Convoy PQ 5
Part ofArctic Convoys of theSecond World War
The Norwegian and the Barents seas, site of the Arctic convoys
Date 27 November – 13 December 1941 Location Arctic Ocean Result British victory
Belligerents
Royal Navy Merchant Navy  Soviet Union	Kriegsmarine  Luftwaffe
Strength
7 merchant ships 6 escorts (in relays) 3 destroyers	Kriegsmarine Luftflotte 5
Casualties and losses
Nil	Nil

Convoy PQ 5 was the sixth of theArctic Convoys of theSecond World War by which the Western Allies supplied military equipment, weapons and raw materials to theSoviet Union afterOperation Barbarossa the German invasion that began on 22 June 1941. The vast majority of the supplies despatched in 1941 came from British stocks. The convoy sailed fromHvalfjörður in Iceland on 27 November 1941.

The cruiserHMS Sheffield and a series ofHalcyon-classminesweepers in relays, escorted the convoy, onlyHMS Sharpshooter sailing straight through. The destroyersHMS Offa,Onslow andOribi struggled for six days to find the convoy until they spotted funnel smoke.

The ships were helped through theGorlo the strait into theWhite Sea, 99 mi (160 km) long and 29–58 mi (46–93 km) wide, by Soviet ice breakers, reachingArkhangelsk on 13 December 1941. As the winter ice increased, later convoys had to go to Murmansk. TheLuftwaffe and theKriegsmarine had almost no knowledge of the early PQ and the return QP convoys.

Between Greenland and Norway are some of the most stormy waters of the world's oceans, 890 mi (1,440 km) of water under gales full of snow, sleet and hail. Around theNorth Cape and theBarents Sea the sea temperature rarely rises about 4°Celsius and a man in the water would probably die unless rescued immediately. The cold water and air made spray freeze on the superstructure of ships, which had to be removed quickly to avoid the ship becomingtop-heavy. The cold Arctic water is met by theGulf Stream, warm water from theGulf of Mexico, which becomes theNorth Atlantic Drift. Arriving at the south-west of England, the drift moves between Scotland and Iceland.^[1]

North of Norway the drift splits, one stream of the North Atlantic Drift goes north ofBear Island toSvalbard and the southern stream follows the coast of Murmansk into the Barents Sea. The mingling of cold Arctic water and warmer water of higher salinity generates thick banks of fog for convoys to hide in but the waters drastically reduce the effectiveness ofAsdic as U-boats moved in waters of differing temperatures and density. The phenomenon is at its most disruptive of submarine detection near theKola Inlet. In winter, polar ice can form as far south as 50 mi (80 km) of the North Cape forcing ships closer toLuftwaffe air bases or being able to sail further out to sea in summer when the ice can recede northwards as far as Svalbard. The region is in perpetual darkness in winter and permanent daylight in the summer which makes air reconnaissance almost impossible or easy.^[1]

The Soviet authorities had claimed that the unloading capacity of Arkhangelsk was 300,000 long tons (300,000 t), Vladivostok 140,000 long tons (140,000 t) and 60,000 long tons (61,000 t) by thePersian Gulf route. When surveyed by British and US technicians, the capacity of the ten berths at Arkhangelsk was assessed as 90,000 long tons (91,000 t) and the same from Murmansk from its eight berths.^[2] By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; aconvoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy.^[3]

The convoy sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores to direct the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaise with the escort commander.^[3][a]

The Soviet leaders needed to replace the colossal losses of military equipment lost after theGerman invasion, especially when Soviet war industries were being moved out of the war zone and emphasised tank and aircraft deliveries. Machine tools, steel and aluminium was needed to replace indigenous resources lost in the invasion. The pressure on the civilian sector of the economy needed to be limited by food deliveries. The Soviets wanted to concentrate the resources that remained on items that the Soviet war economy that had the greatest comparative advantage over the German economy. Aluminium imports allowed aircraft production to a far greater extent than would have been possible using local sources and tank production was emphasised at the expense of lorries and food supplies were squeezed by reliance on what could be obtained from lend–lease. At the Moscow Conference, it was acknowledged that 1.5 million tons of shipping was needed to transport the supplies of the First Protocol and that Soviet sources could provide less than 10 per cent of the carrying capacity.^[5]

