| RS-26 Rubezh | |
|---|---|
| Type | intermediate-range ballistic missile |
| Place of origin | Russia |
| Service history | |
| Used by | RussianStrategic Missile Troops |
| Production history | |
| Designer | Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology |
| Produced | 2011 |
| Specifications | |
| Mass | 36,000 kilograms (80,000 lb) |
| Warhead | 4x each 150/300 KtMIRV, payload; modified version ofAvangard[1]800 kilograms (1,800 lb)[2] |
| Engine | Solid-fueled (last stage or warhead block can have liquid) |
| Propellant | solid, third or fourth stage (warhead block) can be liquid |
Operational range | 5800 km demonstrated[3] |
| Flight altitude | Several tens of km |
| Maximum speed | over Mach 20 (24,500 km/h; 15,200 mph; 6.81 km/s) |
Guidance system | Inertial withGLONASS |
| Accuracy | 90-250 m CEP[citation needed] |
Launch platform | Road-mobileTEL |
TheRS-26 Rubezh (Russian:РС-26 Рубеж, meaningfrontier orboundary), designated by NATO as SS-X-31,[4] is a Russiansolid-fueledintermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with anuclear warhead, of which the range bracket just barely classifies it as anintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It is equipped with athermonuclearMIRV orMaRV payload, and is also intended to be capable of carrying theAvangard hypersonic glide vehicle. The RS-26 is based onRS-24 Yars, and constitutes a shorter version of the RS-24 with one fewer stages.[5][6] The development process of the RS-26 has been largely comparable to that of theRSD-10 Pioneer, a shortened derivative of theRT-21 Temp 2S. Deployment of the RS-26 is speculated to have a similar strategic impact as the RSD-10.[7]
After an unsuccessful test launch in September 2011, it was test-launched successfully on 26 May 2012, from thePlesetsk Cosmodrome in north-western Russia,[8][9] hitting its target minutes later 5,800 km away at theKura Missile Test Range on theKamchatka Peninsula. Further tests were performed successfully fromKapustin Yar toSary Shagan in 2012[10][11] and 2013.[12] In 2018, it was reported that procurement of the RS-26 by the state armament plan until 2027(GPV-27) had been frozen, with funding diverted toward continued procurement of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.[13]
According to theUkrainian Air Force andUkrainska Pravda, on 21 November 2024, during theRussian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation launched an unspecified number ofconventionally armed (i.e. non-nuclear) RS-26 missiles, reportedly targeting critical infrastructure in the city ofDnipro in central Ukraine.[14] Russian government spokespersonDmitry Peskov was asked to confirm this, and at the time, replied that he "had nothing to say on this topic".[15] A Western official stated that the missile used in the attack in question was not an ICBM.[16] Later that day,Vladimir Putin confirmed that the strike had indeed not been performed by an ICBM, but a new model of IRBM, theOreshnik, using a non-nuclear hypersonic payload.[17][18]
The missile was criticized by Western defense observers for indirectly breaching the (now defunct)Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which prohibited the U.S. and Russia from possessing nuclear and conventional ground-launchedballistic missiles,cruise missiles, and missile launchers with ranges of 500–5,500 km (310–3,420 mi). TheRS-26 missile was demonstrated with a light or no payload, extending its range beyond the proscribed 5,500 km (3,400 mi) limit of the treaty; however, all subsequent tests were flights with significantly shorter ranges that fell within the treaty prohibitions. The RS-26 was twice tested at a distance of about 2,000 km (1,200 mi).[19] According toThe National Interest, the RS-26 is exactly the same concept and a direct replacement for theRSD-10 Pioneer—known to NATO as the SS-20 Saber—which was banned under the INF treaty.[20]
The RS-26 is designed to pose a strategic threat to European capitals and has the ability to target NATO forces in Western Europe. According to an article byJeffrey Lewis entitled "The problem with Russia's missiles", the purpose of these weapons is to deter Western forces from coming to the aid of NATO's newer eastern members that are located closer to Russia's borders.[21]