| Naval Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part ofWorld War I | |||||||
.jpg) SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau bombarding Phillipeville on the French-Algerian coast (W. Malchin, 1915) | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United Kingdom France |  German Empire | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
 Berkeley MilneErnest TroubridgeA. B. de Lapeyrère |  Wilhelm Souchon | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 3battlecruisers 4armoured cruisers 4light cruisers 14destroyers | 1battlecruiser 1light cruiser | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| None | 4 sailors[1] | ||||||
Thepursuit ofGoeben andBreslau was a naval action that occurred in theMediterranean Sea at the outbreak of theFirst World War when elements of theBritish Mediterranean Fleet attempted to intercept the GermanMittelmeerdivision consisting of thebattlecruiserSMS Goeben and thelight cruiserSMS Breslau. The German ships evaded the British fleet and passed through theDardanelles to reachConstantinople, where they were eventually handed over to theOttoman Empire. RenamedYavuz Sultan Selim andMidilli, the formerGoeben andBreslau were ordered by their German commander toattack Russian positions, in doing so bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of theCentral Powers.
Though a bloodless "battle," the failure of the British pursuit had enormous political and military ramifications. In the short term it effectively ended the careers of the two British admirals who had been in charge of the pursuit. Writing several years later,Winston Churchill—who had beenFirst Lord of the Admiralty—expressed the opinion that by forcing Turkey into the war,Goeben had brought "more slaughter, more misery, and more ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship."[2]
Dispatched in 1912, theMittelmeerdivision of theKaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy), comprising only theGoeben andBreslau, was under the command ofKonteradmiralWilhelm Souchon. In the event of war, the squadron's role was to interceptFrench transports bringing colonial troops fromAlgeria to France.
When war broke out betweenAustria-Hungary andSerbia on 28 July 1914, Souchon was atPola in theAdriatic whereGoeben was undergoing repairs to herboilers. Not wishing to be trapped in the Adriatic, Souchon rushed to finish as much work as possible, but then took his ships out into the Mediterranean before all repairs were completed. He reachedBrindisi on 1 August, but Italian port authorities made excuses to avoidcoaling the ship. This was because Italy, despite being a co-signatory to theTriple Alliance, had decided to remain neutral.Goeben was joined byBreslau atTaranto and the small squadron sailed forMessina where Souchon was able to obtain 2,000 short tons (1,800 t) of coal from Germanmerchant ships.
Meanwhile, on 30 JulyWinston Churchill, then theFirst Lord of the Admiralty, had instructed the commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet,AdmiralSir Archibald Berkeley Milne, to cover the French transports taking theXIX Corps from North Africa across the Mediterranean to France. The British Mediterranean Fleet—based atMalta—comprised three fast, modern battlecruisers (HMS Inflexible,Indefatigable, andIndomitable), as well as fourarmoured cruisers, fourlight cruisers and a flotilla of 14destroyers.
Milne's instructions were "to aid the French in the transportation of their African Army by covering, and if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularlyGoeben, who may interfere in that action. You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French Admiral. Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a general battle. The speed of your squadrons is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. We shall hope to reinforce the Mediterranean, and you must husband your forces at the outset."[3] Churchill's orders did not explicitly state what he meant by "superior forces." He later claimed that he was referring to "the Austrian Fleet against whose battleships it was not desirable that our three battle-cruisers should be engaged without battleship support."[4]
Milne assembled his force at Malta on 1 August. On 2 August, he received instructions to shadowGoeben with two battlecruisers while maintaining a watch on the Adriatic, ready for asortie by the Austrians.Indomitable,Indefatigable, five cruisers and eight destroyers commanded byRear AdmiralErnest Troubridge were sent to cover the Adriatic.Goeben had already departed but was sighted that same day at Taranto by the British Consul, who informed London. Fearing the German ships might be trying to escape to the Atlantic, theAdmiralty ordered thatIndomitable andIndefatigable be sent west towards Gibraltar.[5] Milne's other task of protecting French ships was complicated by the lack of any direct communications with the French navy, which had meanwhile postponed the sailing of the troop ships. The light cruiserHMS Chatham was sent to search theStraits of Messina forGoeben. However, by this time, on the morning of 3 August, Souchon had departed from Messina, heading west.
