ThePentagon Papers, officially titledReport of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force, is aUnited States Department of Defense history of theUnited States' political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1968. Released byDaniel Ellsberg, who had worked on the study, it was made public on the front page ofThe New York Times in 1971.[1][2] A 1996 article inThe New York Times said that thePentagon Papers had demonstrated, among other things, thatLyndon B. Johnson's administration had "systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress".[3]
ThePentagon Papers revealed that the U.S. had secretly enlarged the scope of its actions in theVietnam War with coastal raids onNorth Vietnam andMarine Corps attacks—none of which were reported in the mainstream media. For his disclosure of thePentagon Papers, Ellsberg was initially charged with conspiracy, espionage, and theft of government property; these charges were later dismissed, after prosecutors investigating theWatergate scandal discovered that staff members in theNixon White House had ordered the so-calledWhite House Plumbers to engage in unlawful efforts to discredit Ellsberg.[4][5]
In June 2011, the documents forming thePentagon Papers were declassified and publicly released.[6][7]
Secretary of DefenseRobert McNamara created the Vietnam Study Task Force on June 17, 1967, for the purpose of writing an "encyclopedic history of theVietnam War".[8] McNamara claimed that he wanted to leave a written record for historians, to prevent policy errors in future administrations,[9] althoughLeslie H. Gelb, then director of Policy Planning at the Pentagon, has said that the notion that they were commissioned as a "cautionary tale" is a motive that McNamara only used in retrospect. McNamara told others, such as Secretary of StateDean Rusk, that he only asked for a collection of documents rather than the studies he received.[10] Motives aside, McNamara did not inform either Rusk or PresidentLyndon Johnson about the study.[8] One report claimed that McNamara had planned to give the work to his friend,Robert F. Kennedy, who was seeking theDemocratic presidential nomination in 1968.[11][12] McNamara later denied this, though he admitted that he ought to have informed Johnson and Rusk.[12]
Instead of using existing Defense Department historians, McNamara assigned his close aide andAssistant Secretary of DefenseJohn McNaughton to collect the papers.[8] McNamara wanted the study done in three months.[13] McNaughton died in aplane crash one month after work began in June 1967, but the project continued under the direction of Defense Department official Les Gelb.[8]
Thirty-six analysts—half of them active-duty military officers, the rest academics and civilian federal employees—worked on the study.[8] They worked to produce 47 volumes answering a list of 100 questions that McNamara (via his secretaries) had sent them, which included questions such as "How confident can we be about body counts of the enemy? Were programs to pacify the Vietnamese countryside working? What was the basis of President Johnson's credibility gap? WasHo Chi Minh an AsianTito? Did the U.S. violate theGeneva Accords on Indochina?"[13] Some of the analysts included Daniel Ellsberg,Morton Halperin,[13]Paul Warnke,[14] future generalsPaul F. Gorman[15] andJohn Galvin,[16][17][13] historian Melvin Gurtov, economists Hans Heymann and Richard Moorstein, and future top diplomatRichard Holbrooke, who drafted a volume.[18][13][19]
The analysts largely used existing files in theOffice of the Secretary of Defense. To keep the study secret from others, includingNational Security AdvisorWalt Rostow, they conducted no interviews or consultations with the armed forces, with the White House, or with other federal agencies.[11][13]
McNamara left the Defense Department in February 1968, and his successorClark Clifford received the finished study on January 15, 1969, five days beforeRichard Nixon's inauguration, although Clifford claimed he never read it. Gelb said in 1991 that he presented the study to McNamara in early 1969, when the latter was president of theWorld Bank, but McNamara did not read it then, and as late as 2018 Gelb did not know if McNamara ever read the study later in his life.[10][13]
The study consisted of 3,000 pages of historical analysis and 4,000 pages of original government documents in 47 volumes, and was classified as "Top Secret – Sensitive". ("Sensitive" is not anofficial security designation; it meant that access to the study should be controlled.) The task force published 15 copies; the think tankRAND Corporation received two of the copies from Gelb, Morton Halperin and Paul Warnke, with access granted if at least two of the three approved.[11][20]
The 47 volumes of the papers were organized as follows:[21]
