Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

Pro-democracy camp (Hong Kong)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Hong Kong political faction in favour of universal suffrage
"Pro-democracy camp" redirects here. For the equivalent political camp in Macau, seePro-democracy camp (Macau).

Pro-democracy camp
民主派
Founded27 October 1986 (1986-10-27)
Ideology
ColoursYellow andgreen
(customary)
Pro-democracy camp
Chinese民主派
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinMín zhǔ pài
Bopomofoㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄓㄨˇ ㄆㄞˋ
Wade–GilesMin2 chu3 p'ai4
IPA[mǐn ʈʂù pʰâɪ]
Yue: Cantonese
Yale RomanizationMàhn jyú paai
JyutpingMan4 zyu2 paai3
IPA[mɐn˩ tsy˧˥ pʰaj˧]
Pan-democracy camp
Chinese泛民主派
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinFàn mín zhǔ pài
Bopomofoㄈㄢˋ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄓㄨˇ ㄆㄞˋ
Wade–GilesFan4 min2 chu3 p'ai4
IPA[fân mǐn ʈʂù pʰâɪ]
Yue: Cantonese
Yale RomanizationFaan màhn jyú paai
JyutpingFaan6 man4 zyu2 paai3
IPA[fan˨ mɐn˩ tsy˧˥ pʰaj˧]
Politics andgovernment
ofHong Kong
  • University Grants Committee Secretariat
  • Working Family and Student Financial Assistance Agency
Related topicsflagHong Kong portal
This article is part ofa series on
Liberalism in Hong Kong

Thepro-democracy camp, also known as thepan-democracy camp, is a political alignment inHong Kong that supports increased democracy, namely theuniversal suffrage of theChief Executive and theLegislative Council as given by theBasic Law under the "One Country, Two Systems" framework.

The pro-democrats generally embraceliberal values such as rule of law, human rights, civil liberties and social justice, though their economic positions vary. They are often referred to as the "opposition camp" as they have consistently been the minority camp within the Legislative Council, and because of their non-cooperative and sometimes confrontational stance towards theHong Kong government andChinese Communist Party (CCP). Opposite to the pro-democracy camp is thepro-Beijing camp, whose members are perceived as being supportive of the Beijing and SAR authorities. Since the1997 handover, the pro-democracy camp has usually received 55 to 60 percent of the votes in each election, but has always received less than half of the seats in theLegislative Council due to theindirectly elected elements of the legislature.

The pro-democracy activists emerged from the youth movements in the 1970s and began to take part in electoral politics as the colonial government introduced representative democracy in the mid-1980s. The pro-democrats joined hands in pushing for greater democracy both in the transition period and afterhandover of Hong Kong in 1997. Many also supported greater democracy in China and the1989 Tiananmen Square protests. The relationship between the pro-democrats and the Beijing government turned hostile after Beijing's bloody crackdown on the protest, after which the pro-democrats were labelled as "treasonous". After the2004 Legislative Council election, the term "pan-democracy camp" (abbreviated "pan-dems") became more commonly used as more allied parties and politicians of varying political ideologies emerged.

The camp faced a challenge in2016 election from the newlocalists who emerged after theUmbrella Revolution and ran under the banner ofself-determination orHong Kong independence. After the election, some localists joined the pro-democrats' caucus, which rebranded itself as the "pro-democracy camp". The disunity within the camp and the failure of the Umbrella Revolution cost the pro-democrats in the2018 by-elections. The2019 anti-extradition movement, however, saw a rebound in popularity for the camp, which contributed to its biggest electoral victory in the history of Hong Kong, gaining control of 17 of the 18 District Councils and more than tripling their seats from 124 to 388 in the2019 District Council election. In reaction to the political upheaval, the Beijing government imposednational security law to curb the opposition and disqualified four sitting pro-democracy legislators, triggering theresignations of remaining pro-democrats and rendering the blocextra-parliamentary. Dozens of activists were arrested and jailed in the following months, most notably theHong Kong 47. Most of the pro-democracy parties dissolved between 2020 and 2025, reportedly under pressure from the authorities. Some media outlets considered the pro-democracy camp to have come to an end when theLeague of Social Democrats dissolved in June 2025.[1][2]

Ideology

[edit]
See also:Liberalism in Hong Kong

One of the main goals of the pro-democracy camp is to achieveuniversal suffrage of theChief Executive (CE) and theLegislative Council (LegCo) as guaranteed inArticle 45 and Article 68 of theBasic Law respectively. Since theNational People's Congress Standing Committee's (NPCSC)31 August 2014 decision, which determined that the Chief Executive candidate would be selected by a highly restrictive nominating committee and was seen as betrayal of the democratic value, some democrats have raised the question of theright to self-determination. However, the mainstream pro-democrats retained their support for a highly autonomous Hong Kong under the "One Country, Two Systems" framework, as promised by the Basic Law.[3]

