Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

Philosophical analysis

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Various techniques typically used by philosophers in the analytic tradition
This article includes a list ofgeneral references, butit lacks sufficient correspondinginline citations. Please help toimprove this article byintroducing more precise citations.(April 2025) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Philosophical analysis is any of varioustechniques, typically used byphilosophers in theanalytic tradition, in order to "break down" (i.e. analyze) philosophical issues. Arguably the most prominent of these techniques is the analysis ofconcepts, known asconceptual analysis.

Method of analysis

[edit]

While analysis is characteristic of the analytic tradition inphilosophy, what is to be analyzed (theanalysandum) often varies. In their papers, philosophers may focus on different areas. One might analyzelinguistic phenomena such assentences, orpsychological phenomena such assense data. However, arguably the most prominent analyses are written onconcepts orpropositions and are known asconceptual analysis.[1]

A.C. Ewing distinguished between two forms of philosophical analysis. The first is "what the persons who make a certain statement usually intend to assert" and the second "the qualities, relations and species of continuants mentioned in the statement". As an illustration he takes the statement "I see a tree", this statement could be analysed in terms what the everyday person intends what they say this or it could be analysed metaphysically by assertingrepresentationalism.[2]

Conceptual analysis consists primarily in breaking down or analyzing concepts into their constituent parts in order to gain knowledge or a better understanding of a particular philosophical issue in which the concept is involved.[3] For example, theproblem of free will in philosophy involves various key concepts, including the concepts offreedom,moral responsibility,determinism,ability, etc. The method of conceptual analysis tends to approach such a problem by breaking down the key concepts pertaining to the problem and seeing how they interact. Thus, in the long-standing debate on whetherfree will is compatible with the doctrine ofdeterminism, several philosophers have proposed analyses of the relevant concepts to argue for eithercompatibilism orincompatibilism.

A famous example of conceptual analysis at its best is given byBertrand Russell in histheory of descriptions. Russell attempted to analyze propositions that involveddefinite descriptions, which pick out a unique individual (such as "The tallest spy"), andindefinite descriptions, which pick out a set of individuals (such as "a spy"). In his analysis of definite descriptions, superficially, these descriptions have the standard subject-predicate form of a proposition: thus "The presentking of France isbald" appears to be predicating "baldness" of the subject, "the present king of France". However, Russell noted that this is problematic, because there is no present king of France (France isno longer a monarchy). Normally, to decide whether a proposition of the standard subject-predicate form is true or false, one checks whether the subject is in the extension of the predicate. The proposition is then true if and only if the subject is in the extension of the predicate. The problem is that there is no present king of France, so the present king of France cannot be found on the list of bald things or non-bald things. So, it would appear that the proposition expressed by "The present king of France is bald" is neither true nor false. However, analyzing the relevant concepts and propositions, Russell proposed that what definite descriptions really express are not propositions of the subject-predicate form, but rather they express existentially quantified propositions. Thus, "The present king of France" isanalyzed, according to Russell's theory of descriptions, as "There exists an individual who is currently the king of France, there is only one such individual, and that individual is bald." Now one can determine thetruth value of the proposition. Indeed, it is false, because it is not the case that there exists a unique individual who is currently the king of France and is bald, since there is no present king of France.[4][5]

Criticism

[edit]

While the method of analysis is characteristic of contemporaryanalytic philosophy, its status continues to be a source of great controversy even among analytic philosophers. Several current criticisms of the analytic method derive fromW.V. Quine's famous rejection of theanalytic–synthetic distinction. While Quine's critique is well-known, it is highly controversial.

Further, the analytic method seems to rely on some sort of definitional structure of concepts, so that one can give necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept. For example, the concept "bachelor" is often analyzed as having the concepts "unmarried" and "male" as its components. Thus, the definition or analysis of "bachelor" is thought to be an unmarried male. But one might worry that these so-called necessary and sufficient conditions do not apply in every case.Wittgenstein, for instance, argues that language (e.g., the word 'bachelor') is used for various purposes and in an indefinite number of ways. Wittgenstein's famous thesis states that meaning is determined by use. This means that, in each case, the meaning of 'bachelor' is determined by its use in a context. So if it can be shown that the word means different things across different contexts of use, then cases where its meaning cannot be essentially defined as 'unmarried man' seem to constitute counterexamples to this method of analysis. This is just one example of a critique of the analytic method derived from a critique of definitions. There are several other such critiques.[6] This criticism is often said to have originated primarily with Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations.

A third critique of the method of analysis derives primarily from psychological critiques ofintuition. A key part of the analytic method involves analyzing concepts via "intuition tests". Philosophers tend to motivate various conceptual analyses by appeal to their intuitions about thought experiments.[7]

In short, some philosophers feel strongly that the analytic method (especially conceptual analysis) is essential to and defines philosophy.[8] Yet, some philosophers argue that the method of analysis is problematic.[9] Some, however, take the middle ground and argue that while analysis is largely a fruitful method of inquiry, philosophers should not limit themselves to only using the method of analysis.

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^Foley, Richard. (1999). "Analysis". Entry inThe Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, second edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  2. ^Ewing, A.C. (January 1935). "Two Kinds of Analysis".Analysis.2 (4):60–64.doi:10.1093/analys/2.4.60.
  3. ^Beaney, Michael. (2003). "Analysis".The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (link).
  4. ^This explication is only of a part of Russell's theory of descriptions and is quite brief and oversimplified.
  5. ^Bertolet, Rod (1999), "Theory of Descriptions", inThe Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, second edition, New York: Cambridge University Press
  6. ^Margolis, E. & Laurence, S. (2006). "Concepts".The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (link).
  7. ^See DePaul, M. & Ramsey, W. (eds.). (1998).Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, for a collection of current essays on the controversy over analysis as it relates to intuition andreflective equilibrium.
  8. ^e.g.
    • * Jackson, Frank. (1998).From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • * Chalmers, David. (1996).The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • * Bealer, George. (1998). "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy". In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.) (1998), pp. 201–239.
  9. ^
    • * Stich, Stephen. (1998). "Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology, and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity". In DePaul and Ramsey (eds.) (1998), pp. 95–112.
    • * Ramsey, William. (1998). "Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis". In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.) (1998), pp. 161–177.

References

[edit]
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953).Philosophical Investigations.

External links

[edit]
  • Beaney, Michael."Analysis". InZalta, Edward N. (ed.).Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • "Concepts" - an article by Margolis & Laurence in theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (section 5 is a good, but short, presentation of the current issues surrounding conceptual analysis in philosophy).
  • "Analytic Philosophy" - an article by Aaron Preston in theInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • "Water's water everywhere" by Jerry Fodor - a review of C. Hughes's bookKripke: Names, Necessity and Identity at the London Review of Books (Fodor goes into several issues regarding the philosophical method of analysis).
Links to related articles
Related articles
Areas of focus
Turns
Logic
Theories
Concepts
Modality
Philosophers
Australian realism
Cambridge
Oxford
Logical positivists
Berlin Circle
Vienna Circle
Harvard
Notre Dame
Pittsburgh School
Pragmatism
Princeton
Quietism
Reformed
Science
Stanford School
Lwow–Warsaw
Epistemologists
Theories
Concepts
Related articles
Concepts
Theories
Philosophy of...
Related topics
Philosophers of science
Precursors
Authority control databasesEdit this at Wikidata
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Philosophical_analysis&oldid=1291983540"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp