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Incontemporary philosophy a distinction has developed between thespeculative philosophy of history and thecritical philosophy of history, now referred to asanalytic.[3][4][5][6][7] The split between these approaches may be approximately compared, by analogy and on the strength of regional and academic influences, to the schism in commitments betweenanalytic andcontinental philosophy wherein the analytic approach is pragmatic and the speculative approach attends more closely to ametaphysics (or anti-metaphysics) of determining forces like language or thephenomenology of perception at the level of background assumptions.
The divergence between these approaches crystallizes in the disagreements betweenHume andKant on the question ofcausality. Hume and Kant may be viewed in retrospect—by expressive anachronism—as analytic and speculative, respectively. Historians likeFoucault orHannah Arendt, who tend to be spoken of as theorists or philosophers before they are acknowledged as historians, may largely be identified with the speculative approach whereas generic academic history tends to be cleave to analytic and narrative approaches.
In hisPoetics,Aristotle (384–322 BCE) maintained the superiority of poetry over history because poetry speaks of whatought ormust betrue rather than merely whatis true.
Herodotus, a fifth-century BCE contemporary ofSocrates, broke from theHomeric tradition of passingnarrative from generation to generation in his work "Investigations" (Ancient Greek: Ἱστορίαι; Istoríai), also known asHistories. Herodotus, regarded by some[who?] as the first systematic historian, and, later,Plutarch (46–120 CE) freely inventedspeeches for their historical figures and chose their historical subjects with an eye towardmorally improving the reader. History was supposed to teach good examples for one to follow.[attribution needed] The assumption that history "should teach good examples" influenced how writers produced history.
By the eighteenth century historians had turned toward a morepositivist approach—focusing onfact as much as possible, but still with an eye on telling histories that could instruct and improve. Starting withFustel de Coulanges (1830–1889) andTheodor Mommsen (1817–1903), historical studies began to move towards a more modern scientific form.[citation needed] In theVictorian era, historiographers debated less whether history was intended to improve thereader, and more on what causes turned history and how one could understand historical change.
During theAge of Enlightenment, history began to be seen as both linear and irreversible.Condorcet's interpretations of the various "stages of humanity" andAuguste Comte'spositivism were among the most important formulations of such conceptions of history, which trustedsocial progress. As inJean-Jacques Rousseau'sEmile (1762) treatise on education (or the "art of training men"), the Enlightenment conceived the human species as perfectible:human nature could be infinitely developed through a well-thoughtpedagogy.
Narrative and causal approaches to history have often been contrasted or even opposed to one another, yet they can also be viewed as complementary.[17] Some philosophers of history such as Arthur Danto have claimed that "explanations in history and elsewhere" describe "not simply an event—something that happens—but a change".[18] Like many practicing historians, they treat causes as intersecting actions and sets of actions which bring about "larger changes", in Danto's words: to decide "what are the elements which persist through a change" is "rather simple" when treating an individual's "shift in attitude", but "it is considerably more complex and metaphysically challenging when we are interested in such a change as, say, the break-up of feudalism or the emergence of nationalism".[19]
Much of the historical debate about causes has focused on the relationship between communicative and other actions, between singular and repeated ones, and between actions, structures of action or group and institutional contexts and wider sets of conditions.[20] John Gaddis has distinguished between exceptional and general causes (following Marc Bloch) and between "routine" and "distinctive links" in causal relationships: "in accounting for what happened at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, we attach greater importance to the fact that President Truman ordered the dropping of an atomic bomb than to the decision of the Army Air Force to carry out his orders."[21] He has also pointed to the difference between immediate, intermediate and distant causes. For his part, Christopher Lloyd puts forward four "general concepts of causation" used in history: the "metaphysical idealist concept, which asserts that the phenomena of the universe are products of or emanations from an omnipotent being or such final cause"; "the empiricist (orHumean) regularity concept, which is based on the idea of causation being a matter of constant conjunctions of events"; "the functional/teleological/consequential concept", which is "goal-directed, so that goals are causes"; and the "realist, structurist and dispositional approach, which sees relational structures and internal dispositions as the causes of phenomena".[22]
There is disagreement about the extent to which history is ultimatelydeterministic. Some argue that geography, economic systems, or culture prescribe laws that determine the events of history. Others see history as a sequence of consequential processes that act upon each other. Even determinists do not rule out that, from time to time, certain cataclysmic events occur to change the course of history. Their main point is, however, that such events are rare and that even apparently large shocks like wars and revolutions often have no more than temporary effects on the evolution of the society.
The question of neutrality concerns itself foremost with analysis of historiography and the biases of historical sources. One prominent manifestation of this analysis is the idea that "history is written by the victors".
G. W. F. Hegel adopts the expression "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht" ("World history is a tribunal that judges the world", a quote fromFriedrich Schiller's poemResignation, published in 1786) and asserts that history is what judges men and women, their actions, and their opinions.[23] Since the twentieth century, Western historians have disavowed the aspiration to provide a judgement of history.[24][25] The goals of historical judgements or interpretations are separate from those oflegal judgements, which need to be formulated quickly after the events and be final.[26]
In hisCollège de France lectures published asSociety Must Be Defended,Michel Foucault posits that the victors of a social struggle use their political dominance to suppress a defeated adversary's version of historical events in favor of their ownpropaganda, which may go so far ashistorical negationism.Wolfgang Schivelbusch'sCulture of Defeat takes an opposing approach that defeat is a major driver for the defeated to reinvent himself, while the victor, confirmed in his attitudes and methods, dissatisfied by the high losses and paltry gains made, may be less creative and fall back.
Related to the issues of historical judgement are those of the pretension to neutrality and objectivity.[27][28] Analytic and critical philosophers of history have debated whether historians should express judgements on historical figures, or if this would infringe on their supposed role.[25] In general,positivists and neopositivists oppose any value-judgement as unscientific.[25]
Early teleological approaches to history can be found intheodicies, which attempted to reconcile theproblem of evil with the existence of God—providing a global explanation of history with belief in a progressive directionality organized by a superior power, leading to aneschatological end, such as aMessianic Age orApocalypse. However, this transcendent teleological approach can be thought asimmanent to human history itself.Augustine of Hippo,Thomas Aquinas,Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, in his 1679Discourse On Universal History, andGottfried Leibniz, who coined the term, formulated such philosophical theodicies. Leibniz based his explanation on theprinciple of sufficient reason, which states that anything that happens, does happen for a specific reason. Thus, if one adopts God's perspective, seemingly evil events in fact only take place in the largerdivine plan. In this way theodicies explained the necessity of evil as a relative element that forms part of a larger plan of history. However, Leibniz's principles were not a gesture offatalism. Confronted with the antiqueproblem of future contingents, Leibniz developed the theory ofcompossible worlds, distinguishing two types of necessity, in response to the problem ofdeterminism.
Schools of thought influenced by Hegel also see history as progressive, but they see progress as the outcome of adialectic in which factors working in opposite directions are over time reconciled. History was best seen as directed by aZeitgeist, and traces of theZeitgeist could be seen by looking backward. Hegel believed that history was moving man towardcivilization, and some also claim he thought that thePrussian state incarnated theend of history. In hisLessons on the History of Philosophy, he explains that each epochal philosophy is in a way the whole of philosophy; it is not a subdivision of the Whole but this Whole itself apprehended in a specific modality.