The pro-democrats generally embraceliberal values such as rule of law, human rights, civil liberties, and social justice, though their economic positions vary. Some pro-democrats position themselves as morepro-labour while most pro-democrats believe in a moremeritocratic oregalitarian society. The pro-democracy camp generally supports theChinese democracy movement, which can be traced back to their support for theTiananmen Square protests of 1989. Many of the pro-democrats have been calling for the end ofone party rule of theChinese Communist Party and therefore are seen as a threat by the Beijing authorities. The camp's support for more liberal democracy is seen as unacceptable by the Beijing government. In some cases, pan-democracy activists have been labeledtraitors (hanjian) to China.[4]

The pro-democrats are also divided by their approach for achieving democracy: the moderate democrats, represented by theDemocratic Party and theAssociation for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL), believe in dialogue with Beijing and Hong Kong governments over struggle, while radical democrats such as the League of Social Democrats and thePeople Power believe in street actions and mass movements. There have been severe conflicts and distrust between the two factions and a great split after theconstitutional reform voting in 2010, where the Democratic Party negotiated with the Beijing representatives and supported the modified reform proposal and was thus seen as a betrayal by the radical democrats.[5]

History

[edit]
See also:Democratic development in Hong Kong

Early development

[edit]
Part ofa series on
Socialism in Hong Kong

Members of the camp include social workers and social activists emerged from the 1970s youth movements. Many of them grouped themselves as the "social action faction", competing against the pro-CommunistMaoists in whom they disagreed with their ultra-nationalist and radical Maoist stances. Although claiming to be patriotic and launching thedefend the Diaoyu Islands movement, the "social action faction" dedicated themselves into the local social issues in Hong Kong. They fought for the social inequality and livelihood issues, including the anti-corruption movement and Chinese Language movement and so forth. In the early 1980s when the question of Hong Kong sovereignty emerged, many of them supported a democratic autonomous Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty, notably theMeeting Point which was founded in January 1983 which became the first political group to publicly support the Chinese sovereignty of Hong Kong.[6]

After theSino-British Joint Declaration, the pro-democrats began to join hands to demand further democracy before and after 1997. In 1986, a number of political groups, activists, professionals and politicians joined hand under the banner of theJoint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government (JCPDG) demanding for1988 direct elections for theLegislative Council and earlieruniversal suffrage for theChief Executive and Legislative Council after 1997, as presented in the proposal of theGroup of 190.[7] Their arch rival at the time was theGroup of 89, a group of conservative business and professional elites in theHong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee (HKBLDC) andHong Kong Basic Law Consultative Committee (HKBLCC). They generally opposed the British colonial administration and its perceived "kowtowing" to the Beijing government over the issues such as constitutional reform, direct elections, civic rights andDaya Bay Nuclear Plant.[7]

The pro-democrats maintained a relatively warm relationship with the Beijing government during the 1980s, as many of the pro-democrats supported the Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong and the "high degree of autonomy" as ensured in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. They also saw the ideal of Hong Kong helping in China'sFour Modernisations.[7] The Beijing authorities also viewed the pro-democrats as the targets of theunited front. BarristerMartin Lee and educatorSzeto Wah, president of theHong Kong Professional Teachers' Union, who were also the two most visible pro-democracy leaders, were appointed members of the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee in 1985 by Beijing.[8]

The pro-democrats also participated in electoral politics as direct elections were introduced in local levels in the 1980s, namely theDistrict Boards,Urban Council andRegional Council. Among them, the Meeting Point formed in 1983, theHong Kong Affairs Society in 1985 andAssociation for Democracy and People's Livelihood in 1986 became the three major pro-democratic groups and formed a strategic alliance in the1988 District Board elections, which laid the foundation of the pro-democracy grassroots supports.[9]

Tiananmen protests and last colonial years

[edit]

The consolidation of its public support has its roots in opposition to the1989 Tiananmen crackdown which aroused widespread horror, sympathy and support of the protesters by Hong Kong citizens.[10] The pro-democrats, who were heavily involved in the protests and formed theHong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (ADSPDMC or Alliance), were seen as "treason" and threat to the Beijing government. The two pro-democracy Basic Law Drafting Committee members, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, were stripped from the office after they resigned in protest of the bloody crackdown, many of other pro-democrats were denied entry to the mainland China since. Since 1989, the Alliance organiseannual candlelight vigil for the June 4 crackdown at theVictoria Park, Hong Kong, which draw thousands of people every year. Ahead of thefirst direct election to the Legislative Council in 1991, around 600 democracy activists co-founded the first major pro-democracy party, theUnited Democrats of Hong Kong.[11][12]

