"Congressional system" redirects here. For the 19th century European power arrangements, seecongress system.
World's states colored by systems ofgovernment:Parliamentary systems: Head of government is elected or nominated by and accountable to the legislature.
Presidential system: Head of government (president) is popularly elected and independent of the legislature.
Presidential republic
Hybrid systems:
Semi-presidential republic: Executive president is independent of the legislature; head of government is appointed by the president and is accountable to the legislature.
Assembly-independent republic: Head of government (president or directory) is elected by the legislature, but is not accountable to it.
Other systems:
Theocratic republic: Supreme Leader is both head of state and faith and holds significant executive and legislative power
This head of government is often also thehead of state. In a presidential system, the head of government is directly or indirectlyelected by a group ofcitizens and is notresponsible to the legislature, and the legislature cannotdismiss the president except in extraordinary cases. A presidential system contrasts with aparliamentary system, where the head of government (usually called a prime minister) derives their power from theconfidence of an electedlegislature, which can dismiss the prime minister with a simple majority.
Not all presidential systems use the title ofpresident. Likewise, the title is sometimes used by other systems. It originated from a time when such a person personally presided over the governing body, as with thepresident of the Continental Congress in theearly United States, before the executive function being split into a separate branch of government. Presidents may also use it insemi-presidential systems. Heads of state ofparliamentary republics, largely ceremonial in most cases, are called presidents.Dictators or leaders ofone-party states, whether popularly elected or not, are also often called presidents.
The presidential system is the most common form of government inthe Americas and is also frequently found inSub-Saharan Africa (along with semi-presidential hybrid systems). By contrast, there are very few presidential republics inEurope (withCyprus andTurkey being the only examples). InAsia, the system is used bySouth Korea,Syria, thePhilippines, andIndonesia.
The presidential system has its roots in the governance of theBritish colonies of the 17th century in what is now the United States. ThePilgrims, permitted to govern themselves inPlymouth Colony, established a system that utilized an independent executive branch. Each year, agovernor was chosen by thecolonial legislature, as well as several assistants, analogous to modern-daycabinets. Additional executive officials such as constables and messengers were then appointed.[4] At the same time, theBritish Isles underwent a brief period of republicanism asthe Protectorate, during which theLord Protector served as an executive leader similar to a president.[5]
The first true presidential system was developed during the United StatesConstitutional Convention in 1787.[6] Drawing inspiration from the previous colonial governments, fromEnglish Common Law, and from philosophers such asJohn Locke andMontesquieu, thedelegates developed what is now known as the presidential system. Most notably,James Wilson advocated for a unitary executive figure that would become the role of the president.[7] The United States became the first presidential republic when theConstitution of the United States came into force in 1789, andGeorge Washington became the first president under a presidential system.
During the 1810s and 1820s, Spanish colonies in the Americassought independence, and several new Spanish-speaking governments emerged inLatin America. These countries modeled theirconstitutions after that of the United States, and the presidential system became the dominant political system in the Americas.[6] Following several decades ofmonarchy, Brazil alsoadopted the presidential system in 1889 withDeodoro da Fonseca as its first president. Latin American presidential systems have experienced varying levels of stability, with many experiencing periods of dictatorial rule.[8][9][10]
Following the pattern of other Spanish colonies, the Philippines established the first presidential system in Asia in 1898, but it fell underAmerican control due to theSpanish–American War. The presidential system was restored after the United States granted the Philippines independence in 1946.
The end ofWorld War II established presidential systems in two countries. After the United States ended theJapanese occupation of Korea, it assistedSouth Korea in the formation of a presidential government. However, the early years of the South Korean presidency were marked by dictatorial control.[11][12] At the same time, Indonesia declaredindependence from the Netherlands in 1945. While it nominally used a presidential system, it was in effect a dictatorship where the president controlled all branches of government. A true presidential system wasestablished in 1998.[13][14]
Decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s brought with it a significant expansion of the presidential system. During this time, several new presidential republics were formed in Africa.[citation needed] Cyprus,[15] the Maldives,[16] andSouth Vietnam[17] also adopted the presidential system following decolonization. Pakistan[18] and Bangladesh[19][20] did so as well, but they changed their governmental systems shortly afterwards.
Several more countries adopted the presidential system in the final decades of the 20th century. A modified version of the presidential system was implemented inIran following constitutional reform in 1989, in which theSupreme Leader serves as the head of state and is the absolute power in this country.[21] In 1981, Palau achieved independence and adopted a presidential system.[22] When theSoviet Union wasdissolved in 1991, the presidential system was adopted by the new states that were created, though most of them adopted other governmental systems over the following decades.[23]
Several characteristics are unique to presidential systems or prominent in countries that use presidential systems. The defining aspect of presidential systems is the separation of powers that divides the executive and the legislature. Advocates of presidential systems cite the democratic nature of presidential elections, the advantages of the separation of powers, the efficiency of a unitary executive, and the stability provided by fixed terms. Opponents of presidential systems cite the potential for gridlock, the difficulty of changing leadership, and concerns that a unitary executive can give way to a dictatorship.
The presidential system is defined by the separation of the executive branch from other aspects of government. Thehead of government is elected to work alongside, but not as a part of, the legislature.[29] There are several types of powers that are traditionally delegated to the president. Under a presidential system, the president may have the power to challenge legislation through aveto,[30] the power topardon crimes, authority over foreign policy, authority to command the military as theCommander-in-chief, and authority over advisors and employees of the executive branch.[citation needed]
Separation of powers is sometimes held up as an advantage, in that each branch may scrutinize the actions of the other. This is in contrast with a parliamentary system, where the majority party in the legislature that also serves as the executive is unlikely to scrutinize its actions. Writing about theWatergate scandal, former British MPWoodrow Wyatt said, "Don't think a Watergate couldn't happen here, you just wouldn't hear about it."[31] The extent of this effect is debated. Some commentators argue that the effect is mitigated when the president's party is in power, while others note thatparty discipline is not as strictly enforced in presidential systems.[32]
James Wilson, who advocated for a presidential system at theconstitutional convention, maintained that a single chief executive would provide for greater public accountability than a group and thereby protect against tyranny by making it plain who was responsible for executive actions. He also submitted that a singular chief executive was necessary to ensure promptness and consistency and guard against deadlock, which could be essential in times of national emergency.[33]
Presidential systems are largely able to avoidcabinet crises, due to aunitary executive being solely responsible for running the government. This was highlighted by James Wilson, who is quoted below.
The executive as well as the legislative power ought to be restrained. ... The restraints on the legislative authority, must from its nature, be chiefly internal; that is, they must proceed from some part or division of itself. But the restraints on the executive power are external. These restraints are applied with the greatest certainty, and with greatest efficacy, when the object of restraint is clearly ascertained. This is best done, when one object only, distinguished and responsible, is conspicuously held up to the view and examination of the publick [sic]. . . . In planning, forming and arranging laws, deliberation is always becoming, and always useful. But in the active scenes of government, there are emergencies, in which the man, as, in other cases, the women[sic], who deliberates is lost. Secrecy may be equally necessary as dispatch. But, can either secrecy or dispatch be expected, when, to every enterprise, mutual communication, mutual consultation, and mutual agreement among men, perhaps of discordant views, of discordant tempers, and of discordant interests, are indispensably necessary? How much time will be consumed! and when it is consumed, how little business will be done! When the time is elapsed; when the business is finished; when the state is in distress, perhaps on the verge of destruction; on whom shall we fix the blame? Whom shall we select as the object of punishment?
