Percentage of Poles (including Kashubians) living on the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth territories,c. 1900
ThePolish Corridor (German:Polnischer Korridor;Polish:korytarz polski), also known as thePomeranian Corridor, was aterritory located in the region ofPomerelia (Pomeranian Voivodeship, EasternPomerania), which provided theSecond Polish Republic with access to theBaltic Sea, thus dividing the bulk ofWeimar Germany from the province ofEast Prussia. At its narrowest point, the Polish territory was just 30 km wide.[1] TheFree City of Danzig (now the Polish cities ofGdańsk,Sopot and the surrounding areas), situated to the east of the corridor, was a semi-independent German speaking city-state forming part of neither Germany nor Poland, though united with the latter through an imposed union covering customs, mail, foreign policy, railways as well as defence.
After Poland lostWestern Pomerania to Germany in the late 13th century, the area of Eastern Pomerania with the strategically important port of Gdańsk remained a narrow strip of land giving Poland access to the Baltic Sea and was also sometimes referred to as Pomeranian corridor.[2][3]
According to German historianHartmut Boockmann the termcorridor was first used by Polish politicians,[4] while Polish historianGrzegorz Lukomski writes that the word was coined byGerman nationalist propaganda of the 1920s.[5] Internationally the term was used in English as early as March 1919[6] and whatever its origins it became a widespread term in English.[7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
The equivalent German term isPolnischer Korridor. Polish names includekorytarz polski ('Polish corridor') andkorytarz gdański ('Gdańsk corridor'); however, reference to the region as a corridor came to be regarded as offensive byinterwar Polish diplomats. Among the harshest critics of the termcorridor was Polish Foreign MinisterJózef Beck, who in his May 5, 1939 speech in theSejm (Polish parliament) said: "I am insisting that the termPomeranian Voivodeship should be used. The wordcorridor is an artificial idea, as this land has been Polish for centuries, with a small percentage of German settlers".[14] Poles commonly referred to the region asPomorze Gdańskie ('Gdańsk Pomerania',Pomerelia") or simplyPomorze ('Pomerania'), or aswojewództwo pomorskie ('Pomeranian Voivodeship'), which was the administrative name for the region.
Perhaps the earliest census data on theethnic andnational structure ofWest Prussia (including areas which later made up the corridor) is from 1819.[21]
Ethnic/national data (Nationalverschiedenheit) for West Prussia in 1819[21]
Karl Andree, inPolen: in geographischer, geschichtlicher und culturhistorischer Hinsicht (Leipzig 1831), gives the total population of West Prussia as 700,000 – including 50% Poles (350,000), 47% Germans (330,000) and 3% Jews (20,000).[22]
During theFirst World War, both sides made bids for Polish support, and in turn Polish leaders were active in soliciting support from both sides.Roman Dmowski, a former deputy in the RussianState Duma and the leader of theEndecja movement was especially active in seeking support from the Allies. Dmowski argued that an independent Poland needed access to the sea on demographic, historical and economic grounds as he maintained that a Poland without access to the sea could never be truly independent. After the warPoland was to be re-established as an independentstate. Since a Polish state had not existed since theCongress of Vienna, the future republic's territory had to be defined.