I. Vietnam and the U.S., 1940–1950 (1 Vol.)
II. U.S. Involvement in the Franco–Viet Minh War, 1950–1954 (1 Vol.)
III. The Geneva Accords (1 Vol.)
IV. Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)
V. Justification of the War (11 Vols.)
VI. Settlement of the Conflict (6 Vols.)
Although President Johnson stated that the aim of the Vietnam War was to secure an "independent, non-CommunistSouth Vietnam", a January 1965 memorandum by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton stated that an underlying justification was "not to help friend, but to contain China".[22][23][24]
On November 3, 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara sent a memorandum to Johnson, in which he explained the "major policy decisions with respect to our course of action in Vietnam". The memorandum begins by disclosing the rationale behind the bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965:
The February decision to bomb North Vietnam and the July approval of Phase I deployments make sense only if they are in support of a long-run United States policy to containChina.[25]
McNamara accused China of harboringimperial aspirations like those of theGerman Empire,Nazi Germany,Imperial Japan and theSoviet Union. According to McNamara, the Chinese were conspiring to "organize all of Asia" against the United States:
China—like Germany in 1917, like Germany in the West and Japan in the East in the late 30s, and like the USSR in 1947—looms as a major power threatening to undercut our importance and effectiveness in the world and, more remotely but more menacingly, to organize all of Asia against us.[25]
To encircle the Chinese, the United States aimed to establish "three fronts" as part of a "long-run effort to contain China":
There are three fronts to a long-run effort to contain China (realizing that the USSR "contains" China on the north and northwest):
(a) the Japan–Korea front;
(b) the India–Pakistan front; and
(c) theSoutheast Asia front.[25]
However, McNamara admitted that thecontainment of China would ultimately sacrifice a significant amount of America's time, money and lives.[25]
Years before theGulf of Tonkin incident occurred on August 2, 1964, the U.S. government was indirectly involved in Vietnam's affairs by sending advisers or (military personnel) to train the South Vietnamese soldiers:
In a section of thePentagon Papers titled "Kennedy Commitments and Programs", American commitment to South Vietnam was attributed to the "creation" of the country by the United States to prevent the spread ofcommunism during the globalCold War. As acknowledged by the papers:
We must note that South Vietnam (unlike any of the other countries in Southeast Asia) was essentially the creation of the United States.[27]
In a sub-section titled "Special American Commitment to Vietnam", the papers emphasized once again the role played by the United States:
- Without U.S. support[Ngo Dinh] Diem almost certainly could not have consolidated his hold on the South during 1955 and 1956.
- Without the threat of U.S. intervention, South Vietnam could not have refused to even discuss the elections called for in 1956 under the Geneva settlement without being immediately overrun by the Viet Minh armies.
- Without U.S. aid in the years following, the Diem regime certainly, and an independent South Vietnam almost as certainly, could not have survived.[27]
More specifically, the United States sent US$28.4 million worth of equipment and supplies to help the Diem regime strengthen its army. In addition, 32,000 men fromSouth Vietnam's Civil Guard were trained by the United States at a cost of US$12.7 million. It was hoped that Diem's regime, after receiving a significant amount of U.S. assistance, would be able to withstand theViet Cong.[27]
The papers identified GeneralEdward Lansdale, who served in theOffice of Strategic Services (OSS) and worked for theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA), as a "key figure" in the establishment of Diem as the President of South Vietnam, and the backing of Diem's regime thereafter. As written by Lansdale in a 1961 memorandum: "We (the U.S.) must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong executive can replace him legally."[27]
According to thePentagon Papers, the U.S. government played a key role in the1963 South Vietnamese coup, in which Diem was assassinated. While maintaining "clandestine contact" with Vietnamese generals planning a coup, the U.S. cut off its aid to President Diem and openly supported a successor government in what the authors called an "essentially leaderless Vietnam":
For the militarycoup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government.
In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals. We maintained clandestine contact with them throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government.
