Prelude to the Iraq War
Part of thewar on terror and theIraq War
Clockwise from top-left: An American helicopter shadows aRussian oil tanker to enforce sanctions against Iraq; Two USF-16 Fighting Falcons prepare to departPrince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia for a patrol as part of Operation Southern Watch, 2000; An Iraqi surface-to-air missile firing at a coalition aircraft, July 2001; A UN weapons inspector in Iraq, 2002; President George Bush, surrounded by leaders of the House and Senate, announces theJoint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 2 October 2002; US Marine M1A1 tank is off-loaded from a US NavyLCAC in Kuwait in February 2003; Anti war protest in London, 2002; US Secretary of StateColin Powell holding a model vial ofanthrax while giving thepresentation to theUnited Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003
Date 1991/21 November 2001 – 20 March 2003 Location Iraq Result Invasion of Iraq
Belligerents
Coalition of the willing United States United Kingdom Australia Poland Kurdistan Region KDP PUK Iraqi National Congress	Republic of Iraq
Commanders and leaders
George W. Bush Dick Cheney Donald Rumsfeld Colin Powell Tommy Franks Tony Blair Geoff Hoon Brian Burridge John Howard Ahmed Chalabi	Saddam Hussein Qusay Hussein Uday Hussein Abid Hamid Mahmud Ali Hassan al-Majid Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri Taha Yassin Ramadan Tariq Aziz

Shortly after theSeptember 11 attacks, theUnited States under theadministration of George W. Bush, actively pressed for military action againstIraq, claiming that Iraqi leaderSaddam Hussein was developingweapons of mass destruction and havingties with al-Qaeda. The United States andUnited Kingdom argued that Iraq's activities posed a threat to the international community.

During the 1990s, the U.S. and the U.K. pursued a policy ofcontainment towards Iraq. Containment encompassed aUnited Nationsinspections regime that was tasked with disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, which was linked to ancomprehensive embargo on that country. In addition, the U.S. and U.K. patrolledno fly zones that barred Iraqi aircraft from operating in northern and southern Iraq. However, by the end of the decade, containment eroded as relations became increasingly strained between the U.N. and Iraq, which ultimately culminated in the weapons inspectors being withdrawn from the country in late 1998. The U.S. and U.K.retaliated with a bombing campaign against Iraqi military targets. Following Desert Fox, Iraq openly challenged U.S. and U.K. aircraft patrolling the no fly zones, attempting to shoot down military aircraft. Concurrently, U.N. sanctions were becoming less enforced, as Iraq was able to manipulate the sanctions regime in its favor to convince more countries to lift the sanctions altogether.

As containment eroded, beginning in the late 1990sneoconservatives argued for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime anddemocratization of Iraq. They justified overthrow on the basis that Ba'athist Iraq posed a direct threat to American security by threateningMiddle East stability and secure access to oil with its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and that the United Nations was an ineffective tool in confronting this threat. Neoconservative advocacy would lead to the passing of theIraq Liberation Act in late 1998, making regime change in Iraq as official U.S. policy. Following the election ofGeorge W. Bush as president in2000, the U.S. moved towards a more aggressive Iraq policy. TheRepublican Party's campaign platform in the 2000 election called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act as "a starting point" in a plan to "remove" Saddam.^[1] Many neoconservatives would take up key positions in the Bush administration.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, elements within the Bush administration believed that Iraq shared responsibility for the attacks, as well as having ties toal-Qaeda. Believing that a state sponsor was involved, many within the administration concurrently harbored a distrust towards theU.S. intelligence community for underestimating threats, and instead preferred utilizing outside analysis and intelligence from the Iraqi opposition that alleged an Iraq-al-Qaeda connection, as well as allegations that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction. Although military action was initially deferred in favor ofinvading Afghanistan, from September 2002 the U.S. began to formally present its case for action against Iraq at the United Nations. In November, theUN Security Council unanimously passedResolution 1441, stating that Iraq was in material breach with its disarmament obligations and giving Iraq "a final opportunity to comply" that had been set out in several previous resolutions (Resolutions660,661,678,686,687,688,707,715,986, and1284).^[2] Concurrently, an elaborate public relations campaign was waged to market military action to both the American and British publics, culminating in then-Secretary of StateColin Powell'sFebruary 2003 address to the Security Council.^[3]

After failing to gain UN support for an UN authorization for an invasion, the U.S., together with the U.K. and small contingents from Australia, Poland, and Denmark,launched an invasion on 20 March 2003 under the authority ofUN Security Council Resolution 660 andUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 678.^[4] Following the invasion, no evidence of an active WMD program or ties to al-Qaeda was ever found.

Throughout theCold War, Iraq had been an ally of theSoviet Union, and there was a history of friction between Iraq and the United States.^[5] The U.S. had backedPahlavi Iran as means of maintaining Gulf stability, and the latter had been an adversary of Iraq. ShahMohammed Reza Pahlavi distrusted the Ba'athist government in Iraq, which he considered a "bunch of thugs and murderers."^[6] In April 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty over theShatt al-Arab and Iranian ships stopped paying tolls to Iraq when they used the Shatt al-Arab.^[7] The Shah argued that the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran because almost all river borders around the world ran along thethalweg, and because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian.^[8] Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but on 24 April 1969, an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships (Joint Operation Arvand) sailed down the Shatt al-Arab, and Iraq—being the militarily weaker state—did nothing.^[9] Mohammad Reza financed Kurdish separatist rebels in Iraq, and to cover his tracks, armed them with Soviet weapons which Israel had seized from Soviet-backed Arab regimes, then handed over to Iran at the Shah's behest. On 7 May 1972, the Shah told a visiting PresidentRichard Nixon that the Soviet Union was attempting to dominate the Middle East via its close ally Iraq, and that to check Iraqi ambitions would also be to check Soviet ambitions.^[10] Nixon agreed to support Iranian claims to have the thalweg in the Shatt al-Arab recognised as the border and to generally back Iran in its confrontation with Iraq.^[10]

From October 1972 until the abrupt end of the Kurdish intervention after March 1975, the CIA "provided the Kurds with nearly $20 million in assistance," including 1,250 tons of non-attributable weaponry.^[11] The main goal of U.S. policy-makers was to increase the Kurds's ability to negotiate a reasonable autonomy agreement with the government of Iraq.^[12] To justify the operation, U.S. officials cited Iraq's support forinternational terrorism and its repeated threats against neighboring states, including Iran (where Iraq supportedBaluchi and Arab separatists against the Shah) and Kuwait (Iraq launched anunprovoked attack on a Kuwaiti border post and claimed the Kuwaiti islands ofWarbah andBubiyan in May 1973), with Haig remarking: "There can be no doubt that it is in the interest of ourselves, our allies, and other friendly governments in the area to see the Ba'thi regime in Iraq kept off balance and if possible overthrown."^[13][14] In 1975, Iran and Iraq signed theAlgiers Accord, which granted Iran equal navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab as the thalweg was now the new border, while Mohammad Reza agreed to end his support for IraqiKurdish rebels.^[15]

In February 1979, theIranian Revolution ousted the American-backedShah from Iran, losing the United States one of its most powerful allies.^[16] That November, the revolutionary groupMuslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, angered that the ailing Shah had been allowed into the United States for medical treatment, occupied the American embassy in Tehran and took American diplomats hostage with the advance approval of the leader of Iran,AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini.^[17] Diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States were severed shortly after.^[18] Concurrently, Iraqi-Iranian relations were deteriorating asKhomeini was attempting toexport the Islamic Revolution to theArab world, calling for existing regimes to be overthrown in Islamist revolutions. Saddam, asecularist and anArab nationalist, perceived Iran'sShia Islamism as an immediate and existential threat to hisBa'ath Party and thereby to Iraqi society as a whole.^[19]

Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980, firstlaunching airstrikes on numerous targets in Iran, including theMehrabad Airport ofTehran, before occupying the oil-rich Iranian province ofKhuzestan, which also has a sizableArab minority.^[20] The invasion was initially successful, as Iraq captured more than 25,900 km² of Iranian territory by 5 December 1980.^[21][20] After making some initial gains, Iraq's troops began to suffer losses fromhuman wave attacks by Iran. By mid-1982, the war's momentum had shifted decisively in favor of Iran, whichinvaded Iraq to depose Saddam's government.^[22][23] Although the U.S. was officially neutral at first, the prospect of an expansionist Iran alarmed many in theReagan administration, leading the U.S. to abandon neutrality.^[24] The U.S. then joined in alongside the Soviet Union, France, China, and the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to bolster Iraq, helping to provide several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, the sale ofdual-use technology, non-U.S. origin weaponry, military intelligence, and special operations training.^[25][26] In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.^[27] Following this, the United States extended credits to Iraq for the purchase of American agricultural commodities,^[28] the first time this had been done since 1967. More significantly, in 1983 the Baathist government hosted United States special Middle East envoyDonald Rumsfeld, to cultivate U.S.-Iraq ties. All of these initiatives prepared the ground for Iraq and the United States to reestablish diplomatic relations in November 1984. Iraq was the last of the Arab countries to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S.^[29]

The U.S. provided critical battle planning assistance at a time when U.S. intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons in waging the war, according to senior military officers with direct knowledge of the program. The U.S. carried out this covert program even as it publicly condemned Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq attackedKurdish villagers inHalabja in March 1988.^[30] According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, theNetherlands, the United Kingdom, and France. A report stated that Dutch, Australian, Italian, French and both West and East German companies were involved in the export of raw materials to Iraqi chemical weapons factories.^[31]

By the time theceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising.^[32] Most of itsdebt was owed toSaudi Arabia and Kuwait.^[33] Relations with Kuwait began to deteriorate as the nation was pumping large amounts of oil, and thus keeping prices low, when Iraq needed to sell high-priced oil from its wells to pay off its huge debt.^[34] Iraq's relations with other Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, were degraded by mounting violence in Iraq against expatriate groups, who were well-employed during the war, by unemployed Iraqis, among them demobilized soldiers. Meanwhile, relations with the U.S. began to deteriorate following the revelations that the U.S. had covertly provided Iran with weaponry.^[20] This political scandal became known as theIran–Contra affair.^[35] The US also began to condemn Iraq's human rights record, including the well-known use of torture.^[36] The UK also condemned the execution ofFarzad Bazoft, a journalist working for the British newspaperThe Observer.^[37] Following Saddam's declaration that "binary chemical weapons" would be used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washington halted part of its funding.^[38] A UN mission to theIsraeli-occupied territories, where riots had resulted in Palestinian deaths, wasvetoed by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US foreign policy aims in the region, combined with the reliance of the US on Middle Eastern energy reserves.^[39] Saddam threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies of some Arab rulers are American ... They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security."^[40] The US sentaerial refuelling planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats.^[41]

The US ambassador to Iraq,April Glaspie, met with Saddam in an emergency meeting on 25 July 1990, where the Iraqi leader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE):^[42]

So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights. If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the US, but individual Arabs may reach you. We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.

Glaspie replied:^[42]

I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. ... Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the UAE and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned.

— April Glaspie

Saddam stated that he would attempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq "would not accept death."^[42] US officials attempted to maintain a conciliatory line with Iraq, indicating that whileGeorge H. W. Bush andJames Baker did not want force used, they would not take any position on what was viewed as a border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, and didn't want to become involved.^[43]

Saddam's foreign ministerTariq Aziz later toldPBSFrontline in 1996 that the Iraqi leadership was under "no illusion" about America's likely response to the Iraqi invasion: "She [Glaspie] didn't tell us anything strange. She didn't tell us in the sense that we concluded that the Americans will not retaliate. That was nonsense you see. It was nonsense to think that the Americans would not attack us."^[44] And in a second 2000 interview with the same television program, Aziz said:

There were no mixed signals. We should not forget that the whole period before August 2 witnessed a negative American policy towards Iraq. So it would be quite foolish to think that, if we go to Kuwait, then America would like that. Because the American tendency ... was to untie Iraq. So how could we imagine that such a step was going to be appreciated by the Americans? It looks foolish, you see, this is fiction. About the meeting with April Glaspie—it was a routine meeting...She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government...what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush. He wanted her to carry a message to George Bush—not to receive a message through her from Washington.^[45]

On 2 August 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait, initially claiming assistance to "Kuwaiti revolutionaries", thus sparking an international crisis. On 4 August an Iraqi-backed "Provisional Government of Free Kuwait" was proclaimed, but a total lack of legitimacy and support for it led to an 8 August announcement of a "merger" of the two countries. On 28 August Kuwait formally became the19th Governorate of Iraq. Just two years after the 1988 Iraq and Iran truce, "Saddam did what his Gulf patrons had earlier paid him to prevent." Having removed the threat of Iranian fundamentalism he "overran Kuwait and confronted his Gulf neighbors in the name of Arab nationalism and Islam."^[46] Saddam justified theinvasion of Kuwait in 1990 by claiming thatKuwait had always been an integral part of Iraq and only became an independent nation due to the interference of theBritish Empire.^[47] Soon after his conquest of Kuwait, Saddam began verbally attacking the Saudis. He argued that the US-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate and unworthy guardian of the holy cities ofMecca andMedina. He combined the language of theIslamist groups that had recently fought in Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack the Saudis.^[48]

TheBush administration had at first been indecisive with an "undertone ... of resignation to the invasion and even adaptation to it as a fait accompli" until the UK's prime ministerMargaret Thatcher^[49] played a powerful role, reminding the President that appeasement in the 1930s had led to war, that Saddam would have the whole Gulf at his mercy along with 65 percent of the world's oil supply, and famously urging President Bush "not to go wobbly".^[49] Once persuaded, US officials insisted on a total Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, without any linkage to other Middle Eastern problems, accepting the British view that any concessions would strengthen Iraqi influence in the region for years to come.^[50] Within hours of the invasion, Kuwaiti and US delegations requested a meeting of theUN Security Council, which passedResolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops.^{[51][52][clarification needed][53]} On 6 August,Resolution 661 placedeconomic sanctions on Iraq.^[54][51][55]Resolution 665^[54] followed soon after, which authorized anaval blockade to enforce the sanctions. It said the "use of measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of resolution 661."^[56][57]

Acting on theCarter Doctrine policy, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could launch an invasion of Saudi Arabia, Bush quickly announced that the US would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, under the codename Operation Desert Shield. The operation began on 7 August 1990, when US troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, due also to the request of its monarch,King Fahd, who had earlier called for US military assistance.^[58] This "wholly defensive" doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8 August, Iraq declared Kuwait to be Iraq's 19th province and Saddam named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, as its military-governor.^[59]

On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passedResolution 678, which gave Iraq until 15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait, and empowered states to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait after the deadline.^{[citation needed]} Cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union made possible the passage of resolutions in the United Nations Security Council giving Iraq a deadline to leave Kuwait and approving the use of force if Saddam did not comply with the timetable.^[60] A US-led coalition of forces opposing Iraq's aggression was formed, consisting of forces from 42 countries.^[61] Saddam ignored the Security Council deadline.^[62] Backed by the Security Council, a US-led coalition launched round-the-clock missile and aerial attacks on Iraq, beginning 16 January 1991.^[62] Israel, thoughsubjected to attack by Iraqi missiles, refrained from retaliating in order not to provoke Arab states into leaving the coalition.^[62] A ground force consisting largely of US and British armored and infantry divisions ejected Saddam's army from Kuwait in February 1991 and occupied the southern portion of Iraq as far as theEuphrates.^[62]

