There are currently nine states recognised as candidates formembership of theEuropean Union:Albania,Bosnia and Herzegovina,Georgia,Moldova,Montenegro,North Macedonia,Serbia,Turkey, andUkraine.[1]Kosovo (the independence of which isnot recognised by five EU member states) formally submitted its application for membership in 2022 and is considered a potential candidate by the European Union. Due to multiple factors, talks with Turkey are at an effective standstill since December 2016.[2]
Six candidates are currently engaged in active negotiations: Montenegro (since 2012), Serbia (since 2014), Albania (since 2020), North Macedonia (since 2020), Moldova and Ukraine (since 2024). The most advanced stage of the negotiations, defined as meeting the interim benchmarks fornegotiating chapters 23 and 24, after which the closing process for all chapters can begin, has only been reached by Montenegro.[3] Montenegro's declared political goal is to complete its negotiations by the end of 2026, and achieve membership of the EU by 2028.[4][5]
The accession criteria are included in theCopenhagen criteria, agreed in 1993, and theTreaty of Maastricht (Article 49). Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty (as amended) says that any "European state" that respects the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law", may apply to join the EU. Whether a country is European or not is subject topolitical assessment by the EU institutions.[6]Past enlargement since the foundation of the European Union as theEuropean Economic Community by theInner Six states in 1958[7] brought total membership of the EU to twenty-eight, although as a result of thewithdrawal of the United Kingdom, the current number of EU member states is twenty-seven.
Of the four majorwestern European countries that are not EU members,Norway,Switzerland andIceland have submitted membership applications in the past but subsequently froze or withdrew them, while theUnited Kingdom is a former member. Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, as well asLiechtenstein, participate in theEU Single Market and also in theSchengen Area, which makes them closely aligned with the EU; none, however, are in theEU Customs Union.
As of 2025, the enlargement agenda of the European Union regards three distinct groups of states:
These states have all submitted applications for accession to the EU, which is the first step of a long multi-year process. They must subsequently negotiate the specific terms of theirTreaty of Accession with thecurrent EU member states, and align their domestic legislation with theaccepted body of EU law (acquis communautaire), along with ensuring an appropriate level of implementation thereof, before joining.
There areother potential member states in Europe that are not formally part of the current enlargement agenda, either due to having a domestic political debate on potential membership, or having withdrawn a previous membership or application for membership. These other potential member states could be included on the enlargement agenda at some point of time in the future, if their foreign policy changes and paves the way for submitting an application, and EU subsequently recognises them as an applicant or candidate.
Historically the norm was for enlargements to consist of multiple entrants simultaneously joining theEuropean Economic Community (1958–1993) andEU (since 1993). The only previous enlargements of a single state were the 1981 admission of Greece and the 2013 admission of Croatia. However, following the significant effect ofthe fifth enlargement in 2004, EU member states have decided that a more individualised approach will be adopted in the future, although the entry of pairs or small groups of countries may coincide.[8]
For an applicant to become a member state of the EU, severalprocedural steps need to get passed. These steps will move the status of the state from applicant (potential candidate) to candidate, and later again to a negotiating candidate. The status as a negotiating candidate is reached by the mutual signing of a negotiation framework at a first intergovernmental conference. The start of substantial negotiations with the EU is subsequently marked by the opening of the first negotiating chapters at a second intergovernmental conference. Every 35 chapters ofthe accepted body of EU law (divided into 6 clusters) must be opened and closed during subsequent additional intergovernmental conferences for a state to conclude the negotiations by the signing of an accession treaty.
After a reform in 2020, the 35 chapters have been divided into six main clusters, where all five chapters of the first cluster are supposed to be opened together at the same time. The opening of chapters, which after the reform occur with several chapters opened together cluster-wise, can only happen by a unanimous decision by theCouncil of the European Union once the screening procedure report has been completed for the specific chapters (outlining all needed legislative changes to comply with EU law), while there can also be set some "opening benchmarks" requiring a certain amount of legislative changes/implementation to be met even before the opening of the chapters. The closure of a chapter is done provisionally by a unanimous decision by theCouncil of the European Union once the state demonstrates to have implemented and aligned their domestic legislation with the EU law, for each specific chapter in concern.
There are no requirement for completion of the screening procedure for all 35negotiating chapters, before the start of the first and second intergovernmental conference.[9]
The 2003 European Council summit inThessaloniki set the integration of theWestern Balkans as a priority of EU expansion.
Slovenia was the firstformer Yugoslav country to join the EU in2004, followed byCroatia in2013.
