanders have been executing and torturing their own personnel since the first year of the invasion. As part of the investigation, Vyorstka said it had obtained hundreds of accounts of executions, with the incidents evolving from initially being punishments for drunkenness or disobedience in the trenches into killings over personal conflicts orextortion. Over 12,000 complaints related to abuse has been sent to Russia's Chief Military Prosecutor's Office since the start of the full-scale war, with a particular increase since the second half of 2023. Out of these, only 10 criminal cases have been opened, resulting in five officers being convicted of killing subordinates. According to the investigation, there is an ″unofficial ban″ on investigating field commanders. Russian soldiers speaking to Vyorstka said that the executed personnel were often listed as deserters or as missing in action, while their bodies were buried in forests or left in the battlefield and shot at to imply combats deaths.[117][118][119]
Compared to the U.S.Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Russian General Staff has a much larger role, which includes operational command over the entire armed forces. It is also responsible for long-term planning, doctrinal development, and equipment procurement. TheChief of the General Staff, in addition to commanding all forces and services, also hasinspector general-like powers within the Staff, being responsible for its structure and functions, and is simultaneously a deputy minister of defense.[129][130]
In 1992 there were eight districts: Moscow, Leningrad,North Caucausian,Volga,Ural,Transbaikal,Siberian andFar Eastern. TheKaliningrad Special Region was formed in 1997. In 1998, the Transbaikal District was dissolved and its territory was divided between the Siberian and Far East districts.[138] In 2001, the Volga and Ural districts were combined as thePrivolzhsk-Ural. In 2010, the existing six districts and the Kaliningrad region were condensed into four districts, which were also joint force commands: the Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern districts. The Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command was established in 2015.[139][140]
Military districts in the early Russian Federation inherited their Soviet era "man, train, and equip" function, mainly having the responsibility of logistics and force generation, including conscription and enlistment of contract soldiers. Districts were primarily focused on land forces. Combat command was delegated by the General Staff to the districts' subordinate formations (i.e. field armies). This changed in the 2008 reform, which made each district a joint operational-strategic command (operativno-strategicheskoye komandovaniye; OSK). This makes military districts comparable to a U.S. geographicunified combatant command.[139][81][141] They oversee permanent forces from each branch, and attached forces from the Airborne Forces or other arms, sometimes including the GRU. Each military district has a defense management center that is the regional equivalent of the National Defense Management Center in Moscow, and they are in constant contact.[141]
In wartime, a military district forms a group of forces as needed for an operation. At the start of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, the districts at the time formed the Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern groups of forces, and the district HQ was also the group HQ.[142] In addition, the102nd Military Base inArmenia, of the formerTranscaucasus Group of Forces, is subordinated to the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don. The201st Guards Military Base inTajikistan is subordinated to the Central Military District in Yekaterinburg. TheOperational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova reported to the Western Military District in Saint Petersburg.[143]
Below military districts, the main operational-level formations in the Ground Forces are numbered armies, consisting of 11 combined arms armies and the1st Guards Tank Army as of 2022. They also have a large tactical role, and during the war in Ukraine the army-level headquarters have sometimes directly commanded battalion tactical groups, bypassing division, brigade, or regiment headquarters.[141] The Aerospace Forces, formed in 2015 by a merger of theRussian Air Force andAerospace Defence Forces, have an equivalent in the form of air force and air defense armies, and as of 2017 one was attached to each of the four districts.[144] The Ground Forces do not have aircraft, but at the end of 2022 it was announced that each combined arms army will receive aviation brigades; without specifying if these will be owned by the Ground Forces or attached Aerospace Forces units.[145] It has been announced that the assets of the former Western Military District's6th Air and Air Defence Forces Army will be split among two armies in the new Leningrad and Moscow districts.[146]
Navy and naval fleets
A map of naval bases, shipyards and spent fuel storage sites operated by theNorthern Fleet
The Navy has its headquarters in Saint Petersburg and consists of four fleets and one flotilla. Each fleet and flotilla receives administrative orders and guidance from the Navy headquarters, but is operationally under an OSK, being aligned with a military district.[147] TheBaltic Fleet headquartered atKaliningrad was aligned with the Western district, and now the Leningrad district. ThePacific Fleet headquartered atVladivostok is aligned with the Eastern district. TheCaspian Flotilla headquartered atAstrakhan and theBlack Sea Fleet headquartered atSevastopol are aligned with the Southern district. TheNorthern Fleet headquartered atSeveromorsk was part of a district-level Joint Strategic Command from 2015 to 2024, and is now under the Leningrad district.[148][149]
