| Radovich v. National Football League | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued January 17, 1957 Decided February 25, 1957 | |
| Full case name | William Radovich v. National Football League et al. |
| Citations | 352U.S.445 (more) 77 S. Ct. 390; 1L. Ed. 2d 456 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Summarily dismissed, (S.D. Cal.); affirmed, 231F.2d620 (9th Cir. 1956);cert. granted,352 U.S. 818 (1956). |
| Holding | |
| Antitrust exemption for professional baseball is specific to that sport and does not apply to professional football | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Clark |
| Dissent | Frankfurter |
| Dissent | Harlan, joined by Brennan |
| Laws applied | |
| Sherman Antitrust Act,U.S. Const. Commerce Clause | |
Radovich v. National Football League (NFL), 352 U.S. 445 (1957), is aU.S. Supreme Court decision ruling that professionalfootball, unlike professionalbaseball, was subject toantitrust laws. It was the third of three such cases heard by the Court in the 1950s involving the antitrust status of professional sports.
Three justices dissented, finding the majority arbitrary and inconsistent in refusing football the exemption it had upheld five years previously inToolson v. New York Yankees (346 U.S.356 (1952)). The majority admitted that the similarity between the two sports from a legal standpoint would probably have denied baseball the exemption as well were it sought afresh, but existingcase law had tied their hands in the absence of any congressional action.
While the NFL has secured some limited antitrust exemptions since through the legislative process, the lack of a blanket exemption due to this decision has had a major impact on the subsequenthistory of football. UnlikeMajor League Baseball, the NFL has faced several competing leagues since then (one of whichmerged with it) and seen five of its franchises move to new cities. Many of these actions have been accompanied by lawsuits brought against the NFL (often successfully) by competing leagues, public stadium-management authorities and its own owners.
In1938undraftedUniversity of Southern California graduateWilliam "Bill" Radovich began his NFL career as aguard with theDetroit Lions. He chose to sign with them because they were the only team in the league that guaranteed players an off-season job.[1]
After four seasons, during which he made sportswriters'All-Pro lists, he left to serve in theNavy during World War II. He returned to the Lions after the war ended, in1945.[2]
The next year, he asked to be traded to theLos Angeles Rams, or be better paid, as his father, who lived near that city, was seriously ill and he wanted to be able to spend more time with him. Lions' ownerFred L. Mandel Jr. refused, saying (according to Radovich) "I'd either play in Detroit or I wouldn't play anywhere". Since his contract had expired, he instead signed with theLos Angeles Dons of the rivalAll-America Football Conference (AAFC) and played with them for two seasons, despite Mandel's promise to put him on ablacklist for five seasons.[1] In 1948 the San Francisco Clippers of thePacific Coast Professional Football League (PCPFL), a minor pro football league whose clubs had some affiliations with the NFL, offered him a position as a player and coach. After learning that the NFL had indeed blacklisted Radovich due to his play in the AAFC and would punish any club that did hire him, however, the Clippers withdrew their offer.[2]
Radovich had to take jobs outside of professional football. One waswaiting tables at Los Angeles'sBrown Derby restaurant. There he metJoseph Alioto, a former antitrust litigator with theJustice Department. In conversation, he told Alioto how he had come to this, and Alioto responded by sketching out alegal brief on theback of a cocktail napkin.[3]
The AAFC was an eight-team league that played from 1946–49. Since it emerged at a time when the NFL was just beginning to recover from the war years (when some teams temporarily merged), was national in scope and had owners wealthier than most of their NFL counterparts, it posed a serious competitive threat to the older league. The NFL took many steps to prevent the AAFC from making headway, blacklisting media who had covered the league as well as players who jumped to it.
Ultimately the AAFC collapsed due to the dominance of theCleveland Browns, who won all four of its championships, and financial problems and instability at some of its weaker franchises. In December 1949 the two leagues merged. The Browns,Baltimore Colts (not related to the team now known as theIndianapolis Colts) andSan Francisco 49ers joined the NFL; other teams folded or merged with an existing team.
InFederal Baseball Club v. National League (259 U.S.200 (1922)),Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had written for a unanimous court thatMajor League Baseball was not covered by theSherman Antitrust Act because it was notinterstate commerce. Travel by teams across state line was "an incident" to the business of staging baseball games, which he described as "purely state affairs".[4] Three decades laterToolson v. New York Yankees upheld thatprecedent due to congressional inaction to change it, despite changes in the business such as broadcasting deals that made the interstate aspect a much greater part of the commerce.