An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.[32]
The following arguments were behind the creation of the corridor:
Ethnic structure of the eastern regions of Prussia in 1817–1823Poles in the Kingdom of Prussia during the 19th century:
90% - 100% Polish
80% - 90% Polish
70% - 80% Polish
60% - 70% Polish
50% - 60% Polish
20% - 50% Polish
5% - 20% Polish
The ethnic situation was one of the reasons for returning the area to the restored Poland.[33] The majority of the population in the area was Polish.[34] As the Polish commission report to theAllied Supreme Council noted on 12 March 1919: "Finally the fact must be recognized that 600,000 Poles in West Prussia would under any alternative plan remain under German rule".[35] Also, asDavid Hunter Miller from presidentWoodrow Wilson's group of experts and academics (known asThe Inquiry) noted in his diary from theParis Peace Conference: "If Poland does not thus secure access to the sea, 600,000Poles inWest Prussia will remain underGerman rule and 20,000,000 Poles in Poland proper will probably have but a hampered and precarious commercial outlet".[36] The Prussian census of 1910 showed that there were 528,000 Poles (including West SlavicKashubians, who had supported the Polish national lists inGerman elections[37][38][39][40]) in the region, compared with 385,000 Germans (including troops and officials stationed in the area).[41][42] The province ofWest Prussia as a whole had between 36% and 43% ethnic Poles in 1910, depending on the source (the lower number is based directly on German 1910 census figures, while the higher number is based on calculations according to which a large part of those people counted asCatholic Germans in the official census in fact identified as Poles).[43] The Poles did not want the Polish population to remain under the control of the German state,[44] which had in the past treated the Polish population and other minorities as second-class citizens[45] and had pursuedGermanization. As ProfessorLewis Bernstein Namier (1888–1960) – born to Jewish parents inLublin Governorate (Russian Empire, formerCongress Poland) and later a British citizen,[46] a former member of theBritish Intelligence Bureau throughout World War I[47] and the British delegation at theVersailles conference,[48] known for hisanti-Polish[49] andanti-German[50][51] attitude – wrote in theManchester Guardian on November 7, 1933: "The Poles are the Nation of the Vistula, and their settlements extend from the sources of the river to its estuary. ... It is only fair that the claim of the river-basin should prevail against that of the seaboard."[52]
The Poles held the view that without direct access to theBaltic Sea, Poland's economic independence would be illusory.[53] Around 60.5% of Polish import trade and 55.1% of exports went through the area.[54] The report of the Polish Commission presented to theAllied Supreme Council said:
1,600,000 Germans inEast Prussia can be adequately protected by securing for them freedom of trade across the corridor, whereas it would be impossible to give an adequate outlet to the inhabitants of the new Polish state (numbering 25,000,000) if this outlet had to be guaranteed across the territory of an alien and probably hostile Power.[55]
TheUnited Kingdom eventually accepted this argument.[53] The suppression of the Polish Corridor would have abolished the economic ability of Poland to resist dependence on Germany.[56] AsLewis Bernstein Namier, Professor of Modern History at theUniversity of Manchester and known for both his "legendary hatred of Germany"[50] andGermanophobia[51] as well as his anti-Polish attitude[49] directed against what he defined as the "aggressive, antisemitic and warmongerily imperialist" part of Poland,[57] wrote in a newspaper article in 1933:
The whole of Poland's transport system ran towards the mouth of the Vistula. ... 90% of Polish exports came from her western provinces.[58] ... Cutting through of the Corridor has meant a minor amputation for Germany; its closing up would mean strangulation for Poland."[59]
By 1938, 77.7% of Polish exports left either through Gdańsk (31.6%) or the newly built port ofGdynia (46.1%)[60]
David Hunter Miller, in his diary from theParis Peace Conference, noted that the problem of Polish access to the sea was very difficult because leaving the entirety ofPomerelia under German control meant cutting off millions of Poles from their commercial outlet and leaving several hundred thousand Poles under German rule, while granting such access meant cutting off East Prussia from the rest of Germany.The Inquiry recommended that both the Corridor and Danzig should have been ceded directly to Poland.
It is believed that the lesser of these evils is preferable, and that the Corridor and Danzig should [both] be ceded to Poland, as shown on map 6. East Prussia, though territorially cut off from the rest of Germany, could easily be assured railroad transit across the Polish corridor (a simple matter as compared with assuring port facilities to Poland), and has, in addition, excellent communication viaKönigsberg and the Baltic Sea. In either case a people is asked to entrust large interests to theLeague of Nations. In the case of Poland they are vital interests; in the case of Germany, aside fromPrussian sentiment, they are quite secondary".[36]
In the end, The Inquiry's recommendations were only partially implemented: most ofWest Prussia was given to Poland, but Danzig became aFree City.
On 18 January, theParis peace conference opened,[62] resulting in the draft of theTreaty of Versailles 28 June 1919. Articles 27 and 28 of the treaty[63] ruled on the territorial shape of the corridor, while articles 89 to 93 ruled on transit, citizenship and property issues.[64] Per the terms of the Versailles treaty, which was put into effect on 20 January 1920, the corridor was established as Poland's access to theBaltic Sea from 70% of the dissolved province ofWest Prussia,[65] consisting of a small part ofPomerania with around 140 km of coastline including theHel Peninsula, and 69 km without it.[66]
The primarily German-speaking seaport of Danzig (Gdańsk), controlling theestuary of the main Polish waterway, theVistula river, became theFree City of Danzig and was placed under the protection of theLeague of Nations without a plebiscite.[67] After the dock workers of Danzig harbour went on strike during thePolish–Soviet War, refusing to unload ammunition,[68] the Polish Government decided to build an ammunition depot atWesterplatte, and a seaport atGdynia in the territory of the Corridor, connected to theUpper Silesian industrial centers by the newly constructedPolish Coal Trunk Line railways.
