Rafael Eitan | |
|---|---|
רפאל איתן | |
 Rafael Eitan | |
| Ministerial roles | |
| 1990–1991 | Minister of Agriculture |
| 1996–1999 | Deputy Prime Minister |
| 1996–1999 | Minister of Agriculture |
| 1996–1999 | Minister of the Environment |
| Faction represented in theKnesset | |
| 1984–1987 | Tehiya |
| 1987 | Independent |
| 1987–1999 | Tzomet |
| Personal details | |
| Born | 11 January 1929 |
| Died | 23 November 2004(2004-11-23) (aged 75) |
| Awards | Medal of Courage Legion of Merit |
| Signature |  |
| Nickname | Raful |
| Military service | |
| Allegiance |  Israel |
| Branch/service |  Haganah Israel Defense Forces |
| Years of service | 1948–1983 |
| Rank |  Rav Aluf (Chief of Staff; highest rank) |
| Commands | |
| Battles/wars | |
Rafael "Raful"Eitan (Hebrew:רפאל "רפול" איתן; 11 January 1929 – 23 November 2004) was an Israeli general, formerChief of Staff of theIsrael Defense Forces (Ramatkal) and later a politician, aKnesset member, andgovernment minister.
Rafael Eitan was bornRafael Kaminsky in themoshav ofTel Adashim[1] nearNazareth in 1929, to Eliyahu and Miriam (née Orlov) Kaminsky,Ukrainian Jewish immigrants to Palestine. His father was one of the founders of the Jewish defense organizationHashomer. Rafael was raised in the community of Tel Adashim and lived there for most of his life.Zvi Nishri (Orloff), a pioneer in modern physical education in Israel, was his uncle.[2] Late in life he reportedly said that he was descended from aSubbotnik family that had served as guards to the tsar.[1] According toNahum Barnea, a genealogical search indicated that he had Jewish parentage on both sides.[3]
His father gave Rafael and his brothers and sisters a strict education. Rafael later married Miriam, with whom he had five children. They ultimately divorced and he married Ofra Meirson.
Eitan was a junior officer in thePalmach, theHaganah's elite strike force, and took part in the1948 Arab–Israeli War. He fought inJerusalem and received a head wound in the battle for theSan Simon Monastery in April 1948. Later he served with the 10th Infantry Battalion in theLachish-Negev region.
In 1954, Captain Eitan became commander of a Paratroops company inUnit 101. DuringOperation Olive Leaves in 1955 he received a machine gun wound to his chest, while participating in a military raid intoSyria. For this action he was decorated with theMedal of Courage.
In the 1956Suez Crisis, Major Eitan was the commander of the890 Paratroopers battalion and participated in the 29 October parachute attack on theMitla Pass.
During theSix-Day War in early June 1967, as a Colonel he commanded theParatroopers Brigade on theGaza front. He received a severe head wound in combat while approaching theSuez Canal.
On the evening of 28 December 1968, he commanded thecommando raid on Beirut airport. According to a legend which circulated among Israeli special forces soldiers, at one point during the raid, he entered the airport terminal, and finding it in a state of disorder with no security guards present, walked to a coffee shop, ordered a coffee, and paid for it in Israeli currency before leaving.[4]
In 1969 he was appointed head of infantry forces and later served as a division commander. As a division commander, of 36th Ugda, Brigadier General Eitan stopped the Syrian attack into theGolan Heights during the October 1973Yom Kippur War. After the war, he was appointed to commander of the northern command and promoted to the rank ofMajor General.
On 1 April 1978, Eitan was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and was appointed byEzer Weizman to be theChief of Staff of theIsrael Defense Forces.
Eitan opened his term with symbolic steps to increasediscipline and efficiency in the IDF. He required soldiers to wear the military beret and to collect spentcartridges after rifle range practice.
Eitan oversaw the redeployment of the IDF outside of theSinai Peninsula after the peninsula was handed back toEgypt. He and Sharon demolished the Israeli town ofYamit in Sinai in April 1982 after the Egyptians refused to pay for its infrastructure.
As chief of staff, Eitan initiated a project that was known as "Raful Youth" (Na'arei Raful), in which young persons from lowsocio-economic background were integrated into the IDF and were trained for professions that allowed them to come out of poverty and avoid getting involved in crime. The IDF also helped those youth to complete their high school studies.
