| Richardson v. Ramirez | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued January 15, 1974 Decided June 24, 1974 | |
| Full case name | Viola N. Richardson v. Abran Ramirez et al. |
| Citations | 418U.S.24 (more) 94 S. Ct. 2655, 41L. Ed. 2d 551; 1974U.S. LEXIS 84 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal.3d 199 (1973). Appeal from the Supreme Court of California |
| Subsequent | Ramirez v. Brown, 12 Cal. 3d 912 (Cal. 1974) |
| Holding | |
| Disenfranchising convicted felons beyond their sentence and parole does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell |
| Dissent | Marshall, joined by Brennan; Douglas (Part I–A) |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. XIV | |
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974),[1] was alandmark decision by theSupreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 6–3, that convicted felons could be barred from voting beyond theirsentence andparole without violating theEqual Protection Clause of theFourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Suchfelony disenfranchisement is practiced in a number of states.
In May 1972, Abran Ramirez, who had previously been convicted of afelony, was refused voter registration by acounty clerk inSan Luis Obispo County,California, on grounds that he had one or more felonies on his criminal record.[2] Joining with other plaintiffs who had also been denied registration for similar reasons, Ramirez brought aclass-action lawsuit againstJerry Brown, who at the time wasCalifornia's Secretary of State, challenging astate constitutional provision that permanentlydisenfranchised anyone convicted of an "infamous crime", unless the right to vote was restored by court order orexecutive pardon.[3]
Typically in voting rights cases, states must show that the voting restriction is necessary to a "compelling state interest," and is the least restrictive means of achieving the state's objective. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the state had no compelling interest to justify denying them theright to vote. TheCalifornia Supreme Court agreed that the law was unconstitutional. On appeal, however, the U.S. Supreme Court said that a state does not have to prove that its felony disenfranchisement laws serve a compelling state interest.
Oral arguments were held on January 15, 1974.[4] George J. Roth argued on behalf of the state of California, and Martin R. Glick argued on behalf of the petitioners.[5]
The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that California's law was constitutional. The majority opinion was written by JusticeWilliam Rehnquist.
The Court relied on Section 2 of theFourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which calls for reducing representation in theU.S. House of Representatives for any state that denies the right to vote to its voters (a provision designed to prevent the Southern states from disenfranchising black citizens after the Civil War). But Section 2 makes an exception for denying voting rights to citizens because of "participation in rebellion, or other crimes."[6] The Court said that this distinguishes felony disenfranchisement from other forms of voting restrictions, which must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests in order to be constitutional.[7]
The Court also reviewed the legislative history of Section 2, and relied as well on the fact that when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, over half of the U.S. states allowed denying the right to vote to "persons convicted of felonies or infamous crimes."[8]
The plaintiffs also raised a separate claim that the application of law violated equal protection, and as the California Supreme Court never considered it, the Court remanded the case back to the state for further consideration.
Before the case could be reconsidered by the California Supreme Court, voters passedProposition 10 in November 1974 to only disenfranchise people while they are imprisoned or on parole.[9][10]
Works related toRichardson v. Ramirez at Wikisource