The Northern Fleet controls the majority of the naval arm of Russia'snuclear triad, while the Pacific Fleet also has some of it.[147] The Navy is supported by theRussian Naval Aviation, which makes it the only branch of the military to have aircraft besides the Aerospace Forces,[150] and also has theRussian Naval Infantry, which consisted of five brigades before 2022. In 2022 it was announced all five brigades will be expanded into divisions, and in the summer of 2023 a sixth brigade was formed.[151] The Naval Infantry is not intended for forced amphibious landings, but to land in a permissive or semi-permissive environment, after that is established either by some of its organic units or by other ground forces.[152]
The Logistical Support (Materialno-tekhnicheskoye obespecheniye or MTO, literally "Material-Technical Support") is the service tasked with sustaining and provisioning the Armed Forces for constant readiness. Russia inherited the former Soviet branches that had this task, theRear Services and Technical Support, the latter focusing on procurement. During the 2008 reforms, they were combined under one centralized system.[156] The director of the MTO is also concurrently the Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics.[157][158] There is an MTO battalion in every Ground Forces maneuver brigade, and at the military district/OSK level, there are MTO and railway brigades, supply depots, and refurbishment plants.[159][160] There is no "requisition and receive" in the Russian logistics system, but a "pushdown" where a higher unit determines the amount and delivery of supplies based on algorithmic calculations.[159]
The MTO system emphasizes the use of existing lines of communication for sustainment, and has railway brigades and pipeline battalions within MTO brigades for this purpose.[159] Departments within the MTO include[161] the Department of Transportation Support, an approximate equivalent of theUnited States Transportation Command, responsible for coordinating and contracting rail, air, or sea military shipping.[162] Others include theAutomobiles and Tanks department andMissile and Artillery department.[161] TheRussian rail system is the main strategic and operational lift capability for the armed forces,[163] as the vast majority of personnel and cargo are moved by rail.[164] TheRailway Troops within the MTO are tasked with rail preparation, construction, and protection, and are organized in ten separate brigades and two separate battalions.[165]
The Russian Armed Forces use a hybrid system consisting ofconscription and volunteer service. All male Russian citizens are required to register for conscription at the age of 17, and all men between the ages of 18 and 27 are required to perform twelve months of military service.[166][167][1] The service term was originally two years before being reduced to eighteen months in March 2007[168] and to one year in January 2008.[54] In December 2022 the maximum age of conscription was increased to 30, and it was proposed to restore the original service term of two years.[169] The mandatory retirement age for most ranks of the military is 65, except forcolonel generals oradmirals and above, for whom it is 70.[1] According to the Ministry of Defense, the armed forces need to maintain a mobilization reserve to have manning resources capable of reinforcing the permanent readiness forces if they cannot deter or suppress an armed conflict on their own.[170]
The authorized strength of the armed forces is specified bydecree of the President of Russia.[171] The armed forces were reduced from the Soviet-era strength of 2.7 million to 2.1 million as of 1994. In 1997, there were 1.6 million personnel,[172] and this was further reduced to about 1 million as of 2000.[45] The 2008 reform reduced officer billets in the armed forces to 220,000, and set a goal of recruiting 425,000 professional contract soldiers by 2017.[52] There were 270,000 conscripts serving each year.[169] In 2010 the military was estimated to have about 1 million active troops,[173] but theAudit Chamber of Russia reported in 2013 that almost a quarter of authorized positions in the military were vacant.[174] Before the start of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, it had an estimated strength of 900,000. The Ministry of Defense has reportedly been recruiting 400,000 to 500,000 soldiers per year during the war.[175] In December 2022 Putin increased the authorized strength from 1.15 million to 1.5 million.[169]
On 28 May 2022, on the background of the ongoinginvasion of Ukraine,Vladimir Putin signed the law which removed the upper age limit for signing first contract for the performance ofvoluntary military service (earlier this limit was 40 years old).[176][177] Most of the contract soldiers fighting in Ukraine come frompoorer sections of the Russian population.[178][179]Signing bonuses for men who went to fight in Ukraine are more than a full year's salary for many people in Russia.[180] In November 2024, following heavy personnel losses, Russia reduced payments to troops injured in the invasion of Ukraine amidst the Russian government facing increasing war costs due to the large amount of injuries.[181][182] In June 2025, Ukrainian and Western estimates for Russian military casualties in Ukraine surpassed one million.[183] In January 2026, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that up to 25,000 Russian soldiers were being killed per month, referring to the losses as ″unsustainable″.[184]
In 2013, it was reported that: "Compared to 2007, the number of female officers and warrant-officers has dropped by nearly two thirds. There were over 30,000 women serving under a contract [with the armed forces] in 2007, and now there are only slightly more than 11,000 of them, including 4,300 officers of various rank." Lt. Col. Yelena Stepanova, the chief of the social processes monitoring department at the Russian armed forces' sociological research center, said. This trend [was] "not ..special" but correspond[ed] with the general .. reduction of the Russian armed forces."[185]