Thus, as the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam.[28]
As early as August 23, 1963, an unnamed U.S. representative had met with Vietnamese generals planning a coup against Diem.[28] According toThe New York Times, this U.S. representative was later identified to be CIA officerLucien Conein.[29]
TheDirector of Central Intelligence,John A. McCone, proposed the following categories of military action:
However, McCone did not believe these military actions alone could lead to an escalation of the situation because the "fear of escalation would probably restrain the Communists".[30] In a memorandum addressed to President Johnson on July 28, 1964, McCone explained:
In response to the first or second categories of action, local Communist military forces in the areas of actual attack would react vigorously, but we believe that none of the Communist powers involved would respond with major military moves designed to change the nature of the conflict ...Air strikes on North Vietnam itself (Category 3) would evoke sharper Communist reactions than air strikes confined to targets in Laos, but even in this case fear of escalation would probably restrain the Communists from a major military response ...[30]
Barely a month after the Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 2, 1964, National Security AdvisorMcGeorge Bundy warned that further provocations should not be undertaken until October, when the government of South Vietnam (GVN) would become fully prepared for a full-scale war against North Vietnam. In a memorandum addressed to President Johnson on September 8, 1964, Bundy wrote:
The main further question is the extent to which we should add elements to the above actions that would tend deliberately to provoke aDRV reaction, and consequent retaliation by us.
Examples of actions to be considered were running US naval patrols increasingly close to the North Vietnamese coast and/or [sic] associating them with34A operations.
We believe such deliberately provocative elements should not be added in the immediate future while the GVN is still struggling to its feet. By early October, however, we may recommend such actions depending on GVN progress and Communist reaction in the meantime, especially to US naval patrols.[31]
While maritime operations played a key role in the provocation of North Vietnam, U.S. military officials had initially proposed to fly aLockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the country, but this was to be replaced by other plans.[22]
Daniel Ellsberg knew the leaders of the task force well. He had worked as an aide to McNaughton from 1964 to 1965, had worked on the study for several months in 1967, and Gelb and Halperin approved his access to the work at RAND in 1969.[11] Now opposing the war, Ellsberg and his friendAnthony Russo[32] photocopied the study in October 1969 intending to disclose it. Ellsberg approached Nixon's National Security AdvisorHenry Kissinger, SenatorsWilliam Fulbright andGeorge McGovern, and others, but none were interested.[11]
Ellsberg showed some of the documents privately to sympathetic policy expertsMarcus Raskin and Ralph Stavins of theInstitute for Policy Studies.[33][34] They declined to publish the papers, but passed on some of them to, and recommended he seekThe New York Times reporterNeil Sheehan, whom Ellsberg had first met in Vietnam[35] and was reintroduced to by Raskin and Stavins.[34] After discussing them in February 1971, Ellsberg gave 43 of the volumes to Sheehan on March 2.[36]
Ellsberg had initially requested that Sheehan only take notes of the study in Ellsberg's apartment; Sheehan disobeyed, frantically copying them in numerous shops in the Boston area at the urging of and with help from his wifeSusan Sheehan, and flying with the copies to Washington, where he and an editor there worked in a hotel room atThe Jefferson to organize and read them. EditorsA. M. Rosenthal andJames L. Greenfield had the copies delivered by mail first to Greenfield's apartment, then Greenfield and his wife drove them to multiple rooms at theNew York Hilton Midtown. There, Sheehan, Rosenthal, Greenfield, deputy foreign editors Gerald Gold andAllan M. Siegal, a team of three writers—Fox Butterfield,Hedrick Smith, and E. W. Kenworthy—and researcher Linda Amster worked around the clock to organize and summarize them for publication.[37][35] Sheehan would also give some copies to theTimes Washington bureau chiefMax Frankel, who would then help shepherd the papers into print.[38][39][40] Before publication,The New York Times sought legal advice. The paper's regular outside counsel,Lord Day & Lord, advised against publication,[11] but in-house counselJames Goodale prevailed with his argument that the press had aFirst Amendment right to publish information significant to the people's understanding of their government's policy.[35]
The New York Times began publishing excerpts on June 13, 1971; the first article in the series was titled "Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces Three Decades of Growing US Involvement". The study was dubbed the Pentagon Papers during the resulting media publicity.[11][41] Street protests, political controversy, and lawsuits followed.