Albania,Bosnia and Herzegovina,Montenegro,North Macedonia, andSerbia have all been officially granted candidate status.[10][11]Kosovo, which is claimed by Serbia andnot recognised by 5 EU states, applied on 14 December 2022 and is considered a potential candidate by the European Union.[12][13]
Serbia, Albania and Montenegro, as the most advanced candidates in their negotiation processes with the EU, may join the EU sometime between 2028 and 2030, considering the 18 to 24 month ratification process which starts after the negotiations are completed.[14][15][16] Montenegro's declared political goal is to complete its negotiations by the end of 2026, and achieve membership of the EU by 2028.[4][5]
The European Council had endorsed starting negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia on 26 March 2020,[17] however, the negotiation process was blocked byBulgaria for over two years.[18][a] In June 2022 French President Emmanuel Macron submitted a compromise proposal which, if adopted by both countries, would pave the way for the immediate adoption of negotiating frameworks for North Macedonia and Albania by theEU Council and for the organisation of intergovernmental conferences with them.[19] On 24 June 2022, Bulgaria's parliament approved the revised French proposal to lift the country's veto on opening EU accession talks with North Macedonia, with theAssembly of North Macedonia also doing so on 16 July 2022 allowing accession negotiations to begin. On the same day, the start of negotiations was set for 19 July 2022.[20]
On 8 November 2023, theEuropean Commission adopted a new Growth Plan for theWestern Balkans, with the aim of bringing them closer to the EU through offering some of thebenefits of EU membership to the region in advance of accession. The Growth Plan provides €6 billion financial grants and loans for the entire region in return of implementation of structural reforms. Beside the core financial support of the growth plan, one of the additional embedded priority actions is granting access to theSingle Euro Payments Area.[21]
On 8 November 2023, the European Commission recommended opening negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved.[22] On 12 March 2024, the European Commission recommended opening EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, citing the positive results from important reforms the country enacted.[23][24][25] On 21 March 2024, all 27 EU leaders, representing theEuropean Council, gathered for a summit in Brussels, where they unanimously granted conditional approval for opening EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.[26][27] On 17 December 2024, the Council reiterated that they still needed to receive an approved Growth Plan reform package along with a national programme for adoption of EU law, and that the country should appoint a chief negotiator and a nationalIPA III coordinator, before the adoption of a negotiation framework can happen as the next step of the process for Bosnia and Herzegovina.[28]
On 25 December 2024, theNational Assembly of Republika Srpska (afederal entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) adopted conclusions alleging the erosion of the legal order inBosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded the "annulment of all acts resulting from unconstitutional actions by foreign individuals (High Representatives) who lack the constitutional authority to propose or enact laws", and "requires representatives fromRepublika Srpska in state institutions to suspend decisions related to European integration (as well as all decision-making concerned to the overall level of the country) until the process aligns with democratic principles and the rule of law".[29] However, the High Representative issued an order on 2 January 2025 that prohibited the implementation with immediate legal effect of the entirety of these conclusions, due to having found them to violate Republika Srpska's obligations and commitments under theDayton Agreement.[30] On 8 January 2025, thePresident of Republika Srpska,Milorad Dodik, stated that he would seriously reconsider whether Republika Srpska should pursue the European path, as he instead preferred efforts to secede the entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and rejected the authority of the Constitutional Court and High Representative.[31] TheDelegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina stated in response: "The sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order – including Constitutional Court decisions – and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be respected. The EU urges the political leadership of the Republika Srpska to refrain from and renounce provocative, divisive rhetoric and actions, including questioning the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country. The EU urges all political actors in BiH to take resolute action to implement the necessary reforms to advance on the EU path towards opening EU accession negotiations. We reiterate our full commitment to the EU accession perspective of BiH as a single, united and sovereign country".[32]
In 2005, theEuropean Commission suggested in a strategy paper that the present enlargement agenda could potentially block the possibility of a future accession ofArmenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Georgia,Moldova, andUkraine.[33]Olli Rehn, theEuropean Commissioner for Enlargement between 2004 and 2010, said on the occasion that the EU should "avoid overstretching our capacity, and instead consolidate our enlargement agenda," adding, "this is already a challenging agenda for our accession process."[34] In May 2009, theEastern Partnership was established as a specific dimension of theEuropean Neighbourhood Policy, which contains both a bilateral and multilateral track for six Eastern neighbours to the European Union (Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Georgia,Moldova, andUkraine),[35] in the form of aninstitutionalised forum for discussingvisa agreements,free trade deals, and strategic partnership agreements, while there is no requirement to pursueaccession to the European Union.[36]
TheEuropean Parliament passed a resolution in April 2014 stating that "in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as any other European country, have a European perspective and can apply for EU membership in compliance with the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, minority rights and ensuring the rule of rights."[37] In 2016-17 Association Agreements between the EU and Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine were ratified, and collectively these three countries became referred to as theAssociation Trio. They also entered theDeep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU, which creates "framework for modernising [...] trade relations and for economic development by the opening of markets via the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas, and by an extensive harmonisation of laws, norms and regulations in various trade-related sectors, creating the conditions for aligning key sectors" of their economies with EU standards.[38] However, the EU did not expand further into thepost-Soviet space in the 2010s.[39]
As of December 2019, the Association Trio is sometimes expanded to theTrio + 1 with the inclusion ofArmenia, which is not formally on the EU's enlargement agenda but is considering submitting an application for membership.
By January 2021, Georgia and Ukraine were preparing to formally apply for EU membership in 2024.[40][41][42] However, following the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine submitted an application for EU membership on 28 February 2022, followed by Georgia and Moldova on 3 March 2022.[43][44] On 23 June 2022, theEuropean Council granted candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, and recognised Georgia as a potential candidate for membership.[45] When taking its candidacy decision for Ukraine and Moldova, the Council made opening the accession negotiations conditional to addressing respectively seven and nine key areas related to strengthening the rule of law, fighting corruption and improving governance processes.
In his speech in Moldova on 28 March 2023, President of the European Council Charles Michel mentioned that "by the end of the year, the Council will have to decide on the opening negotiations with [Ukraine and Moldova]. It will be a political decision taking into account the report that will be published by the Commission. And I sincerely hope that a positive decision will be possible by the end of the year".[46]
On 8 November 2023, the European Commission recommended opening negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine, and granting candidate status to Georgia,[22] and this was agreed by the European Council on 14 December 2023.[47]
On 25 June 2024, the first Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was called by the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, officially marking the start of the accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine.[48]
On 9 July 2024, following the adoption of a law by Georgia's rulingGeorgian Dream party requiring non-governmental and media entities to register as "foreign agents", the EU ambassador in Georgia announced that in response the EU would de facto halt the country's accession progress, with no further steps to advance the process to be expected and no financial support granted for as long as the law exists.[49][50] The European Union has threatened Georgia with sanctions and suspension of relations if the country becomes a "one-party state" without political opposition following parliamentary elections in October 2024.[51]
The2024 Georgian parliamentary elections resulted in Georgian Dream retaining power, but were disputed by opposition parties which claimed that the vote was not free and fair and was subject to widespread voter fraud. TheEuropean Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution which rejected the validity of the results, and called for the vote to be repeated within a year.[52] Following this, Georgian Prime MinisterIrakli Kobakhidze stated that accession negotiations would be suspended until the end of 2028,[53] though he insisted thathis government would continue to implement the reforms required for accession and that it still planned for Georgia to join the EU by 2030.[54]
The EU have halted all financial aid for the Georgian government since 27 June 2024, and instead redirected its financial support only to be received by civil society and the media in Georgia.[50] Similar to the growth plans andIPA III grants launched towards supporting structural reforms to improve accession perspectives forcandidates from the Western Balkans, the EU launched – or is about to launch – similar growth plan programmes for Ukraine and Moldova:[28]
In October 2024, theMoldovan EU membership constitutional referendum resulted in support to amend theConstitution of Moldova to include the aim of becoming an EU member state.[61][62][63]
Turkey's candidacy to join the EU has been a matter of major significance and considerable controversy since it was granted in 1999. Turkey has had historically close ties with the EU, having anassociation agreement since 1964,[64] being in acustoms union with the EU since 1995 and initially applying to join in 1987. Only after a summit in Brussels on 17 December 2004 (following the major2004 enlargement) did the European Council announce that membership negotiations with Turkey were officially opened on 3 October 2005.