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History bring together the theses of the philosophy of history that Hegel developed during his classes at theUniversity of Berlin taught in the years 1822–1823, 1828 and 1830–1831. Editions of the work byEduard Gans in 1837, Charles Hegel in 1840 andGeorg Lasson in 1917 stand out. Hegel's work presents a complex exposition of his theses, which can lead to more than one mistake. For this reason, a series of works have been written aimed at interpreting the writings of the German philosopher, including his philosophy of history, which has been considered one of his clearest works.[30]
Hegel's philosophy of history aimed for a philosophical reflection on world history, thinking about the history of humanity in all its spatial and temporal breadth. This Hegelian particularity, versus the works of historians, rests on the fact that the German philosopher sought to determine what the teleology of history was, particularly what the end of history was, and how that process would develop.[31] With this end in mind, Hegel applied his philosophical system, both metaphysical and logical, to develop the thesis that the history of humanity consists of a rational process of constant progress towards freedom.[32]
According to Hegelian philosophy, reason made a spatial transition from east to west, that is, from Asia to Europe. This transition of reason, says Hegel, is made explicit in the concept of freedom that each civilization developed in these spaces has had. Thus, in the east, the Chinese civilization, India, and the various civilizations of Mesopotamia were characterized by considering that freedom belonged to a single subject, that person being understood as the emperor or empress, the king or queen. The rest of the individuals in these civilizations are, according to Hegel, like children under the tutelage of a father. The second stage of this transition of freedom overcame the paternal stage. Greece and Rome, civilizations where freedom no longer belonged only to the head of the state, but also to a limited number of people who met certain requirements, that is, the citizens. Finally, the third stage, German-Christian Europe, reached a level of consciousness about freedom that maintains that it no longer belonged to one or a few; on the contrary, freedom was good for all human beings.[33]
The reactions that Hegel's thesis generated have been diverse. On the one hand, it is argued that Hegel's contribution consisted of consolidating the philosophy of history as an independent and formal discipline of philosophy.[29][34] On the other hand, it is argued that Hegel's philosophy of history is an example oftotalitarianism,racism, andEurocentrism, widely debated criticisms.[35][36][37][38][39]
After Hegel, who insisted on the role ofgreat men in history, with his famous statement aboutNapoleon, "I saw the Spirit on his horse"[citation needed],Thomas Carlyle argued that history was the biography of a few central individuals,heroes, such asOliver Cromwell orFrederick the Great, writing that "The History of the world is but the Biography of great men." His view of heroes included not only political and military figures, the founders or topplers of states, but artists, poets, theologians and other cultural leaders. His history of great men, of geniuses, sought to organize change in the advent ofgreatness.
Explicit defenses of Carlyle's position have been rare since the late twentieth century. Most philosophers of history contend that the motive forces in history can best be described only with a wider lens than the one he used for his portraits. A.C. Danto, for example, wrote of the importance of the individual in history, but extended his definition to includesocial individuals, defined as "individuals we may provisionally characterize as containing individual human beings amongst their parts. Examples of social individuals might be social classes [. . .], national groups [. . .], religious organizations [. . .], large-scale events [. . .], large-scale social movements [. . .], etc."[40] The great man theory of history was most popular with professional historians in the nineteenth century; a popular work of this school is theEncyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition (1911), which contains lengthy and detailed biographies about the great men of history.[note 1]
AfterMarx'sconception of a materialist history based on theclass struggle, which raised attention for the first time to the importance of social factors such as economics in the unfolding of history,Herbert Spencer wrote "You must admit that the genesis of the great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown. . . . Before he can remake his society, his society must make him."
Inspired by the Enlightenment's ideal of progress, social evolutionism became a popular conception in the nineteenth century.Auguste Comte's (1798–1857)positivist conception of history, which he divided into the theological stage, the metaphysical stage and the positivist stage, brought upon by modern science, was one of the most influential doctrines of progress. TheWhig interpretation of history, as it was later called, associated with scholars of theVictorian andEdwardian eras inBritain, such asHenry Maine orThomas Macaulay, gives an example of such influence, by looking at human history as progress from savagery and ignorance toward peace, prosperity, and science. Maine described the direction of progress as "from status to contract," from a world in which a child's whole life is pre-determined by the circumstances of his birth, toward one of mobility and choice.