When an action is within the scope of a president's power, a presidential system can respond more rapidly to emerging situations than a parliamentary system. A prime minister, when taking action, needs to retain the support of the legislature, but a president is often less constrained. InWhy England Slept, future U.S. presidentJohn F. Kennedy argued that British prime ministersStanley Baldwin andNeville Chamberlain were constrained by the need to maintain the confidence of theCommons.[35]It is easy for either the president or the legislature to escape blame by shifting it to the other. Describing the United States, former treasury secretaryC. Douglas Dillon said, "The president blames Congress, the Congress blames the president, and the public remains confused and disgusted with the government in Washington".[36] Years before becoming president,Woodrow Wilson famously wrote "how is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy needs the whipping?"[37]Walter Bagehot said of the American system, "The executive is crippled by not getting the law it needs, and the legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsibility: the executive becomes unfit for its name since it cannot execute what it decides on; the legislature is demoralized by liberty, by taking decisions of which others [and not itself] will suffer the effects".[38]
Conversely, a presidential system can producegridlock when the president and the legislature are in opposition. This rarely happens in a parliamentary system, as the prime minister is always a member of the party in power. This gridlock is a common occurrence, as the electorate often expects more rapid results than are possible from new policies and switches to a different party at the next election.[39] Critics such asJuan Linz, argue that in such cases of gridlock, presidential systems do not offer voters the kind of accountability seen in parliamentary systems and that this inherent political instability can cause democracies to fail, as seen in such cases as Brazil andAllende's Chile.[40]
A 2024 meta-analytical review found that presidential systems were associated with more corruption than parliamentary systems.[41]
The structure of the political system can affect how quickly the government responds to national emergencies like economic collapse, terrorism, natural disasters, and so forth. The presidential system's structure enables it to respond more quickly and steadily than the parliamentary system, particularly in emergency situations, according to proponents of presidentialism.[42] A fixed executive term, the division of powers among the departments, the concentration of decision-making authority, and ongoing leadership are all characteristics of the presidential system.[43]
In numerous historical instances, these structural characteristics have been evident. For instance, in 1933, during the Great Depression, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed office, there was a general fear of the recession and banking. He declared a national bank holiday immediately following his inauguration. In an effort to stabilize the financial system and rebuild public trust, he signed the Emergency Banking Relief Act a few days later. This swift sequence of executive actions and legislative approval demonstrates how a fixed-term presidency, when paired with targeted authority, enables cogent and prompt actions under systemic risk. During the first 100 days of his administration, President Roosevelt was able to maintain public trust by successfully coordinating policy across several agencies. The benefits of a presidential system during a national crisis are especially evident in the capacity to enact policies without the uncertainty of coalition negotiations or cabinet dissolutions.[44]
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a similar pattern emerged. In order to handle the national security emergency, President George W. Bush and the executives promptly coordinated the military, Congress, and federal agencies. Soon after, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), giving the president the power to use any necessary and suitable tactics to combat terrorists. In an unprecedented national crisis, the government was able to maintain the administrative and national focus by quickly mobilizing federal agencies under a single executive direction. The presidency was characterized as the primary organizing center for crisis management in a disjointed federal system in later evaluations, such as the official 9/11 Commission Report.[45]
Chile's reaction to the powerful earthquake that struck the nation on February 27, 2010, is another illustration of presidential crisis leadership. The earthquake, which had a Richter magnitude of 8.8, and the ensuing tsunami severely damaged communications and infrastructure throughout central Chile. Within hours of the incident, then-President Michelle Bachelet, who was in office under Chile's presidential republic system, proclaimed a national state of catastrophe. She mobilized the armed forces to help with emergency logistics, restore order, and coordinate the distribution of relief by exercising constitutional powers granted under Article 41 of the Chilean Constitution. A unified command structure was made possible by the presidential system, which eliminated the need for parliamentary approval in order to reallocate emergency funds or activate the armed forces. In less than a day, the executive had set up a central coordination center in Santiago, using the National Emergency Office (ONEMI) and the Ministry of Interior to oversee civil defense, health services, and foreign aid operations. Chile's government "demonstrated rapid executive coordination and operational continuity under a presidential emergency framework," according to reports from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).[46] Concentrated executive authority in presidential systems can improve crisis-management efficiency and national coordination during large-scale natural disasters, as demonstrated by Chile's presidential institutions, which enabled a swift and coordinated response that restored basic infrastructure and security despite the disaster's significant loss of life and property.[47][48]
The early reactions to COVID-19 in different nations also demonstrate how the presidential system makes it possible to manage national emergencies more skillfully. For example, on March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump of the United States declared a national emergency, allowing the Federal Emergency Management Agency to mobilize resources in accordance with the Stafford Act.[49] The presidential system allowed for immediate national declaration and centralized emergency funding, despite certain difficulties between the federal and state governments.[50][51]
On the other hand, executive authority is closely linked to legislative deliberation in nations that have adopted parliamentary systems, like the United Kingdom. Therefore, it took a long time to declare national restrictions and financial relief packages during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the early stages of the pandemic, the central government of South Korea, which has a presidential system, made use of the president's powerful executive powers. They established nationwide testing, contact tracing, and resource distribution through the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency by using their presidential authority. The Presidential Office issued emergency orders and national alerts as early as January 2020, weeks before legislative discussions on pandemic response funding started, according to official records from the Ministry of Health.[52] The Korean example shows how a single presidential executive can combine administrative coordination, policy enforcement, and scientific expertise without the need for coalition negotiations or votes of confidence.