Turkey is theeleventh largest economy in the world (measured as Purchasing Power Parity), and is a keyregional power.[65][66] In 2006,Carl Bildt, formerSwedish foreign minister, stated that "[The accession of Turkey] would give the EU a decisive role for stability in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which is clearly in the strategic interest of Europe."[67] However, others, such as formerFrench PresidentNicolas Sarkozy and formerGerman ChancellorAngela Merkel, expressed opposition to Turkey's membership. Opponents argue that Turkey does not respect the key principles that are expected in aliberal democracy, such as thefreedom of expression.[68]
Turkey's large population would also alter the balance of power in the representative European institutions. Upon joining the EU, Turkey's 84 million inhabitants would bestow it the largest number ofMEPs in theEuropean Parliament. It would become the mostpopulous country in the EU.[69] Another problem is that Turkey does not recognise one EU member state,Cyprus, because of theCyprus problem and the Cypriot government blocks some chapters of Turkey's talks.[70][71]
EU–Turkey relations have deteriorated following President Erdoğan's crackdown on supporters of the2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt. While Erdoğan stated that he approved the reintroduction of the death penalty to punishthose involved in the coup, the EU announced that it strongly condemned the coup attempt and would officially end accession negotiations with Turkey if the death penalty was reintroduced.[72] On 25 July 2016, President of the European CommissionJean-Claude Juncker said that Turkey was not in a position to become a member of the European Union in the near future and that accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey would be stopped immediately if the death penalty was brought back.[73] On 24 November 2016, the European Parliament approved a non-binding resolution calling for the "temporary freeze of the ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey" over human rights and rule of law concerns.[74][75][76] On 13 December 2016, theEuropean Council (comprising the heads of state or government of the member states) resolved that it would open no new areas in Turkey's membership talks in the "prevailing circumstances",[77] as Turkey's path toward autocratic rule made progress on EU accession impossible.[78] On 6 July 2017, the European Parliament accepted the call for the suspension of full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey,[79] and a repeat of the exact same vote ended with the same result in March 2019[80] and May 2021.[81] On 17 July 2018, then-Austrian ChancellorSebastian Kurz said that it would be beneficial to end the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey and instead develop bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey.[82] As of 2022, and especially following Erdoğan's victory in theconstitutional referendum, Turkish accession talks are effectively at a standstill.[2][83][84]
In July 2023, Erdoğan brought up Turkey's accession to EU membership up in the context ofSweden's application for NATO membership.[85] However, in September 2023, he announced that the European Union was well into a rupture in its relations with Turkey and that they could part ways during Turkey's European Union membership process.[86]CHP leader andTurkey's main opposition leaderÖzgür Özel announced that if he wins thenext Turkish general elections, his country will rapidly continue its accession negotiations with the EU and his country will become a member of the EU as soon as possible.[87]
| State | Status[1] | Chapters opened | Chapters closed | Latest steps | Next step | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Montenegro (accession process) | Candidate negotiating (since June 2012)[88] | 33/33[88]
| 7/33[89][88]
| Screening completed for all chapters in June 2013.[90] First chapters opened in December 2012.[91] | All chapters must be closed to conclude the negotiations. | ||||||||
| Albania (accession process) | Candidate negotiating (since July 2022)[92] | 28/33[93][94]
| 0/33[94]
| Screening completed for all chapters in November 2023.[95] First chapters opened in October 2024.[96] | All chapters must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations. | ||||||||
| Serbia (accession process) | Candidate negotiating (since January 2014)[97] | 22/34[97]
| 2/34[97]
| Screening completed for all chapters in March 2015.[98] First chapters opened in December 2015.[99] | All chapters must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations. Benchmarks have been met for the opening of all 3 remaining chapters in cluster 3, but this has been postponed due the opening being conditional on"substantial further progress made by Serbia, in particular in accordance with...the rule of law (chapter 23+24) and thenormalisation of relations with Kosovo".[28][100] | ||||||||
 Moldova(accession process) (relations) | Candidate negotiating (since June 2024)[48][101] | 0/33[102]
| 0/33[102]
| Screening completed for all chapters in September 2025.[103] | Opening of the first 5 negotiating chapters (Fundamentals cluster) at a second intergovernmental conference. All chapters must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations. | ||||||||
| North Macedonia (accession process) | Candidate negotiating (since July 2022)[92] | 0/33[104]
| 0/33[104]
| Screening completed for all chapters in December 2023.[104] | The opening of the first 5 negotiating chapters (Fundamentals cluster) at a second intergovernmental conference will not begin until the opening phase has been completed, which, according to theCouncil conclusions of July 2022, is conditional on theAssembly of North Macedonia approving aconstitutional amendment related to the Bulgarian minority.[105][106][28] | ||||||||
 Ukraine(accession process) (relations) | Candidate negotiating (since June 2024)[48][107] | 0/33[108]
| 0/33[108]
| Screening completed for all chapters in September 2025.[109] | The opening of the first 5 negotiating chapters (Fundamentals cluster) at a second intergovernmental conference. Every chapter must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations. | ||||||||
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (accession process) | Candidate (since December 2022)[110] | — | — | The European Council granted conditional approval for the opening of accession negotiations in March 2024.[111][110] | The European Commission needs to prepare a negotiating framework for adoption by theCouncil, once all relevant steps set out in the Commission's recommendation of 12 October 2022 have been taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina.[112] The state claimed to meet 98% of conditions demanded by the European Commission by passing a 2024 budget and Growth Plan reform package in July 2024.[113][114][115] Final approval of the Growth Plan reform package was however blocked by fourcantons on 25 July.[116] As of December 2024, the Council reminded they still needed to receive an approved Growth Plan reform package along with a national programme for adoption of EU law, and that the country should appoint a chief negotiator and a nationalIPA III coordinator, before the adoption of a negotiation framework can happen as the next step of the process.[28] | ||||||||