As the Gulf War reached its end, the U.S. attempted to instigate the overthrow of Saddam Hussein via a military coup. On February 15, 1991, President of the United States,George H. W. Bush, made a speech targeting Iraqis viaVoice of America radio. Bush stated:^[63]

There is another way for the bloodshed to stop: and that is, for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and then comply with the United Nations' resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.^[64]

On March 1, 1991, one day after the Gulf War ceasefire, a revolt broke out inBasra against the Iraqi government. The uprising spread within days to all of the largest Shia cities in southern Iraq:Najaf,Amarah,Diwaniya,Hilla,Karbala,Kut,Nasiriyah andSamawah. The rebellions were encouraged by an airing of "The Voice of Free Iraq" on 24 February 1991, which was broadcast from a CIA-run radio station out of Saudi Arabia. The Arabic service of the Voice of America supported the uprising by stating that the rebellion was well supported, and that they would soon be liberated from Saddam.^[65] In the North, Kurdish leaders took American statements that they would support an uprising to heart, and began fighting, hoping to trigger acoup d'état. However, when no US support came, Iraqi generals remained loyal to Saddam and brutally crushed the Kurdish uprising and the uprising in the south.^[66] Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Turkey and Kurdish areas of Iran. On April 5, the Iraqi government announced "the complete crushing of acts of sedition, sabotage and rioting in all towns of Iraq." An estimated 25,000 to 100,000 Iraqis were killed in the uprisings.^[67][68]

Many Iraqi and American critics accused President George H. W. Bush and his administration of encouraging and abandoning the rebellion after haltingCoalition forces at Iraq's southern border with Kuwait at the end of the Gulf War.^[69][70] In 1996,Colin Powell,Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted in his bookMy American Journey that, while Bush's rhetoric "may have given encouragement to the rebels", "our practical intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to Iran thatremained bitterly hostile toward the United States."^[71] Coalition CommanderNorman Schwarzkopf Jr. has expressed regret for negotiating a ceasefire agreement that allowed Iraq to use helicopters (to compensate for the destroyed infrastructure), but also suggested a move to support the uprisings would have empowered Iran.^[72] Bush's national security adviser,Brent Scowcroft, toldABC'sPeter Jennings "I frankly wished [the uprisings] hadn't happened ... we certainly would have preferred a coup."^[73] Scowcroft later stated in a 2001 interview that removing Hussein from power was not an objective of anyUnited Nations Security Council resolution related to the Gulf War or the1991 Iraq AUMF Resolution, and that it was a fundamental interest of the United States to maintain a unified Iraq and to keep a balance in the region.^[74]

In 1992, theUS Defense Secretary during the war,Dick Cheney, made the same point:

I would guess if we had gone in there, we would still have forces in Baghdad today. We'd be running the country. We would not have been able to get everybody out and bring everybody home.

And the final point that I think needs to be made is this question of casualties. I don't think you could have done all of that without significant additional US casualties, and while everybody was tremendously impressed with the low cost of the (1991) conflict, for the 146 Americans who were killed in action and for their families, it wasn't a cheap war.

And the question in my mind is, how many additional American casualties is Saddam [Hussein] worth? And the answer is, not that damned many. So, I think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the President made the decision that we'd achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.^[75]

With Saddam remaining firmly in power, the U.S. now had to create a long term policy to prevent Saddam from ever threatening Gulf stability again. The U.S. subsequently created a policy of containment against Iraq, which relied on three pillars; utilizing no-fly zones, sanctions, and forcing disarmament. In addition the U.S. continued to explore the possibility of ousting Saddam in a coup. By the end of the 1990s however, the containment strategy was put into question amidst rising challenges that Iraq increasingly posed.^[76]

On 6 August 1990, four days after theIraqi invasion of Kuwait, theUnited Nations Security Council (UNSC) placed a comprehensive embargo onIraq.Security Council Resolution 661 banned alltrade and financial resources with both Iraq and occupied Kuwait except for medicine and "in humanitarian circumstances" foodstuffs, the import of which was tightly regulated. Sanctions barred Iraq from selling its oil onto the global market, import military technology.^[77] A Multinational Interception Force was organized and led by the U.S. to intercept, inspect and possibly impound vessels, cargoes and crews suspected of carrying freight to or from Iraq.^[78] Following the Gulf War,Resolution 687 amended the embargo to include eliminating weapons of mass destruction and extended-rangeballistic missiles, prohibiting any support forterrorism, and forcing Iraq to paywar reparations to Kuwait and all foreign debt.^[77][79] The resolution established theUnited Nations Special Commission to oversee and monitor Iraq's disarmament.^[80] Sanctions would only be lifted if Iraq disarmed.^[81] The powers given to UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq were: "unrestricted freedom of movement without advance notice in Iraq"; the "right to unimpeded access to any site or facility for the purpose of the on-site inspection...whether such site or facility be above or below ground"; "the right to request, receive, examine, and copy any record data, or information...relevant to" UNSCOM's activities; and the "right to take and analyze samples of any kind as well as to remove and export samples for off-site analysis".^[82]

Iraq initially attempted to conceal their WMD programs, hoping to ride the inspections out after a period of time. ButUN inspections proved to be far more through and stringent than what Saddam had originally anticipated, and was forced to begrudgingly accept their presence and allow the inspectors to destroy Iraq's arms. Unbeknownst to the UN however, Saddam gave orders to his second in commandHussein Kamel (who helped head Iraq's WMD and military industries) in July 1991, to covertly destroy much of Iraq's undeclared stocks of weapons of mass destruction and related capabilities. The decision to secretly destroy weapons and material without UN verification would come to greatly harm Iraq's credibility with the UN in the years ahead, for the lack of verification convinced many in the UN and other nations that Saddam continued to develop and retain significant stockpiles of WMD.^[81] After the invasion, Hans Blix who headed UN disarmament efforts in Iraq in 2002-2003, wrote in his book that Saddam may have been weary that the inspectors (who worked closely with foreign intelligence agencies) would have uncovered military and regime secrets that could have undermined the regime, and also wanted to retain some deliberate ambiguity to keep potential enemies at bay.^[83] Similarly, when interrogated by the FBI in 2004, Saddam asserted that the majority of Iraq's WMD stockpiles had been destroyed in the 1990s by UN inspectors, and the remainder were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq; the illusion of maintaining a WMD program and WMDs was maintained as a deterrent against possible Iranian invasion.^[84] An FBI agent who interrogated Saddam during this time also speculated that while Iraq may not have possessed WMDs after the 1990s, Saddam may have intended to restart his WMD programs if given the opportunity to do so in the future, as Iraq also attempted to keep intact their scientific research and infrastructure.^[84][81]

With the UN assuming that WMD stockpiles and programs continued to exist, the sanctions against Iraq were subsequently prolonged. The sanctions inflicted significant damage onto the country, as GDP plummeted from US$44.36 billion in 1990 to US$9 billion by 1995, inflation rose to 387%, and wiped out Iraq's middle class. Sanctions also caused high rates ofmalnutrition, shortages of medical supplies,diseases fromlack of clean water, lengthypower outages, and the near collapse of theeducation system.^{[81][85][86][87]} During the 1990s and 2000s, many surveys and studies concluded thatexcess deaths in Iraq—specifically among children under the age of 5—greatly increased during the sanctions at varying degrees.^[85][88][89] On the other hand, several later surveys conducted in cooperation with the post-Saddam government during the U.S.-ledoccupation of Iraq "all put the U5MR in Iraq during 1995–2000 in the vicinity of 40 per 1000," suggesting that "there was no major rise in child mortality in Iraq after 1990 and during the period of the sanctions."^[90][91]