When considered collectively, these examples demonstrate how the presidential system offers an institutional framework that permits coordinated and uniform administrative responses in times of national emergency, including public health, security, and economic crises. Regardless of Parliament's confidence, leaders can continue to steer policy due to the president's fixed term. Additionally, quick mobilization of national resources is made possible by the broad constitutional authority. These benefits are contingent, though. If checks like judicial review and legislative monitoring are ineffective, the likelihood of democratic accountability being undermined rises with the concentration of power. As a result, academics note that the presidential system's capacity to handle crises depends not only on the president's official authority but also on the institutional environment in general, including party discipline, political norms, and administrative capacities.
After all, a number of nations with presidential systems have found that an institutional balance between stability and flexibility is necessary to enable prompt and reliable responses in emergency situations. The presidential system can both guarantee stability during times of national crisis and act as a command center for resolving the crisis when it is backed by an open oversight system, independent courts, and a strong political culture.
In a presidential system, the president is elected independently of the legislature. This may be done directly through a popular vote or indirectly, such as through theelectoral college used in the United States. This aspect of the presidential system is sometimes touted as more democratic, as it provides a broader mandate for the president. Once elected, a president typically remains in office until the conclusion of a term.[53]
Presidential systems are typically understood as having a head of government elected by citizens to serve one or more fixed terms. Fixed terms are praised for providing a level of stability that other systems lack.[citation needed]
Proponents[who?] of the presidential system also argue that stability extends to the cabinets chosen under the system. In most parliamentary systems, cabinets must be drawn from within the legislative branch. Under the presidential system, cabinet members can be selected from a much larger pool of potential candidates. This allows presidents the ability to select cabinet members based as much or more on their ability and competency to lead a particular department as on their loyalty to the president, as opposed to parliamentary cabinets, which might be filled by legislators chosen for no better reason than their perceived loyalty to the prime minister.[citation needed]
Some political scientists dispute this concept of stability, arguing that presidential systems have difficulty sustaining democratic practices and that they have slipped into authoritarianism in many of the countries in which they have been implemented. According to political scientistFred Riggs, presidential systems have fallen into authoritarianism in nearly every country where they've been attempted.[54][55] The list of the world's 22 older democracies includes only two countries (Costa Rica and the United States) with presidential systems.[56] Yale political scientist Juan Linz argues that:[40]
The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the president's fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate. Losers must wait four or five years without any access to executive power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization.
Fixed terms in a presidential system may also be considered a check on the powers of the executive, contrasting with parliamentary systems, which may allow the prime minister to call elections whenever they see fit or orchestrate their vote of no confidence to trigger an election when they cannot get a legislative item passed.
Unlike in parliamentary systems, the legislature does not have the power to recall a president under the presidential system.[53] However, presidential systems may have methods to remove presidents under extraordinary circumstances, such as a president committing a crime or becoming incapacitated. In some countries, presidents aresubject to term limits.