Toolson's short,per curiammajority opinion concluded that the antitrust exemption applied to baseball only. InUnited States v. International Boxing Club of New York (348 U.S.236 (1955)), the Court denied a motion by theappellee to extend it toprofessional boxing despite the commercial similarities between it and baseball.
Radovich and Alioto brought suit under theClayton Act, which allows private parties to seek damages fromunfair business practices, against the NFL, all its memberfranchises,commissionerBert Bell, the PCPFL (by then defunct) and its commissioner at the time, J. Rufus Klawans.[5] He alleged he had been the victim of agroup boycott intended to ruin the AAFC and sought $35,000 in damages.[6] The defendants, primarily the NFL, argued in a pretrial motion that the antitrust exemption for baseball should apply equally to football, barring the lawsuit, and that even if it did not, it should be dismissed forfailure to state a cause of action.
The district court accepted those arguments, as did theNinth Circuit. The latter distinguished football from boxing, which the Supreme Court had already denied the exemption, by noting that it and baseball were bothteam sports, unlike boxing.[7]
The federal government, interested in not further restricting the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, filed anamicus curiae brief on behalf of Radovich, drafted bySolicitor GeneralJ. Lee Rankin. Maxwell Keith wrote the petition forcertiorari and the briefs before the Court on behalf of Radovich. He made the oral argument along with Rankin.Marshall Leahy and Bernard Nordlinger argued for the NFL.[8]
JusticeTom C. Clark wrote for the majority; there were no concurring opinions by the other justices. On the other side,Felix Frankfurter wrote an opinion reiterating his dissent inInternational Boxing Club, andJohn Marshall Harlan II was joined by new justiceWilliam Brennan in another.
Clark reiterated that the Court's existing jurisprudence on the issue –Federal Baseball,Toolson andInternational Boxing – was explicit and clear that the exemption applied to baseball only. "As long as the Congress continues to acquiesce we should adhere to – but not extend – the interpretation of the Act made in those cases", he said. But "the volume of interstate business involved in organized professional football places it within the provisions of the Act."[9] He admitted that this was at odds with the reality, but defended the reliance on a congressional remedy as a better process than a judicial one:
If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer, aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts. ButFederal Baseball held the business of baseball outside the scope of the Act. No other business claiming the coverage of those cases has such an adjudication. We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by court decision. Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legislation. The resulting product is therefore more likely to protect the industry and the public alike. The whole scope of congressional action would be known long in advance and effective dates for the legislation could be set in the future without the injustices of retroactivity and surprise which might follow court action.[9]
He also found that Radovich had adequately stated acause of action, dismissing claims of frivolity and vagueness raised by the NFL. Broadcasting revenues were likely, if proven, to be enough of the defendants' business alone to come under the terms of theSherman Antitrust Act. "This Court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress", he concluded. "We think that Radovich is entitled to an opportunity to prove his charges."[10]
"The most conscientious probing of the text and the interstices of the Sherman Law", wrote Frankfurter, "fails to disclose that Congress, whose will we are enforcing, excluded baseball – the conditions under which that sport is carried on – from the scope of the Sherman Law but included football." He was more concerned, however, with what he felt was undue respect for thedoctrine ofstare decisis, a concern he had voiced inInternational Boxing. "Full respect forstare decisis does not require a judge to forgo his own convictions promptly after his brethren have rejected them", he concluded.[11]
Harlan, who had been part of the majority inToolson andInternational Boxing, also saw the majority as purely arbitrary in his short dissent. "I am unable to distinguish football from baseball under the rationale ofFederal Baseball andToolson", he wrote, "and can find no basis for attributing to Congress a purpose to put baseball in a class by itself". He accused the majority of using "discriminatory fiat" to make "untenable distinctions" between the two sports.[12]
With the caseremanded for trial in the District Court, Maxwell Keith continued his representation whosettled with the league for $42,500. Radovich said years later he believed Keith, who wanted him to drop the suit, "double-crossed" him. The settlement came after lengthy arguments between the two men over whether to proceed with the trial. Afterwards he says he learned Keith had been pressured to settle by the league.[1]
"What I did opened doors", he said. "It's the first time that any professional sport was ever taken to court and beaten."[1] He never worked in football again and died in 2002.