He was chief of staff at the time of the Israeliair attack onIraq'sOsirak nuclear reactor complex on 7 June 1981.
In April 1982 he initiated a new policy in theOccupied Territories which in Israeli army slang became known by theHebrew wordtertur. One document from his office stated:
1. It is necessary to act with force against agitators and to imprison them at every opportunity.
2. . . . When it is necessary, use legal measures which enable imprisonment for interrogation for a period stated in the law, and release them for one or two days and then re-imprison them.
After the trial of seven members of the Israeli army in December 1982, an Israeli operations officer was quoted as describedtertur: "In addition to this business where you work to discover the provocateurs, youtertur the population. Populationtertur does not mean that you punish those who did something, but you simply round up everyone, just like that."[5]
In 1981 it became public knowledge the Israel was arming and forming an alliance with the LebanesePhalangist militia. In May it was revealed that Eitan had recently visitedJounieh several times and met with the militia leadership.[6] The previous month, at a meeting in Damascus, the Lebanese government had come to an agreement withUNIFIL to deployLebanese Army soldiers into the areas that theUN forces were stationed inSouthern Lebanon. This was followed by an increase ofIDF activity in Lebanon which culminated in a crisis over the positioning Syrian antiaircraft missiles.[7] Operations included a nighttime commando raid on five Palestinian targets in Southern Lebanon, 9–10 April;[8] the shooting down of two Syrian Army helicopters in theBeqaa valley, 28 April;[9] a commando raid nearDamour in which four Libyan and two Syrian soldiers were killed, 27 May.[10]
On 3 June 1982,Abu Nidal's militant group gravely wounded Israel's ambassador in London,Shlomo Argov, in an assassination attempt. In response, theIsraeli Air Force bombedPalestinian refugee camps inLebanon. The Palestinian militants shelled Israel's northern settlements in retaliation and resulted in the Israeli government's 4 June order to begin the1982 Lebanon War. The operation was launched on 6 June and soon became a full-scaleinvasion. The Israeli plan was to drive thePLO away from the Israeli border and helpBachir Gemayel's Phalangist militia take control of south Lebanon. During the war, the IDF faced theSyrian military, Palestinian militants and variousmilitias. The IDF engaged inurban warfare and shelledBeirut to hit PLO headquarters.
The IDF achieved some impressive military results – such as wiping out the entire Syrian air defense system in the first days of the war, under the command ofIAFMajor generalDavid Ivri. But it also had some failures, such as theBattle of Sultan Yacoub.
The operation was designed to be limited – both in time and area – but the IDF advanced far beyond the planned "40 kilometers" under the command of Defense MinisterAriel Sharon. The mounting Israeli casualties in Lebanon, combined with theSabra and Shatila massacre, resulted in mass protests by the Israeli public against the war – which resulted in a cease-fire agreements and the establishment of theKahan Commission to investigate the massacre.
In concluding that Eitan was "in breach of duty that was incumbent on the Chief of Staff"[11] the Commission focused on two points:
Firstly, that he did not take into consideration the "danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed" when he, with theMinister of Defence, decided to send thePhalangistmilitia into the refugee camps. The commission argued that it was "common knowledge ... that there was a possibility of harm to the population in the camps at the hands of the Phalangists", particularly in the aftermath of the assassination of their leader, the newly elected President of Lebanon,Bashir Gemayel.[12]
Secondly they found that he was in dereliction of duty for not following up reports of acts of killings which had become known within hours of the Phalangist entry into Shatila camp. They record that he had a meeting with the Phalangist leaders on the following day in Beirut and did not raise the issue. At this meeting he expressed satisfaction with the Phalangist operation and agreed to provide further support.[13]
In its recommendations the commission noted that Eitan was due to retire in April 1983 and therefore resolved "that it is sufficient to determine responsibility without making any further recommendation."[14]
In a book co-authored byZe'ev Schiff, military correspondent ofHa'aretz, andEhud Ya'ari, Middle East Affairs correspondent forIsraeli television,[15] published a year after the Kahan Report, new information came to light, that suggested that Eitan was aware of the feelings of the Phalangists before he and Sharon decided to send the militia into the refugee camps.