The inability to remove a president early is also the subject of criticism. Even if a president is "proved to be inefficient, even if he becomes unpopular, even if his policy is unacceptable to the majority of his countrymen, he and his methods must be endured until the moment comes for a new election".[57]
The consistency of a presidency may be seen as beneficial during times of crisis. When in a time of crisis, countries may be better off being led by a president with a fixed term than rotating premierships.[citation needed] Some critics, however, argue that the presidential system is weaker because it does not allow a transfer of power in the event of an emergency.Walter Bagehot argues that the ideal ruler in times of calm is different from the ideal ruler in times of crisis, criticizing the presidential system for having no mechanism to make such a change.[38]
The president's status as bothhead of government andhead of state is sometimes the subject of criticism.Dana D. Nelson criticizes the office of the President of the United States as essentially undemocratic and characterizes presidentialism as worship of the president by citizens, which she believes undermines civic participation.[58][59]
A 2019 peer-reviewedmeta-analysis based on 1,037 regressions in 46 studies finds that presidential systems generally seem to favor revenue cuts, while parliamentary systems would rely on fiscal expansion characterized by a higher level of spending before an election.[60]
Presidentialism is often criticized for its inherent contradictions and electoral dynamics. Scholars highlight the paradox of simultaneously empowering and constraining presidents, creating tension in governance. Additionally, the winner-take-all nature of presidential elections fosters zero-sum competition, intensifying polarization and conflict. Together, these features illustrate the structural challenges of presidential systems.
Scholars of comparative politics often note that presidential systems embody inherent contradictions. These constitutions are designed to produce a strong and stable executive, often legitimized through direct popular election. The president is expected to stand above the particular interests represented in legislatures and to articulate a unified “will of the people.” This Rousseauian notion contrasts with the Anglo-American tradition, which views democracy as the competition and negotiation of diverse interests. In practice, the effort to centralize representation in the office of the president may displace conflict into extra-political arenas rather than eliminating it.
At the same time, presidential constitutions also reflect deep suspicion toward the personalization of power. Memories of monarchs and authoritarian rulers influenced provisions that restrict executive authority. Common safeguards include bans on reelection, legislative advice-and-consent powers over appointments, impeachment procedures, guarantees of judicial independence, and oversight institutions such as Chile’s Contraloría. In some contexts, even the intervention of the armed forces has historically been regarded as a moderating influence against executive overreach.
This paradox—the simultaneous empowerment and constraint of the presidency—shapes decision-making, leadership style, and political rhetoric. It also introduces a dimension of tension not reducible to socioeconomic or ideological factors. In Latin America, for instance, constitutions intended to prevent personalist leadership sometimes reinforce personalismo by concentrating symbolic legitimacy in a single office. The resulting contradiction between constitutional texts and political practice has been widely observed in the region’s history.
Compared with parliamentary systems, presidentialism tends to create rigidity in the political process. Supporters argue that this rigidity ensures predictability by shielding executives from frequent parliamentary realignments or votes of no confidence. However, unforeseen developments—such as the death of an incumbent or serious misjudgments during crises—can leave presidential systems weaker and less adaptable than parliamentary governments. Prime ministers may restore legitimacy through confidence votes or early elections, and leadership changes do not necessarily trigger regime crises. By contrast, replacing a president often produces institutional deadlock or political instability.
These structural paradoxes are especially significant during regime transitions and democratic consolidation. While presidentialism promises authority and stability, its rigid frameworks can reduce flexibility in times of uncertainty. The tension between empowering executives and restraining them remains a defining feature of presidential constitutions, shaping both their strengths and vulnerabilities.[61]
A common criticism of presidentialism is the zero-sum character of presidential elections. Because the president is elected through a winner-take-all contest, political competition often becomes highly polarized, with victory granting one side exclusive control of executive authority. This arrangement can turn democratic politics into a zero-sum game, heightening the potential for conflict.
By contrast, parliamentary elections more often distribute representation among multiple parties. Coalition-building and power-sharing are common, leading incumbents to accommodate the demands of smaller parties and ensuring that those parties retain a stake in the system. Such arrangements reduce polarization and enhance democratic stability.
Presidents, however, frequently interpret their authority as an independent popular mandate, even when elected by a narrow plurality. This perception fosters a sense of unilateral mission, making opposition to presidential policies appear more irksome than in parliamentary systems. Prime ministers, acting as representatives of temporary governing coalitions, are generally more accustomed to compromise.
