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*This list is a simplification. It is likely that the development of Buddhist schools was not linear. |
ThePudgalavāda (Sanskrit: "Personalism";Pali: Puggalavāda;Chinese:補特伽羅論者;pinyin:Bǔtèjiāluō Lùnzhě;Vietnamese:Bổ-đặc-già-la Luận giả) was a Buddhist philosophical view and also refers to a group ofNikāya Buddhist schools (mainly known as Vātsīputrīyas) that arose from theSthavira Nikāya.[1] The school is believed to have been founded by the elder Vātsīputra in the third century BCE.[1] They were a widely influential school in India and became particularly popular during the reign of emperorHarshavadana (606–647 CE). Harsha's sister Rajyasri was said to have joined the school as a nun.[2] According to Dan Lusthaus, they were "one of the most popular mainstream Buddhist sects in India for more than a thousand years".[3]
The Pudgalavādins asserted that while there is noātman, there exists a pudgala (person) or sattva (being) which is neither a conditioned dharma nor an unconditioned dharma.[1] This doctrine of the person was their method of accounting forkarma,rebirth, andnirvāṇa. For the Pudgalavādins, the pudgala was what underwent rebirth through successive lives insaṃsāra and what experiences nirvāṇa. They defended this view through philosophical argument as well as scriptural citation. According to Thiện Châu andRichard Gombrich, they used the Bhārahārasūtras a major reference for their view. This text states that the person (pudgala) is the bearer of the five aggregates, and that the taking up of them is craving and suffering:
Bhārā have pañcakkhandhā,bhārahāro ca puggalo; Bhārādānaṁ dukhaṁ loke, bhāranikkhepanaṁ sukhaṁ.[4]
Thefive aggregates are truly burdens, and theburden-carrieris the person. Taking up the burden is suffering in the world; Laying the burden down is blissful.[5][6]
TheKathāvatthu also mentions that the Pudgalavādins relied on the following statements by the Buddha: "There is a person who exerts for his own good" and "There appears a person who is reborn for the good and happiness of many, for showing compassion to the world of beings."[7] The Pudgalavādins held that this person was "inexpressible" and indeterminate in its relation to thefive aggregates and could not be said to be neither the same as the aggregates nor different. However, the person could not be denied entirely, for if this were so, nothing would getreborn and nothing would be the object ofloving-kindness meditation.[8] Thus, according toL. S. Cousins:
The difference is that for the voidist the person is a label for the aggregates experiences as objects of consciousness whereas for the personalist the relationship between the person and those objects cannot be described as either the same nor different.[8]
Thus this pudgala was the subject of experiences, the doer of wholesome and unwholesome actions, and the experiencer of karma, transmigration and nirvāṇa. Yet it was also "indefinable" (avāktavya), neither a conditioned (saṃskṛta) nor an unconditioned dharma (nirvāṇa) and neither the same as nor different from the five aggregates.[9] However, as Thiện Châu notes in his survey of their literature, the Pudgalavādins carefully developed this theory especially to be compatible withanātman and theMiddle Way and thus the pudgala is "not an absolute reality totally separated from compounded things."[10]
TheAbhidharmakośa shows how the Pudgalavādins explained their theory by using the analogy of fire and fuel. Thefive aggregates are the fuel and the pudgala the fire. The fire exists as long as there is fuel, but it is not the same as the fuel and has properties that the fuel does not. They are co-existent and the fuel (aggregates) are the support for the fire (pudgala), and thus are not the same nor wholly different.[7] For the Pudgalavādins, if one says that the person is thesame as the aggregates (thereductionist Buddhist view of other schools), this is like saying fire and fuel are the same thing, which is one mistake. On the other hand, if one says that fire and fuel are totally different, this is like saying fire does not depend on fuel, a second mistake (related to non-Buddhist views). Thus they took a middle road between these and argued for a person which is neither identical to the aggregates nor different from them.[11] They sought to refute the view of other Buddhists that the aggregates and the person were the same. They held that, at death when the aggregates are destroyed, the person would then also be destroyed, thus not be reborn. They also believed it contradicted the Buddha's words i.e. "the bearer of the burden" exists.[12]
The Kathāvatthu also mentions that the pudgala can be likened to what is called a being (sattva) and also to what is calledjiva (life force), but that it is neither identical nor different from the body (kaya).[13] One Pudgalavādin text explains the nature of this relationship as being based on clinging or appropriation (upādāna):
The designation of appropriation (upādāna-prajñapti) is the designation of life (jiva) (which is) internal appropriation (upādāna) in the present and is composed of the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and domains (āyatana); that is to say that the phenomena of appropriation concerning the internal life in the present, which is formed by compounded things – (saṃskāra) and the fetters is what is called the designation of appropriation.[14]
The Pudgalavādins also seem to have held that the liberated person exists even afterparinirvāṇa in a state of supreme bliss, or as Thiện Châu notes, they saw nirvāṇa as "a transcendental domain" and an "existence in the beyond".[15]