 Georgia(accession process) (relations) | Candidate (since December 2023)[47] | — | — | The European Council granted candidate status in December 2023.[117] TheGeorgian government suspended its EU membership application process until the end of 2028.[53][28] | The European Commission needs to recommend starting negotiations. This is considered unlikely following thedisputed elections. | ||||||||
| Kosovo (accession process) | Applicant / Potential candidate | — | — | Application for membership submitted in December 2022.[13] | TheCouncil needs to by unanimous decision request the European Commission to submit an opinion. This is considered unlikely as long as thedispute with Serbia remains active. | ||||||||
 Turkey(accession process) (relations) | Candidate with frozen negotiations (opened in October 2005,[118] but frozen since December 2016)[77] | 16/33[119]
| 1/33[119]
| Screening completed for all chapters in October 2006.[118] First chapters opened in June 2006.[118] Chapter opening frozen in December 2016, due to backsliding in the areas of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights.[77] Chapter closing dialogue frozen since June 2018.[120][119] | Negotiations frozen, with no further chapters being considered for opening or closing, which has been reconfirmed by theCouncil each year since 2018.[119][120][121][122][123][106][28] |
| Major events | Association Agreement (with link) | Membership application | Candidate status | Negotiations start (1stIGC) | Substantial negotiations start (2ndIGC) | Accession Treaty signed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | 1 Dec 1964 (AA) | 14 Apr 1987 | 12 Dec 1999 | 3 Oct 2005[124] | 12 Jun 2006[118][125] | (tbd) |
| Montenegro | 1 May 2010 (SAA) | 15 Dec 2008 | 17 Dec 2010[126] | 29 Jun 2012[88] | 18 Dec 2012[91] | (tbd) |
| Serbia | 1 Sep 2013 (SAA) | 22 Dec 2009 | 1 Mar 2012 | 21 Jan 2014[127] | 14 Dec 2015[99] | (tbd) |
| Albania | 1 Apr 2009 (SAA) | 28 Apr 2009 | 27 Jun 2014[128][129] | 19 Jul 2022[92] | 15 Oct 2024[96] | (tbd) |
| North Macedonia | 1 Apr 2004 (SAA) | 22 Mar 2004 | 17 Dec 2005 | 19 Jul 2022[92] | (tbd) | (tbd) |
| Moldova | 1 Jul 2016 (AA) | 3 Mar 2022[130] | 23 Jun 2022[45] | 25 Jun 2024[131] | (tbd) | (tbd) |
| Ukraine | 1 Sep 2017 (AA) | 28 Feb 2022[132] | 23 Jun 2022[45] | 25 Jun 2024[133] | (tbd) | (tbd) |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1 Jun 2015 (SAA)[134] | 15 Feb 2016[135] | 15 Dec 2022[11] | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) |
| Georgia | 1 Jul 2016 (AA) | 3 Mar 2022[136] | 14 Dec 2023[47] | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) |
| Kosovo[Note 1] | 1 Apr 2016 (SAA)[137] | 14 Dec 2022[13] | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) |
| All events | Candidates negotiating | Candidates | Applicant / Potential candidate | Candidate with frozen negotiations | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Moldova | Montenegro | North Macedonia | Serbia | Ukraine | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Georgia | Kosovo[Note 1] | Turkey | ||||
| EU Association Agreement[Note 2] | |||||||||||||
| EU Association Agreement negotiations start | 31 Jan 2003 | Jan 2010[138] | 10 Oct 2005[Note 3] | 5 Apr 2000 | 10 Oct 2005[Note 4] | 5 Mar 2007 | 25 Nov 2005 | Jan 2010 | 28 Oct 2013[140] | 1959AA 1970CU | |||
| EU Association Agreement signature | 12 Jun 2006 | 27 Jun 2014 | 15 Oct 2007 | 9 Apr 2001 | 29 Apr 2008 | 21 Mar 2014AA 27 Jun 2014DCFTA | 16 Jun 2008 | 27 Jun 2014 | 27 Oct 2015[141] | 12 Sep 1963AA 1995CU | |||
| EU Association Agreement entry into force | 1 Apr 2009 | 1 Jul 2016 | 1 May 2010 | 1 Apr 2004 | 1 Sep 2013 | 1 Sep 2017 | 1 Jun 2015[134] | 1 Jul 2016 | 1 Apr 2016[137] | 1 Dec 1964AA 31 Dec 1995CU[142] | |||
| Membership application | |||||||||||||
| Membership application submitted | 28 Apr 2009 | 3 Mar 2022[130] | 15 Dec 2008 | 22 Mar 2004 | 22 Dec 2009 | 28 Feb 2022[132] | 15 Feb 2016[135] | 3 Mar 2022[136] | 14 Dec 2022[13] | 14 Apr 1987 | |||
| Council asksCommission foropinion | 16 Nov 2009 | 7 Mar 2022[143] | 23 Apr 2009 | 17 May 2004 | 25 Oct 2010[144] | 7 Mar 2022[143] | 20 Sep 2016[145] | 7 Mar 2022[143] | (tbd) | 27 Apr 1987 | |||
| Commission presents legislative questionnaire to applicant | 16 Dec 2009 | 11 Apr 2022 (Part I) 19 Apr 2022 (Part II)[146] | 22 Jul 2009 | 1 Oct 2004 | 24 Nov 2010 | 8 Apr 2022 (Part I) 13 Apr 2022 (Part II)[147] | 9 Dec 2016[148] | 11 Apr 2022 (Part I) 19 Apr 2022 (Part II)[146][149] | (tbd) | ||||
| Applicant responds to questionnaire | 11 Jun 2010 | 22 Apr 2022 (Part I)[150] 12 May 2022 (Part II)[151] | 12 Apr 2010 | 10 May 2005 | 22 Apr 2011 | 17 Apr 2022 (Part I)[152] 9 May 2022 (Part II)[153] | 28 Feb 2018 | 2 May 2022 (Part I)[154] 10 May 2022 (Part II)[155] | (tbd) | ||||
| Commission issues its opinion (and subsequent reports) | 2010–2013 | 17 Jun 2022[156] | 9 Nov 2010 | 2005–2009 | 12 Oct 2011 | 17 Jun 2022[156] | 2019[157]–2022 | 17 Jun 2022[156] | (tbd) | 1989, 1997–2004 | |||
| Candidate status | |||||||||||||
| Commission recommends granting of candidate status | 16 Oct 2013[158] | 17 Jun 2022[156] | 9 Nov 2010 | 9 Nov 2005 | 12 Oct 2011 | 17 Jun 2022[156] | 12 Oct 2022[159] | 8 Nov 2023[22] | (tbd) | 13 Oct 1999 | |||
| European Council grantscandidate status to Applicant | 27 Jun 2014[128][129] | 23 Jun 2022[45] | 17 Dec 2010[126] | 17 Dec 2005 | 1 Mar 2012 | 23 Jun 2022[45] | 15 Dec 2022[11] | 14 Dec 2023[47] | (tbd) | 12 Dec 1999 | |||
| Accession negotiations | |||||||||||||
| Commission recommends to open negotiations | 9 Nov 2016[160] | 8 Nov 2023[22] | 12 Oct 2011 | 14 Oct 2009 | 22 Apr 2013[161] | 8 Nov 2023[22] | 12 Mar 2024[24] | (tbd) | (tbd) | 6 Oct 2004 | |||
| European Council decides to open negotiations | 26 Jun 2018[162][120][163] | 14 Dec 2023[47] | 28 Jun 2012[88] | 18 Jun 2019[163] | 28 Jun 2013[97] | 14 Dec 2023[47] | 21 Mar 2024[112] | (tbd) | (tbd) | 16 Dec 2004[119] | |||
| Council setsnegotiations start date | 24 Mar 2020[10] | 21 Jun 2024[164] | 26 Jun 2012[165] | 24 Mar 2020[10] | 17 Dec 2013[166] | 21 Jun 2024[164] | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | 17 Dec 2004 | |||
| Membership negotiations start (firstIGC) | 19 Jul 2022[92] | 25 Jun 2024[131] | 29 Jun 2012[88] | 19 Jul 2022[92] | 21 Jan 2014[127] | 25 Jun 2024[133] | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | 3 Oct 2005[124] | |||
| First negotiating chapters opened (secondIGC) | 15 Oct 2024[96] | (tbd) | 18 Dec 2012[91] | (tbd) | 14 Dec 2015[99] | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | 12 Jun 2006[118][125] | |||
| Membership negotiations end | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | |||
| Accession treaty and joining the EU | |||||||||||||
| Accession Treaty signature | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | |||