Without specific orders, Souchon had decided to position his ships off the coast ofAfrica, ready to engage when hostilities commenced in order to attack French transport ships, which were headed toward Toulon. He planned to bombard the embarkation ports ofBône andPhilippeville inFrench Algeria.Goeben was heading for Philippeville, whileBreslau was detached to deal with Bône. At 18:00 on 3 August, while still sailing west, he received word that Germany had declared war on France. Then, early on 4 August, Souchon received orders from AdmiralAlfred von Tirpitz reading: "Alliance withgovernment ofCUP concluded 3 August. Proceed at once toConstantinople." So close to his targets, Souchon ignored the order and pushed on, flying theRussian flag as he approached, in order to evade detection. He carried out a shore bombardment at dawn before breaking off and heading back to Messina for more coal.[6]
Under a pre-war agreement with the United Kingdom, France was able to concentrate her entire fleet in the Mediterranean, leaving theRoyal Navy to ensure the security of France'sAtlantic coast. Three squadrons of the French fleet were covering the transports. However, assuming thatGoeben would continue west toGibraltar, the French commander, Admiralde Lapeyrère, sent the "Groupe A" of his fleet to the west in order to make contact, but Souchon was heading east and so was able to slip away.
At 09:30 on 4 August Souchon made contact with the two British battlecruisers,Indomitable andIndefatigable, which passed the German ships in the opposite direction. Neither force engaged as, unlike France, the UK had not yet declared war with Germany (the declaration would not be made until later that day, following the start of theGerman invasion of neutral Belgium). The British started shadowingGoeben andBreslau but were quickly outpaced by the Germans. Milne reported the contact and position, but neglected to inform the Admiralty that the German ships were heading east. Churchill therefore, still expecting them to threaten the French transports, authorised Milne to engage the German ships if they attacked. However, a meeting of the British Cabinet decided that hostilities could not start before a declaration of war, and at 14:00 Churchill was obliged to cancel his attack order.[7]
The rated speed ofGoeben was 27knots (50 km/h; 31 mph), but her damaged boilers meant she could only manage 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph), and this was only achieved by working men and machinery to the limit; four stokers were killed by scaldingsteam. Fortunately for Souchon, both British battlecruisers were also suffering from problems with their boilers and were unable to keepGoeben′s pace. The light cruiserHMS Dublin maintained contact, whileIndomitable andIndefatigable fell behind. In fog and fading light,Dublin lost contact offCape San Vito on the north coast ofSicily at 19:37.Goeben andBreslau returned to Messina the following morning, by which time Britain and Germany were at war.
The Admiralty ordered Milne to respect Italian neutrality and stay outside a 6-nautical-mile (11 km; 6.9 mi) limit from the Italian coast—which precluded entrance into the passage of the Straits of Messina. Consequently, Milne posted guards on the exits from the Straits. Still expecting Souchon to head for the transports and the Atlantic, he placed two battlecruisers—Inflexible andIndefatigable—to cover the northern exit (which gave access to the western Mediterranean), while the southern exit of the Straits was covered by a single light cruiser,HMS Gloucester. Milne sentIndomitable west to coal atBizerte, instead of south to Malta.[8]
For Souchon, Messina was no haven. The Italian authorities insisted that he depart within 24 hours and delayed supplying coal. Provisioning his ships required ripping up the decks of German merchantsteamers in harbour and manually shovelling their coal into his bunkers. By the evening of 6 August, despite the help of 400 volunteers from the merchantmen, he had only taken on 1,500 short tons (1,400 t) which was insufficient to reach Constantinople. Further messages from Tirpitz made his predicament even more dire. He was informed that Austria would provide no naval aid in the Mediterranean and that the Ottoman Empire was still neutral and therefore he should no longer make for Constantinople. Faced with the alternative of seeking refuge at Pola, and probably remaining trapped for the rest of the war, Souchon chose to head for Constantinople anyway, his purpose being "to force the Ottoman Empire, even against their will, to spread the war to theBlack Sea against their ancient enemy, Russia."[8]
Milne was instructed on 5 August to continue watching the Adriatic for signs of the Austrian fleet and to prevent the German ships joining them. He chose to keep his battlecruisers in the west, dispatchingDublin to join Troubridge's cruiser squadron in the Adriatic, which he believed would be able to interceptGoeben andBreslau. Troubridge was instructed "not to get seriously engaged with superior forces," once again intended as a warning against engaging the Austrian fleet. WhenGoeben andBreslau emerged into the eastern Mediterranean on 6 August, they were met byGloucester, which, being outgunned, began to shadow the German ships.[9]