The publication ofDarwin'sThe Origin of Species in 1859 introducedhuman evolution. However, it was quickly transposed from its original biological field to the social field, insocial Darwinist theories.Herbert Spencer, who coined the term "survival of the fittest", orLewis Henry Morgan inAncient Society (1877) developed evolutionist theories independent from Darwin's works, which would be later interpreted as social Darwinism. These nineteenth-centuryunilineal evolution theories claimed that societies start out in a primitive state and gradually become morecivilised over time, and equated the culture and technology of Western civilisation with progress.
Arthur Gobineau'sAn Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853–55) argued that race isthe primary force determining world events, that there are intellectual differences between humanraces, and that civilizations decline and fall when the races are mixed. Gobineau's works had a large popularity in the so-calledscientific racism theories that developed during theNew Imperialism period.
After thefirst world war, and even beforeHerbert Butterfield (1900–1979) harshly criticized it, the Whig interpretation had gone out of style. The bloodletting of that conflict had indicted the whole notion of linear progress.Paul Valéry famously said: "We civilizations now know ourselves mortal."
As early as the 18th century, philosophers began focusing on contextual factors contributing to the course of history. Historians of theAnnales School, founded in 1929 byLucien Febvre andMarc Bloch, were a major landmark in the shift from a history centered on individualsubjects to studies concentrating ingeography, economics,demography, and other social forces.Fernand Braudel's studies on theMediterranean Sea as "hero" of history andEmmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's history ofclimate were inspired by this school.
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under given circumstances directly encountered and inherited from the past.[43]
The historico-politicaldiscourse analyzed byMichel Foucault inSociety Must Be Defended (1975–76) considerstruth as the fragile product of a historical struggle, first conceptualized asrace struggle—understood not in the modern sense ofbiological race but closer to that of apeople ornation.Boulainvilliers, for example, was an exponent of nobility rights. He claimed that the French nobility were the racial descendants of the Franks who invaded France (while the Third Estate was descended from the conquered Gauls), and had right to power by virtue ofright of conquest. He used this approach to formulate a historical thesis of the course of French political history—a critique of both the monarchy and the Third Estate. Foucault regards him as the founder of the historico-political discourse as political weapon.
In Great Britain, this historico-political discourse was used by the bourgeoisie, the people and the aristocracy as a means of struggle against the monarchy—cf.Edward Coke orJohn Lilburne. In France,Boulainvilliers,Nicolas Fréret, and thenSieyès,Augustin Thierry, andCournot reappropriated this form of discourse. Finally, at the end of the nineteenth century, this discourse was incorporated byracialist biologists andeugenicists, who gave it the modern sense of race and, even more, transformed this popular discourse into astate racism inNazism. Foucault also presents thatMarxists too seized this discourse and took it in a different direction, transforming theessentialist notion of race into the historical notion ofclass struggle, defined by socially structured position. This displacement of discourse constitutes one of the bases of Foucault's thought—that discourse is not tied to thesubject, rather the subject is a construction of discourse. Moreover, discourse is not the simpleideological and mirror reflexion of an economicinfrastructure, but is a product and the battlefield of multiples forces—which may not be reduced to the simple dualistcontradiction of two energies.
Foucault shows that what specifies this discourse from the juridical and philosophical discourse is its conception of truth—that truth is no longer absolute, it is the product of race struggle. History itself, which was traditionally the sovereign's science, thelegend of his glorious feats and monument building, ultimately became the discourse of the people, thus a political stake. The subject is not any more a neutralarbitrator, judge, orlegislator, as inSolon's or Kant's conceptions. Therefore, what became the historical subject must search in history's furor, under the "juridical code's dried blood", the multiplecontingencies from which a fragilerationality temporarily finally emerged. This may be, perhaps, compared to thesophist discourse in Ancient Greece. Foucault warns that it has nothing to do withMachiavelli's orHobbes's discourse on war, for to this popular discourse, the sovereign is nothing more than "an illusion, an instrument, or, at the best, an enemy. It is a discourse that beheads the king, anyway that dispenses itself from the sovereign and that denounces it".