Nevertheless, the effects of sanctions caused widespread outrage globally and with it, came great pressure to soften the sanctions altogether. Iraq further intensified the pressure by heavily publicizing the deprivation caused by sanctions, and threatened to cutoff cooperation with UNSCOM unless the sanctions would be lifted.^[81]Security Council Resolution 706 of 15 August 1991 was introduced to allow the sale of Iraqi oil in exchange for food.^[92]Security Council Resolution 712 of 19 September 1991 confirmed that Iraq could sell up to US$1.6 billion in oil to fund anOil-For-Food Programme (OFFP).^[93] Saddam initially refused, believing that it would lift pressure on the UNSC to lift sanctions completely. As a result, Iraq was effectively barred from exporting oil to the world market for several years.^[94] By 1995, the deteriorating conditions forced Saddam to change his mind and accept OFFP.^[81] Under the OFFP, the UN states that "Iraq was permitted to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months, with two-thirds of that amount to be used to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs. Later on, the limits imposed on oil exports were loosened, then removed altogether. The share of revenue allocated to humanitarian relief increased to 72%;^[95][96] 25% of the proceeds (which were held inescrow^[94]) were redirected to aKuwaiti reparations fund, and 3% to UN programs related to Iraq.^[95] The first shipments of food arrived in March 1997, with medicines following in May 1997.^[97] The UN recounts that "Over the life of the Programme, the Security Council expanded its initial emphasis on food and medicines to include infrastructure rehabilitation".^[95] The OFFP allowed the Iraqi economy to stabilize as it led to the inflow ofhard currency and revitalized trade with their neighbors, which helped reduce inflation. Iraq'sgross domestic product increased from US$10.8 billion in 1996 to US$30.8 billion in 2000.^[86]

Meanwhile, relations with UNSCOM became increasingly strained. By the summer of 1995, Iraq attempted to end the sanctions and inspections by promising UNSCOM that if their upcoming June 1995 report to the Security Council declared that Iraq complied in the nuclear and chemical fields, then Iraq would disclose information about their biological programs, which they denied weaponizing. Saddam then threatened to cutoff cooperation with UNSCOM unless the sanctions would be lifted.^[81] But in August, Hussein Kamel defected alongside his brother, their wives (who were Saddam's daughters) and children toJordan. Cooperating with UNSCOM, Kamel revealed that the Iraqi WMD programs was far more sophisticated than Iraq was willing to admit, and that the biological program was for weaponization.^[98][81] In an effort to limit the damage of Kamel's defection, the regime took inspectors to Kamel's farm to 'uncover' WMD-related documents which allowed UNSCOM to access more information that had previously been withheld. But the defection forced UNSCOM to take a more aggressive posture towards Iraq, demanding inspections of more sensitive regime sites such as presidential palaces, of which Iraq was unwilling to easily accept. UNSCOM now believed that Iraq was deliberately deceiving the inspectors and choosing non-compliance with disarmament. The latter decided to hinder inspections of sensitive sites and documentation.^[81]

By 1998, Iraq's relations with UNSCOM had reached a nadir, despite attempts bySecretary-GeneralKofi Annan to repair the relationship. Saddam and senior regime leaders realized that Iraq was unlikely to ever satisfy the UN's requirements for disarmament and subsequently cutoff cooperation with UNSCOM and theIAEA in late 1998. Although it was temporarily revoked after an American military buildup, relations were so strained that it never recovered. After UNSCOM reported to the UNSC on December 15 that Iraq had failed to comply, the U.S. and U.K. launched abombing campaign to cripple Iraq's WMD programs and regime. The inspectors had been withdrawn beforehand, and Iraq vowed to never to allow them back. In addition, Saddam had issued a "secret order" that Iraq did not have to abide by any UN Resolution since in his view "the United States had broken international law". No inspections were carried out between 1998-2002.^[81] Concurrently, Iraq began to leverage both its oil reserves and the OFFP to convince more countries to oppose the sanctions. Lax UN financial oversight over the OFFP allowed Iraq to corrupt the sanctions regime, handing out favorable oil contracts and allocations to states and individuals opposing the sanctions, includingChina,Russia, andFrance on the Security Council. This was fueled by continuing publicity of the hardships of Iraqis under sanctions.^[81] The government even tried to prevent benefits from flowing toShi'ite areas in southern Iraq to persuade more countries to oppose the sanctions.^[86] Iraq felt that degrading sanctions without inspections were more preferable than accepting sanctions with inspections. Iraq used the money to further bolster the regime and its military, being able to increasingly import proscribed goods. In 1999, UNSCOM was replaced with theUnited Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.^[81]

In March and early April, nearly two million Iraqis, 1.5 million of themKurds,^[99] escaped from strife-torn cities to the mountains along the northern borders, into the southern marshes, and toTurkey andIran.^[100] Their exodus was sudden and chaotic with thousands of desperate refugees fleeing on foot, on donkeys, or crammed onto open-backed trucks and tractors. Many were gunned down byRepublican Guard helicopters, which deliberately strafed columns of fleeing civilians in a number of incidents in both the north and south.^[69] Numerous refugees were also killed or maimed by stepping on land mines planted by Iraqi troops near the eastern border duringthe war with Iran. According to the U.S. Department of State and international relief organizations, between 500 and 1,000 Kurds died each day along Iraq's Turkish border.^[100] According to some reports, up to hundreds of refugees died each day along the way to Iran as well.^[101]

Fearful that Saddam would launch another wide-scale repression campaign like that of theAl-Anfal campaign in the late 1980s, the U.S.-led coalition created a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq to prevent aerial attacks by the Iraqis on the Kurds. On 3 March, GeneralNorman Schwarzkopf warned the Iraqis that Coalition aircraft would shoot down Iraqi military aircraft flying over the country. On 20 March, a USF-15C Eaglefighter aircraft shot down an Iraqi Air ForceSu-22 Fitterfighter-bomber over northern Iraq. On 22 March, another F-15 destroyed a second Su-22 and the pilot of an IraqiPC-9 trainer bailed out after being approached by US fighter planes. On 5 April, theUnited Nations Security Council passedResolution 688, calling on Iraq to end repression of its civilian population. On 6 April,Operation Provide Comfort began to bring humanitarian relief to the Kurds. Alongside aerial enforcement by the U.S., U.K., and France, was the delivery of humanitarian relief of over an estimated 1 million Kurdish refugees by a 6-nation airlift operation commanded from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey involving forces from the US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, and Italy.^[102] As a result of these efforts, Iraq withdrew from Iraqi Kurdistan in October 1991. Provide Comfort was later superseded byOperation Northern Watch, without French participation.^[103]

In southeastern Iraq, thousands of civilians, army deserters, and rebels began seeking precarious shelter in remote areas of theHawizeh Marshes straddling the Iranian border. After the uprising, theMarsh Arabs were singled out for mass reprisals,^[104] accompanied byecologically catastrophic drainage of theIraqi marshlands and the large-scale and systematicforcible transfer of the local population. A large scale government offensive attack against the refugees estimated 10,000 fighters and 200,000 displaced persons hiding in the marshes began in March–April 1992, using fixed-wing aircraft; a U.S. Department of State report claimed that Iraq dumped toxic chemicals in the waters in an effort to drive out the opposition.^[100] Concurrently, Iraqi media declared on August 2, 1992 (The 2nd Anniversary of theIraqi invasion of Kuwait) that Kuwait was their 19th province and that they would invade again. Shortly thereafter, Iraqi troops began exchanging fire and making incursions into Kuwait.^[105][106]