The electoral alliance of United Democrats of Hong Kong and Meeting Point, together with other smaller political parties, groups and independents, won a historical landslide victory in the 1991 election, took 17 out of the 18 geographical constituency seats.[13] The pro-democrats were often considered strategic allies ofChris Patten, the lastcolonial governor who proposed amuch progressive democratic reform in the last years before thehandover of Hong Kong, despite Beijing's strong opposition. The Democrats supported Patten's proposal for the1995 Legislative Council election. However,Emily Lau's full-scale direct election amendment was not passed as a result of Meeting Point's abstaining from voting for Emily Lau, which caused harsh criticism from the radical democrats and theUnited Ants.[12][14] In 1994, the United Democrats and the Meeting Point merged into theDemocratic Party, which won another landslide victory in the 1995 election, taking 19 seats in total, far ahead of other parties. Together with other democratic parties and individuals including Emily Lau,Lee Cheuk-yan andLeung Yiu-chung who later formedThe Frontier in 1996 andChristine Loh who formed theCitizens Party in 1997, the pro-democrats gained a thin majority in the legislature for the last two years before 1997.[15][16]

The Beijing government argued that the electoral reform introduced by Patten had violated the Joint Declaration and thus they no longer felt obliged to honour the promise of a "through train", a plan to keep the 1995 elected legislature into post-handover SAR era. A parallel Legislative Council, theProvisional Legislative Council, was formed in 1996 under the control of the Pro-Beijing camp, this became the Legislative Council upon the founding of the new SAR government in 1997, in which the pro-democrats except for the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood boycotted it, deeming it as unconstitutional.[17]

Handover to China and 1 July 2003 protest

[edit]

All of its members, except theAssociation for Democracy and People's Livelihood, declined to join the extralegal Provisional Legislative Council installed by the government of thePeople's Republic of China, and were ousted from the territory's legislature for a year until the 1998 election.[18] Starting from the 1998 election, since theplurality electoral system was changed toproportional representation, compounded with the restoration of corporate votes in the functional constituencies, and replacement of broad-based functional constituencies with traditional ones, the number of seats of the camp dipped, albeit having similar share of vote.[19] Within the camp, share of smaller parties and independents increased relatively, with the share of the Democratic Party falling from around two-thirds in 1995 to less than a half by 2004.

The pro-democracy camp was the strong opposition to thenational security and anti-subversion legislation of theBasic Law Article 23 and they successfully called forover 500,000 people to protest on 1 July 2003 against the legislation, the largest demonstration since the handover.[20] The pro-democrats received victories in the subsequent2003 District Councils and2004 Legislative Council elections. The barrister-formed Article 23 Concern Group formed by the pro-democracy lawyers, which transformed intoArticle 45 Concern Group, saw its memberAudrey Eu,Alan Leong andRonny Tong were elected in the 2004 election. In 2006, the group formed the middle class and professional orientedCivic Party.[citation needed] On the other hand, the left-wing radical groupLeague of Social Democrats was formed in the same year byTrotskyist legislatorLeung Kwok-hung and radical radio hostWong Yuk-man.[21] As a result of the diversification of the pro-democracy elements, the use of "pan-democrats" gained in popularity, as it is typically meant to be non-denominational and all-inclusive.

In the2007 Chief Executive election, Civic Party'sAlan Leong successfully gained enough nominations to challenge the incumbent Chief ExecutiveDonald Tsang, but he was not elected as expected due to the control of theElection Committee by the pro-Beijing camp. After the2008 Legislative Council election, The Frontier merged into the Democratic Party and the convenorEmily Lau was elected vice chair of the party.[22]

2012 reform package and the Split

[edit]

Donald Tsang, the Chief Executive, promised to resolve the question of universal suffrage in his office during the election. He carried out the2012 constitutional package in 2009 which was criticised by the pro-democracy as lack of genuine progress. The League of Social Democrats called for ade factoreferendum, by way of the2010 by-elections in five geographical constituencies.[23]Civic Party, the second largest pro-democratic party joined, however the Democratic Party, the largest party, was reluctant to participate. The Democratic Party and other moderate democrats and pro-democracy scholars launched theAlliance for Universal Suffrage and started to engage with the mainland officials. The Democratic Party brought out a revised proposal of the package to Beijing and the revised proposal was passed in the Legislative Council in the support of the government and Pro-Beijing camp.[24]

However, it triggered a major split within the camp and also in the Democratic Party. The Young Turks including the LegCo memberAndrew Cheng quit the party and formed theNeo Democrats. The Democratic Party was accused by the LSD and the radicals of betraying democracy and its supporters. On the matter of whether to coordinate with the moderate democrats in the2011 District Council elections, the League of Social Democrats was suffered in the factional fighting and two of the three LSD legislators left the party in disarray and formed thePeople Power.[25] The People Power's campaign targeted pan-democracy parties in the 2011 District Council elections that had supported the reform package filled candidates to run against them but only won one seat of 62 contested.