To ensure the possibility of public debate about the papers' content, on June 29,US SenatorMike Gravel, an Alaska Democrat, entered 4,100 pages of the papers into the record of his Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds. These portions of the papers, which were edited for Gravel byHoward Zinn andNoam Chomsky, and given directly to Gravel byBen Bagdikian, the then national editor ofThe Washington Post in a June 26[42] meeting in front of theMayflower Hotel at midnight,[43][44][45][46][47] were smuggled into Gravel's congressional office and guarded zealously by disabled Vietnam veterans beforehand,[46] and subsequently published byBeacon Press, the publishing arm of theUnitarian Universalist Association of Congregations.[48] A federalgrand jury was subsequently empaneled to investigate possible violations of federal law in the release of the report. Leonard Rodberg, a Gravel aide, wassubpoenaed to testify about his role in obtaining and arranging for publication of thePentagon Papers. Gravel asked the court (inGravel v. United States) to quash the subpoena on the basis of theSpeech or Debate Clause inArticle I, Section 6 of theUnited States Constitution.
That clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [a Senator or Representative] shall not be questioned in any other Place", meaning that Gravel could not be prosecuted for anything said on the Senate floor, and, by extension, for anything entered to theCongressional Record, allowing the papers to be publicly read without threat of atreason trial and conviction. When Gravel's request was reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court denied the request to extend this protection to Gravel or Rodberg because the grand jury subpoena served on them related to a third party rather than any act they themselves committed for the preparation of materials later entered into the Congressional Record. Nevertheless, the grand jury investigation was halted, and the publication of the papers was never prosecuted.
Later, Ellsberg said the documents "demonstrated unconstitutional behavior by a succession of presidents, the violation of their oath and the violation of the oath of every one of their subordinates."[46] He added that he leaked the Papers to end what he perceived to be "a wrongful war";[46][35] in an interview in 2015, Neil Sheehan described Ellsberg's state of mind at the time as "totally conflicted" between getting the Papers published and not wanting to go to prison.[37]
President Nixon at first planned to do nothing about publication of the study, since it embarrassed the Johnson and Kennedy administrations rather than his; however, Kissinger convinced the president that not opposing the publication set a negative precedent for future secrets.[11] It has also been suggested that Kissinger's previous work with Ellsberg at Rand would damage his standing in Nixon's eyes and that he therefore sought to distance himself from Ellsberg, in addition Kissinger feared that Ellsberg could leak other defense secrets, including nuclear targeting.[49]: 475 The administration argued Ellsberg and Russo were guilty of afelony under theEspionage Act of 1917, because they had no authority to publish classified documents.[50] After failing to persuadeThe New York Times to voluntarily cease publication on June 14,[11]Attorney GeneralJohn N. Mitchell and Nixon obtained a federal court injunction forcingThe New York Times to cease publication after three articles.[11][51]The New York Times publisherArthur Ochs Sulzberger said:
These papers, as our editorial said this morning, were really a part of history that should have been made available considerably longer ago. I just didn't feel there was any breach of national security, in the sense that we were giving secrets to the enemy.[52]
The newspaper appealed the injunction, and the caseNew York Times Co. v. United States quickly rose through the U.S. legal system to theSupreme Court.[53]
On June 18, 1971,The Washington Post began publishing its own series of articles based upon thePentagon Papers;[11] Ellsberg had given portions toThe Washington Post reporter and former RAND Corporation colleague Ben Bagdikian in a Boston-area motel earlier that week.[54] Bagdikian flew with the portions to Washington and physically presented them to executive editorBen Bradlee at the latter's house in theGeorgetown neighborhood; Bradlee set up a team of writers, lawyers and editors to hide out in his house and organize the portions.[55] Bagdikian later met with Mike Gravel in front of the Mayflower Hotel on June 26[42] to give him copies.[47][43][44][45][46] On June 18, Assistant U.S. Attorney GeneralWilliam Rehnquist askedThe Washington Post to cease publication. After the paper refused, Rehnquist sought an injunction in U.S. district court. JudgeMurray Gurfein declined to issue such an injunction, writing that "[t]he security of the Nation is not at the ramparts alone. Security also lies in the value of our free institutions. A cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in authority to preserve the even greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know."[56] The government appealed that decision, and on June 26 the Supreme Court agreed to hear it jointly withThe New York Times case.[53] Fifteen other newspapers received copies of the study and began publishing it.[11] According to Ellsberg in 2017 and 2021, 19 newspapers in total eventually drew on thePapers for their investigative work;[57][35] thePost's then court reporterSanford J. Ungar wrote in his May 1972 bookThe Papers and The Papers that aside from theTimes and thePost,The Boston Globe and theSt. Louis Post-Dispatch had also been brought to court by the Nixon administration over coverage of thePapers.[58]
On June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court decided, 6–3, that the government failed to meet the heavyburden of proof required forprior restraint injunction. The nine justices wrote nine opinions disagreeing on significant, substantive matters.