The British and Americans accepted that the onus was on them to find most of the shipping, despite their commitments in other theatres. The Prime Minister,Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by2,000 tanks and another3,600 aircraft more than already promised.^[6] In November, the US president,Franklin D. Roosevelt, ordered AdmiralEmory Land of the US Maritime Commission and then the head of theWar Shipping Administration that deliveries to Russia should only be limited by 'insurmountable difficulties'.^[5] The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled atHvalfjörður in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.^[7]

FromOperation Dervish toConvoy PQ 11, the supplies to the USSR were mostly British, in British ships defended by the Royal Navy. A fighter force that could defend Murmansk was delivered that protected the Arctic ports and railways into the hinterland. British supplied aircraft and tanks reinforced the Russian defences of Leningrad and Moscow from December 1941. The tanks and aircraft did not save Moscow but were important in the Soviet counter-offensive. TheLuftwaffe was by then reduced to 600 operational aircraft on the Eastern Front, to an extent a consequence ofLuftflotte 2 being sent to the Mediterranean against the British. Tanks and aircraft supplied by the British helped the Soviet counter-offensive force back the Germans further than might have been possible. In January and February 1941, deliveries of tanks and aircraft allowed the Russians to have a margin of safety should the Germans attempt to counter-attack.^[8]

The BritishGovernment Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based atBletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers andtraffic analysts. By June 1941, the GermanEnigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the olderHeimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, BritishY-stations were able to receive and readLuftwaffeW/T transmissions and give advance warning ofLuftwaffe operations. In 1941, navalHeadache personnel, with receivers to eavesdrop onLuftwaffe wireless transmissions, were embarked on warships.^[9]

The rival GermanBeobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of theKriegsmarineMarinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to helpKriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941,B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.^[10]

German naval forces in Norway were commanded byHermann Böhm, theKommandierender Admiral Norwegen. Two U-boats were based in Norway in July 1941, four in September, five in December and four due in January 1942.^[11]Grand Admiral (Großadmiral)Erich Raeder, head of theKriegsmarine, proposed a sortie to theFührer,Adolf Hitler, on 13 November but fuel shortage and the fate ofBismarck, led Hitler to veto the suggestion;Admiral Scheer was sent to northern Norway. Raeder withdrew the torpedo boats in the north and replaced them withType 1934-classdestroyers. The destroyers carried a heavy armament of five 5-inch guns and eight torpedo tubes but suffered from unreliable boilers. Raeder orderedKarl Dönitz, the commander of the U-boat arm (Befehlshaber der U-Boote [BdU]) to sendU-boats to Norway sufficent to keep three on patrol.^[12]

In mid-1941,Luftflotte 5 (Air Fleet 5) had been re-organised for Operation Barbarossa whenLuftgau Norwegen (Air Region Norway) was headquartered inOslo.FliegerführerStavanger (Air Commander Stavanger) the centre and north of Norway,Jagdfliegerführer Norwegen (Fighter Leader Norway) commanded the fighter force andFliegerführer Kerkenes (Oberst [colonel] Andreas Nielsen) in the far north had airfields atKirkenes andBanak. The Air Fleet had 180 aircraft, sixty of which were reserved for operations on theKarelian Front against theRed Army.^[13]

The distance from Banak toArkhangelsk was 560 mi (900 km) andFliegerführer Kerkenes had only tenJunkers Ju 88 bombers ofKampfgeschwader 30, thirty Stukas, tenMesserschmitt Bf 109 fighters ofJagdgeschwader 77, fiveMesserschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters ofZerstörergeschwader 76, ten reconnaissance aircraft and an anti-aircraft battalion.^[13] Sixty aircraft were far from adequate in such a climate and terrain where "there is no favourable season for operations" (Earl F. Ziemke).^[14] The emphasis of air operations changed from army support to anti-shipping operations as Allied Arctic convoys became more frequent.^[13]

TheLuftwaffe Sea Rescue Service (Seenotdienst) along with theKriegsmarine, theNorwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprisedSeenotbereich VIII at Stavanger, covering Bergen and Trondheim withSeenotbereich IX at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations, if aircrew were to be saved before they succumbed to the cold and severe weather.^[15]