Nevertheless, the People Power managed to win three seats in the2012 Legislative Council election and the radical democrats of the (People Power and the League of Social Democrats) topped 264,000 votes, compared to the Civic Party's 255,000 and Democratic Party's 247,000 respectively.[26] Despite the pan-democrats securing three of the five newly created,District Council (second) constituency seats the ratio of the vote share between the pan-democrats and thepro-Beijing camp narrowed significantly from the traditional 60% to 40%, to 55% to 45%.

The chairman of the Democratic PartyAlbert Ho represented the pan-democracy camp to run in the2012 Chief Executive election. On election day the pan-democrats declined to vote for neitherHenry Tang norLeung Chun-ying and called for ablank vote from the electors.[27]

2014 Umbrella Revolution

[edit]
This article is part ofa series on
Localism in Hong Kong
See also:Localism in Hong Kong

In March 2013, all 27 democratic legislators formed theAlliance for True Democracy (ATD), replacing the Alliance for Universal Suffrage, to show solidarity of the camp to fight for genuine democracy. The ATD put forward a three-channel proposal for the2017 Chief Executive election during theconstitutional reform consultation in 2014. However, the decision of theNational People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) on 31 August ruled out the possibility for any candidate not endorsed by Beijing to be nominated for the election, which the pan-democrats accused as a betrayal of the principle of "one person, one vote," The pan-democrats had supported legal scholarBenny Tai'sOccupy Central plan of civil disobedience against Beijing's decision, which later turned into a79-day occupy protest which often dubbed as "Umbrella Revolution".[3] On 18 June 2015, all 27 pan-democrat legislators andMedical legislatorLeung Ka-lau voted against the government's constitutional reform bill while the pro-Beijing legislators launched a failed walk-out. The bill was defeated by 28 against 8 for, barely meeting the quorum of 35.[28]

Many new political groups emerged from the Umbrella Revolution often distanced themselves from the pan-democrats. Many of whom, being labelled as "localists", criticised pan-democrats' failing in achieving democracy in the last 30 years. Many of them called for more "militant" tactics over pan-democrats' "non-violent" principles and "China–Hong Kong separation" over the some mainstream pan-democrats' mild "Chinese nationalist sentiment".[29] Some of them also criticised pan-democrats' demand of the vindication of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, as pursued by theHong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDMC). There was also growing voice forHong Kong independence from the Chinese rule, as many of whom deemed the "One Country, Two Systems" had failed.[30]

Continued division and anti-extradition protests

[edit]

In the2016 Legislative Council election,localist camp with different banners together took away 19 per cent of the vote share from the pan-democrats, in which the traditional pan-democrats secured only 36 per cent, 21 less than the previous election. The non-establishment forces secured 30 out of the 70 seats, in which pan-democrats took 23 seats. After the election, the 27-member pro-democrats' caucus rebranded themselves into "pro-democracy camp" or "G27", as three backers of the "self-determination" of Hong Kong, namelyNathan Law,Lau Siu-lai andEddie Chu joined the caucus.[31] The "G27" soon became "G26" after Chu left the caucus shortly afterwards.

In the2016 Election Committee subsector election, the pro-democrat coalition "Democrats 300+" scored a record victory in theElection Committee which was responsible for electing the2017 Chief Executive. The democrats decided not to field their candidate in order to boost the chance of an alternative establishment candidate against incumbentLeung Chun-ying. After Leung announced he would not seek for re-election, the pro-democrats turned againstChief Secretary for AdministrationCarrie Lam who was seen as "C.Y. 2.0". The pro-democrats nominated formerFinancial SecretaryJohn Tsang and retired judgeWoo Kwok-hing amid theLiaison Office actively lobbied for Lam. Ahead of the election, some 98 per cent of the "Democrats 300+" coalition decided on voting for Tsang as he was the most popular candidate in the polls.[32]

On 14 July 2017,Leung Kwok-hung of theLeague of Social Democrats, Nathan Law of theDemosisto,Yiu Chung-yim and Lau Siu-lai were unseated from the Legislative Council overtheir manners at the oath-taking ceremony at the inaugural meeting as a result of the legal action from the Leung Chun-ying government and the interpretation of theHong Kong Basic Law by theNational People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), following the disqualification of two pro-independence legislators,Youngspiration'sBaggio Leung andYau Wai-ching.[33]

The pro-democrats suffered a defeat in theby-election for four of the six vacancies on 11 March 2018, losing theKowloon West geographical constituency andArchitectural, Surveying, Planning and Landscape functional constituency to the pro-Beijing candidates. Yiu Ching-yim who contested in Kowloon West was defeated byVincent Cheng of the DAB with a thin margin, making it the first time a pro-democrat lost in asingle-member district election since the handover. The vote share of the pro-democrats also dropped from the traditional 55 per cent to only 47 per cent.[34]

The pro-democrats fiercely opposed theamendment to the extradition law in 2019 which they feared the erosion of Hong Kong's legal system and its built-in safeguards.[35][36] The opposition led to thehistoric massive protests throughout the latter half of the year. Riding on the anti-government sentiments, the pro-democracy camp achieved its biggest landslide victory in the history of Hong Kong in the2019 District Council election, gaining control of 17 of the 18 District Councils and tripling their seats from around 124 to about 388. The pro-democrats were also able to capture 117 District Council subsector seats in the 1,200-member Election Committee, which is responsible for electing the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. Pro-Beijing parties and independents won from around 300 to only 62 seats, losing nearly 80 per cent of the seats.[37][38]

2020 mass resignations from legislature

[edit]
Main article:2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council mass resignations

TheHong Kong national security law promulgated by the NPCSC in June 2020 gave sweeping power to the Hong Kong government to suppress the opposition. In thesubsequently-postponed Legislative Council election of September 2020, 12 pro-democracy and localist candidates were disqualified by the returning officers for breaching the national security law, including three Civic Party incumbent legislatorsAlvin Yeung,Kwok Ka-ki andDennis Kwok, as well asKenneth Leung.[39] The pro-democracy camp was divided over whether to stay for the extended legislative term or to quit, as they deemed the disqualifications to be unlawful. In the end, 19 of the 22 pro-democrats remained in the Legislative Council.[40]

In November 2020, the NPCSC applied the national security law to disqualify the four sitting legislators whose candidacies were previously invalidated. In response, the pro-democrat convenor and Democratic Party chairmanWu Chi-wai announced the remaining 15 pro-democracy legislators were toresign en masse in protest to the decision, declaring the death of the "One Country, Two Systems" and separation of power in Hong Kong. The mass resignations left virtually no opposition in the Legislative Council.[41][42][43]Cheng Chung-tai, the legislator from localistCivic Passion, and nonpartisanPierre Chan remained as the only members that were not aligned with the pro-Beijing camp.[44] They both voted against theelectoral revamp that was widely criticised asdemocratic backsliding. Cheng was disqualified in 2021 and Chan stood down at the legislature's dissolution later that year.[44][45]

End of political participation

[edit]

In January 2021, 55 pro-democracy activists or allies were arrested, including grandees of several pro-democracy parties, and subsequently charged for subversion over the pro-democracy primaries a year earlier. The case became known as that of theHong Kong 47 and was considered to be a major blow against the camp. Several parties dissolved later, includingNeo Democrats,Civic Party, and, amongst them the largest, theDemocratic Party. On 29 June 2025, theLeague of Social Democrats, the last active party of the pro-democracy camp, also ended their operations amidst pressure.[46] Since then, the pro-democracy camp has been considered to have come to an end.[47][48]Ronny Tong, a member of the Executive Council and a former democrat, said a "new pro-democracy camp" could start from scratch.[49]

TheNeighbourhood and Worker's Service Centre no longer continues their work as a political advocacy group or as a political party, though remains active.[50] TheHong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, which tried to join the2023 Hong Kong local elections but failed, is also active.[51]

Convenor

[edit]

A caucus-like mechanism, without whips, was established on 8 October 2004 and was then known as "Lunchbox Conference", as legislators discussed local and political issues during luncheon on every Fridays. The convenor was the nominal leader of the camp but did not contain any real powers.[36] It was renamed as "Pro-Democracy Camp Meetings" after2016 election.[52] The conference ceased to function afteren masse resignations in 2020.

Convenor of Pro-Democracy Camp Meetings
PortraitConvenorConstituencyTook officeLeft officePartyLegCoRef
Cyd HoHong Kong Island8 October 20045 October 2012Civic Act-up3rd
4th
Labour[53]
Emily LauNew Territories East5 October 2012September 2013Democratic5th[54]
Frederick FungDistrict Council (Second)September 201315 September 2014ADPL[55]
Alan LeongKowloon East16 September 20149 September 2015Civic[56]
Cyd HoHong Kong Island10 September 201528 September 2016Labour[57]
James ToDistrict Council (Second)28 September 201625 August 2017Democratic6th[58]
Charles MokInformation Technology25 August 20179 July 2018Prof Commons[59]
Claudia MoKowloon West9 July 201828 September 2019HK First[60]
Tanya ChanHong Kong Island28 September 201929 September 2020Civic[61]
Wu Chi-waiKowloon East29 September 202030 November 2020Democratic[62]