| EU joining date | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | (tbd) | |||
| |||||||||||||
The table below shows the level of preparation of applicant countries with EU standards (acquis communautaire) on a 5-point scale, using data from the European Commission's 2024 reports. The analysis is based on the analysis performed by the online media outletEuropean Pravda for Ukraine; scores for other countries, as well as additional sections (public administration reform and economic criteria) were added based on official data from the European Commission's reports.[167][168]
| Chapter | Candidates negotiating | Candidates | Applicant / Potential candidate | Candidate with frozen negotiations | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Moldova | Montenegro | North Macedonia | Serbia | Ukraine | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Georgia | Kosovo | Turkey | ||||
| Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process | |||||||||||||
| Public administration reform | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1.5 | 3 | 2 | 2.5 | |||
| 23. Judiciary and fundamental rights | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1.5 | 1 | |||
| 24. Justice, freedom and security | 3 | 2 | 3.5 | 3 | 2.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | |||
| The existence of a functioning market economy | 4 | 1.5 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1.5 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 5 | |||
| The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union | 2 | 1.5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1.5 | 2 | 1 | 4 | |||
| 5. Public procurement | 3 | 2 | 3.5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2.5 | 3 | |||
| 18. Statistics | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | |||
| 32. Financial control | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | |||
| Cluster 2: Internal Market | |||||||||||||
| 1. Free movement of goods | 2.5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2.5 | 4 | |||
| 2. Freedom of movement for workers | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | |||
| 3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | |||
| 4. Free movement of capital | 3 | 2.5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2.5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | |||
| 6. Company law | 3 | 1.5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | |||
| 7. Intellectual property law | 3 | 2 | 4.5 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |||
| 8. Competition policy | 2.5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 9. Financial services | 3.5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2.5 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |||
| 28. Consumer and health protection | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | |||
| Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth | |||||||||||||
| 10. Digital transformation and media | 3.5 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3.5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 16. Taxation | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3.5 | 2 | 2 | 2.5 | 2 | 3 | |||
| 17. Economic and monetary policy | 3.5 | 2 | 3 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | |||
| 19. Social policy and employment | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1.5 | 2 | |||
| 20. Enterprise and industrial policy | 3.5 | 2 | 4 | 3.5 | 3 | 2.5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | |||
| 25. Science and research | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | |||
| 26. Education and culture | 3 | 2.5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | |||
| 29. Customs union | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | |||
| Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity | |||||||||||||
| 14. Transport | 2 | 2 | 3.5 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | |||
| 15. Energy | 3.5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | |||
| 21. Trans-European networks | 2 | 2 | 3.5 | 4 | 3.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | |||
| 27. Environment and climate change | 2 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||
| Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion | |||||||||||||
| 11. Agriculture and rural development | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2.5 | 2 | |||
| 13. Fisheries and aquaculture | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | |||
| 22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1.5 | 1 | 3 | |||
| 33. Financial and budgetary provisions | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | 2 | |||
| Cluster 6: External relations | |||||||||||||
| 30. External relations | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | |||
| 31. Foreign, security and defence policy | 4 | 3.5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | — | 2 | |||
| Average level | 2.82 | 1.99 | 3.18 | 3.06 | 3.13 | 2.22 | 1.64 | 2.18 | 1.99 | 2.99 | |||
5 Well advanced 4.5 Good / Well advanced 4 Good level of preparation 3.5 Moderate / Good 3 Moderately prepared 2.5 Some / Moderate 2 Some level of preparation 1.5 Early stage / Some 1 Early stage | |||||||||||||
The table below shows the progress over the past year of applicant countries on a 4-point scale, using data from the European Commission's 2024 reports. The analysis is based on the analysis performed by the online media outletEuropean Pravda for Ukraine; scores for other countries, as well as additional sections (public administration reform and economic criteria) were added based on official data from the European Commission's reports.[167][168]
| Chapter | Candidates negotiating | Candidates | Applicant / Potential candidate | Candidate with frozen negotiations | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Moldova | Montenegro | North Macedonia | Serbia | Ukraine | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Georgia | Kosovo | Turkey | ||||
| Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process | |||||||||||||
| Public administration reform | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | |||
| 23. Judiciary and fundamental rights | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | -4 | 1 | 0 | |||
| 24. Justice, freedom and security | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |||
| The existence of a functioning market economy | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | |||
| The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||
| 5. Public procurement | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | |||
| 18. Statistics | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 32. Financial control | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |||
| Cluster 2: Internal Market | |||||||||||||
| 1. Free movement of goods | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | |||
| 2. Freedom of movement for workers | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |||
| 3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |||