A Polish-language poster, illustrating the drop in German population in selected cities of western Poland in the period 1910–1931
The German authorChristian Raitz von Frentz writes that after First World War ended, the Polish government tried to reverse the systematicGermanization from former decades.[69]Frederick the Great (King in/of Prussia from 1740 to 1786) settled around 300,000 colonists in the eastern provinces ofPrussia and aimed at a removal of thePolish nobility, which he treated with contempt. Frederick also described Poles as "slovenly Polish trash" and compared them to theIroquois.[70][71] On the other hand, he encouraged administrators and teachers who could speak both German andPolish.[72] Prussia pursued a secondcolonization aimed at Germanization after 1832.[73] The Prussians passed laws aiming at Germanization of the provinces ofPosen and West Prussia in the late 19th century. ThePrussian Settlement Commission established a further 154,000 colonists, including locals, in the provinces of Posen and West Prussia before World War I. Military personnel were included in the population census. A number of German civil servants and merchants were introduced to the area, which influenced the population status.[74]
According to Richard Blanke, 421,029 Germans lived in the area in 1910, making up 42.5% of the population.[75] Blanke has been criticized by Christian Raitz von Frentz, who has classified his book as part of a series on the subject that has an anti-Polish bias; additionally Polish professor A. Cienciala has described Blanke's views as sympathetic to Germany.[76] In addition to the military personnel included in the population census, a number of German civil-servants and merchants were introduced to the area, which influenced the population mix, according toAndrzej Chwalba.[74] By 1921 the proportion of Germans had dropped to 18.8% (175,771). Over the next decade, the German population decreased by another 70,000 to a share of 9.6%.[77]
German political scientistStefan Wolff, Professor at theUniversity of Birmingham, claims that the actions of Polish state officials after the corridor's establishment followed "a course of assimilation and oppression".[78] As a result, a large number of Germans left Poland after 1918: according to Wolff, 800,000 Germans had left Poland by 1923,[78] according to Gotthold Rhode, 575,000 left the former province of Posen and the corridor after the war,[79] according toHerrmann Rauschning, 800,000 Germans had left between 1918 and 1926,[79] contemporary author Alfons Krysinski estimated 800,000 plus 100,000 from East Upper Silesia,[79] the contemporary German statistics say 592,000 Germans had left by 1921,[79] other Polish scholars say that up to a million Germans left.[79] Polish authorWładysław Kulski says that a number of them were civil servants with no roots in the province and around 378,000,[clarification needed] and this is to a lesser degree is confirmed by some German sources such as Hermann Rauschning.[80] Lewis Bernstein Namier raised the question as to whether many of the Germans who left were actually settlers without roots in the area - Namier remarked in 1933 "a question must be raised how many of those Germans had originally been planted artificially in that country by the Prussian Government."[81]
The above-mentioned Richard Blanke, in his bookOrphans of Versailles, gives several reasons for the exodus of the German population:
A number of former settlers from thePrussian Settlement Commission who settled in the area after 1886 in order to Germanize it were in some cases given a month to leave, in other cases they were told to leave at once.[80]
Poland found itself under threat during thePolish-Bolshevik war of 1919–1921,[80] and the German population feared that Bolshevik forces would control Poland. Migration to Germany was a way to avoid conscription and participation in the war.