Members

[edit]

This list includes the major political parties and groups in Hong Kong:

Current

[edit]

Political parties and groups with limited activities:

No longer active

[edit]

The following parties are no longer active:

The following protest or civic groups are no longer active:

Dissolved

[edit]

Dissolved political parties:

Dissolved major unions:

Dissolved alliances:

Electoral performance

[edit]

Chief Executive elections

[edit]
ElectionCandidatePartyVotes%
1996Did not contest
2002Did not contest
2005Lee Wing-tatDemocraticNot nominated
2007Alan LeongCivic12315.93
2012Albert HoDemocratic767.24
2017Leung Kwok-hung[a]LSDNot nominated
2022Did not contest

Legislative Council elections

[edit]
ElectionNumber of
popular votes
% of
popular votes
GC
seats
FC
seats
EC
seats
Total seats+/−Status
1991843,888[b]Steady61.63Steady167
20 / 60
13IncreaseN/a
1995557,515Steady61.13Decrease16103
29 / 60
11IncreaseN/a
1998982,249Increase66.36Increase1550
20 / 60
N/aMinority
2000799,249Decrease60.56Decrease1650
21 / 60
1IncreaseMinority
20041,105,388Increase62.44Increase187
25 / 60
3IncreaseMinority
2008901,707Decrease59.50Decrease194
23 / 60
3DecreaseMinority
20121,036,998Increase57.26Decrease189
27 / 70
4IncreaseMinority
2016781,168Decrease36.02Decrease1310
23 / 70
3DecreaseMinority
2021Did not contest000
0 / 90
0SteadyExtra-parliamentary
2025Did not contest000
0 / 90
0SteadyExtra-parliamentary

Municipal elections

[edit]
ElectionNumber of
popular votes
% of
popular votes
UrbCo
seats
RegCo
seats
Total
elected seats
198968,831Steady32.38Steady
5 / 15
5 / 12
10 / 27
1991200,877Increase51.28Increase
6 / 15
7 / 12
14 / 27
1995287,226Increase51.51Increase
18 / 32
16 / 27
34 / 59

District Council elections

[edit]
ElectionNumber of
popular votes
% of
popular votes
Total
elected seats
+/−
1988139,982Steady22.16Steady
61 / 264
24Increase
1991170,757Increase32.11Increase
83 / 272
22Increase
1994280,707Increase40.89Increase
146 / 346
48Increase
1999325,829Increase40.18Decrease
157 / 390
22Increase
2003477,596Increase45.54Increase
198 / 400
38Increase
2007445,781Decrease39.15Decrease
127 / 405
56Decrease
2011464,512Increase39.34Increase
103 / 412
16Decrease
2015581,058Increase40.20Increase
126 / 431
25Increase
20191,674,083Increase57.10Increase
388 / 452
265Increase
2023N/AN/A
0 / 470
388Decrease

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^Not endorsed by mainstream pro-democrats.
  2. ^Each voter was given two votes in the 1991 election.