Recruitment into the Russian military has also been open to non-Russian citizens of theCommonwealth of Independent States, of which Russia is the largest member.[186] By December 2003, the Russian parliament had approved a law in principle to permit the Armed Forces to employ foreign nationals on contract by offering them Russian citizenship after several years service[187] yet, up to 2010, foreigners could only serve in Russia's armed forces after getting a Russian passport. Under a 2010 Defence Ministry plan, foreigners without dual citizenship would be able to sign up for five-year contracts and will be eligible for Russian citizenship after serving three years.[188] On 20 September 2022 theState Duma passed a bill which would make Russian citizenship available to foreign soldiers upon 12 months service in the AFRF; previously the service requirement had been set at three years.[189]
Media has reported that to increase manpower amid casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian war, the Russian Armed Forces has increasingly turned to foreign recruits, many coming from countries across Africa, the Middle East, and South and East Asia according to theLos Angeles Times.[190][191][192][193] According to the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, nearly 200 foreigners from 37 countries were being held as prisoners of war in October 2025 after being captured while fighting for Russia in the war.[190] Ukrainian Defense Intelligence said that five times as many non-Russian soldiers were captured by Ukraine in 2024 than in 2023, and twice as many as in 2024 had been captured by September 2025.[190]
France24 cited experts saying that Russia is drawing on men from the Indian subcontinent to boost their manpower; for example, researcher Yohann Michel described foreign soldiers being used expendably to reveal Ukrainian positions.[194] India has confirmed at least 44 Indian citizens were serving in Russian units as of November 2025[update],[195] with several having died in combat.[194] In May 2024, the IndianCentral Bureau of Investigation said it had arrested four people linked to a human trafficking network that sent men to fight for the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine.[196][197] Some Indian and Nepalese men and their families have said that they were promised non-combat "helper" roles in the military, but were sent to the front line; others allege that they were promised civilian employment or were in Russia as tourists or students, but were deceived and coerced into joining the military.[198][199][200][201][195] The Indian government has raised this issue repeatedly, and observers cited byChannel News Asia named protections against forced recruitment of Indians as a significant issue that would have to be addressed in a potential agreement on labour mobility between India and Russia.[195]
Men from African countries have also been recruited into the Russian military. Kenya said in November 2025 that more than 200 Kenyans were fighting for Russia in Ukraine;[202] in the same month, Kenyan PresidentWilliam Ruto thanked Ukrainian PresidentVolodymyr Zelenskyy for assisting in the release of Kenyans deceived into joining the Russian military.[203] In September 2025, Kenyan police raided houses in southern Kenya and rescued 22 people about to be trafficked to Russia; witnesses said they had not known that they would be recruited into Russia's military.[203] Kenyan state prosecutor Kennedy Amwayi said in December 2025 that Kenya's Directorate of Criminal Investigations was investigating an "organised, transnational criminal network" that worked with people in Russia and tricked Kenyans into joining the war.[203] Botswana also said two men had been tricked into fighting for Russia.[202] 17 South African men have also alleged that they were deceived into joining the Russian military through a job recruitment scam;Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, daughter of former South African PresidentJacob Zuma, resigned as a member of parliament after she was accused of involvement in the scam.[202][204][205][206]
In January 2026,The Daily Telegraph reported that in a recent survey of over 10,000 Russian soldiers captured by Ukraine, 7% had been found to be foreign mercenaries from 40 different countries.[207] The Telegraph compared Russia's tactics in recruiting foreigners tohuman trafficking, and said Russia used recruiters in African countries who were already part of migrantlabour trafficking.[207]
Danish researcher Karen Philippa Larsen, who specialises in Russianprivate military companies and has spoken to foreign soldiers captured by Ukraine, divided foreign fighters for Russia into three categories: mercenaries who knowingly chose to fight; people who knew they would sign a contract with the Russian Defence Ministry, but believed they would be working in security or logistics; and people who believed they were joining civilian employment, such as jobs as technicians or in agriculture.[208]
The Russian military education system, inherited from theSoviet Union, trains officer-specialists in narrowly defined military occupational specialties at military schools. In this it differs greatly from theAmerican military education system in which newly qualified second lieutenants receive particular specialties in the framework of their "career branch" only after graduation from amilitary academy or theROTC.[209] Students of Russian civilian institutions ofhigher education wishing to join thereserve officer training program cannot choose a military occupational specialty, because each civilian specialty taught by civilianuniversity is attached to a particular military occupational specialty taught by themilitary training center of the sameuniversity by therector's order. It also differs from theAmerican military education system in which students can choose between available types ofROTC.[citation needed]
The upper age limit for a military officer commissioning school is 22, for an active-duty officer program at a training center it is 24, and for a reserve officer training program it is 30. After at least seven years of service on active-duty, an officer at the rank ofmajor orcaptain 3rd rank can attend a military academy. After graduating and serving at least another five years, an officer at the rank ofcolonel orcaptain 1st rank can attend theRussian General Staff Academy.[1][210][211]
Higher military schools, which prepare career commissioned officers for active duty service as platoon/company commanders and at equivalent positions (tactical level).