The sea rescue aircraft comprisedHeinkel He 59 floatplanes,Dornier Do 18 andDornier Do 24 seaplanes.Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, the high command of theLuftwaffe) was not able to increase the number ofsearch and rescue aircraft in Norway, due to a general shortage of aircraft and crews, despite Stumpff pointing out that coming down in such cold waters required extremely swift recovery and that his crews "must be given a chance of rescue" or morale could not be maintained.^[15]

The convoy consisted of five British ships,SS Briarwood,SS Chulmleigh,SS Empire Stevenson,SS Saint Clears andSS Trehata, with two Russian merchant ships,SS Komiles andSS Petrovski, all of which arrived safely. The close escort comprised fiveHalcyon-classminesweepers in relays,HMS Hazard,Hebe from 27 November to 7 December withHMS Sheffield, aTown-classcruiser from 1 to 7 December, before detaching to Murmansk withHazard andHebe on 7 December.HMS Sharpshooter sailed straight through from 27 November to 13 December andHMS Bramble andSeagull from 7 to 13 December.^[16] The destroyersHMS Offa,Onslow andOribi spent six days searching for the convoy, until its smoke was spotted along the ice-edge, having been supplied with mistaken information by the Home Fleet headquarters. The ships were helped through theWhite Sea Throat (Gorlo) a strait into theWhite Sea, 99 mi (160 km) long and 29–58 mi (46–93 km) wide, by Soviet ice breakers, reaching Arkhangelsk on 13 December.^[17]

The convoy arrived at theGorlo where icebreakers kept a passage open until 12 December. The closing of the White Sea by ice meant that subsequent convoys, beginning withConvoy PQ 7 would have to use Murmansk, Admiral Golovko wrote in his diary for 10 December,

Matters are evidently moving in favour of Murmansk becoming the reception point for convoys.^[18]

and on 25 December wrote,

The signs are that cargo vessels will sail into Murmansk. Now there is no end to our troubles.^[18]

German knowledge of the Arctic convoys was so limited that there were no attacks by theKriegsmarine ortheLuftwaffe from Operation Dervish to Convoy PQ 5, theKriegsmarine having only five torpedo boats (small destroyers) that were not suited to operations in Arctic waters.^[19] Convoy PQ 5 arrived without loss and was part of a run of outbound convoys toConvoy PQ 11 that had little difficulty, apart from the weather, in reaching the Arctic north of the USSR. These convoys delivered 75 ships out of 77, with one early return and one loss to a U-boat.^[20]

Ships convoyed^[21]

Name	Year	Flag	GRT	Pos'n	Notes
SS Briarwood	1930	Merchant Navy	4,019	21	Convoy Commodore
SS Chulmleigh	1938	Merchant Navy	5,445	31
SS Empire Stevenson	1941	Merchant Navy	6,209	22
SS Komiles	1932	Soviet Union	3,962	23
SS Petrovski	1921	Soviet Union	3,771	32
SS Saint Clears	1936	Merchant Navy	4,312	12	Wintered In North Russia
SS Trehata	1928	Merchant Navy	4,817	11

Convoy escorts^[16]

Name	Flag	Type	Notes
Distant cover
HMS Sheffield	Royal Navy	Town-classcruiser	1–7 December
Hvalfjörður to 7 December
HMS Hazard	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	27 November – 7 December
HMS Hebe	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	27 November – 7 December
Hvalfjord to Arkhangelsk
HMS Sharpshooter	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	27 November – 13 December
From Arkhangelsk
HMS Bramble	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	7–13 December
HMS Seagull	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	7–13 December
Destroyers
HMS Offa	Royal Navy	O-class destroyer
HMS Onslow	Royal Navy	O-class destroyer
{HMS Oribi	Royal Navy	O-class destroyer

• Blair, Clay (1996).Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–42. Vol. I. London: Cassell.ISBN 0-304-35260-8.
• Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972].Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham Publishing.ISBN 1-86176-257-7.
• Roskill, S. W. (1962) [1956].The Period of Balance.History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. II (3rd impression ed.). London:HMSO.OCLC 174453986.Archived from the original on 6 March 2014.
• Schofield, Bernard (1964).The Russian Convoys. London: BT Batsford.OCLC 906102591 – via Archive Foundation.

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