According to the Pudgalavādin text known as theTraidharmakaśāstra, the pudgala can be designated in three ways, called the threeprajñaptis:[16][1]
Regarding the first form of designation,Dan Lusthaus adds that:
If the appropriator is something different from the skandhas themselves, then there is a sixth skandha, which is doctrinally impermissible. If the skandhas appropriate themselves, that leads to a vicious cycle of infinite regress. Hence, the Vātsīputrīya argue, the nominal person (pudgala) is neither the same as nor different from the skandhas. It is a heuristic fiction that avoids these unwarranted consequences and lends coherence by also corresponding to how actual persons experience themselves—that is, as distinct individuals continuous with, but not absolutely identical to or reducible to, their own pasts and futures.[17]
Lusthaus also explains their reasoning for the second and third designations as follows:
But what remains constant or continuous between such [past and future] lives? If it is a self-same invariant identity, then this would indeed be a case of atmavada, a view the Vātsīputrīyas, like all Buddhists, reject. In what sense would someone be the same or different from the person in one's previous life? If completely different, then to posit a continuity between them is incoherent. If the same, then their real discontinuities are ignored, leading to a form of eternalism, another impermissible view for Buddhists. Hence, they are neither the same nor different, but linked by a fictional pudgala. Finally, Buddhist practice leads to nirvana; but who attains this? If there is an integral individual that ceases on attaining nirvana, then this would entail the unwarranted view of annihilationalism. If there is no cessation of the karmic individual, then there is no nirvana. Both extremes, though implicit in standard Buddhist formulations, render Buddhism itself incoherent, a problem only solved, the Vātsīputrīyas argue, if one admits the fictional pudgala implicit in standard Buddhist doctrine.[18]
With this system, Pudgalavādins held that they could explainkarmic moral retribution andpersonal identity by positing an ineffable (avaktavya) dharma that avoids falling into the extremes of annihilation (ucceda) and eternity (sasvata).[16] One Pudgalavāda text affirms that this doctrine is aMiddle Way thus:
If the pudgala could be described in terms of existence or non-existence, one would fall into nihilism (ucchedadristi) or eternalism (sasvatadrsti), but the Buddha does not allow us to uphold there two opinions. If one says that the pudgala does not exist, that is committing a fault in the order of thequestions to be avoided. That expression is not justified. Why? If one affirms that no pudgala exists, that is a fake view (mithyadrsti). If (on the contrary), one affirms that the pudgala exists (conditionally), that is a right view (samyagdrsti). That is why it is possible to say that the pudgala exists.[19]
Because they felt that Vātsīputrīya views were close to the view of a self orātman, they were sharply criticised by theVibhajyavādins (a record of this is found in theTheravādinKathāvatthu), as well as by theSarvastivādins (in theVijñanakaya),Sautrantikas (most famously in theAbhidharmakośa), and theMadhyamaka school (Candrakirti'sMadhyamakavatara).[20] The earliest source for the pudgala doctrinal controversy is thePuggalakatha of theKathāvatthu, attributed toMoggaliputtatissa (c. third century BCE).[21]
The Buddhist philosopherVasubandhu argued against the pudgala theory in hisAbhidharmakośa. Vasubandhu begins by stating that the Vātsīputrīya hold that the pudgala 'is based' on the five aggregates, and that this could mean one of two things:[22]
Vasubandhu argues then that 'pudgala' is identical to the aggregates and just a label for them. Vasubandhu first argues that we can either perceive the pudgala directly or perceive it by perceiving the aggregates. If the latter, then its just a label for aggregates. If we perceive it directly, then the aggregates would be based on the pudgala, not the other way around.[22] Vasubandhu also attacks the view that we can perceive the pudgala by all six senses. If this is true, then the pudgala is nothing but the five aggregates since all that the senses perceive is their direct sense impressions and nothing more.[22]
According to Thich Thien Chau, other secondary theses of the personalist Vātsīputrīya-Saṃmitīyas include:[16]
The school had aTripiṭaka, with Sūtra Piṭaka (in four Āgamas),Vinaya Piṭaka andAbhidharma Piṭakas, like other early Buddhist schools.[23] Only four of their texts survive in Chinese translation:
One surviving Pudgalavāda text is theTraidharmakaśāstra (Taishō Tripiṭaka XXV, 1506 pp. 15c-30a), an Abhidharma work which was translated twice into Chinese.[1] The text mentions that lack of knowledge also includes lack of knowledge of the indefinable (avyākṛta), which refers to the pudgala.[1] Another Pudgalavāda text, theSammatiyanikayaśāstra, put forth various arguments for and against the following propositions:[24]
All of these views are ultimately rejected. The text claims that the pudgala is neither an existent nor a purely conceptual construct.[20]
Peter Harvey agrees with criticisms leveled against the Pudgalavādins byMoggaliputta-Tissa andVasubandhu, and finds that there is no support in the PaliNikāyas for their pudgala concept.[25]
However, according to Bhikṣu Thiện Châu:
The creation of the theory of the pudgala represents a reaction against the "depersonalization" of the abhidharmika tradition. The Pudgalavadins, on the other hand, tried to preserve the essence of the doctrine of substancelessness (anātmavāda). The theory of the pudgala has been misinterpreted by the polemical literature; nevertheless, it offers much of doctrinal interest to Buddhist thinkers.[16]
Furthermore, Thiện Châu in his analysis of their doctrine adds:
The Pudgalavadins were probably not satisfied with the interpretation according to which a man is merely the result of a combination of psycho-physical factors. For a man is something different from a chariot; the latter is only an assemblage of parts and separate pieces whereas the former is essentially a being with its totality of which the psycho-physical parts develop after conception and birth.[26]
According toDan Lusthaus, "no Buddhist school has been more vilified by its Buddhist peers or misunderstood by modern scholars."[27] Lusthaus argues that, far from promoting the view of a self (ātmavāda), the Vātsīputrīya position which can be seen in their surviving texts is that the pudgala is "a prajñapti (only a nominal existent) that is neither identical to nor different from the skandhas."[3] Furthermore:
The Vātsīputrīya argument is that the pudgala is a necessary prajñapti since any theory of karma, or any theory that posits that individuals can make spiritual progress for themselves or can assist other individuals to do likewise, is incoherent without it. Karma means that an action done at one time has subsequent consequences for the same individual at a later time, or even a later life. If the positive and negative consequences of an action don't accrue to the self-same individual, then it would make no sense to speak of things like progress (who is progressing?), and Buddhist practice itself becomes incoherent. If there are no persons, then there is no one who suffers, no one who performs and reaps the consequences of his or her own karma, no Buddha, no Buddhists, and no Buddhism. Obviously, those are not acceptable consequences for a Buddhist.[22]
Lusthaus notes that for the Vātsīputrīyas, their theory is simply an attempt to explain what other Buddhist traditions leave unsaid and assumed, mainly what it is that undergoes rebirth, has moral responsibility and attains enlightenment. According to Lusthaus, for the Vātsīputrīyas, "while other Buddhists might leave the word "pudgala" unsaid, the narratives presupposed in their doctrines require it."[28]
According to Thiện Châu, the Vātsīputrīyas were the initial parent school out of which branched off four sub-schools (sometime between the 1st century BCE and the 1st century CE); mainly theSaṃmitīyas,Dhammuttariyas, Bhadrayanikas, and theSandagarikas.[29] The Vātsīputrīya communities were established inKosambi andSarnath, living side by side with theSaṃmitīyas, a school which quickly eclipsed them in popularity.[30]
The most prominent of the Pudgalavādin schools were certainly theSaṃmitīyas (Sanskrit;Chinese:正量部;pinyin:Zhèngliàng Bù) who were especially prominent inSindh and inGujarat during theMaitraka dynasty (470–788 CE). Inscriptions have also established the existence of Saṃmitīya communities inMathura andSarnath between the 2nd and 4th centuries.[31] The Tibetan historianButon Rinchen Drub noted that the Saṃmitīya usedApabhraṃśa as their main language.[32] By the 4th century, this school had become so influential that they replaced theSarvastivādins inSarnath as the most prominent school. By the time of KingHarsha in the seventh century, they were the largest Nikāya Buddhist school in India.[33] Due to their geographic spread, this led to them being divided into two further sub-schools, the Avantakas centered inAvanti and the Kurukulas centered aroundKuru on the upper Ganges.[33]
Their most influential center of learning was atValabhi University in Gujarat, which remained an important place for the study of Nikāya Buddhism until the 8th century.[34]Yijing, who visited Gujarat in 670 CE, noted that the Sammitiyas had the greatest number of followers inWestern India and that the learning center at Valabhi rivaled that ofNalanda.[34]
Étienne Lamotte, using the writings of the Chinese travelerXuanzang, asserted that the Saṃmitīya were in all likelihood the most populous non-Mahāyāna sect in India, comprising double the number of the next largest sect,[35] although scholarL. S. Cousins revised his estimate down to a quarter of all non-Mahāyāna monks, still the largest overall.[36] The Saṃmitīya sect seems to have been particularly strong in the Sindh, where one scholar estimates 350 Buddhist monasteries were Saṃmitīya of a total of 450.[37] This area was rapidlyIslamised in the wake of theArab conquest. They continued to be a presence in India until the end of Indian Buddhism, but, never having gained a foothold elsewhere, did not continue thereafter.
Ancient sources such asXuanzang and Tibetan historianTāranātha reported that the Saṃmitīyas were staunch opponents ofMahāyāna.[38] According toTāranātha, Saṃmitīya monks from the Sindh burned tantric scriptures and destroyed a silver image ofHevajra at Vajrāsana monastery inBodh Gaya.[39] In the biography of Xuanzang, it is recounted that an elderlyBrahmin and follower of the Saṃmitīya sect named Prajñāgupta composed a treatise in 700 verses which opposed the Mahāyāna teachings.[40] In response, while living atNālandā, Xuanzang wrote a Sanskrit work in 1600 verses to refute this text, calledThe Destruction of Heresy.[40]
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