State-employed Germans such as judges, prosecutors, teachers and officials left as Poland did not renew their employment contracts. German industrial workers also left due to fear of lower-wagecompetition. Many Germans had become economically dependent on Prussian state aid as Prussia had fought the "Polish problem" in its provinces.[80]
Germans refused to accept living in a Polish state.[80] AsLewis Bernstein Namier said: "Some Germans undoubtedly left because they would not live under the dominion of a race which they had previously oppressed and despised."[82]
Germans feared that the Poles would seek reprisals after over a century of harassment anddiscrimination by the Prussian and German state against the Polish population.[80]
Social and linguistic isolation: While the population was mixed, only Poles were required to be bilingual. The Germans usually did not learn Polish. When Polish became the only official language in Polish-majority provinces, their situation became difficult. The Poles shunned Germans, which contributed to their isolation.[80]
Lower standards of living. Poland was a much poorer country than Germany.[80]
FormerNazi politician and later opponent Hermann Rauschning wrote that 10% of Germans were unwilling to remain in Poland regardless of their treatment, and another 10% were workers from other parts of the German Empire with no roots in the region.[80]
Blanke says that official encouragement by the Polish state played a secondary role in the German exodus.[80] Christian Raitz von Frentz notes "that many of the repressive measures were taken by local and regional Polish authorities in defiance of Acts of Parliament and government decrees, which more often than not conformed with the minorities treaty, theGeneva Convention and their interpretation by theLeague council – though it is also true that some of the central authorities tacitly tolerated local initiatives against the German population."[69] While there were demonstrations and protests and occasional violence against Germans, they were at a local level, and officials were quick to point out that they were a backlash against former discrimination against Poles.[80] There were other demonstrations when Germans showed disloyalty during thePolish–Soviet War[80] as theRed Army announced the return to the pre-war borders of 1914.[83] Despite popular pressure and occasional local actions, perhaps as many as 80% of Germans emigrated more or less voluntarily.[80]
Helmut Lippelt writes that Germany used the existence of theGerman minority in Poland for political ends and as part of its revisionist demands, which resulted in Polish countermeasures. Polish Prime MinisterWładysław Sikorski stated in 1923 that the de-Germanization of these territories had to be ended by vigorous and quick liquidation of property and eviction of German "Optanten" (Germans who refused to acceptPolish citizenship and per theVersailles Treaty were to leave Poland) so that German nationalists would realize that their view of the temporary state of Polish western border was wrong.[84][85] To Lippelt this was partially a reaction to the German claims and partiallyPolish nationalism, urging to exclude the German element. In turn,anti-Polish prejudice fueled German policy.[84]
In the period leading up to theEast Prussian plebiscite in July 1920, the Polish authorities tried to prevent traffic through the Corridor, interrupting postal, telegraphic and telephone communication.[86] On March 10, 1920, the British representative on the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission, H. D. Beaumont, wrote of numerous continuing difficulties being made by Polish officials and added "as a result, the ill-will between Polish and German nationalities and the irritation due to Polish intolerance towards the German inhabitants in the Corridor (now under their rule), far worse than any former German intolerance of the Poles, are growing to such an extent that it is impossible to believe the present settlement (borders) can have any chance of being permanent. ... It can confidently be asserted that not even the most attractive economic advantages would induce any German to vote Polish. If the frontier is unsatisfactory now, it will be far more so when it has to be drawn on this side (of the river) with no natural line to follow, cutting off Germany from the river bank and within a mile or so ofMarienwerder, which is certain to vote German. I know of no similar frontier created by any treaty."[86]
TheGerman Ministry for Transport established theSeedienst Ostpreußen ('Sea Service East Prussia') in 1922 to provide a ferry connection toEast Prussia, now a German exclave, so that it would be less dependent on transit through Polish territory.
Connections by train were also possible by sealing the carriages (Korridorzug), i.e. passengers were not forced to apply for an official Polishvisa in their passport; however, the rigorous inspections by the Polish authorities before and after the sealing were strongly feared by the passengers.[87]
In May 1925, a train passing through the corridor on its way to East Prussia crashed, because thespikes had been removed from the tracks for a short distance and thefishplates unbolted. 25 people including 12 women and 2 children were killed, while some 30 others were injured.[88]