Ano-fly zone up to the32nd Parallel was enacted by the U.S., U.K., and France on August 26, 1992, withU.S. NavyF/A-18C Hornets ofCarrier Air Wing Five from the aircraft carrierUSS Independence being the first to fly into the zone. There were at least 70 fixed aircraft of theIraqi Air Force assumed to be based in the No-Fly Zone at the time.^[107] Iraq frequently challenged both no-fly zones, firing on coalition aircraft, and flying helicopters and aircraft into the zones. The coalition often retaliated by bombing Iraqi air defense sites and/or shooting down Iraqi aircraft.^{[108][109][110]}

In late April 1993, the United States asserted that Saddam Hussein had attempted to have former President George H. W. Bush assassinated during a visit to Kuwait on April 14–16.^[111] On June 26, as per order of then-PresidentClinton, U.S. warships stationed in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sealaunched a cruise missile attack at theIraqi Intelligence Service building in downtownBaghdad in response to Iraq's plot to assassinate former PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush.^[112] Actions in the no-fly zones decreased meanwhile, as Iraq halted firing onto aircraft.

In October 1994, Iraq once again began mobilizing around 64,000 Iraqi troops near the Kuwaiti border.^[113][114] The U.S. responded by deploying by building up troop presence in the Persian Gulf to deter a second invasion of Kuwait. Iraq subsequently withdrew its troops from the border.^[115]

When fighting broke out between the KurdishPUK andKDP factions in 1996, the latter decided to ask for assistance from the Iraqi government who, seeing an opportunity to retake northern Iraq, accepted. On 31 August, 30,000 Iraqi troops, spearheaded by an armored division of theIraqi Republican Guard, attacked the PUK-held city ofErbil, which was defended by 3,000 PUK Peshmerga led by Korsat Rasul Ali, in conjunction with KDP forces. Erbil was captured, and Iraqi troops executed 700 PUK andIraqi National Congressprisoners of war in a field outside the city. After installing the KDP in control of Erbil,Iraqi Army troops withdrew from the Kurdish region back to their initial positions. The KDP drove the PUK from its other strongholds, and with additional Iraqi Army help, captured Sulaymaniyah on 9 September.Jalal Talabani and the PUK retreated to the Iranian border, and American forces evacuated 700 Iraqi National Congress personnel and 6,000 PUK members out of northern Iraq.^[116][117] On 13 October, Sulaymaniyah was recaptured by the PUK, allegedly with support of Iranian forces.^[118]

The attacks stoked fears that Saddam intended to launch a genocidal campaign against the Kurds similar to the campaigns of1988 and1991. The Clinton administration, unwilling to allow the Iraqi government to regain control of Iraqi Kurdistan, beganOperation Desert Strike on 3 September, when American ships andB-52 Stratofortress bombers launched 27 cruise missiles at air defense sites in southern Iraq. The next day, 17 more cruise missiles were launched from American ships against Iraqi air defense sites. The United States also deployed strike aircraft and an aircraft carrier to thePersian Gulf region, and the extent of the southern no-fly zone was moved northwards to the33rd parallel.^[119]

In December 1998, the U.S. and U.K. initiatedOperation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign of Iraqi regime and military targets after Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM collapsed. Prior to this, France ended their participation in the no-fly zones, arguing that they were maintained too long and were ineffective. Following the bombing, Iraq declared that they no longer recognized the no-fly zones, resuming their efforts to shoot down coalition aircraft. This marked an increased level of combat between Iraq and the coalition, as coalition warplanes retaliated attempted shoot downs by further bombing air defense sites.^[120][121]

In May 1991,U.S. PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush signed a presidential finding directing theCentral Intelligence Agency to create conditions for Hussein's removal from power. Coordinating anti-Saddam groups was an important element of this strategy and theIraqi National Congress (INC), led byAhmed Chalabi, was the main group tasked with this purpose. The name INC was reportedly coined bypublic relations expertJohn Rendon (of theRendon Group agency) and the group received millions in covert funding in the 1990s, and then about $8 million a year in overt funding after the passage of theIraq Liberation Act in 1998. INC represented the first major attempt by opponents of Saddam to join forces, bringing togetherKurds of all religions,Sunni andShi'iteArabs (bothIslamic fundamentalist andsecular) as well as non-Muslim Arabs; additionallymonarchists,nationalists and ex-military officers.^[122] In June 1992, nearly 200 delegates from dozens of opposition groups met inVienna, along with Iraq's two main Kurdish militias, the rivalKurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In October 1992, major Shi'ite groups, including theSCIRI andal-Dawa, came into the coalition and INC held a pivotal meeting in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, choosing a Leadership Council and a 26-member executive council.

At theVienna conference, the INC madeAhmed Chalabi, a secular Shi'ite Iraqi-American and mathematician by training as its president. Chalabi was previously responsible for the 1989 collapse of JordanianPetra Bank, which caused a $350 million bail-out by theCentral Bank of Jordan and accused of embezzlement and false accounting.^[123] Chalabi fled the country in the trunk of a car owned byPrince Hassan of Jordan.^[124] He was convicted and sentencedin absentia forbank fraud by a Jordanianmilitary tribunal to 22 years in prison. Chalabi maintained that his prosecution was a politically motivated effort to discredit him sponsored bySaddam Hussein.^[125]

In 1993 Chalabi had begun promoting a plan for regime change called "The End Game". It envisioned a revolt by INC-led Shi'ites in southern Iraq and Kurds in the north that would inspire a military uprising and lead to the installation of an INC-dominated regime friendly to the U.S. He also began to use some of his CIA funding to build an armed militia. A later variation also included the presence of ex-U.S. Special Forces to incite Iraqi military defections. The U.S. would then recognize the INC as Iraq's provisional government, give it Iraq's U.N. seat; create INC-controlled "liberated zones" freed of sanctions, give the INC frozen Iraqi assets under U.S. control, launch air attacks, and have equipment prepositioned in the region in case U.S. ground forces were activated. The plan was quietly championed by neoconservatives before and during the early months of theBush administration.^{[126][127][128][129]}

Differences within INC eventually led to its virtual collapse. In May 1994, the two main Kurdish parties beganfighting with each other over territory and other issues. In January 1995,CIA case officerRobert Baer traveled to northern Iraq with a five-man team to set up a CIA station. He made contact with the Kurdish leadership and managed to negotiate a truce between Barzani and Talabani.^[130]

Within days, Baer and the INC made contact with an Iraqi general who was plotting to assassinateSaddam Hussein. The plan was to use a unit of 100 renegade Iraqi troops to kill Saddam as he passed over a bridge nearTikrit. Chalabi was convinced, as the commanders to whom they had spoken, were the same who openly supported Saddam and crushed his opponents in the Kurdish and Shia revolts. Baer cabled the plan to Washington but did not hear anything back. After three weeks, the plan was revised, calling for an attack by Kurdish forces in northern Iraq while rebel Iraqi troops leveled one of Saddam's houses with tank fire in order to kill the Iraqi leader. Baer again cabled the plan to Washington and received no response. On 28 February, theIraqi Army was placed on full alert. In response, the Iranian and Turkish militaries were also placed on high alert.Turkey had been planning to launch on offensive against Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. Baer received a message directly from National Security AdvisorTony Lake telling him his operation was compromised. This warning was passed on Baer's Kurdish and Iraqi contacts. Upon learning this,Barzani backed out of the planned offensive, leaving Talabani's PUK forces to carry it out alone. The Iraqi Army officers planning to kill Saddam with tank fire were compromised, arrested and executed before they could carry out the operation. The PUK's offensive was still launched as planned, and within days they managed to destroy three Iraqi Army divisions and capture 5,000 prisoners.^[130] Despite Baer's pleas for American support of the offensive, none was forthcoming, and the Kurdish troops were forced to withdraw.^[130] The failure of the 1995 coup attempt lead to the command structure of INC to fall apart with factional infighting. Chalabi was banned from those frequent visits toCIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia.

In the summer of 1996, fighting resumed between the Kurdish parties. The KDP subsequently garnered armed support from Saddam Hussein in 1996 for itscapture of the town ofArbil from rival PUK. Iraq took advantage of the request by launching a military strike in which 200 opposition members were executed and as many as 2,000 arrested. 650 oppositionists (mostly INC) were evacuated and resettled in the United States under parole authority of theUS Attorney General.^[131]

INC was subsequently plagued by factional infighting, a cutoff of funds from its international backers (including the United States), and continued pressure from Iraqi intelligence services especially after the failed 1995 coup attempt. In 1998, however, theUS Congress authorized $97 million in U.S. military aid for Iraqi opposition via the Iraq Liberation Act, intended primarily for INC.^[131]

Another opposition group was theIraqi National Accord. Unlike theIraqi National Congress strategy of fomenting revolution among Iraq's disaffected minorities, the INA felt the best way to remove Saddam was organizing a coup among Iraqi military and security services. From 1992-1995, INA insurgents conducted a bomb and sabotage campaign.^[132] However, the INA had been infiltrated by agents loyal to Saddam, and in June 1996, 30 Iraqi military officers were executed and 100 others were arrested for alleged ties to the INA.^[133]

In October 1998, removing the Iraqi government became officialU.S. foreign policy with enactment of theIraq Liberation Act. Enacted following the expulsion ofUN weapons inspectors the preceding August (after some had been accused of spying for the U.S.), the act provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic opposition organizations" to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq."^[134]

As containment eroded, hawks began advocating a more aggressive approach to confronting Iraq. Known as neoconservatives, they were grounded on the view of "peace through strength", that military power and strength should be used to confront American adversaries and threats, as well as unilaterally promoting American interests such as fostering democratization globally.^[135] Many harbored a distrust towards the intelligence community for underestimating threats to the United States and preferred utilizing outside analysis to separately review intelligence data. During the 1970s, many accused theCIA of underestimating theSoviet Union's military strength and intentions. After lobbying, theWhite House and the CIA agreed to an experiment of outside analysis on Soviet military power, which became known asTeam B.^[136] Headed by a team of 16 "outside experts" who had access to highly classified data, they argued that the USSR was engaged in a military buildup utilizing the doctrine of winning nuclear wars, rather than the CIA's view that the USSR was reliant onmutually assured destruction.^{[136][137][138]} The study's finding later helped influence the American military buildup during theReagan administration.^[139] During the Reagan administration, many neoconservatives took up roles in the administration and staunchly supported theReagan Doctrine against globalCommunism.

Many viewedGeorge H.W. Bush's decision to leaveSaddam Hussein in power after theGulf War and allowing him to crush the1991 uprisings as a betrayal of democratic principles.^{[140][141][142][143][144][76]} After the end of both the Gulf War and theCold War, neoconservativePaul Wolfowitz asUnder Secretary of Defense for Policy worked on a draft Defense Planning Guidance that called for American unilateralism and reliance on preemption to strike emerging threats before they materialized. The draft outlines several scenarios in which U.S. interests could be threatened by regional conflict: "access to vital raw materials, primarilyPersian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking." The draft relies on seven scenarios in potential trouble spots to make its argument—with the primary case studies beingIraq andNorth Korea. Although the document was never formally adopted by the Bush Sr. administration, elements later appeared as part of theBush Jr. administration anddoctrine.^[76] In 1996, a study group of American-Jewish neoconservative strategists led byRichard Perle drafted a foreign policy report on the behest of newly-elected Israeli Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu. Known as theA Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, the report called for a new, more aggressive Middle East policy on the part of the United States in defense of the interests of Israel, including the removal ofSaddam Hussein from power inIraq and the containment ofSyria through a series ofproxy wars, the outright rejection of any solution to theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict that would include aPalestinian state, and an alliance between Israel,Turkey andJordan against Iraq, Syria andIran.^[145]

Founded byWilliam Kristol andRobert Kagan, theProject for the New American Century (PNAC) was aneoconservativethink tank that called for "aReaganite policy of military strength andmoral clarity".^{[146][147][148][149]} PNAC's first public act was to release a June 1997 "Statement of Principles" that described the United States as the "world's pre-eminent power", and said that the nation faced a challenge to "shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests". To this goal, the statement called for significant increases in defense spending, and for the promotion of "political and economic freedom abroad". It said the United States should strengthen ties with its democratic allies, "challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values", and preserve and extend "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles". Calling for a "Reaganite" policy of "military strength and moral clarity", it concluded that PNAC's principles were necessary "if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next".^[150] Of the twenty-five people who signed PNAC's founding statement of principles, ten went on to serve in theadministration of U.S. President George W. Bush, includingDick Cheney,Donald Rumsfeld, andPaul Wolfowitz.^{[151][152][153][154]}

In 1998, Kristol and Kagan advocatedregime change inIraq throughout theIraq disarmament process through articles that were published in theNew York Times.^[155][156] Following perceived Iraqi unwillingness to co-operate withUN weapons inspections, core members of the PNAC includingRichard Perle,Paul Wolfowitz,R. James Woolsey,Elliott Abrams,Donald Rumsfeld,Robert Zoellick, andJohn Bolton were among the signatories of an open letter initiated by the PNAC to PresidentBill Clinton calling for the removal ofSaddam Hussein.^[157][158] Portraying Saddam Hussein as a threat to the United States, itsMiddle East allies, and oil resources in the region, and emphasizing the potential danger of anyweapons of mass destruction under Iraq's control, the letter asserted that the United States could "no longer depend on our partners in theGulf War to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspections". Stating that American policy "cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in theUN Security Council", the letter's signatories asserted that "the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf".^[159]

Neoconservatives and PNAC formed close political relationships withAhmed Chalabi'sIraqi National Congress, who was championed as a notable force fordemocracy in Iraq.^[160] They lobbied for theIraq Liberation Act, which declared that it was the official policy of the United States to support "regime change", and required the President to assist Iraqi opposition groups including the INC. The law was signed by PresidentClinton in October 1998.^{[161][162][163]}

Following thecollapse of the Soviet Union, proponents of a missile defense shield began to focus on the risk posed byrogue states developing ballistic missiles capable of eventually reaching the US.^[164] Although the 1995National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), stated that there was no state besides thefive major nuclear powers was capable of acquiring missiles that could reach the United States within the ensuing 15 years, Republican lawmakers intent on funding a defensive shield accused theClinton administration for inaccurate assessments and distorted intelligence.^[164][165] In early 1996, theHouse National Security Committee held hearings on the ballistic missile threat, and in a final report recommended that two reviews be created: one to investigate the NIE itself, and another to complete a new investigation of the ballistic missile threat.^[166] The first review was conducted by formerDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI) and futureDefense SecretaryRobert Gates. He concluded that while there was evidence of faultymethodology in the NIE, there was no political bias in its conclusions.^[167] This conclusion again angered the missile defense supporters who had counted on this review to further their arguments.^[165]

The second review was headed by a commission chaired by once and future Secretary of Defense,Donald Rumsfeld in early 1998.^[168] During that time the commission were frustrated by thecompartmentalization of intelligence, the refusal of analysts to speculate or hypothesize on given information, and what they considered general inexperience in the intelligence personnel.^[169][170] The final report argued that the US was threatened by ballistic missiles tipped with biological or nuclear payloads from China, Russia,Iran,Iraq, andNorth Korea. The report criticized the U.S. intelligence community for underestimating these growing threats and that the processes of the intelligence community to make estimates on these threats were causing an erosion of accurate assessments.^[171] The commission is thought by some foreign policy analysts to be the basis for President George W. Bush'saxis of evil line in his 2002State of the Union Address, in which he accusedIraq,Iran, andNorth Korea of beingstate sponsors of terrorism and of pursuingweapons of mass destruction.^[172] The Rumsfeld Commission grouped the three countries together because they all were believed to be pursuing ballistic missile programs based on theScud missile. In the pre-9/11 days of the Bush presidency, the administration had focused heavily on developing a national missile defense system to counter such threats.^[173]

TheRepublican Party's campaign platform in the 2000 election called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act as "a starting point" in a plan to "remove" Saddam.^[174] Following the2000 election, Clinton briefed President-electGeorge W. Bush in December 2000, expressing his regret that people he regarded as the world's two most dangerous individuals,Osama Bin Laden andSaddam Hussein, were still alive and free. Of the latter, he warned Bush that Hussein will "cause you a world of problems."^[175] Upon hisinauguration, Bush directedthe Pentagon to look into military options for Iraq and the CIA to improve intelligence on the country.^[176][177] At a February 1 principals meeting Paul Wolfowitz lobbied for arming the Iraqi opposition.^[177] Bush'sTreasury SecretaryPaul O'Neill also claimed that Bush's first twoNational Security Council meetings included a discussion of invading Iraq. He was given briefing materials entitled "Plan for post-Saddam Iraq," which envisioned peacekeeping troops, war crimes tribunals, and divvying up Iraq's oil wealth. A Pentagon document dated March 5, 2001 was titled "Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts," and included a map of potential areas for exploration.^[178] A contingency plan known asOperation Desert Badger was also created if Iraq successfully shot down a U.S. warplane in the no-fly zones. The plan called for major attacks on the Iraqi regime, which would have exceededOperation Desert Fox in scope and scale. It also included the option of utilizing ground troops stationed in Kuwait to seize territory in Southern Iraq.^[179]

These old dinosaurs of U.S. foreign policy, were stuck in a time warp. They're not mentally flexible enough to understand the world has changed since they were in office. They were thinking about the Cold War, where states were the source of threat. They dismissed these non-state actors, these shadowy groups. That was one of the flaws in W's thinking. That bringing old veterans in would be useful in a time of change. It wasn't. It was the opposite.

On the morning of 11 September 2001, a total of 19Arab men—15 of whom were from Saudi Arabia—carried out fourcoordinated attacks in the United States. Four commercial passenger jet airliners were hijacked.^[181][182] The hijackers intentionally crashedtwo ofthe airliners into the Twin Towers of theWorld Trade Center in New York City, killing everyone on board and more than 2,000 people in the buildings. Both buildings collapsed within two hours from damage related to the crashes, destroying nearby buildings and damaging others. The hijackers crashed athird airliner into thePentagon inArlington,Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C.The fourth plane crashed into a field nearShanksville, in ruralPennsylvania, after some of its passengers and flight crew attempted to retake control of the plane, which the hijackers had redirected toward Washington, D.C., to target theWhite House, or theUS Capitol. No one aboard the flights survived. The death toll among responders including firefighters and police was 836 as of 2009.^[183] Total deaths were 2,996, including the 19 hijackers.^[183]

By midday, theNational Security Agency intercepted communications that pointed toOsama Bin Laden's responsibility, and many members within theCentral Intelligence Agency immediately knew thatal-Qaeda had orchestrated the attacks.^[184][185] However, elements within the Bush administration believed that an attack of such magnitude and complexity required a state actor.^[186][187] On the evening of 11 September, President Bush stated the US would respond to the attacks and would "make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them."^[188]

Iraq was the only country in the world to praise the 9/11 attacks, issuing an official statement saying "the American cowboys are reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity", while the official al-Iraq newspaper called the event "a lesson for all tyrants, oppressors and criminals."^[189][190] The Duelfer Report later concluded that the reaction stemmed from Saddam's paranoia and misreading of international events, and that elements within the Iraqi government was fearful of how the U.S. would react and wanted to communicate that Iraq wasn't involved.^[191]

On the afternoon of September 11, Rumsfeld issued rapid orders to his aides to look for evidence of possible Iraqi involvement in regard to what had just occurred, according to notes taken by senior policy officialStephen Cambone. "Best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H." – meaning Saddam Hussein – "at same time. Not only UBL" (Osama bin Laden), Cambone's notes quoted Rumsfeld as saying. "Need to move swiftly – Near term target needs – go massive – sweep it all up. Things related and not."^[192][193] According to the9/11 Commission Report, "Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party."^[187]

In the first emergency meeting of theNational Security Council on the day of the attacks, Rumsfeld asked, "Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al-Qaeda?" with his deputyPaul Wolfowitz adding that Iraq was a "brittle, oppressive regime that might break easily—it was doable," and, according toJohn Kampfner, "from that moment on, he and Wolfowitz used every available opportunity to press the case."^[194] The idea was initially rejected at the behest of Secretary of StateColin Powell, but, according to Kampfner, "Undeterred Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz held secret meetings about opening up a second front—against Saddam. Powell was excluded." In such meetings they created a policy that would later be dubbed theBush Doctrine, centering on "pre-emption" and the war on Iraq, which thePNAC had advocated in their earlier letters.^[195]

On the evening of 12 September, President Bush ordered White House counter-terrorism coordinatorRichard A. Clarke to investigate possible Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Shocked by the sophistication of the 9/11 attacks, Bush wondered whether a state sponsor was involved. He wondered whether Iraq was involved as it was an American adversary and was the only place where the United States was engaged incombat operations. He also recalled that Iraq had supported Palestinian suicide terrorists, and also thought whether Iran was involved as well. Clarke's office issued a memo on 18 September that noted wide ideological gaps between Iraq to al-Qaeda, and that only weak anecdotal evidence linked the two. The report found nothing of significance to indicate Iraqi involvement.^[187]: 334 Clarke later recalled that the paper was quickly returned by a deputy with a note saying, "Please update and resubmit."^[176][196] Similarly, a 21 SeptemberPresident's Daily Brief (prepared at Bush's request) indicated that the U.S. intelligence community had no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the attacks and there was "scant credible evidence that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with Al Qaeda." The PDB wrote off the few contacts that existed between Saddam's government and al-Qaeda as attempts to monitor the group, not work with it. Bush, Vice PresidentDick Cheney, National Security AdvisorCondoleezza Rice, SecretariesColin Powell and Rumsfeld, under secretaries at the State and Defense Departments, and other senior administration officials received the paper.^[197]

Clarke later revealed details of another National Security Council meeting the day after the attacks, during which officials considered the U.S. response. Already, he said, they were certain al-Qa'ida was to blame and there was no hint of Iraqi involvement. "Rumsfeld was saying we needed to bomb Iraq," according to Clarke. Clarke then stated, "We all said, 'No, no, al-Qa'ida is in Afghanistan.'" Clarke also revealed that Rumsfeld complained in the meeting, "there aren't any good targets in Afghanistan and there are lots of good targets in Iraq."^[198] Rumsfeld even suggested to attack other countries like Libya and Sudan, arguing that if this was to be a truly "global war on terror" then all state sponsors of terrorism should be dealt with.^[199]

Wolfowitz argued for action against Iraq, noting that Saddam had praised the attacks and claimed that Iraq was involved in the1993 bombing of theWorld Trade Center. A Pentagon paper specified three priority targets for initial action;al Qaeda, theTaliban, andBa'athist Iraq. It argued that al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States with the latter being cited in being involved in sponsoring terrorism, along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction. Although Bush decided to prioritize theinvasion of Afghanistan, he ordered contingency plans to be prepared for Iraq, which involved seizingIraqi oilfields in the south.^[187]

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, letters containinganthrax spores were mailed to several news media offices and to senatorsTom Daschle andPatrick Leahy, killing five people and infecting 17 others. Capitol Police Officers and staffers working for SenatorRuss Feingold were exposed as well.^[200] The anthrax was determined to be weapons-grade. Later investigations showed that a domestic perpetrator had orchestrated the attacks.^[201] But immediately after the anthrax attacks,White House officials pressuredFBI DirectorRobert Mueller to publicly blameal-Qaeda following theSeptember 11 attacks.^[202] "They really wanted to blame somebody in the Middle East," the retired senior FBI official stated. The FBI knew early on that the anthrax used was of a consistency requiring sophisticated equipment and was unlikely to have been produced in "some cave". At the same time, President Bush and Vice President Cheney in public statements speculated about the possibility of a link between the anthrax attacks and al-Qaeda.^[203]The Guardian reported in early October that American scientists had implicated Iraq as the source of the anthrax,^[204] and the next dayThe Wall Street Journal editorialized that al-Qaeda perpetrated the mailings, with Iraq the source of the anthrax.^[205] A few days later,John McCain suggested on theLate Show with David Letterman that the anthrax may have come from Iraq,^[206] and the next weekABC News did a series of reports stating that three or four (depending on the report) sources had identifiedbentonite as an ingredient in the anthrax preparations, implicating Iraq.^{[207][208][209]}

Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as well as other neoconservatives sought out information that linked both Ba'athist Iraq and al-Qaeda together, and expressed skepticism toward's the CIA's intelligence. They questioned whether the CIA were competent enough to produce accurate information as the agency underestimated threats and failed to accurately predict events such as theIranian Revolution, theIraqi Invasion of Kuwait, and thecollapse of the Soviet Union. In addition following the Gulf War, UNSCOM inspections revealed the presence of an intact Iraqi military facility that had facilitated the development of a nuclear weapon that was mere months away from its first nuclear weapons detonation. The CIA had no knowledge of such a facility beforehand.^[210]

They instead preferred outside analysis, of which information was supplied by theIraqi National Congress as well as unvetted pieces of intelligence.^[185] According to John Kampfner, "Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz believed that, while the established security services had a role, they were too bureaucratic and too traditional in their thinking." As a result, "they set up what came to be known as the 'cabal', a cell of eight or nine analysts in a newOffice of Special Plans (OSP) based in the U.S. Defense Department." The office was headed byUnder Secretary of Defense for PolicyDouglas Feith. According to an unnamed Pentagon source quoted by Hersh, the OSP "was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties toAl Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States".^[195] Within months of being set up, the OSP "rivaled both the CIA and the Pentagon'sDefense Intelligence Agency, the DIA, as President Bush's main source of intelligence regarding Iraq's possible possession of weapons of mass destruction and connection with Al Qaeda."

The INC provided information that argued that Iraq had ties to al-Qaeda. In addition, the OSP reviewed raw intelligence. One information claimed that lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta had met with Iraqi intelligence inPrague,Czech Republic in April 2001. Another included information about a captured al-Qaeda militantIbn al-Shaykh al-Libi. al-Libi claimed that al-Qaeda had sought weapons of mass destruction from Iraq.^[185] However, these pieces of information had been already discredited by the intelligence community.^[212][213] Despite this, they continued to work alleging a Saddam-al-Qaeda connection. In one instance, an "Iraqi intelligence cell" briefing to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002 condemned the CIA's intelligence assessment techniques and denounced the CIA's "consistent underestimation" of matters dealing with thealleged Iraq–Al-Qaeda co-operation. In September 2002, two days before the CIA's final assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, Feith briefed senior advisers toDick Cheney andCondoleezza Rice, undercutting the CIA's credibility and alleging "fundamental problems" with CIA intelligence-gathering.

Critics heavily denounced the role of the OSP for their role in the Iraq War. In an interview with the ScottishSunday Herald, formerCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) officerLarry C. Johnson said the OSP was "dangerous for US national security and a threat to world peace. [The OSP] lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removingSaddam. It's a group ofideologues with pre-determined notions of truth and reality. They take bits of intelligence to support their agenda and ignore anything contrary. They should be eliminated."^[214] In an interview,Vincent Cannistraro, a former senior CIA official and counterterrorism expert stated that the intelligence provided by the Iraqi National Congress "... isn't reliable at all. Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear. And much of it is used to support Chalabi's own presidential ambitions. They make no distinction between intelligence and propaganda, using alleged informants and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating] cooked information that goes right into presidential and vice-presidential speeches."^[215] The actions of the OSP have led to accusation of the Bush administration "fixing intelligence to support policy" with the aim of influencing Congress in its use of theWar Powers Act.^[216]

SenatorBob Graham chaired the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2002, when the Congress voted on the Iraq War Resolution. He first became aware of the significance of Iraq in February 2002, when Gen. Tommy Franks told him the Bush administration had made the decision to begin to de-emphasize Afghanistan in order to get ready for Iraq. In September, the Senate Intelligence Committee met with George Tenet, Director of the CIA, and Graham requested a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. Tenet responded by saying "We've never done a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, including its weapons of mass destruction." and resisted the request to provide one to Congress. Graham insisted "This is the most important decision that we as members of Congress and that the people of America are likely to make in the foreseeable future. We want to have the best understanding of what it is we're about to get involved with." Tenet refused to do a report on the military or occupation phase, but reluctantly agreed to do a NIE on the weapons of mass destruction. Graham described the Senate Intelligence Committee meeting with Tenet as "the turning point in our attitude towards Tenet and our understanding of how the intelligence community has become so submissive to the desires of the administration. The administration wasn't using intelligence to inform their judgment; they were using intelligence as part of a public relations campaign to justify their judgment."^[217]

Congress voted to support the war based on the NIE Tenet provided in October 2002. However, the bipartisan "Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Prewar Intelligence" released on July 7, 2004, concluded that the key findings in the 2002 NIE either overstated, or were not supported by, the actual intelligence. The Senate report also found the US Intelligence Community to suffer from a "broken corporate culture and poor management" that resulted in a NIE that was completely wrong in almost every respect.^[218]

• Outline of the Iraq War
• International reactions to the prelude to the Iraq War
• Oil-for-Food Programme
• Operation Northern Watch
• Prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

• Frontline: "The War Behind Closed Doors" PBS documentary on the neoconservative advocacy against Iraq
• Frontline: "Rumsfeld's War" PBS documentary on Donald Rumsfeld's tenure as Secretary of Defense under the Bush administration
• Frontline: "The Dark Side" PBS documentary on Dick Cheney's remaking of the Executive and infighting leading up to the war in Iraq
• Frontline: "Bush's War" PBS documentary on the Bush administration's policies in the war on terror

• Modern history of Iraq
• Preludes to wars
• Politics of Iraq
• Iraq–United States relations
• Causes and prelude of the Iraq War
• Dick Cheney
• Foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration
• George W. Bush administration controversies

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