During a minuted meeting at the Defense Minister's office at 5 pm on Thursday 16 September 1982 between US diplomats includingMorris Draper and Sharon, Eitan, Saguy, and two other senior Defense Ministry staff, Draper was informed of the Israeli plan to send the Phalangists into the camps. A heated exchange followed, centering on which Lebanese force was to enter the camps. Draper insisted that it should be the regular Lebanese army. At this point Eitan broke into the discussion:[16]
They're not up to it. Let me explain to you. Lebanon is at a point of exploding into a frenzy of revenge. No one can stop them. Yesterday we spoke with the Phalange about their plans. They don't have a strong command.... They're obsessed with the idea of revenge. You have to know the Arabs well to sense something like that. If Amin tells the Phalangists to wreak their vengeance, he'll legitimize what's going to happen. I'm telling you that some of their commanders visited me, and I could see in their eyes that it's going to be a relentless slaughter. A number of incidents already happened today, and it's a good thing we were there, rather than the Lebanese army, to prevent it from going further.
Schiff and Ya'ari continue: "To hear Eitan tell it, the IDF was the last obstacle to a bloodthirsty rampage by the Phalange. Of course, he neglected to state that the Phalange forces were waiting outside Shatila at that very moment, because he, among others, had encouraged them to fight in the camps".
After his retirement from the army in April 1983,[17] Eitan entered politics. He had the image of thesabra Israeli who connected to his roots and to the land. His background in agriculture and hobbies such aswood work and flight contributed to this image, which attracted many in the Israeli public.[18]
Eitan was considered to be a conservative advocating tough policies towards the Palestinians.[19] On 12 April 1983 Eitan said in aKnesset committee meeting: "The Arabs will never defeat us by throwing stones. Our answer will be a nationalist Zionist solution. For every stone throwing – we'll establish ten settlements. If there will be – and there will be – a hundred settlements betweenNablus andJerusalem, no stones will be thrown."[20] On another occasion, in an address to the Knesset, he remarked "When we have settled the land, all the Arabs will be able to do about it will be to scurry around like drugged cockroaches in a bottle".[21][1]
Eitan initially joined theTehiya party and was firstelected to the Knesset in 1984. Later he established an ultra-nationalist party calledTzomet, which had conservative views on defense and foreign policy but a liberal and secular domestic platform. He was elected to the11th Knesset and served asMinister of Agriculture between 1988 and 1991, when Tzomet left the government. In the1992 elections, Tzomet achieved a record of eight seats, but Eitan refused to joinYitzhak Rabin's coalition.
Eitan was a supporter of theIsraeli alliance with Apartheid-era South Africa.[22] Eitan has been accused of expressing racist sentiments towardsArabs. Blacks in South Africa, he claimed, "want to gain control over the white minority just like the Arabs here want to gain control over us. And we, like the white minority in South Africa, must act to prevent them from taking over".[23]
Eitan had troubles in controlling his party, resulting in some Knesset members splitting from Tzomet to join other parties. When Rabin presented theOslo II Accords to theKnesset, it managed to pass only with the support ofAlex Goldfarb andGonen Segev – two Tzomet members who were promised ministries by Rabin in return for their support.
On 1996, Tzomet joined an alliance ofLikud andGesher headed byBenjamin Netanyahu. Although the triumvirate lost theKnesset election toLabour, Netanyahu won theelection for Prime Minister, allowing him to form the government. Eitan was promised the ministry of internal security, but a criminal investigation against him blocked his nomination. The investigation eventually cleared Eitan and the case was closed on 1998 due to "lack of evidence". In the meantime, Eitan served as Agriculture andEnvironment Minister and also as a Deputy Prime Minister (1998–99).
In 1999 Tzomet failed to win any Knesset seats and Eitan retired from politics.
On 23 November 2004, Eitan arrived at theMediterranean seaport of Ashdod, where he was overseeing a port expansion project. A large wave swept him from a breakwater into the sea and he drowned. He was lost in rough waters for over an hour before his body was recovered by theIsraeli Navy. He was pronounced dead after efforts to revive him failed.[24]
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War of Independence Ribbon | Operation Kadesh Ribbon | Six-Day War Ribbon | War of Attrition Ribbon | Yom Kippur War Ribbon | First Lebanon War Ribbon | Commander of theLegion of Merit |
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| Preceded by | Chairman of theCommittee on Drug Abuse 1992–1996 | Succeeded by |
Heads ofNorthern Command | ||
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