According to Polish historian Andrzej Chwalba, during the rule of theKingdom of Prussia and theGerman Empire various means were used to increase the amount of land owned by Germans at the expense of the Polish population. In Prussia, thePolish nobility had its estates confiscated after thePartitions, and handed over toGerman nobility.[89] The same applied to Catholic monasteries.[89] Later, the German Empire bought up land in an attempt to prevent the restoration of a Polish majority in Polish inhabited areas in its eastern provinces.[90]Christian Raitz von Frentz notes that measures aimed at reversing past Germanization included the liquidation of farms settled by the German government during the war under the 1908 law.[69]
In 1925 the Polish government enacted a land reform program with the aim of expropriating landowners.[91] While only 39% of the agricultural land in the Corridor was owned by Germans,[91] the first annual list of properties to be reformed included 10,800hectares from 32 German landowners and 950 hectares from seven Poles.[91] Thevoivode of Pomorze, Wiktor Lamot, stressed that "the part of Pomorze through which the so-called corridor runs must be cleansed of larger German holdings".[91] The coastal region "must be settled with a nationally conscious Polish population. ... Estates belonging to Germans must be taxed more heavily to encourage them voluntarily to turn over land for settlement. Border counties ... particularly a strip of land ten kilometers wide, must be settled with Poles. German estates that lie here must be reduced without concern for their economic value or the views of their owners".[91]
Prominent politicians and members of the German minority were the first to be included on the land reform list and to have their property expropriated.[91]
Germans in the Polish Corridor according to the 1931 census
The creation of the corridor aroused great resentment in Germany, and all interwar governments of theWeimar Republic refused to recognize the eastern borders agreed at Versailles, and refused to follow Germany's acknowledgment of its western borders in theLocarno Treaties of 1925 with a similar declaration with respect to its eastern borders.[78]
Institutions in Weimar Germany supported and encouraged German minority organizations in Poland, in part radicalized by the Polish policy towards them, in filing close to 10,000 complaints about violations of minority rights to theLeague of Nations.[78]
Poland in 1931 declared her commitment to peace, but pointed out that any attempt to revise its borders would mean war. Additionally, in conversation with U.S. PresidentHerbert Hoover, Polish delegate Filipowicz noted that any continued provocations by Germany could tempt the Polish side to invade, in order to settle the issue once and for all.[92]
TheNazi Party, led byAdolf Hitler, took power in Germany in 1933. Hitler at first ostentatiously pursued a policy ofrapprochement with Poland,[93] culminating in the ten-yearPolish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. In the years that followed, Germany placed an emphasis onrearmament, as did Poland and other European powers.[94][95] Despite this, the Nazis were able to achieve their immediate goals without provoking armed conflict: firstly, in March 1938Nazi Germany annexedAustria, and in the late September theSudetenland after theMunich Agreement; Poland also made an advance againstCzechoslovakia and annexedTrans-Olza (1 October 1938).[96] Germany tried to get Poland to join theAnti-Comintern Pact. Poland refused, as the alliance was rapidly becoming a sphere of influence of an increasingly powerful Germany.[97] On 24 October 1938, the German Foreign MinisterJoachim von Ribbentrop asked the Polish ambassadorJózef Lipski to have Poland sign the Anti-Comintern Pact.[98] During a visit to Rome on 27–28 October 1938, Ribbentrop told the Italian Foreign MinisterCount Galeazzo Ciano that he wanted to turn the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance, and spoke of his desire to have Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania sign the Anti-Comintern Pact so "all our energies can be directed against the Western democracies".[98] In a secret speech before a group of 200 German journalists on 10 November 1938, Hitler complained that his peace propaganda stressing that his foreign policy was based upon the peaceful revision of the Treaty of Versailles had been too successful with the German people, and he called for a new propaganda campaign intended to stoke a bellicose mood in Germany.[99] Notably, the enemies Hitler had in mind in his speech was not Poland, but rather France and Britain.[100]
Following negotiations with Hitler on the Munich Agreement, British Prime MinisterNeville Chamberlain reported that, "He told me privately, and last night he repeated publicly, that after thisSudeten German question is settled, that is the end of Germany's territorial claims in Europe".[101] Almost immediately following the agreement, however, Hitler reneged on it. The Nazis increased their requests for the incorporation of the Free City of Danzig into Germany, citing the "protection" of the German majority as a motive.[102] In November 1938, Danzig's district administrator,Albert Forster, reported to theLeague of Nations that Hitler had told him Polish frontiers would be guaranteed if the Poles were "reasonable like the Czechs." German State SecretaryErnst von Weizsäcker reaffirmed this alleged guarantee in December 1938.[103] In the winter of 1938–1939, Germany placed increasing pressure on Poland and Hungary to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact.[104]