Alioto was later electedmayor of San Francisco for two terms. He and the NFL would meet again in antitrust court, most notably as adversaries when he successfully representedLos Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission in its suit that cleared the way for theOakland Raiders' move tothat city. But he also successfully defended it against a suit brought by disgruntledBoston Patriots'quarterbackJoe Kapp, and representedPhiladelphia Eagles' ownerLeonard Tose in an unsuccessful action against the bankers he alleged had conspired to try to force him to sell the team in the late 1970s.[3]
Belllobbied Congress to pass an antitrust exemption after the decision, and had almost succeeded before he died. His successor,Pete Rozelle, continued the effort, but was only able to get limited exemptions to allow sharing of television revenues (the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961) and, later, themerger with theAmerican Football League (AFL). Since the Court's ruling means professional football is covered under antitrust law, the NFL has faced a number of competing leagues and lawsuits it would not otherwise be subject to.
The AFL had been formed byLamar Hunt two years afterRadovich was decided, and played for ten seasons. The NFL could not use the same tactics it had against the AAFC, and the two leagues merged in 1970 to become the modern NFL. When theDallas Cowboys were created to compete for the same market as Hunt'sDallas Texans, the AFL brought a suit that eventually led to the merger.
Today the AFL is considered the NFL's most successful competitor. To secure the antitrust exemptions that made the merger possible, Rozelle promisedLouisiana congressmanHale Boggs the NFL would expand intoNew Orleans, and theSaints andCincinnati Bengals were added to the league shortly thereafter.
In the 1970s theWorld Football League (WFL) took on the NFL. An apparently auspicious start, during a short players' strike, turned sour when it was discovered teams gave away many tickets, and soon the teams and their league were experiencing serious financial problems. After a season and a half it folded. The only two teams to have remained solvent applied to join the NFL asexpansion teams but were rejected. One of the teams, theMemphis Grizzlies, sued the NFL in its own lawsuit,Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League. It took several years for the case to work its way through the federal court system; the Grizzlies ultimately lost their case. The Grizzlies case centered around the league's rejection of the Grizzlies' application making it impossible to maintain operations, which the courts claimed would instead open up opportunities for competing leagues.
The next decade brought theUnited States Football League (USFL), which played its season in the spring instead of autumn. After three seasons of play during which it never had the same number of teams and many franchises moved, it also filed an antitrust suit it had brought against the NFL. Seeking hundreds of millions of dollars and damages,USFL v. NFL centered around the NFL's television contracts, and in addition to the financial damages, it also sought to invalidate the league's contracts with at least one of theBig Three television networks that dominated U.S. TV at the time. The jury concluded that the NFL was indeed violating antitrust laws but refused to tear up the broadcast contracts (noting that a last-ditch effort to move the league's season to autumn forced out numerous major market teams that would have made a television package more appealing) and only awarded a token $3 judgment in the USFL's favor. The failure to secure either objective in the lawsuit, coupled with mounting debts, prompted the USFL to cease operations.
There have been two prominent efforts to establish a major professional football league outside the NFL's auspices since the USFL's lawsuit, neither of which has resulted in lawsuits or antitrust challenges. In 2001,NBC, shut out of its TV contract with pro football for the first time since the 1960s, formed theXFL as ajoint venture with theWorld Wrestling Federation. The league played one short season, during the winter, and emphasized entertainment value over top-flight competition. Amid rapidly declining interest and viewer disappointment in the product, the XFL shut down. TheUnited Football League sought to create a parallel pro league in 2009; the UFL managed to put a respectable product on the field but was shut out in its efforts to secure the paying television contract that was required to make the league's finances viable, and amid massive financial losses it played its last games in 2012, by which point the league was unable to draw fans or pay its players.
The owners recognized theNational Football League Players Association (NFLPA) because some congressmen and senators pointed to the nonunion status of the league to deny support for exemptions. The NFLPA and the league clashed in court over labor issues and antitrust law. First there was Kapp's lawsuit, which the league eventually won when it was reheard by a jury.[13] ThenBaltimore Coltstight endJohn Mackey sued to block enforcement of the "Rozelle Rule", by which teams that signed another team'sfree agents were compensated with players or draft picks determined by the commissioner.[14] His legal victory gave the players free agency, which their baseball counterpartshad been denied by the Supreme Court, but the NFLPAbargained it away in return for compensation to current and former players affected by the Rozelle Rule.[15]
Afterthe 1987 strike, the players won it back, but only afterNew York Jetsrunning backFreeman McNeil filed a successful lawsuit that challenged the free agency provisions under the Sherman Act.[16] Eventually the players got the current free agency system in return for asalary cap.
The 1987 strike led to another antitrust action before the Supreme Court,Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (518 U.S.231 (1996)). Anthony Brown, apractice squad player for theWashington Redskins during the strike, challenged the teams' decision to unilaterally impose a $1,000 weekly maximum for practice players. This time, the NFL won, as the justices ruled 8-1 that groups of employers, as well as single employers, could implement a contract provision they had offered in good faith during animpasse.
Two other significant actions have been brought against the NFL on antitrust grounds. The first was from theNorth American Soccer League (NASL), which challenged an NFL policy, never formally adopted, barring owners from having interests in other professional team sports. Rozelle had pushed for its inclusion as an amendment to the league constitution, believing that owners must be focused on football and could be in aconflict of interest with the NFL if they owned franchises in other sports, since the other sports competed for disposable income with the NFL.[17] Opposing them were Hunt,Miami Dolphins' ownerJoe Robbie andEdward Bennett Williams, who at the time owned theBaltimore Orioles as well as the Redskins. Hunt had founded theDallas Tornado, and owned part of theNBAChicago Bulls for a while. Robbie's wife owned theFort Lauderdale Strikers, and Robbie himself warned that the policy was "an open invitation for a lawsuit under the Sherman Act".[18]
The NASL brought suit against the NFL, arguing that its restrictions on cross-ownership were an unfair trade practice to deny other sports and leagues full access to the pool of experienced franchise owners. After losing in district court, it won on appeal[19] but by then was in desperate straits, and folded two years later. The NFL's ownership policies were slightly modified; Rozelle never got the full limitations he wanted.
During that time, the most significant suit in modern NFL history was brought. TheLos Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission (LAMCC) sued the league over its provision requiring unanimous approval from other owners for franchise moves, which had otherwise hindered its efforts to conclude a lease with theRaiders, then playing inOakland, where ownerAl Davis was unhappy with the condition ofOakland–Alameda County Coliseum. Davis had also been incensed that the league had allowed the LA Coliseum's previous NFL team, theLos Angeles Rams, to move toAnaheim Stadium despite his abstention from the vote. His team began play in the LA Coliseum in 1982.
The LAMCC's suit was the NFL's most notable use of the "single entity" defense: that despite being composed of more than two dozen separate member teams it was one business for purposes of the Sherman Act. It failed both at trial and then in appeals court, and ultimately the Supreme Court deniedcertiorari in 1984.[20] Shortly afterwards the Colts moved toIndianapolis, the first of several franchise moves made possible by the invalidation of the NFL's ability to prevent them.
The NFL's antitrust-related legal entanglements as a result ofRadovich have led to suggestions that antitrust law cannot be applied to professional sports leagues in the same way they are applied to other businesses. In 1981, whiletestifying before theHouse Judiciary Committees in support of another exemptionbill, Rozelle complained that "[L]eagues are regularly damned in antitrust if they do and damned in antitrust if they don't." He noted that at the time, the city of Oakland was planning to sue the NFL if it allowed the Raiders to move to Los Angeles, and the LAMCC was suing it fornot allowing the move.[21]
Rozelle's complaint received some support in the 1990s when sports-law expert Gary Roberts testified to Congress that sports-related antitrust decisions, including many of those above, had been "inconsistent, often unjustifiable, and generally counterproductive".[22] InBrown, JusticeStephen Breyer'smajority opinion acknowledged that "clubs that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent economic competitors, as they depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic survival."[23]
Radovich was not drafted by an N.F.L. team after the 1937 season so he shopped for a team to join. He chose Detroit. 'They were the only team that guaranteed players a job during the off season' ... In 1946 Radovich told the Lions he wanted either to be traded to the West Coast, preferably to the Rams, or to be given more money so he could afford to fly back and forth between Detroit to Los Angeles. The Lions' owner, Fred Mandel Jr., refused both requests. 'The little creep said I'd either play in Detroit or I wouldn't play anywhere,' Radovich recalled. 'He also told me if I tried to play in the new league, he would put me on a blacklist for five years.'
Tose's counsel in the suit would be Joseph Alioto, former mayor of San Francisco and one of the country's foremost antitrust litigators ...Radovich had germinated from an encounter between Alioto and Radovich when the latter was waiting tables in Los Angeles's Brown Derby restaurant. When he told Alioto his story, the attorney drafted a brief for his case on a napkin. In it, he had attacked the League's 'blackballing' of his client as 'a conspiracy to monopolize commerce in professional football' ... Alioto's defense of the NFL had come inKapp v. NFL, a 1974 suit by one of Billy Sullivan's players claiming that the standard NFL player contract was a violation of the Sherman Act ... The jury went with Alioto.
A federal court jury Thursday unanimously decided that the National Football League's Plan B free agency system is illegal, that it substantially harms the effect on competition for players' services and thus violates antitrust laws.
Works related toRadovich v. National Football League at Wikisource