References

[edit]
  1. ^Rishab Rathi (2 July 2025)."End of the Line: Hong Kong's Last Opposition Voice Falls Silent".The Diplomat. Retrieved15 August 2025.
  2. ^"Hong Kong's last functioning pro-democracy party disbands".The Economist. 3 July 2025. Retrieved15 August 2025.
  3. ^abBuckley, Chris; Forsythe, Michael (31 August 2014)."China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong".The New York Times.Archived from the original on 27 February 2015. Retrieved31 August 2014.
  4. ^Jensen, Lionel M. Weston, Timothy B. [2006] (2006). China's Transformations: The Stories Beyond the Headlines. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 22.ISBN 0-7425-3863-X.
  5. ^"A more united Democratic Party predicted as Young Turks leave".South China Morning Post. Hong Kong. 20 December 2010.
  6. ^Scott, Ian.Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong. University of Hawaii Press. p. 210.
  7. ^abcDavies, Stephen; Roberts, Elfed (1990).Political Dictionary for Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Macmillan Publishers (HK) Ltd.
  8. ^Loh, Christine (2010).Underground front. Hong Kong University Press. p. 158.
  9. ^Lo, Shiu-hing (2016).The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong. Springer. pp. 143–145.
  10. ^Wing-kai Chiu, Stephen. Lui, Tai-Lok. The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong. [2000] (2000). Hong Kong University Press.ISBN 962-209-497-X.
  11. ^Chan, Ming K. (1997).The Challenge of Hong Kong's Reintegration with China: Modern Diasporic Femininity. Hong Kong University Press.
  12. ^abSing, Ming (2004).Hong Kong's Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis. Psychology Press.
  13. ^Scott, Ian (1991)."An Overview of the Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections of 1991"(PDF).Asian Journal of Public Administration.13 (2):11–37.doi:10.1080/02598272.1991.10800247.Archived(PDF) from the original on 8 June 2020. Retrieved9 July 2017.
  14. ^Chiu, Stephen Wing-Kai; Lü, Dale; Lui, Tai-Lok (2000).The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press. p. 43.
  15. ^"Save Our Harbour".The Citizens Party. Archived fromthe original on 9 November 1999.
  16. ^"Past Political Record – Christine Kung-Wai Loh".The Citizens Party. Archived fromthe original on 3 October 1999.
  17. ^Loh, Christine (2010).Underground front. Hong Kong University Press. p. 187.
  18. ^Carroll, John Mark (2007).A Concise History of Hong Kong. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 202.
  19. ^Sing, Ming (2004).Hong Kong's Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis. Psychology Press. p. 158.
  20. ^Wong, Yiu-Chung. One Country, Two Systems in Crisis: Hong Kong's Transformation Since the Handover. Lexington books.
  21. ^Wong, Stan Hok-Wui (2015).Electoral Politics in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Protest, Patronage, and the Media. Springer. p. 76.
  22. ^"Frontier members vote for Democrats merger".South China Morning Post.Archived from the original on 13 February 2012. Retrieved9 July 2017.
  23. ^Associated Press (11 March 2010),"Hong Kong, China debate legality of referendum"Archived 11 April 2010 at theWayback Machine, Asian Correspondent. Retrieved on 5 April 2010.
  24. ^Cheung, Gary; Wong, Albert & Fung, Fanny (25 June 2010) "Cheers and jeers for political reform vote",South China Morning Post
  25. ^Pepper, Suzanne (15 November 2010)."Politicking Hong Kong Style".Archived from the original on 6 January 2011. Retrieved3 April 2013.
  26. ^Luk, Eddie (17 September 2012)."Change on way for Democrats, says Sin".The Standard. Archived fromthe original on 12 April 2013. Retrieved3 April 2013.
  27. ^Siu, Phila (22 March 2012)."Tang or Blank".The Standard
  28. ^Lam, Hang-chi (18 June 2015)."And so, we stagger into an even more uncertain future".ejinsight.Archived from the original on 29 September 2016. Retrieved17 September 2016.
  29. ^Lau, Stuart (10 June 2013)."Independent thinker Horace Chin treads bold path".South China Morning Post.Archived from the original on 15 September 2017. Retrieved9 July 2017.
  30. ^Fitzpatrick, Liam."Hong Kong Makes History with First Pro-Independence Rally".TIME.Archived from the original on 6 July 2017. Retrieved9 July 2017.
  31. ^"非建制「G27」共商大計 溝通平台擬正名「民主派會議」".Ming Pao. 7 October 2016.Archived from the original on 8 October 2016. Retrieved10 November 2016.
  32. ^"Pan-democrats pledge more than 290 votes for John Tsang in Hong Kong leadership race".South China Morning Post. 20 March 2017.Archived from the original on 24 March 2017. Retrieved26 March 2017.
  33. ^"Four More Hong Kong Lawmakers Ousted In a Blow to Democratic Hopes".TIME. 17 July 2017.Archived from the original on 28 September 2018. Retrieved18 July 2017.
  34. ^"Hong Kong democrats to rely on legal appeals after failing to win back Legco veto foothold".South China Morning Post. 12 March 2018.Archived from the original on 16 March 2018. Retrieved17 March 2018.