Military training centers within civilian institutions ofhigher education, which prepare reserve commissioned officers who can serve as platoon/company commanders and at equivalent positions (tactical level).
Military academies, which improve the military occupational specialty knowledge of commissioned officers to allow them to be appointed to battalion/regiment/brigade commander or equivalent positions (operational-tactical level).
Adjunctura is a military analogue of civiliangraduate school, which allow commissioned officers to get academic degree ofcandidate of sciences in military oriented specialties and be appointed to a teaching positions in military academies, military schools, military training centers.
Reserve components
Russian Armed Forces have reserves (Russian: запас;transliteration: zapas) which includes 2 components:[1]
Active reserve – Mobilization human reserve (Russian: мобилизационный людской резерв;transliteration: mobilizatsionnyy lyudskoy reserv)
Enrolling in themobilization human reserve is voluntary and implies the special contract. This possibility is available for each persons, who is in the mobilization human resource already.[212] The initial contract is concluded for 3 years period. Military personnel of mobilization human reserve (reservists) perform part-time duties in military units.[213] Reservists are appointed to a military position in particular military units and are involved in all operational, mobilization, and combat activities of these military units. As a rule, in peacetime time reservists perform their duties 2–3 days per month and during an annual military camp training of 20 to 30 days.[214]
The exact number of reservists is unknown because a relevant paragraph of thePresidential Decree[215] which determines the number of reserve troops is classified. The military units manned by reservists are determined byGeneral Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and this information is classified too.
The persons who are in mobilization human resource (non-reservists) may be enlisted to military camp trainings in peacetime. The duration of each training can not exceed 2 months, herewith the total duration of such trainings for the entire period of being in mobilization human resource can not exceed 12 months, and a person may be enlisted in such training no more than once every three years.[216]
As of 2009, the number of citizens who can be used for mobilization deployment on an involuntary basis in the case of wartime mobilization was estimated at 31 million.[217]
Reservists are subject to mobilization in wartime first of all. Non-reservists are subject to mobilization secondarily. The mobilization of non-reservists is carried out by taking into account the age category under the article 53 of Federal Law of 28 March 1998, No.53-FZ "About military duty and military service": in order from first category to third category.[218][219]
The first category includes: 1) the persons at the any military rank below that of a commissioned officer (enlisted personnel) and not reached the age of 35 years old; 2) the persons at the any rank fromjunior lieutenant tocaptain (captain-lieutenant in naval service) inclusively (juniorcommissioned officers) and not reached the age of 50 years old; 3) the persons at the any rank frommajor (captain 3rd rank in naval service) tolieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively and not reached the age of 55 years old; 4) the persons at the rank ofcolonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) and not reached the age of 60 years old; 5) the persons at the rank ofmajor general (counter admiral in naval service) or higher (supreme officers) and not reached the age of 65 years old.[218][219]
The second category includes: 1) enlisted personnel in age from 35 but less than 45; 2) junior commissioned officers in the age from 50 but less than 55; 3) commissioned officers at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively in the age from 55 but less than 60; 4) commissioned officers at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) in the age from 60 but less than 65; 5) supreme officers in age from 65 but less than 70.[218][219]
The third category includes: 1) enlisted personnel in the age from 45 but less than 50; 2) junior commissioned officers in the age from 55 but less than 60; 3) commissioned officers at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively in the age from 60 but less than 65; 4) all females in the age less than 45 for enlisted personnel and less than 50 for commissioned officers. The person who has reached the age limit, established for the third category (the second category for persons at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) or higher), is retired and is not subject to mobilization.[218][219]