A current popular conception[citation needed] considers the value of narrative in the writing and experience of history. Important thinkers in this area includePaul Ricœur,Louis Mink,W.B. Gallie, andHayden White. Some have doubted this approach because it draws fictional and historical narrative closer together, and there remains a perceived "fundamental bifurcation between historical and fictional narrative" (Ricœur, vol. 1, 52). In spite of this, most modern historians such asBarbara Tuchman orDavid McCullough consider narrative writing important to their approaches. The theory of narrated history (or historicized narrative) holds that the structure of lived experience, and such experience narrated in both fictional and non-fictional works (literature and historiography) have in common the figuration of "temporal experience." In this way narrative can "'grasp together' and integrate . . . into one whole and complete story" the "composite representations" of historical experience (Ricœur x, 173). Louis Mink writes that "the significance of past occurrences is understandable only as they are locatable in the ensemble of interrelationships that can be grasped only in the construction of narrative form" (148). Marxist theoristFredric Jameson also analyzes historical understanding this way, and writes that "history is inaccessible to us except in textual form . . . it can be approached only by way of prior (re)textualization" (82).
SincePlato'sRepublic, civic education and instruction has had a central role in politics and the constitution of a common identity. History has thus sometimes become the target ofpropaganda, for example inhistorical revisionist attempts. Plato's insistence on the importance of education was relayed by Rousseau'sEmile: Or, On Education (1762), a counterpart toThe Social Contract (1762).Public education has been seen by republican regimes and the Enlightenment as a prerequisite of the masses' progressive emancipation, as conceived by Kant inWas Ist Aufklärung? (What Is Enlightenment?, 1784).
Modern education systems, instrumental in the construction ofnation states, also involved the elaboration of a common, national history.History textbooks are one way through which this common history was transmitted.Le Tour de France par deux enfants, for example, was theFrench Third Republic's classic textbook for elementary school: it described the story of two French children who, following the German annexation of theAlsace-Lorraine region in 1870, go on atour de France during which they become aware of France's diversity and the existence of the variouspatois.
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^Voltaire,La philosophie de l'histoire, Changuion, 1765.
^Ricoeur, Paul (1995).Tiempo y narración. Configuración del tiempo en el relato histórico (in Spanish). Vol. 1. Ciudad de México: Siglo XXI. p. 169.ISBN968-23-1966-8.
^Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti, ed. (2021).Philosophy of history: twenty-first-century perspectives. London New York Oxford New Delhi Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic. p. 2.ISBN978-1-350-11184-4.
^Lemon, Michael C. (2003).Philosophy of history: a guide for students (1. publ ed.). London: Routledge. pp. 1–2, 7, 9,281–283.ISBN978-0-415-16204-3.
^The Continuing Relevance of Speculative Philosophy of History, Journal of the Philosophy of History
^Philosophy of History, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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^Rolf Gruner, "The concept of the speculative philosophy of history,"Metaphilosophy3(4).
^Sarton, George (1948).Introduction to the History of Science. Science and Learning in the Fourteenth Century. Vol. 3. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company. p. 1262.
^abH. Mowlana (2001). "Information in the Arab World",Cooperation South Journal1.[incomplete short citation]
^Compare:Ibn Khaldun (1958)."Introduction by N. J. Dawood".The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History in Three Volumes. Princeton/Bollingen paperbacks. Vol. 1. Translated by Franz Rosenthal; compiled by N. J. Dawood (abridged, illustrated, reprint, revised ed.). Princeton University Press. p. x.ISBN9780691017549. Retrieved2016-06-18.In rejecting idle superstition and denouncing uncritical acceptance of historical data, Ibn Khaldun adopted a scientific method totally new to his age, and used a new terminology to drive home his ideas. That he was fully aware of the originality of his thinking and the uniqueness of his contribution is illustrated by the many references he makes to his 'new science'.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
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^CompareOswald Spengler and History as Destiny, page 93: "[...] the closing years of the First World War, when Spengler was completing his work, had witnessed the passing of the feudal rule of landed aristocracy in Germany and its merging into budding forms of parliamentary plutocracy - soon to be followed by the rise of 'mobocracy' and then Caesarism."