Initially, the main concern of German diplomacy was not Danzig or the Polish Corridor, but rather having Poland sign the Anti-Comintern Pact, which as the American historianGerhard Weinberg noted was "... a formal gesture of political and diplomatic obeisance to Berlin, separating them from any other past or prospective international ties, and having nothing to do with the Soviet Union at all".[104] In late 1938–early 1939, Hitler had decided upon war with Britain and France, and having Poland sign the Anti-Comintern Pact was intended to protect Germany's eastern border while the Wehrmacht turned west.[104] In November 1938, Hitler ordered his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact, which had been signed with theEmpire of Japan in 1936 and joined byFascist Italy in 1937 into an anti-British military alliance.[104] Starting in October 1938, the main focus on German military planning was for a war against Britain with Hitler ordering theLuftwaffe to start building a strategical bombing force capable of bombing British cities.[105] On 17 January 1939, Hitler approved of the famousZ Plan that called for a gigantic fleet to take on theRoyal Navy and on 27 January 1939 he ordered that henceforward theKriegsmarine was to have first priority for defence spending.[105]
The situation regarding the Free City and the Polish Corridor created a number of headaches for German and Polish customs.[106] The Germans requested the construction of anextra-territorialReichsautobahn freeway (to complete theReichsautobahnBerlin-Königsberg) and railway through the Polish Corridor, effectively annexing Polish territory and connecting East Prussia to Danzig and Germany proper, while cutting off Poland from the sea and its main trade route. If Poland agreed, in return they would extend the non-aggression pact for 25 years.[107]
This seemed to conflict with Hitler's plans to turn Poland into a satellite state and with Poland's rejection of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and his desire either to isolate or to gain support against theSoviet Union.[107] German newspapers in Danzig and Nazi Germany played an important role in inciting nationalist sentiment: headlines buzzed about how Poland was misusing its economic rights in Danzig and German Danzigers were increasingly subjugated to the will of the Polish state.[102] At the same time, Hitler also offered Poland additional territory as an enticement, such as the possible annexation ofLithuania, theMemel Territory,Soviet Ukraine and parts of theCzech lands.[108][109] However, Polish leaders continued to fear for the loss of their independence and a fate like that of Czechoslovakia,[109] which had yielded theSudetenland to Germany in October 1938, only to be invaded by Germany in March 1939. Some felt that the Danzig question was inextricably tied to the problems in the Polish Corridor and any settlement regarding Danzig would be one step towards the eventual loss of Poland's access to the sea.[102] Hitler's credibility outside Germany was very low after theoccupation of Czechoslovakia, though some British and French politicians approved of a peaceful revision of the corridor's borders.[110]
In 1939, Nazi Germany made another attempt to renegotiate the status of Danzig;[103][111][112] Poland was to retain a permanent right to use the seaport if the route through the Polish Corridor was to be constructed.[111] However, the Polish administration distrusted Hitler and saw the plan as a threat to Polish sovereignty, practically subordinating Poland to the Axis and the Anti-Comintern Bloc while reducing the country to a state of near-servitude as its entire trade would be dependent on Germany.[113][114]Robert Coulondre, the French ambassador in Berlin in a dispatch to the Foreign MinisterGeorges Bonnet wrote on 30 April 1939 that Hitler sought: "...a mortgage on Polish foreign policy, while itself retaining complete liberty of action allowing the conclusion of political agreements with other countries. In these circumstances, the new settlement proposed by Germany, which would link the questions of Danzig and of the passage across the Corridor with counterbalancing questions of a political nature, would only serve to aggravate this mortgage and practically subordinate Poland to the Axis and the Anti-Comintern Bloc. Warsaw refused this in order to retain its independence."[113]
Hitler used the issue of the status city as pretext for attacking Poland, while explaining during a high-level meeting of German military officials in May 1939 that his real goal is obtainingLebensraum for Germany, isolating Poles from their Allies in the West and afterwards attacking Poland, thus avoiding the repeat of the Czech situation, where the Western powers became involved.[115][116][117][118][119]
A revised and less favorable proposal came in the form of anultimatum delivered by the Nazis in late August, after the orders had already been given to attack Poland on September 1, 1939. Nevertheless, at midnight on August 29, von Ribbentrop handed British Ambassador SirNevile Henderson a list of terms that would allegedly ensure peace in regard to Poland. Danzig was to return to Germany and there was to be a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor; Poles who had been born or had settled there since 1919 would have no vote, while all Germans born but not living there would. An exchange of minority populations between the two countries was proposed. If Poland accepted these terms, Germany would agree to the British offer of an international guarantee, which would include the Soviet Union. A Polishplenipotentiary, with full powers, was to arrive in Berlin and accept these terms by noon the next day. The British Cabinet viewed the terms as "reasonable," except the demand for a Polish plenipotentiary, which was seen as similar to Czechoslovak PresidentEmil Hácha accepting Hitler's terms in mid-March 1939.
It was not until the following noon that thePolish Ambassador Józef Lipski appeared at the Foreign Office and sought an audience with Ribbentrop. Five hours later he was shown in, and since he did not have the negotiating authority demanded by Hitler, Ribbentrop briefly dismissed him with the information that he would inform the "Führer" of this. Thus theGerman-Polish relations were severed.[120]
Most of the area was inhabited byPoles,Germans, andKashubians. The census of 1910 showed that there were 528,000 Poles (including West Slavic Kashubians) compared to 385,000 Germans in the region.[41] The census included German soldiers stationed in the area as well as public officials sent to administer the area. Since 1886, aSettlement Commission was set up byPrussia to enforce German settlement[122] while at the same time Poles, Jews and Germans migrated west during theOstflucht.[123] In 1921 the proportion of Germans in Pomerania (where the Corridor was located) was 18.8% (175,771). Over the next decade, the German population decreased by another 70,000 to a share of 9.6%.[77] There was also aJewish minority. in 1905, Kashubians numbered about 72,500.[124] After the occupation by Nazi Germany, a census was made by the German authorities in December 1939. 71% of people declared themselves as Poles, 188,000 people declared Kashubian as their language, 100,000 of those declared themselves Polish.[125]
German population in the Polish Corridor as of 1921, per Blanke 1993[126]
At the 1945Potsdam Conference following the German defeat inWorld War II, Poland's borders were reorganized at the insistence of the Soviet Union, which occupied the entire area. Territories east of theOder-Neisse line, including Danzig, were put under Polish administration. The conference did not debate about the future of the territories that were part of western Poland before the war, including the corridor. It automatically became part of the reborn state in 1945.
InThe Shape of Things to Come, published in 1933,H. G. Wells correctly predicted that the corridor would be the starting point of a futureSecond World War. He depicted the war as beginning in January 1940 and would involve heavyaerial bombing of civilians, but that it would result in a 10-yeartrench warfare-esque stalemate between Poland and Germany eventually leading to a worldwide societal collapse in the 1950s.
^A History of Western Civilization:Then came the acquisition of Prussia (separated from Brandenburg by the "Polish corridor") page 382, author Roland N. Stromberg Dorsey Press 1969.
^The Scandinavians in History. "Brandenburg, by the acquisition of Eastern Pomerania besides other territories within the empire was firmly established on the Baltic, though a Polish corridor running between Eastern Pomerania and East Prussia to Danzig denied her all she desired", page 174, author Stanley Mease Toyne. Ayer Publishing 1970
^Hartmut Boockmann, Ostpreussen und Westpreussen, Siedler 2002, p. 401,ISBN3-88680-212-4[1]
^Edmund Jan Osmańczyk, Anthony Mango,Encyclopedia of the United Nations and international agreements, 3rd edition, Taylor & Francis, 2003, p.1818,ISBN0-415-93921-6: "Polish Corridor: International term for Poland's access to the Baltic in 1919–1939."
^Hartmut Boockmann, Ostpreussen und Westpreussen, Siedler 2002, p. 401,ISBN3-88680-212-4[2]
^Denmark: Salmonsens Konversationsleksikon, e.g., in the article about railways: ("the German railway network was reduced due to [Germany's] territorial concessions following the [first world] war and is cut in two separate parts by the Polish corridor.")[3] (1930) and article about Poland[4] (1924)
^Barbara Dotts Paul,The Polish-German Borderlands: An Annotated Bibliography, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994,ISBN0-313-29162-4: contains an abundant collection of contemporary sources using Polish or Danzig Corridor
^abJames Minahan,One Europe, Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000, p. 375,ISBN0-313-30984-1
^W. D. Halsey, L. Shores, Bernard Johnston, Emanuel Friedman,Merit Students Encyclopedia, Macmillan Educational Corporation, 1979, p. 195: Pomerelia, independent in 1227 and thereafter
^A Lasting Peace page 127, James Clerk Maxwell Garnett, Heinrich F. Koeppler – 1940
^Arms and Policy, 1939–1944 page 40, Hoffman Nickerson – 1945
^The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812–1822 page 279, Harold Nicolson. Grove Pres 2000
^Urban Societies in East-Central Europe, pages 190–191, Jaroslav Miller 2008
^Blanke, Richard (1993).Orphans of Versailles. The Germans in Western Poland 1918–1939. Lexington, KY.: University Press of Kentucky. pp. 244–245.ISBN978-0813156330.