  35. ^"Hong Kong pushes bill allowing extraditions to China despite..."Reuters. 10 June 2019.Archived from the original on 10 June 2019. Retrieved10 June 2019.
  36. ^abChan, F. (2021)."Fragmented Politics in Hong Kong—Analyzing the Pro-democracy Cohesion in the Legislative Council Before 2019".East Asia.38 (3):249–269.doi:10.1007/s12140-021-09362-1.PMC 8031336.PMID 33850414.
  37. ^"Hong Kong voters deliver landslide victory for pro-democracy campaigners".The Guardian. 24 November 2019.Archived from the original on 25 November 2019. Retrieved29 November 2019.
  38. ^Bradsher, Keith; Ramzy, Austin; May, Tiffany (24 November 2019)."Hong Kong Election Results Give Democracy Backers Big Win".The New York Times.Archived from the original on 25 November 2019. Retrieved25 November 2019.
  39. ^"Hong Kong bars 12 opposition candidates from election". BBC. 30 July 2020.Archived from the original on 1 September 2020. Retrieved14 November 2020.
  40. ^Wong, Natalie (29 September 2020)."Most of Hong Kong's opposition lawmakers to serve out extended term in Legislative Council, after supporters narrowly back move in poll".South China Morning Post.Archived from the original on 31 October 2020. Retrieved25 December 2020 – viaYahoo! News.
  41. ^"Hong Kong pro-democracy lawmakers resign after China ruling".BBC. 11 November 2020.Archived from the original on 23 June 2021. Retrieved11 November 2020.
  42. ^"Hong Kong opposition lawmakers quit over Beijing resolution".SCMP Young Post. 11 November 2020.Archived from the original on 22 January 2021. Retrieved11 November 2020.
  43. ^"Four Hong Kong opposition lawmakers disqualified after ruling from Beijing".SCMP Young Post. 11 November 2020.Archived from the original on 11 November 2020. Retrieved11 November 2020.
  44. ^abHo, Kelly (26 August 2021)."Hong Kong lawmaker Cheng Chung-tai unseated after failing patriotism test".Hong Kong Free Press HKFP. Retrieved13 August 2025.
  45. ^"Pierre Chan decides against seeking another term as Hong Kong lawmaker".South China Morning Post. 19 September 2021. Retrieved13 August 2025.
  46. ^Pomfret, James; Pang, Jessie (29 June 2025)."Hong Kong's last active pro-democracy group says it will disband amid security crackdown".Reuters. Retrieved13 August 2025.
  47. ^"香港民主派走進歷史 社民連主席陳寶瑩宣布解散" [Hong Kong pro-democracy camp becomes history as LSD chair announces dissolution].Yahoo News (in Chinese (Taiwan)). 30 June 2025. Retrieved13 August 2025.
  48. ^"香港主權移交中國28週年 資深黨員稱民主派將成歷史" [Grandee says pro-democracy camp to become history amidst Hong Kong handover anniversary].Central News Agency (in Chinese (Taiwan)). 1 July 2025. Retrieved13 August 2025.
  49. ^潘耀昇 (29 June 2025)."社民連解散|湯家驊談民主派前景:民協有發展空間 不能局限選舉".香港01 (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved13 August 2025.
  50. ^ab"回歸 28 年|由盛放到覆滅 回顧民主派政治團體土崩瓦解 - 集誌社".The Collective (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). 2 July 2025. Retrieved2 July 2025.
  51. ^"香港區議會選舉2023:「整頓」後的候選人名單告訴了我們什麼?".BBC (in Chinese). 21 November 2023.
  52. ^"非建制「G27」共商大計 溝通平台擬正名「民主派會議」".Ming Pao (in Traditional Chinese). 8 October 2016. Retrieved10 February 2022.
  53. ^"政情:泛民爭做「飯盒會」召集人".Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved16 September 2014.
  54. ^"劉慧卿任泛民飯盒會召集人".Yahoo 新聞. 星島日報. 5 October 2012. Retrieved29 September 2020.
  55. ^"隔牆有耳: 馮檢基接掌泛民飯盒會".Archived from the original on 16 September 2014. Retrieved16 September 2014.
  56. ^"隔牆有耳:阿基做召集人 少做Gym".Archived from the original on 16 September 2014. Retrieved16 September 2014.
  57. ^"何秀蘭接捧做泛民會議召集人" (in Chinese). 星島日報. 9 September 2015. Archived fromthe original on 30 March 2016. Retrieved10 September 2015.
  58. ^"非建制派議員會面商合作平台 涂謹申暫任召集人".Archived from the original on 14 January 2017. Retrieved1 October 2016.
  59. ^李大煒 (25 August 2017)."民主派會議換馬 莫乃光成新召集人 冀民主派保持團結".香港01 (in Chinese (Hong Kong)).Archived from the original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved29 September 2020.
  60. ^"【政情】毛孟靜任民主派班長 建制泛民同感嘆".Now 新聞 (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). 9 July 2018. Retrieved29 September 2020.
  61. ^"【傘運5周年】告別議會前接任民主派召集人 陳淑莊:議會內外積極跟進警暴".Apple Daily 蘋果日報 (in Chinese (Hong Kong)).Archived from the original on 21 June 2021. Retrieved29 September 2020.
  62. ^"去留議會︱民調出爐 47.1%受訪者撐留任未達門檻 暫19民主派議員表態延任一年".Apple Daily 蘋果日報 (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Archived fromthe original on 5 November 2020. Retrieved29 September 2020.
  63. ^"Hong Kong's Civic Party folds after 17 years of championing opposition causes".South China Morning Post. 27 May 2023. Retrieved13 August 2025.
Legislative Council (90)
Pro-Beijing (90)
District councils
Pro-Beijing
Centrist
Portals:
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pro-democracy_camp_(Hong_Kong)&oldid=1333750201"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2026 Movatter.jp