Age limits in the reserve component of Russian Armed Forces (males)[1]
2005–2008 reform of the reserve officer training system
The reserve officer training system, inherited from theSoviet Union, involved selective conscription of graduates of civilian institutions of higher education, who have graduated themilitary departments of their almae matres and received acommission as anofficer. Such person could be conscripted from the reserve of armed forces to active duty, up until the age of 27. The period of active duty of such an officer was several years, and at the end of that period he was due to be enlisted in the reserve of armed forces again. Such officers were called "blazers" in the army's slang (for example,Anatoly Kvashnin was a "blazer").[220]
In 2005,Minister of DefenceSergei Ivanov announced a significant reduction in the number of military departments carrying out the training commissioned officers from students of civilian institutions of higher education.[221] By March 2008, 168 of 235 civilian universities, academies and institutions which previously had military departments had lost these units.[222] 37 of 67 civilian universities, academies and institutions which retained military departments became the basis for the establishment of new military training centers.[222] The military training centers focused on training officers for active duty, whilst the military departments focused on training officers for the reserve.[223]
In 2006 the conscription of reserve officers was abolished. Graduates of military departments were not subject to conscription to active duty anymore (with the exception of a wartime mobilization). All graduates of military training centers were due to be enrolled for 3 years active duty upon their university graduation.[224]
2018 beginning of formation of voluntary military reserve force
In 2018,Russia started a full-scale formation of amilitary reserve force based uponvolunteers selected from among those who retired fromactive duty.[214] The Russian military reserve force (Russian:мобилизационный людской резерв,romanized: mobilizatsionny lyudskoy rezerv) is a set of citizens who have signed a contract to perform military service as a reservist. They are appointed to a military position in a particularmilitary unit. They are involved in all operational, mobilization, and combat activities of these military units, unlike other citizens who haven't signed such contracts and who can be used for a mobilization deployment of armed forces on an involuntary basis only in cases stipulated by law.[225]
The deployment ofmilitary units composed of reservists, takes minimum time and does not requires any retraining ofmilitary personnel. The military units composed of reservists use the same weapons as used by military units, composed ofactive duty military personnel. Military units staffed byreservists are 100% manned up to wartime standards just like military units staffed by active duty military personnel only. There is no possibility to define by military units designation what we're dealing with - reserve or not reserve military unit. The number of reservists is not presented in open sources and is not among the number of active dutymilitary volunteers which is published byMinistry of Defence. This makes it difficult for establish real troop strength of new Russian military units and formations.
Russian troops in May 2023
2019 reform of the reserve officer training system
In 2018 the military departments and the military training centers were abolished.[226] From that moment on, students of civilian institutions of higher education were trained under both officers training programmes (for reserve and for active duty) in theMilitary Training Centers.[227] In 2019, there were training military centers in 93 civilian institutions of higher education.[228][229]
Mobilization
The firstmobilization of citizens being inmobilization human resource, conducted on a compulsory basis, in the Russian Federation's history was announced byPresidential Decree of 21 September 2022 No.647 during theRussian invasion of Ukraine.[230] Russia began the 2022 invasion with an active-duty force based on volunteer enlisted soldiers that proved to be too small, and mobilized 300,000 members of its equivalent of the U.S. military'sIndividual Ready Reserve, consisting of former conscripts, enlisted soldiers, and officers with service from as far back as the 1990s.[231]
Between 1991 and 1997 newly independent Russia's defence spending fell by a factor of eight in real prices.[232] In 1998, when Russiaexperienced a severe financial crisis, its military expenditure in real terms reached its lowest point—barely one-quarter of the USSR's in 1991, and two-fifths of the level of 1992, the first year of Russia's independent existence.