Troubridge's squadron consisted of the armoured cruisersHMS Defence,Black Prince,Warrior,Duke of Edinburgh and eight destroyers armed with torpedoes. The cruisers had 9.2 in (230 mm) guns versus the 11 in (280 mm) guns ofGoeben and had armour a maximum of 6 in (15 cm) thick compared to the battlecruiser's 11 in (28 cm) armour belt. This meant that Troubridge's squadron was not only outranged and vulnerable toGoeben′s powerful guns, but it was unlikely that his cruiser's guns could seriously damage the German ship at all, even at short range.[10] In addition, the British ships were several knots slower thanGoeben, despite her damaged boilers,[11] meaning that she could dictate the range of the battle if she spotted the British squadron in advance. Consequently, Troubridge considered his only chance was to locate and engageGoeben in favourable light, at dawn, withGoeben east of his ships, and ideally launch a torpedo attack with his destroyers; however, at least five of the destroyers did not have enough coal to keep up with the cruisers steaming at full speed. By 04:00 on 7 August, Troubridge realised he would not be able to intercept the German ships before daylight and after some deliberation he signalled Milne with his intentions to break off the chase, mindful of Churchill's ambiguous order to avoid engaging a "superior force." No reply was received until 10:00, by which time he had withdrawn to Zante to refuel.[12]
Milne orderedGloucester to disengage, still expecting Souchon to turn west, but it was apparent toGloucester′s captain thatGoeben was fleeing.Breslau attempted to harassGloucester into breaking off—Souchon had acollier waiting off the coast ofGreece and needed to shake his pursuer before he could rendezvous.Gloucester finally engagedBreslau, hoping this would compelGoeben to drop back and protect the light cruiser. According to Souchon,Breslau was hit, but no damage was done. The action then broke off without further hits being scored. Finally, Milne orderedGloucester to cease pursuit atCape Matapan.
Shortly after midnight on 8 August Milne took his three battlecruisers and the light cruiserHMS Weymouth east. At 14:00 he received an incorrect signal from the Admiralty stating that Britain was at war with Austria; war would not be declared until 12 August and the order was countermanded four hours later, but Milne chose to guard the Adriatic rather than seekGoeben. Finally, on 9 August, Milne was given clear orders to "chaseGoeben which had passed Cape Matapan on the 7th steering north-east." Milne still did not believe that Souchon was heading for the Dardanelles, and so he resolved to guard the exit from theAegean, unaware thatGoeben did not intend to come out.
Souchon had replenished his coal off the Aegean island ofDonoussa on 9 August, and the German warships resumed their voyage to Constantinople. At 17:00 on 10 August, he reached the Dardanelles and awaited permission to pass through. Germany had for some time been courting the Committee of Union and Progress of theimperial government, and it now used its influence to pressure the Turkish Minister of War,Enver Pasha, into granting the ships passage, an act that would outrage Russia, which relied on the Dardanelles as its main all-season shipping route. In addition, the Germans managed to persuade Enver to order any pursuing British ships to be fired on. By the time Souchon received permission to enter the straits, his lookouts could see smoke on the horizon from approaching British ships.
Turkey was still a neutral country bound by treaty to prevent German warships from passing the straits. To get around this difficulty it was agreed that the ships should become part of the Turkish navy. On 16 August, having reached Constantinople,Goeben andBreslau were transferred to the Turkish Navy in a small ceremony, becoming respectivelyYavuz Sultan Selim andMidilli, though they retained their German crews with Souchon still in command. The initial reaction in Britain was one of satisfaction, that a threat had been removed from the Mediterranean. On 23 September, Souchon was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman Navy.[13]
In August, Germany—still expecting a swift victory—was content for the Ottoman Empire to remain neutral. The mere presence of a powerful warship likeGoeben in theSea of Marmara would be enough to occupy a British naval squadron guarding the Dardanelles. However, following German reverses at theFirst Battle of the Marne in September, and with Russian successes against Austria-Hungary, Germany began to regard the Ottoman Empire as a useful ally. Tensions began to escalate when the Ottoman Empire closed the Dardanelles to all shipping on 27 September, blocking Russia's exit from the Black Sea—that accounted for over 90 percent of Russia's import and export traffic.