| 4. Free movement of capital | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||
| 6. Company law | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | |||
| 7. Intellectual property law | 2 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | |||
| 8. Competition policy | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | |||
| 9. Financial services | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 28. Consumer and health protection | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||
| Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth | |||||||||||||
| 10. Digital transformation and media | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||
| 16. Taxation | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | |||
| 17. Economic and monetary policy | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | |||
| 19. Social policy and employment | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | |||
| 20. Enterprise and industrial policy | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 25. Science and research | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | |||
| 26. Education and culture | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||
| 29. Customs union | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | |||
| Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity | |||||||||||||
| 14. Transport | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 15. Energy | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | |||
| 21. Trans-European networks | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||
| 27. Environment and climate change | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||
| Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion | |||||||||||||
| 11. Agriculture and rural development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | |||
| 12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | |||
| 13. Fisheries and aquaculture | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | |||
| 22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |||
| 33. Financial and budgetary provisions | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | — | 0 | |||
| Cluster 6: External relations | |||||||||||||
| 30. External relations | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||
| 31. Foreign, security and defence policy | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | — | 0 | |||
| Average progress | 1.56 | 1.89 | 1.83 | 1.39 | 1.08 | 1.78 | 0.61 | 1.06 | 1.50 | 1.08 | |||
4 Very good progress 3 Good progress 2.5 Some / Good progress 2 Some progress 1 Limited progress 0 No progress -4 Backsliding | |||||||||||||
TheMaastricht Treaty (Article 49) states that any European country (as defined by aEuropean Council assessment) that is committed todemocracy may apply for membership in the European Union.[169] In addition to European states, other countries have also been speculated or proposed as future members of the EU.
States in Europe that have chosen, for various reasons, not to join the EU have integrated with it to different extents according to their circumstances. Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein participate directly in the single market via theEEA, Switzerland does so via bilateral treaties and the otherEuropean microstates (Andorra,Monaco,San Marino,Vatican City) have specific agreements with the EU and neighbouring countries, including their use of theeuro as their currency. Most of these countries are also part of theSchengen Area. Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland have all previously had live applications to join the EU, which have been withdrawn or otherwise frozen. Such applications could be resubmitted in the event of a change in the political landscape.
On 12 March 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming that Armenia metMaastricht TreatyArticle 49 requirements and that the country may apply for EU membership.[211] Apetition calling for a referendum on whether Armenia should apply for membership of the EU,[212] which was supported by Armenian prime ministerNikol Pashinyan,[213] succeeded in reaching the 50,000 signatures required in order to be submitted for a vote in theNational Assembly.[214][215] On 12 February 2025, Armenia's parliament approved a bill on the launch of the accession process of Armenia to the European Union.[216] Pashinyan had stated that if the bill was approved then a roadmap should be agreed to with the European Union prior to holding the referendum.[217] The decision for the government to support the bill was reported to be the first step of "the beginning of theaccession process of the Republic of Armenia to the European Union".[218][219]On 4 April 2025, Armenian PresidentVahagn Khachaturyan signed and approved the bill on the process of Armenia's accession to the EU.[220][221]
Iceland had active accession negotiations from July 2010 until September 2013, but then the membership application was first suspended and then withdrawn by the Icelandic government.[citation needed] Since March 2022, opinion polls have however shown a stable support for Iceland to join the EU. There was a renewed call in September 2022 for a referendum on resuming EU membership negotiations.[222] Following the2024 Icelandic parliamentary election, theSocial Democratic Alliance,Viðreisn andPeople's Party formed a new coalition government, which agreed to hold areferendum on resuming negotiations on EU membership by 2027.[223]
Internal enlargement is the process of new member states arising from the break-up of an existing member state.[225][226][227] There have been and are a number ofactive separatist movements within member states (for example inCatalonia andFlanders) but there are no clear agreements, treaties or precedents covering the scenario of an existing EU member state breaking into two or more states, both of which wish to remain EU member states. The question is whether one state is a successor and one a new applicant or, alternatively, both are new states which must be admitted to the EU.[228][229]
In some cases, a region desires to leave its state and the EU, namely those regions wishing tojoin Switzerland. But most, namely the two movements that held referendums during the 2010s, Scotland and Catalonia, see their future as independent states within the EU. This results in great interest in whether, once independent, they would retain EU membership or conversely whether they would have to re-apply. In the later case, since new members must be approved unanimously, any other state which has an interest in blocking their membership to deter similar independence movements could do so.[230][231] Additionally, it is unclear whether the successor state would retain anyopt-outs that the parent state was entitled to.
The presence of a strong Basque Nationalist movement, a majority in several territories of theBasque Country, makes possible the future existence of an independent Basque Country under different potential territorial configurations. In overall terms the Basque nationalism is pro-European.