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.
— Justice Black[59]
Thomas Tedford and Dale Herbeck summarized the reaction of editors and journalists at the time:
As the press rooms of theTimes and thePost began to hum to the lifting of the censorship order, the journalists of America pondered with grave concern the fact that for fifteen days the 'free press' of the nation had been prevented from publishing an important document and for their troubles had been given an inconclusive and uninspiring 'burden-of-proof' decision by a sharply divided Supreme Court. There was relief, but no great rejoicing, in the editorial offices of America's publishers and broadcasters.
— Tedford and Herbeck, pp. 225–226.[60]
Ellsberg surrendered to authorities at the U.S. Attorney's office in Boston on June 28,[54] and admitted that he had given the papers to the press: "I felt that as an American citizen, as a responsible citizen, I could no longer cooperate in concealing this information from the American public. I did this clearly at my own jeopardy and I am prepared to answer to all the consequences of this decision".[52] He was indicted by a grand jury in Los Angeles on charges of stealing and holding secret documents.[52] Federal District JudgeWilliam Matthew Byrne, Jr. declared amistrial and dismissed all charges against Ellsberg and Russo on May 11, 1973, after it was revealed that agents acting on the orders of the Nixon administration illegally broke into the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and attempted to steal files; representatives of the Nixon administration approached the Ellsberg trial judge with an offer of the job of FBI directorship; and several irregularities appeared in the government's case, including its claim that it had lost records of illegal wiretapping against Ellsberg conducted by theWhite House Plumbers in the contemporaneousWatergate scandal. Byrne ruled: "The totality of the circumstances of this case which I have only briefly sketched offend a sense of justice. The bizarre events have incurably infected the prosecution of this case." Ellsberg and Russo were freed due to the mistrial; they were not acquitted of violating the Espionage Act.[11]
In March 1972, political scientistSamuel L. Popkin, then assistant professor of Government atHarvard University, was jailed for a week for his refusal to answer questions before a grand jury investigating thePentagon Papers case, during a hearing before theBostonFederal District Court. The Faculty Council later passed a resolution condemning the government's interrogation of scholars on the grounds that "an unlimited right of grand juries to ask any question and to expose a witness to citations for contempt could easily threaten scholarly research".[61]
Gelb estimated thatThe New York Times only published about five percent of the study's 7,000 pages. The Beacon Press edition was also incomplete. Halperin, who had originally classified the study as secret, obtained most of the unpublished portions under theFreedom of Information Act and theUniversity of Texas published them in 1983. TheNational Security Archive published the remaining portions in 2002. The study itself remained formally classified until 2011.[11]
ThePentagon Papers revealed that the United States had expanded its war with the bombing of Cambodia and Laos, coastal raids on North Vietnam, and Marine Corps attacks, none of which had been reported by the American media.[62] The most damaging revelations in the papers revealed that four administrations (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson) had misled the public regarding their intentions. For example, the Eisenhower administration actively worked against the Geneva Accords. The Kennedy administration knew of plans to overthrow South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem before his death in the November 1963 coup. Johnson had decided to expand the war while promising "we seek no wider war" during his 1964 presidential campaign,[11] including plans to bomb North Vietnam well before the1964 United States presidential election. President Johnson had been outspoken against doing so during the election and claimed that his opponentBarry Goldwater was the one that wanted to bomb North Vietnam.[52]
In another example, a memo from the Defense Department under the Johnson Administration listed the reasons for American persistence:
Another controversy was that Johnson sent combat troops to Vietnam by July 17, 1965,[citation needed] before pretending to consult his advisors on July 21–27, per the cable stating that "Deputy Secretary of DefenseCyrus Vance informs McNamara that President had approved 34 Battalion Plan and will try to push throughreserve call-up."[65]
In 1988, when that cable was declassified, it revealed "there was a continuing uncertainty as to [Johnson's] final decision, which would have to await Secretary McNamara's recommendation and the views of Congressional leaders, particularly the views of Senator[Richard] Russell."[66]