In the early 2000s, defence spending increased by at least a minimum of one-third year-on-year, leading to overall defence expenditure almost quadrupling over the past six years, and according to Finance MinisterAlexei Kudrin, this rate is to be sustained through 2010.[233] Official government military spending for 2005 was US$32.4 billion, though various sources, have estimated Russia's military expenditures to be considerably higher than the reported amount.[234]
Estimating Russian military expenditure is beset with difficulty; the annualIISS Military Balance has underscored the problem numerous times within its section on Russia.[234] The IISSMilitary Balance comments, "By simple observation ... [the military budget] would appear to be lower than is suggested by the size of the armed forces or the structure of themilitary–industrial complex, and thus neither of the figures is particularly useful for comparative analysis."[235] By some estimates, overall Russian defence expenditure is now at the second highest in the world after the USA.[236] According to Alexander Kanshin, Chairman of the Public Chamber of Russia on affairs of veterans, military personnel, and their families, the Russian military is losing up to US$13 billion to corruption every year.[237]
On 16 February 2009 Russia's deputy defence minister said statedefence contracts would not be subject to cuts this year despite the ongoing financial crisis, and that there would be no decrease in 2009.[240] The budget would still be 1.376 trillion rubles and in the current exchange rates this would amount to $41.5 billion.
Later in February 2009, due to the world financial crisis, the Russian Parliament's Defence Committee stated that the Russian defence budget would instead be slashed by 15 percent, from $40 billion to $34 billion, with further cuts to come.[241] On 5 May 2009, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the defence budget for 2009 will be 1.3 trillion rubles (US$39.4 billion). 322 billion rubles are allocated to purchase weapons, and the rest of the fund will be spent on construction, fuel storage and food supply.
According to the head of the Defence Committee of the State Duma Vladimir Komoyedov, Russia planned to spend 101.15 billion rubles on nuclear weapons in 2013–2015. "The budget provisions under 'The Nuclear Weapons Complex' section in 2013-2015 will amount to 29.28 billion rubles, 33.3 billion rubles and 38.57 billion rubles respectively," Komoyedov said, Vechernaya Moskva reports.
Komoyedov added that in 2012 the spending on nuclear weapons made up 27.4 billion rubles. The draft law "On the Federal Budget for 2013 and for the planning period of 2014 and 2015" will be discussed in the first reading on 19 October 2012, The Voice of Russia reports.[242]
The Russian government's published 2014 military budget is about 2.49 trillionrubles (approximately US$69.3 billion), thefourth largest in the world behind the US, China and Saudi Arabia. The official budget is set to rise to 3.03 trillion rubles (approximately US$83.7 billion) in 2015, and 3.36 trillion rubles (approximately US$93.9 billion) in 2016.[243] As of 2014, Russia's military budget is higher than any other European nation, and approximately 1/7th (14 percent) of theUS military budget.[72]
In 2015,SIPRI found that Russia was the world's second biggest exporter of major weapons for the period 2010–14, increasing exports by 37 per cent. India, China and Algeria accounted for almost 60 percent of total Russian exports. Asia and Oceania received 66 percent of Russian arms exports in 2010–14, Africa 12 percent and the Middle East 10 percent.[72]
In 2017, Russia was reported to have slashed its defense spending by 20%, due to calls by Vladimir Putin to spend money on other initiatives such as healthcare and education. The cut decreased Russia's military spending to $66.3 billion, in which Russia slumped to being the fourth-highest military spender.[244] Russia's 2019 defense budget was US$48 billion and the 2020 figure was $61.7 billion.[245]
However, due to theRussian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Russian government has dramatically increased military spending to over 85+ billion dollars, returning to third position as the highest military spender in the world. The increase in military spending was needed to recoup losses in the war and reorient Russia into awar economy.[3] On 5 October 2023,Vladimir Putin stated that Russia's spending on defense and security now equals to 6% of its GDP.[246]
TheSukhoi PAK FA is one of the latest procurement projects of the Russian Armed Forces.
About 70 percent of the former Soviet Union's defence industries are located in the Russian Federation.[247] Many defence firms have beenprivatised; some have developed significant partnerships with firms in other countries.