On 1 October 2017, theCatalan government held areferendum on independence, which had been declared illegal by theConstitutional Court of Spain, with potential polling stations being cordoned off by riot police. The subsequent events constituted a political crisis for Catalonia. The EU's position is to keep distance from the crisis while supporting Spain's territorial integrity and constitution.[241][242] While the debate around Scotland's referendum may inform the Catalan crisis, Catalonia is in a distinct situation from Scotland whereby the central government does not recognise the legitimacy of any independence declaration from Catalonia. If Spain does not recognise the independence of a Catalan state, Catalonia cannot separately join the EU and it is still recognised as part of Spain's EU membership.
Corsica has a strong and electorally successfulnationalist movement, with positions ranging from autonomy to outright independence, the latter option with around 10–15% public support.[243] The independist partyCorsica Libera envisions an independent Corsica within the European Union as a union of various European peoples, as well as recommendations for alignment within European directives.[244]
There is anactive movement towardsFlemish independence orunion with the Netherlands. The future status ofWallonia andBrussels (thede facto capital of the EU) are unclear as viable political states, perhaps producing a unique situation fromScotland andCatalonia. There are various proposals, both within and outside the independentist movement, forwhat should happen to Brussels, ranging from staying part of the Belgian rump state, to joining the hypothetical Flemish state, to becoming a separate political entity.[245][246]
Sardinia has a strong and electorally successfulnationalist movement, with positions ranging from autonomy to outright independence. Generally associated withleft-wing politics, the Sardinian movement is largely pro-European and pro-environmentalism.[247][248]
According to a 2012 survey conducted in a joint effort between theUniversity of Cagliari and that ofEdinburgh,[249][250][251] 41% ofSardinians would be in favour of independence (with 10% choosing it from both Italy and the European Union, and 31% only from Italy with Sardinia remaining in the EU), whilst another 46% would rather have a larger autonomy within Italy and the EU, including fiscal power; 12% of people would be content to remain part of Italy and the EU with a Regional Council without any fiscal powers, and 1% in Italy and the EU without a Regional Council and fiscal powers.[252][253][254][255][256][257][258] A 2017 poll by the Ixè Institute found that 51% of those questioned identified as Sardinian (as opposed to an Italian average of 15% identifying by their region of origin), rather than Italian (19%), European (11%) and/or citizen of the world (19%).[259][260]
Sardinian nationalists address a number of issues, such as theenvironmental damage caused by the military forces[261][262][263][264][265][266][267][268][269] (about 60% of such bases in Italy are located on the island),[270] the financial and economic exploitation of the island's resources by the Italian state and mainland industrialists,[271] the lack of any political representation both in Italy and in theEuropean Parliament[272][273] (due to an unbalanced electoral constituency that still remains to this day,[274] Sardinia has not had its own MEP since 1994),[275] the nuclear power andwaste (on which a referendum was proposed by a Sardist party,[276] being held in 2011[277]) and the ongoing process of depopulation and Italianization that would destroy the Sardinian indigenous culture.[278]
Similarly to Sardinia,Veneto has a strong and electorally successfulnationalist movement, with positions ranging from autonomy to outright independence. In acontroversial online poll held in 2014, 89% of participants were in favour of Veneto becoming "a federal, independent and sovereign state" and 55% supported accession to European Union membership.[279] Three years later, in the2017 autonomy referendum, with a 58% turnout, 98% of the participants voted in favour of "further forms and special conditions of autonomy to be attributed to the Region of Veneto".[280] Consequently, negotiations between the Venetian government and the Italian one started.
The longstanding and largest Venetist party,Liga Veneta (LV), was established in 1979 under the slogan "farther fromRome, closer toEurope",[281] but has later adopted moreEurosceptic positions.Luca Zaia, a LV member who has served aspresident of Veneto since 2010, usually self-describes as apro-Europeanist and has long advocated for a "Europe of regions" and "macro-regions".[282][283][284][285]
This scenario consists of the event of an EU member state taking over a land area outside the union, previously independent or part of a different country. One such event has taken place in history, whenEast Germany became part of a united Germany in 1991.
Officially, theisland nation ofCyprus is part of the European Union, under thede jure sovereignty of theRepublic of Cyprus.Turkish Cypriots are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and thus of the European Union, and were entitled to vote in the2004 European Parliament election (though only a few hundred registered). The EU'sacquis communautaire is suspended indefinitely in the northern third of the island, which has remained outside the control of the Republic of Cyprus since theTurkish invasion of 1974. TheGreek Cypriot community rejected theAnnan Plan for the settlement of theCyprus dispute in areferendum on 24 April 2004. Had the referendum been in favour of the settlement proposal, the island (excluding the BritishSovereign Base Areas) would have joined the European Union as theUnited Cyprus Republic. The European Union's relations with theTurkish Cypriot Community are handled by theEuropean Commission'sDirectorate-General for Enlargement.[286]
TheEuropean Council has recognised that following theUK withdrawal from the EU, ifNorthern Ireland were to be incorporated into aunited Ireland it would automatically rejoin the EU under the current Irish membership. A historical precedent for this was the incorporation ofEast Germany into theFederal Republic of Germany as a single European Communities member state.[287][288]
Opinion polls in bothMoldova andRomania show significant support for the unification of the two countries, based on their reciprocal historical and cultural ties.[289][290] Such a scenario would result in Moldova becoming part of an enlarged Romania and therefore receiving the benefits and obligations of the latter's EU membership.[291] An obstacle would be the existence of the breakawayPridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria), which the international community recognizes to bede jure part of Moldova's sovereign territory but isde facto independent. Transnistria's almost complete absence of historical or political precedents for being part of Romania, its ethnic composition despite the presence of Romanian-speakers and its political and military backing from Russia have been seen as major hurdles to integration of the region with both Romania and the EU.[290] Another likely barrier from within Moldova would be opposition on the part of the autonomous territory ofGagauzia, whose population has been mostly against integration with Romania since the 1990s.[292]2014 referendums held by the Gagauz government showed both overwhelming support for the region joining theCustoms Union of the Eurasian Economic Union and a similar level of rejection to closer ties with the EU.[293]
There are multiplespecial member state territories, some of which are not fully covered by the EU treaties and apply EU law only partially, if at all. It is possible for a dependency to change its status regarding the EU or some particular treaty or law provision. The territory may change its status from participation to leaving or from being outside to joining.