Nixon'sSolicitor GeneralErwin N. Griswold later called thePentagon Papers an example of "massive overclassification" with "no trace of a threat to the national security". The Pentagon Papers' publication had little or no effect on the ongoing war because they dealt with documents written years before publication.[11]
After the release of thePentagon Papers, Barry Goldwater said:
During the campaign, President Johnson kept reiterating that he would never send American boys to fight in Vietnam. As I say, he knew at the time that American boys were going to be sent. In fact, I knew about ten days before the Republican Convention. You see I was being called a trigger-happy, warmonger, bomb happy, and all the time Johnson was saying, he would never send American boys, I knew damn well he would.[52]
SenatorBirch Bayh, who thought the publishing of thePentagon Papers was justified, said:
The existence of these documents, and the fact that they said one thing and the people were led to believe something else, is a reason we have a credibility gap today, the reason people don't believe the government. This is the same thing that's been going on over the last two-and-a-half years of this administration. There is a difference between what the President says and what the government actually does, and I have confidence that they are going to make the right decision, if they have all the facts.[52]
In 1991, Les Gelb said the following:
But I cannot say that I was pleased. I worried about the turmoil that would enter my life, then as a scholar at the Brookings Institution. I worried about the potential misuse of the papers by doves to stamp government leaders as liars and by hawks to brand war critics as traitors.
What troubled me was that the papers—a vast, undigested mass of fragmentary truths—in the newspapers would become like sticks of historical dynamite, damaging more than illuminating the ongoing struggle over Vietnam policy.
How publication affected that struggle is still unclear. But then and now and above all, theTimes' publication insured what mattered most to those of us who wrote the studies and to our democracy—that the papers would live.[13]
Gelb reflected in 2018 that many people have misunderstood the most important lessons of thePentagon Papers:
Ellsberg created the myth that what the Papers show is that it all was a bunch of lies... [The truth] is, people actually believed in the war and were ignorant about what could and could not actually be done to do well in that war. That's what you see when you actually read the Papers, as opposed to talk about the Papers...
[M]y first instinct was that if they just hit the papers, people would think this was the definitive history of the war, which they were not, and that people would, would think it was all about lying, rather than beliefs. And look, because we'd never learned that darn lesson about believing our way into these wars, we went into Afghanistan and we went into Iraq...
You know, we get involved in these wars and we don't know a damn thing about those countries, the culture, the history, the politics, people on top and even down below. And, my heavens, these are not wars like World War II and World War I, where you have battalions fighting battalions. These are wars that depend on knowledge of who the people are, with the culture is like. And we jumped into them without knowing. That's the damned essential message of the Pentagon Papers...
I don't deny the lies. I just want [the American people] to understand what the main points really were.[10]
On May 4, 2011, the National Archives and Records Administration announced that the papers would be declassified and released to theRichard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum inYorba Linda, California, on June 13, 2011.[67][68] The release date included the Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson Libraries and the Archives office inCollege Park, Maryland.[69]
The full release was coordinated by the Archives'sNational Declassification Center (NDC) as a special project to mark the anniversary of the report.[70] There were still eleven words that the agencies having classification control over the material wanted toredact, and the NDC worked with them, successfully, to prevent that redaction.[70] It is unknown which 11 words were at issue and the government has declined requests to identify them, but the issue was made moot when it was pointed out that those words had already been made public, in a version of the documents released by the House Armed Services Committee in 1972.[71]
The Archives released each volume of thePentagon Papers as a separate PDF file,[70] available on their website.[72]
Watergate prosecutors find a memo addressed toJohn Ehrlichman describing in detail the plans to burglarize the office of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist,The Post reports.
He ran agents behind the Iron Curtain in the early 1950s. He was the C.I.A.'s contact with friendly generals in Vietnam as the long war took shape there. He was the man through whom the United States gave the generals tacit approval as they planned the assassination of South Vietnam's President, Ngo Dinh Diem, in November 1963.
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