Peter van Inwagen (/vænɪnˈwɑːɡən/van in-WAH-ghən; born September 21, 1942) is an Americanphilosopher. He is the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at theUniversity of Notre Dame and a research professor of philosophy atDuke University each spring.^[2] He previously taught atSyracuse University, earning his PhD from theUniversity of Rochester in 1969^[3] under the direction ofRichard Clyde Taylor.^[4] Van Inwagen is one of the leading figures in contemporarymetaphysics,philosophy of religion, andphilosophy of action. He was the president of theSociety of Christian Philosophers from 2010 to 2013.^[5]

Van Inwagen's 1983monographAn Essay on Free Will^[6] played an important role in rehabilitatinglibertarianism with respect tofree will in mainstreamanalytical philosophy.^[7] In the book, he introduces the termincompatibilism about free will anddeterminism, to stand in contrast tocompatibilism—the view that free will is compatible with determinism.

Van Inwagen's central argument (theconsequence argument) for this view is that "If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of those things (including our present acts) are not up to us."^[8]

Van Inwagen also added what he called theMind Argument (after the philosophical journalMind, where such arguments often appeared). "TheMind argument proceeds by identifying indeterminism withchance and by arguing that an act that occurs by chance, if an event that occurs by chance can be called an act, cannot be under the control of its alleged agent and hence cannot have been performed freely. Proponents of [this argument] conclude, therefore, that free will is not only compatible with determinism but entails determinism."^[9]

TheConsequence Argument and theMind Argument are the two horns in the classic dilemma and standard argument against free will.^{[citation needed]} If determinism is true, our actions are not free. If indeterminism is true, our actions are influenced by randomness and ourwill cannot bemorally responsible for them.^[10]

Van Inwagen concludes, "Free Will Remains a Mystery."^[11] In an article written in the third person called "Van Inwagen on Free Will",^[12] he describes the problem with his incompatibilist free will if random chance directly causes our actions. He imagines the universe reverting a thousand times to exactly the same circumstances it was in at some earlier time and observing all the "replays". If the agent's actions are random, she sometimes "would have agent-caused the crucial brain event and sometimes (in seventy percent of the replays, let us say) she would not have [...] I conclude that even if an episode of agent causation is among the causal antecedents of every voluntary human action, these episodes do nothing to undermine the prima facie impossibility of an undetermined free act."^[13]

InMaterial Beings,^[14] Van Inwagen argues that all material objects are either elementary particles or living organisms. Every composite material object is made up of elementary particles, and the only such composite objects are living organisms. A consequence of this view is that everyday objects such as tables, chairs, cars, buildings, and clouds do not exist. While there seem to be such things, this is only because there are elementary particles arranged in specific ways. For example, where it seems that there is a chair, Van Inwagen says that there are only elementary particles arranged chairwise. These particles do not compose an object, any more than a swarm of bees composes an object. Like a swarm of bees, the particles we call a chair maintain a more or less stable arrangement for a while, which gives the impression of a single object. An individual bee, by contrast, has parts that are unified in the right way to constitute a single object (namely, a bee).

Van Inwagen gave the 2003Gifford Lectures; they are published in hisThe Problem of Evil.^[15] There he argues that theproblem of evil is a philosophical argument and, like most philosophical arguments, fails.

Van Inwagen has shown an interest in theafterlife debate, particularly in relation toresurrection of the body. In his article "I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come", he concludes that Christians must account for some sort of physical continuity in their account of existence of the same person after death. In particular, Van Inwagen notes, this is a problem for theChristian materialist, one who believes that human beings are physical substances.

Van Inwagen was elected to theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005,^[16] and was President of the Central Division of theAmerican Philosophical Association in 2008/09. He was the President of theSociety of Christian Philosophers from 2010 to 2013.^[5]

He has delivered lectures including:

• The F. D. Maurice Lectures, three lectures delivered at the University of London in March 1999
• The Wilde Lectures on Natural Religion, eight lectures delivered at Oxford University in Trinity Term, 2000
• The Stewart Lectures: three lectures delivered at Princeton University, October 2002
• TheGifford Lectures, eight lectures delivered at theUniversity of St. Andrews, May 2003
• The Jellema Lectures: two lectures delivered atCalvin College, March 2004
• The Münster Lectures in Philosophy, including a student colloquium at the University of Münster, November 2015

In May 2011 it was announced that he is to receive anhonorary doctorate from theUniversity of St Andrews,Scotland.^[17]

Van Inwagen lives inGranger, Indiana, with his wife, Elisabeth. He converted toChristianity in 1980.^[18] In May 1983, he wasbaptized anEpiscopalian and received hisFirst Communion.^[19][20]

• Van Inwagen, Peter; Lane Craig, William (2024).Do Numbers Exist?.doi:10.4324/9781003008712.ISBN 978-1-003-00871-2..^[21]
• Thinking about Free Will. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 2017.ISBN 978-1-107-16650-9.
• Existence: Essays in Ontology. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 2014.ISBN 978-1-107-62526-6.
• The Problem of Evil. Oxford:Oxford University Press. 2006.ISBN 978-0-19-924560-4.
• Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 2002.ISBN 978-0-521-79164-9.
• The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics. Boulder, CO:Westview Press. 1998.ISBN 978-0-8133-2731-0.
• God, Knowledge and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca:Cornell University Press. 1995.ISBN 978-0-8014-8186-4.
• Metaphysics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 2002.ISBN 978-0-8133-9055-0.
• Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1990.ISBN 978-0-8014-8306-6.
• An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983.ISBN 978-0-19-824924-5.

• American philosophy
• List of American philosophers
• Mereological nihilism

• Kane, Robert (2005).A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford University Press.ISBN 978-0-19-514970-8. RetrievedApril 13, 2020.
• van Inwagen, Peter (1983).An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.ISBN 978-0-19-824924-5.
• van Inwagen, Peter (2000)."Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture".Philosophical Perspectives.14. Ridgeview Publishing Company. RetrievedApril 13, 2020.
• van Inwagen, Peter (2004). Campbell, Joseph Keim; O'Rourke, Michael; Shier, David (eds.).Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press. pp. 213–230.ISBN 978-0-262-53257-0. RetrievedApril 13, 2020.
• van Inwagen, Peter (2017).Thinking about Free Will. Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-1-107-16650-9. RetrievedApril 13, 2020.
• Zimmerman, Dean (2009).Sosa, Ernest;Rosenkrantz, Gary;Kim, Jaegwon (eds.).A Companion to Metaphysics (2nd ed.). Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell. pp. 619–621.

• Official PageArchived October 17, 2013, at theWayback Machine at the University of Notre Dame
• The Problem of Evil, Oxford University Press, 2006. (Gifford Lectures 2002)
• Papers by van Inwagen
• "Metaphysics" (Entry in theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• Interviews from the PBS programCloser to Truth

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