In some contexts, presidential regimes have sought to mitigate the harsh implications of winner-take-all elections through informal consociational agreements. In Venezuela and Colombia, for example, presidential constitutions remained in place, but major parties turned to negotiated power-sharing to stabilize democracy. These practices illustrate both the adaptability of presidential regimes and the institutional challenges posed by their zero-sum nature.[62]
The 1977 general election in Spain marked the country’s first free democratic vote following the death of dictator Francisco Franco. Acting Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, leader of the centrist Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), secured 34.9% of the vote and 167 of 350 parliamentary seats, remaining in office. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), led by Felipe González, won 29.4% and 118 seats, while the Communist Party (PCE) gained 9.3% and 20 seats, and the right-wing Alianza Popular (AP), under Manuel Fraga, took 8.4% and 16 seats.
Analysts have since argued that if Spain had held a presidential election instead of a parliamentary one, the results would likely have been far more divisive. No single party commanded a majority, meaning any presidential candidate would have needed to form broad and uncertain coalitions. Given the lack of clear information about voter preferences and the fragmented nature of Spain’s political spectrum at the time, coalition-building would have been both risky and unstable.
For the left, a unified campaign around Felipe González might have seemed possible, but it would have required alliances with Communists and regional nationalist parties, undermining the PSOE’s independent identity. Such a “popular front” strategy could have produced ideological confusion and alienated centrist voters.
On the right, Suárez’s centrist UCD faced similar dilemmas. While Suárez represented moderate reformers who had negotiated Spain’s peaceful transition, the AP was widely viewed as the continuist heir of the Franco regime. A right-wing alliance risked associating Suárez with authoritarian remnants, while refusal to cooperate with Fraga’s AP might have split the conservative vote.
In a hypothetical presidential race, campaigning would likely have intensified polarization between the democratic left and the post-Franco right. Each side would have framed the other as a threat—either “communist radicals” or “Franco’s heirs.” The resulting confrontation might have derailed the fragile process of democratic consolidation.
Ultimately, Spain’s adoption of a parliamentary framework helped moderate its political transition. Parliamentarism enabled distinct parties to coexist, negotiate, and evolve without forcing premature ideological fusion. The success of Spain’s democratization from 1977 onward—culminating in González’s stable Socialist government in 1982—illustrates how parliamentary institutions encouraged gradual reform, compromise, and national unity.
In short, the Spanish case suggests that during democratic transitions, parliamentary systems tend to mitigate polarization, while presidential contests can magnify it.
The separation of the executive and the legislature is the key difference between a presidential system and a parliamentary system. The presidential system elects a head of government independently of the legislature, while in contrast, the head of government in a parliamentary system answers directly to the legislature. Presidential systems necessarily operate under the principle of structural separation of powers, while parliamentary systems do not;[29] however, the degree of functional separation of powers exhibited in each varies –dualistic parliamentary systems such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Slovakia forbid members of the legislature from serving in the executive simultaneously, whileWestminster-type parliamentary systems such as theUnited Kingdom require it. Heads of government under the presidential system do not depend on the approval of the legislature as they do in a parliamentary system (except for mechanisms such as impeachment).[53]
The presidential system and the parliamentary system can also be blended into asemi-presidential system. Under such a system, executive power is shared by an elected head of state (a president) and a legislature-appointed head of government (a prime minister or premier). The amount of power each figure holds may vary, and a semi-presidential system may lean closer to one system over the other.[53] The president typically retains authority over foreign policy in a semi-presidential system.[citation needed] A pure presidential system may also have mechanisms that resemble those of a parliamentary system as part ofchecks and balances. The legislature may have oversight of some of the president's decisions throughadvice and consent, and mechanisms such asimpeachment may allow the legislature to remove the president under drastic circumstances.[citation needed]
Presidentialism metrics allow a quantitative comparison of the strength of presidential system characteristics for individual countries. Presidentialism metrics include the presidential index inV-Dem Democracy indices[63] and presidential power scores.[64] The table below shows for individual countries the V-Dem presidential index, where higher values indicate higher concentration of political power in the hands of one individual, such as thegeneral secretary of the Communist Party inone-party rulingcommunist states.
Subnational governments may be structured as presidential systems. All of the state governments in the United States use the presidential system, even though this is not constitutionally required. In these cases, instead of the title of President, the role has the title of Governor. On a local level, a presidential system might be organized with the office of the Mayor acting as the president. Some countries without a presidential system at the national level use a form of this system at a subnational or local level. One example isJapan, where the national government uses the parliamentary system.
The following countries have presidential systems where the post of prime minister (official title may vary) exists alongside that of the president. The president is still both the head of state and government and the prime minister's role is to mostly assist the president.
^All South Korean constitutions since 1963 provided for a strong executive Presidency; in addition, the formally authoritarianYushin Constitution of theFourth Republic established a presidential power to dissolve theNational Assembly, nominally counterbalanced by a vote of no confidence. Both of these provisions were retained by theFifth Republic's constitution but repealed upon the transition to democracy and the establishment of theSixth Republic
^An interim constitution passed in 1995 removed the President's ability to dissolve theVerkhovna Rada and Rada's ability to dismiss the government by a vote of no confidence. Both of these provisions were restored upon the passage of a permanent constitution in 1996.
^Vile, M. J. (1967). The separation of powers. In: Greene, J. P., & Pole, J. R. (Eds.). (2008).A companion to the American Revolution, Ch. 87. John Wiley & Sons.
^abSundquist, James L. (1997). "The U.S. Presidential System as a Model for the World". In Baaklini, Abdo I.; Desfosses, Helen (eds.).Designs for Democratic Stability: Studies in Viable Constitutionalism.Routledge. pp. 53–72.ISBN0765600528.
^McCarthy, Daniel J. (1987). "James Wilson and the Creation of the Presidency".Presidential Studies Quarterly.17 (4):689–696.
^Sondrol, Paul (2005). "The Presidentialist Tradition in Latin America".International Journal of Public Administration.28 (5):517–530.doi:10.1081/PAD-200055210.S2CID153822718.
^Schlesinger, Arthur (1974). "No Way to Curb the Executive".The New Republic.
^Depauw, Sam; Martin, Shane (2008). "Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective". In Giannetti, Daniela; Benoit, Kenneth (eds.).Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments.Routledge.
^Shugart, Matthew Soberg; Carey, John M. (1992).Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press.ISBN9781139173988.
^Chile Earthquake – Situation Report No. 5 (Report). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2010-03-08. Retrieved2025-11-08.Original ReliefWeb source no longer available; archived version not found.{{cite report}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
^Riggs, Fred W. (1997). "Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism: Implications for Representativeness and Legitimacy".International Political Science Review.18 (3): 258.doi:10.1177/019251297018003003.JSTOR1601343.S2CID145450791.
^"Conceptual homogenization of a heterogeneous field: Presidentialism in comparative perspective".Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance:72–152. 1994.
^Dahl, Robert A. (2001).How Democratic Is the American Constitution?. Yale University Press.ISBN0-300-09218-0.
^Balfour. "Introduction".The English Constitution.
^Fix‐Fierro, Héctor; Salazar‐Ugarte, Pedro (2012-05-17),"Presidentialism",The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press,ISBN978-0-19-957861-0, retrieved2025-11-07
^"Κεφάλαιον Ε' – Περὶ συντάξεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς πολιτείας" [Chapter 5 – Concerning the organisation of the Hellenic state].Πολιτικὸν Σύνταγμα τῆς Ἑλλάδος [Political Constitution of Greece](PDF) (in Greek).Troezen:Third National Assembly. 5 May 1827.Archived(PDF) from the original on 5 July 2011. Retrieved29 December 2024 – via theHellenic Parliament.Ἡ νομοτελεστικὴ [ἐξουσία] ἀνήκει εἰς ἕνα μόνον ὀνομαζόμενον Κυβερνήτην, ἔχοντα διαφόρους ὑπ' αὐτὸν γραμματεῖς τῆς ἐπικρατείας. [The Executive [power] belongs solely to one [individual] titled Governor, who has under him state secretaries.]
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