^The Danzig Dilemma; A Study in Peacemaking by Compromise – "This report was origin of the famous Polish corridor to the Baltic which the Commission proposed on ethnographic grounds as well as to give Poland her promised free and secure access to the sea", John Brown Mason, page 50
^Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia Sergeevna Lebedeva, Wojciech Materski, Maia A. Kipp,Katyn: A Crime without Punishment, Yale University Press, 2008,ISBN0-300-10851-6,Google Print, p.15
^The Danzig Dilemma; a Study in Peacemaking by Compromise: A Study in Peacemaking by Compromise. John Brown Mason. page 49
^Gdańskie Zeszyty Humanistyczne: Seria pomorzoznawcza Page 17, Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna (Gdańsk). Wydział Humanistyczny, Instytut Bałtycki, Instytut Bałtycki (Poland) – 1967
^Położenie mniejszości niemieckiej w Polsce 1918–1938 Page 183, Stanisław Potocki – 1969
^Rocznik gdański organ Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauki i Sztuki w Gdańsku – page 100, 1983
^Do niepodległości 1918, 1944/45, 1989: wizje, drogi, spełnienie page 43, Wojciech Wrzesiński – 1998
^ab"Principles and Problems of International Relations" page 608 H. Arthur Steiner – 1940
^Leśniewski, Andrzej; et al. (1959). Sobański, Wacław (ed.).Western and Northern territories of Poland : Facts and problems. Studies and monographs. Poznań – Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie (Publishing House of the Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa). p. 7.
^The Danzig dilemma a study in peacemaking by compromise by John Brown Mason Stanford university press 1946, page 116
^abcA Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection Under the League of Nations: The Case of the German Minority in Poland, 1920-1934 page 8. LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Münster, 1999
^Ritter, Gerhard (1974).Frederick the Great: A Historical Profile. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 179–180.ISBN0-520-02775-2.It has been estimated that during his reign 300,000 individuals settled in Prussia.... While the commission for colonization established in the Bismarck era could in the course of two decades bring no more than 11,957 families to the eastern territories, Frederick settled a total of 57,475.... It increased the German character of the population in the monarchy's provinces to a very significant degree.... in West Prussia where he wished to drive out the Polish nobility and bring as many of their large estates as possible into German hands.
^"In fact from Hitler to Hans we find frequent references and Jews as Indians. This, too, was a long standing trope. It can be traced back to Frederick the Great, who likened the 'slovenly Polish trash' in newly reconquered West Prussia to Iroquois."Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930David Blackbourn, James N. Retallack University of Toronto 2007
^Compare:Koch, Hannsjoachim Wolfgang (1978). "6: Frederick the Great".A History of Prussia. London: Routledge (published 2014). p. 136.ISBN9781317873082. Retrieved2017-10-20.[...] by 1778 there were 277 Protestant and 58 Catholic teachers employed in the Bromberg region (the present-day Bydgoszcz) with strong preference being given to those who could speak Polish in addition to their native German. Frederick's instruction to his successor to acquire a knowledge of Polish also dates from this period.
^Wielka historia Polski t. 4 Polska w czasach walk o niepodległość (1815–1864). Od niewoli do niepodległości (1864 - 1918) Marian Zagórniak, Józef Buszko 2003 page 186.
^abHistoria Polski 1795–1918. Andrzej Chwalba. Page 444.
^abButler, Rohan, MA., Bury, J.P.T., MA., & Lambert M.E., MA., editors, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 1st Series, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1960, vol.x, Chapter VIII, "The Plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder January 21 - September 29, 1920", p.726-7
^An impression of the psychological consequences of the train sealing is given through the relevant paragraphs of the bookletNamen, die keiner mehr nennt ('Names, no longer called by anyone'), authored by the liberal German journalistMarion Dönhoff.
^The history of the German resistance, 1933-1945 Peter Hoffmann page 37 McGill-Queen's University Press 1996
^Hitler Joachim C. Fest page 586 Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002
^Blitzkrieg w Polsce wrzesien 1939 Richard Hargreaves page 84 Bellona, 2009
^A military history of Germany, from the eighteenth century to the present dayMartin Kitchen page 305 Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975
^International history of the twentieth century and beyond Antony Best page 181 Routledge; 2 edition (July 30, 2008)
^Horst Rohde:Hitlers erster „Blitzkrieg“ und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa. In: derselbe, Klaus A. Maier et al.:Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 2:Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1979, pp. 79–158, p. 90.