The recent steps towardsmodernization of the Armed Forces have been made possible by Russia's economic resurgence based onoil and gas revenues as well a strengthening of its owndomestic market. Currently[when?] the military is in the middle of a major equipment upgrade, with the government in the process of spending about $200 billion (what equals to about $400 billion in PPP dollars) on development and production of military equipment between 2006 and 2015 under the State Armament Programme for 2007–2015 (GPV – госпрограмма вооружения).[248]
Mainly as a result of lessons learned during theRusso-Georgian War, the State Armament Programme for 2011–2020 was launched in December 2010. Prime Minister Putin announced that 20–21.5 trillion rubles (over $650 billion) will be allocated to purchase new hardware in the next 10 years. The aim is to have a growth of 30% of modern equipment in the army, navy and air force by 2015, and of 70% by 2020.[249][250][251][252] In some categories, the proportion of new weapon systems will reach 80% or even 100%.[253]
As of 2011, Russia's chief military prosecutor said that 20 percent of the defence budget was being stolen or defrauded yearly.[254] It is suspected that equipment is not properly maintained due to the resulting lack of funds, which may have contributed to equipment failures observed during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[27][255]
In 2018, RF Armed Forces adopted 35 types of weapons and military equipment and completed state tests of 21 more.[256] The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) was procured the YeSU TZ (Yedinaya Sistema Upravleniya Takticheskogo Zvena) battlefield management system that same year. The YeSU TZ battlefield management system incorporates 11 subsystems that control artillery, electronic warfare systems, ground vehicles, air defence assets, engineering equipment, and logistics support, among other things.[257]
Twelve missile regiments have been rearmed with Yars ICBMs, 10 missile brigades with Iskander tactical ballistic missile systems, 13 aviation regiments with MiG-31BM,Su-35S, Su-30SM, and Su-34 combat aircraft, three army aviation brigades and six helicopter regiments with Mi-28N and Ka-52 combat helicopters, 20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments withS-400 Triumf SAM systems, 23 batteries withPantsir-S self-propelled anti-aircraft gun-missile systems, and 17 batteries with Bal and Bastion mobile coastal defence missile systems [MCDMSs] since 2012 and as of March 2019.[257]
In early 2023, there were reports that the Russian Defense Ministry purchased more than a thousand tablets with a domestic software for higher-ranking officials and also begun receiving a new line of gliding bombs with a range of tens of kilometers.[258][259]
The New York Times reported on 13 September 2023, citing US and European officials, that Russia overcomes theinternational sanctions and its missile production now exceeded pre-war levels. It was also reported that Russia now produces more ammunitions than the United States and Europe and it can manufacture 200 tanks and two million units of ammunition in a year.[260]CNN also reported in September 2023 that Russia produces ammunition seven times cheaper and eight times faster than Europe.[261]
In September 2023, various Russian regions launched the production of suicide drones at their own initiatives.[262][263] Vladimir Putin also claimed that the production of main armored vehicles has increased by four times in comparison with the past year and the production of the especially important destruction means by three times.[264]
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense,[265] the Russian Armed Forces received in 2023 several hundreds of thousands of small arms, new and repaired weapon systems, military vehicles and equipment, artillery systems, air defense systems, missiles and bombs, aircraft and helicopters, drones, and also over a million individual armor protection and equipment means.[266][267][268]CNN reported on 11 March 2024 that Russia currently produces about 250,000 artillery shells a month or about 3 million a year which is nearly three times the quantity theUS andEurope produce forUkraine. CNN cited Western intelligence officials and also said that Russia imports ammunition fromIran andNorth Korea.[269]
In April 2025, GeneralChristopher Cavoli said before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia is replacing its extensive battlefield losses of equipment and munitions at an "unprecedented rate" due to the expansion of industrial capabilities and the transition to a war economy. He also said that North Korea is providing Moscow with "millions" of artillery shells, missiles and weapons systems while Iran provided it with 400 short-range ballistic missiles, hundreds of thousands of artillery shells, thousands of kamikaze drones and the licenses and technology to produce thousands more of such drones inside Russia.[270] Despite this, equipment shortages due to losses in Ukraine led to many reports in early 2025 about Russian soldiers using unconventional measures like donkeys, horses, and civilian cars for transport and assaults.[271][272][273][274][275] The Russian Minister of Defense,Andrey Belousov, said in August 2025 that the Russian Army had been supplied with 22,750 motorcycles, quad bikes and buggies since the beginning of the year.[276]
As of January 2017, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that Russia has approximately 1,765 deployed strategic warheads, and another 2,700 non-deployed strategic and deployed and non-deployed tactical warheads, plus an additional 2,510 warheads awaiting dismantlement.[277] Russia'sStrategic Rocket Forces controls its land-based nuclear warheads, while the Navy controls the submarine based missiles and the Aerospace Forces the air-launched warheads. Russia's nuclear warheads are deployed in four areas:
Land-based immobile (silos), likeR-36 and its replacementRS-28 Sarmat.