TheFaroe Islands, a self-governing nation within theKingdom of Denmark, is not part of the EU, as explicitly asserted by both Rome treaties.[294] The relations with the EU are governed by a Fisheries Agreement (1977) and aFree Trade Agreement (1991, revised 1998). The main reason for remaining outside the EU is disagreements about theCommon Fisheries Policy,[295] which disfavours countries with large fish resources. Also, every member has to pay for theCommon Agricultural Policy, which favours countries having much agriculture which the Faroe Islands does not. When Iceland was in membership negotiations around 2010, there was a hope of better conditions for fish-rich countries,[citation needed] but to no avail. The Common Fisheries Policy was introduced in 1970 for the very reason of getting access for the first EC members to waters of candidate countries, namely the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark including the Faroe Islands.[citation needed]
Nevertheless, there have been politicians, mainly in the right-wingUnion Party (Sambandsflokkurin), led by their chairmanKaj Leo Johannesen, who would like to see the Faroes as a member of the EU. However, the chairman of the left-wingRepublic (Tjóðveldi),Høgni Hoydal, has expressed concerns that if the Faroes were to join the EU as is, they might vanish inside the EU, comparing this with the situation ofÅland today, and wants the local government to solve the political situation between the Faroes and Denmark first.[296]
Greenland is part of theKingdom of Denmark, and became part of the EEC (the predecessor entity of the EU) when Denmark joined in 1973. After the establishment of Greenland'shome rule in 1979, which made it an autonomous community, Greenland held a referendum on EEC membership. The result was (mainly because of theCommon Fisheries Policy) to leave, so on 1 February 1985,Greenland left theEEC andEURATOM. Its status was changed to that of an Overseas Country.[297][298] Danish nationals residing in Greenland (i.e. all native population) are nonetheless fully European citizens; they are not, however, entitled to vote in European elections.
There has been some speculation as to whether Greenland may consider rejoining the now-European Union. On 4 January 2007, the Danish dailyJyllands-Posten quoted the former Danishminister for Greenland,Tom Høyem, as saying "I would not be surprised if Greenland again becomes a member of the EU... The EU needs theArctic window and Greenland cannot alone manage the gigantic Arctic possibilities".[299] Greenland has a lot of natural resources, and Greenland has, especially during the2000s commodities boom, contracted foreign private companies to exploit some of them, but the cost is considered too high, as Greenland is remote and severely lacks infrastructure which has to be built. After 2013 prices declined so such efforts stalled.
The Brexit debate has reignited talk about the EU in Greenland with calls for the island to join the Union again.[297] In 2024, an opinion poll found that 60 percent of Greenland's population would vote in favour of re-joining the EU.[300]
The islands ofAruba andCuraçao, as well asSint Maarten, are constituent countries of theKingdom of the Netherlands, whileBonaire,Sint Eustatius andSaba arespecial Dutch municipalities. All areOverseas Countries and Territories (OCT) under Annex II of the EC treaty.[297] OCTs are considered to be "associated" with the EU and apply some portions of EU law. The islands are opting to become anOutermost Region (OMR) of the EU, a status in which the islands form a part of the European Union, though they benefit fromderogations (exceptions) from some EU laws due to their geographical remoteness from mainland Europe. The islands are focusing on gaining the same status as theAzores,Madeira, theCanary Islands, and theFrench overseas departments.
When Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba were established as Dutch public bodies after thedissolution of the Netherlands Antilles (which was an OCT) in 2010, their status within the EU was raised. Rather than change their status from an OCT to an outermost region, as their change in status within the Netherlands would imply, it was decided that their status would remain the same for at least five years. After those five years, their status would be reviewed.[needs update]
If it was decided that if one or all of the islands wish to integrate more with the EU then theTreaty of Lisbon provides for that following a unanimous decision from theEuropean Council.[301] FormerEuropean Commissioner for EnlargementDanuta Hübner has said before theEuropean Parliament that she does not expect many problems to occur with such a status change, as the population of the islands is only a few thousand people.[citation needed]
The territories ofFrench Guiana,Guadeloupe,Martinique,Mayotte andRéunion areoverseas departments of France and at the same time mono-departmentaloverseas regions. According to the EC treaty (article 299 2), all of these departments areoutermost regions (OMR) of the EU—hence provisions of the EC treaty apply there while derogations are allowed. The status of theOverseas collectivity ofSaint-Martin is also defined as OMR by theTreaty of Lisbon.New Caledonia and the overseas collectivities ofFrench Polynesia,Saint-Barthelemy,Saint Pierre and Miquelon, andWallis and Futuna areOverseas Countries and Territories of the EU.[297]
New Caledonia is anoverseas part of France with its own unique status under the French Constitution, which is distinct from that of overseas departments and collectivities. It is defined as an "overseas country of France" under the 1998Nouméa Accord, and enjoys a high degree of self-government.[302] Currently, in regard to the EU, it is one of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT).
As a result of theNouméa Accord, New Caledonians voted in three consecutive independence referendums in2018,2020, and2021. The referendums were to determine whether the territory would remain a part of the French Republic as a "sui generis collectivity", or whether it would become an independent state. The accords also specify a gradual devolution of powers to the local New Caledonian assembly. The results of all three referendums determined that New Caledonia would remain a part of the French Republic.
Spain, which fears the separation of the Catalonia region, has blocked the accession of Kosovo ...Jose Manuel Barroso, thepresident of the European Commission ... went on: 'It will be extremely difficult to get the approval of all the other member states to have a new member coming from one member state.' 'We have seen that Spain has been opposing even the recognition of Kosovo, for instance. It's to some extent a similar case because it's a new country, and so I believe it's going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.'
'They have to resolve a mountain of problems, asBetter Together has explained very well,' he said.'You have to achieve candidate status. You have to negotiate 35 chapters . It has to be ratified by the institutions of the EU. It then has to be ratified by 28 national parliaments.'
pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – like any other European state – have a European perspective and may apply to become members of the Union provided that they adhere to the principles of democracy, respect fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights and ensure the rule of law;
| Previous enlargements | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Candidates |
| ||||||||
| Potential candidates | |||||||||
| Partnerships |
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| Other geographically European countries | |||||||||
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