Germany's gift of the two modern warships had an enormous positive impact on the Turkish population. At the outbreak of the war, Churchill had caused outrage when he "requisitioned" two almost completed Ottomanbattleships in British shipyards,Sultan Osman I andReshadieh, which had been financed by public subscription at a cost of £6,000,000. The Ottomans were offered compensation of £1,000 per day for so long as the war might last, provided she remained neutral. (These ships were commissioned into theRoyal Navy asHMS Agincourt andHMS Erin respectively.) The Ottoman Empire had been neutral, though the navy had been pro-British (having purchased 40 warships from British shipyards) while the army was in favour of Germany, so the two incidents helped resolve the deadlock and the Ottoman Empire would join theCentral Powers.[14]
Continueddiplomacy from France and Russia attempted to keep the Ottoman Empire out of the war, but Germany was agitating for a commitment. In the aftermath of Souchon's daring dash to Constantinople, on 15 August 1914 the Ottomans canceled their maritime agreement with Britain and the Royal Navy mission under AdmiralLimpus left by 15 September.
Finally, on 29 October, the point of no return was reached when Admiral Souchon tookGoeben,Breslau and a squadron of Turkish warships and launched theBlack Sea Raid against the Russian ports ofNovorossiysk,Feodosia,Odessa, andSevastopol. The ensuing political crises brought the Ottoman Empire into the war.
While the consequences of the Royal Navy's failure to interceptGoeben andBreslau had not been immediately apparent, the humiliation of the "defeat" resulted in Admirals de Lapeyrère, Milne and Troubridge being censured. Milne was recalled from the Mediterranean and did not hold another command until retirement at his own request in 1919, his planned assumption of the Nore command having been cancelled in 1916 due to "other exigencies." The Admiralty repeatedly stated that Milne had been exonerated of all blame.[15] For his failure to engageGoeben with hiscruisers, Troubridge wascourt-martialled in November on the charge that "he did forbear to chase His Imperial German Majesty's shipGoeben, being an enemy then flying." The charge was not proved on the grounds that he was under orders not to engage a "superior force." However, he was never given another sea-going command but did valuable service, co-operating with the Serbs on the Balkan and being given command of a force on theDanube in 1915 against the Austro-Hungarians. He eventually retired as a full Admiral.[16]
Although a relatively minor 'action' and perhaps not a widely known historical event, the escape ofGoeben to Constantinople and its eventual annexation to Turkey ultimately precipitated some of the most dramatic naval chases of the 20th century. It also assisted in helping to shape the eventual splitting up of the Ottoman Empire into the many states we know today.
GeneralLudendorff stated in his memoirs that he believed the entry of the Ottomans into the war allowed the outnumbered Central Powers to fight on for two years longer than they would have been able on their own, a view shared by historian Ian F.W. Beckett.[17]
The war was extended to theMiddle East with main fronts ofGallipoli, theSinai and Palestine,Mesopotamia, and theCaucasus. The course of thewar in the Balkans was also influenced by the entry of the Ottoman Empire on the side of the Central Powers. Had the war ended in 1916, some of the bloodiest engagements, such as theBattle of the Somme, would have been avoided. TheUnited States might not have been drawn from the policy of isolation to intervene in a foreign war.
TheGallipoli campaign is considered to be the beginning of Australian and New Zealandnational consciousness, an event which would not have taken place without the Ottoman entry into the war. The anniversary of the landings, 25 April, is known asANZAC Day, the most significant commemoration of military casualties and veterans in the two countries, surpassingRemembrance Day (Armistice Day).[18][19][20]
In allying with the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire shared their fate in ultimate defeat. This gave the allies the opportunity to carve up the collapsed Empire to suit their political whims. Many new nations were created includingSyria,Lebanon,Saudi Arabia andIraq.
{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help){{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)Barbara Tuchman - As a very young child, the author ofThe Guns of August was on an Italian passenger ship that witnessed the Gloucester's action against Goeben and Breslau.
Media related toPursuit of Goeben and Breslau at Wikimedia Commons43°00′00″N15°00′00″E / 43.0000°N 15.0000°E /43.0000; 15.0000