Themilitary doctrine of Russia seesNATO expansion as one of the threats for the Russian Federation and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional aggression that can endanger the existence of the state. In keeping with this, the country's nuclear forces received adequate funding throughout the late 1990s. The number ofintercontinental ballistic missiles and warheads on active duty has declined over the years, in part in keeping with arms limitation agreements with the U.S. and in part due to insufficient spending on maintenance, but this is balanced by the deployment of new missiles as proof against missile defences.[278]
Russia has developed the newRT-2PM2 Topol-M (SS-27) missiles that a Russian general claimed to be able to penetrate any missile defence, including the planned U.S.National Missile Defence. The missile can change course in both air and space to avoid countermeasures. It is designed to be launched from land-based, mobileTEL units.[278]
Because of international awareness of the danger that Russian nuclear technology might fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue officers who it was feared might want to use nuclear weapons to threaten or attack other countries, thefederal government of the United States and many other countries provided considerable financial assistance to the Russian nuclear forces in the early 1990s.[citation needed] This money went in part to finance decommissioning of warheads under international agreements, such theCooperative Threat Reduction programme, but also to improve security and personnel training in Russian nuclear facilities.
^Russian:Вооружённые Си́лы Росси́йской Федера́ции,romanized: Vooruzhyonnyye Sily Rossiyskoy Federatsii
^A group of forces has permanently assigned Ground Forces field armies or direct-reporting army corps, and is assigned Airborne Forces or Naval Infantry units as needed.
^Masters, Jonathan (28 September 2015)."The Russian Military".Council on Foreign Relations.Archived from the original on 17 September 2017. Retrieved17 August 2017.
^The Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation was established as the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command in March 1992 and then reorganised as the Coordinating Staff in August 1993. It quickly became a very weak body as the new states' authorities asserted their control over their own armed forces. (Russia and NIS Mineral Industry Handbook, International Business Publications, 2007.) Army GeneralVladimir Yakovlev (general) appears to have become Chief of the Staff in June 2001 (DS2002-0819).
^For some early discussion on this period, see Richard Woff, "A Russian Army",Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1992, 198-200. See alsoVoenniy vestnik No 12, 1991.
^Arbatov, Alexei G. (1998). "Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects".International Security.22 (4):83–134.doi:10.2307/2539241.JSTOR2539241.
^"766,055". RIA Novosti. 31 October 2013.Archived from the original on 14 April 2017. Retrieved13 April 2017 – via russiandefpolicy.blog.Почти четверть должностей в ВC РФ были вакантными на начало года [Almost a quarter of positions in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were vacant at the beginning of the year].Риа Новости (in Russian). RIA Novosti. 24 October 2013.Archived from the original on 14 April 2017. Retrieved13 April 2017.
^Interfax. “Number of Women Serving for Russian Armed Forces down by Nearly Two Thirds in 5 Years.” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 6 March 2013, via EbascoHost andWP:TWL.
^"Azeris attracted to serve in Russian army."BBC Worldwide Monitoring. (Originally in the Azerbaijani paperEcho.) 14 March 2005. (Via Lexis-Nexis, 27 July 2005).
^Henry Ivanov, Quality not quantity: Country Briefing: Russia,Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 December 2003, p.25
^abStepovoy, Bogdan; Ramm, Alexey; Andreev, Yevgeniy (13 February 2018)."В резерв по контракту".Izvestia (in Russian).Archived from the original on 13 February 2018. Retrieved14 March 2020.
^Chuprin, Konstantin (2009). Taras, Anatoliy (ed.).Вооружённые силы стран СНГ и Балтии. Справочник [Armed forces of CIS countries and Baltic states. Handbook] (in Russian). Moscow: Современная школа.ISBN978-985-513-617-1.
^Troshev, Gennady (2001).Моя война. Чеченский дневник окопного генерала [My war. Chechen diary of trench general] (in Russian). Moscow: Вагриус.ISBN5-264-00657-1.
^Austin, Greg; Alexey Muraviev (2000).The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia. London, New York: I.B. Tauris. p. 155.ISBN1-86064-485-6.
^FBIS: Informatsionno-Analiticheskoye Agentstvo Marketing i Konsalting, 14 March 2006, "Russia: Assessment, Adm Baltin Interview, Opinion Poll on State of Armed Forces".
^abInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, previous editions
^International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance 2006, Routledge, p.153
^Lillis, Katie Bo; Bertrand, Natasha; Liebermann, Oren; Britzky, Haley (11 March 2024)."CNN Politics".CNN.Archived from the original on 16 March 2024. Retrieved12 March 2024.
Galeotti, Mark, "Organised crime and Russian security forces: mafiya, militia and military",Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, issue 1:2, 2001.
.svg)
.svg)
.svg)
_01.jpg)
_18.jpg)
.png)
_1.jpeg)
_(49581303977).jpg)