^Hewitson, M. (2014)History and Causality, 127-48.
^Danto, A. (1968)Analytical Philosophy of History, 233.
^Danto, A. (1968)Analytical Philosophy of History, 249.
^Hewitson, M. (2014)History and Causality, 86-116.
^Gaddis, J. L. (2002)The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past, 64.
^Janez Juhant, Bojan Žalec (eds.),Reconciliation: The Way of Healing and Growth, LIT Verlag Münster, 2012, p. 98.
^Curran, Vivian Grosswald (2000)Herder and the Holocaust: A Debate About Difference and Determinism in the Context of Comparative Law in F. C. DeCoste, Bernard Schwartz (eds.)Holocaust's Ghost: Writings on Art, Politics, Law and Educationpp.413-5
^Curran, Vivian Grosswald (2000)Herder and the Holocaust: A Debate About Difference and Determinism in the Context of Comparative Law in F. C. DeCoste, Bernard Schwartz (eds.)Holocaust's Ghost: Writings on Art, Politics, Law and Educationp.415
^Rubinoff, LionelHistory, Philosophy and Historiography: Philosophy and the Critique of Historical Thinking, in William SweetThe Philosophy of History: A Re-Examination, Chapter 9p.171
^abWalsh, William (1951). «What is Philosophy of History».An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. London: Hutchinson University Library. p. 11
^Sibree, John "Translator's Introduction" in Georg Hegel (2001) [1837]. Charles Hegel, ed. The Philosophy of History. Ontario: Batoche Books. pp. 5-6.
^Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Nisbet, Hugh Barr; Forbes, Duncan; Hoffmeister, Johannes (1992).Lectures on the philosophy of world history (1. paperback ed., [Reprint] ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. p. 11.ISBN978-0-521-28145-4.
^Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Nisbet, Hugh Barr; Forbes, Duncan; Hoffmeister, Johannes (1992).Lectures on the philosophy of world history (1. paperback ed., [Reprint] ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 27–29, 43, 47.ISBN978-0-521-28145-4.
^Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Nisbet, Hugh Barr; Forbes, Duncan; Hoffmeister, Johannes (1992).Lectures on the philosophy of world history (1. paperback ed., [Reprint] ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 54–55.ISBN978-0-521-28145-4.
^Collingwood, Robin (1952) [1946].Idea de la historia. Ciudad de México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. p. 117
^Popper, Karl R.; Soros, George; Ryan, Alan; Gombrich, Ernst H.; Popper, Karl R. (2020). "Hegel and the New Tribalism".The open society and its enemies. Princeton Classics (One-Volume Edition, Princeton Classics paperback edition, first printing ed.). Princeton Oxford: Princeton University Press. p. 273.ISBN978-0-691-21084-1.
^MacCarney, Joseph; MacCarney, Joe (2000).Hegel on history. Routledge philosophy guidebooks (1. publ ed.). London: Routledge. pp. 142–151.ISBN978-0-415-11695-4.
^Hodgson, Peter Crafts (2012).Shapes of freedom: Hegel's philosophy of world history in theological perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 81, 124.ISBN978-0-19-965495-6.
^Buck-Morss, Susan (2009).Hegel, Haiti, and universal history. Illuminations: cultural formations of the Americas. Pittsburgh, Pa: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 60, 117.ISBN978-0-8229-4340-2.
^Danto, "The Historical Individual", 266, inPhilosophical Analysis and History, edited by Williman H. Dray, Rainbow-Bridge Book Co., 1966
^Ingold, T. On the Distinction between Evolution and History. Social Evolution & History,. Vol. 1, num. 1. 2002. Pp. 5-24. P. 9,socionauki.ru
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