Huáqiáo (simplified Chinese:华侨;traditional Chinese:華僑) refers to people of Chinese citizenship residing outside of either thePRC orROC (Taiwan). The government of China realized that the overseas Chinese could be an asset, a source of foreign investment and a bridge to overseas knowledge; thus, it began to recognize the use of the term Huaqiao.[23]
Ching-Sue Kuik rendershuáqiáo in English as "the Chinesesojourner" and writes that the term is "used to disseminate, reinforce, and perpetuate a monolithic and essentialist Chinese identity" by both the PRC and the ROC.[24]
The modern informal internet termhaigui (海归;海歸) refers to returned overseas Chinese andguīqiáo qiáojuàn (归侨侨眷;歸僑僑眷) to their returning relatives.[25][clarification needed]
Huáyì (华裔;華裔) refers to people of Chinese descent orancestry residing outside of China, regardless of citizenship.[26] Another often-used term is海外華人;Hǎiwài Huárén or simply華人;Huárén. It is often used by theGovernment of the People's Republic of China to refer to people of Chinese ethnicities who live outside the PRC, regardless of citizenship (they can become citizens of the country outside China by naturalization).
Overseas Chinese who are southerners, such as theToisanese, Cantonese or Hokkiens refer to themselves as唐人 (Tángrén).[a] Literally, it meansTang people, a reference toTang dynasty China when it was ruling. This term is commonly used by the Cantonese as a colloquial reference to southern Han people and has little relevance to the ancient dynasty. For example, in the early 1850s when Chinese shops opened on Sacramento St. inSan Francisco, California, United States, the Chinese emigrants, mainly from thePearl River Delta west ofCanton, called itTang People Street (唐人街)[b][27][28]: 13 and the settlement became known asTang People Town (唐人埠)[c] or Chinatown.[28]: 9–40
The termshǎoshù mínzú (少数民族;少數民族) is added to the various terms for the overseas Chinese to indicate those who would be consideredethnic minorities in China. The termsshǎoshù mínzú huáqiáo huárén andshǎoshù mínzú hǎiwài qiáobāo (少数民族海外侨胞;少數民族海外僑胞) are all in usage. TheOverseas Chinese Affairs Office of the PRC does not distinguish between Han and ethnic minority populations for official policy purposes.[25] For example, members of theTibetan people may travel to China on passes granted to certain people of Chinese descent.[29] Various estimates of the Chinese emigrant minority population include 3.1 million (1993),[30] 3.4 million (2004),[31] 5.7 million (2001, 2010),[32][33] or approximately one tenth of all Chinese emigrants (2006, 2011).[34][35] Cross-border ethnic groups (跨境民族;kuàjìng mínzú) are not considered Chinese emigrant minorities unless they left Chinaafter the establishment of an independent state on China's border.[25]
Some ethnic groups who have historic connections with China, such as theHmong, may not or may identify themselves as Chinese.[36]
The Chinese people have a long history of migrating overseas, as far back as the 10th century. One of the migrations dates back to the Ming dynasty when a Chinese of Iranian ancestryZheng He (1371–1435) became the envoy of Ming empire. He sent people – many of themCantonese andHokkien – toexplore and trade in theSouth China Sea and in theIndian Ocean.
Main sources of Chinese migration from the 19th century to 1949.
In the mid-1800s, outbound migration from China increased as a result of the European colonial powers opening uptreaty ports.[37]: 137 The British colonization of Hong Kong further created the opportunity for Chinese labor to be exported to plantations and mines.[37]: 137
During the era of European colonialism, many overseas Chinese werecoolie laborers.[37]: 123 Chinese capitalists overseas often functioned as economic and political intermediaries between colonial rulers and colonial populations.[37]: 123
The area ofTaishan, Guangdong Province was the source for many of economic migrants.[26] In the provinces ofFujian andGuangdong in China, there was a surge in emigration as a result of the poverty and village ruin.[38]
San Francisco and California was an early American destination in the mid-1800s because of the California Gold Rush. Many settled in San Francisco forming one of the earliest Chinatowns. For the countries in North America and Australia saw great numbers of Chinese gold diggers finding gold in thegold mining andrailway construction. Widespread famine in Guangdong impelled many Cantonese to work in these countries to improve the living conditions of their relatives.
Research conducted in 2008 by German researchers who wanted to show the correlation between economic development and height, used a small dataset of 159 male labourers from Guangdong who were sent to the Dutch colony of Suriname to illustrate their point. They stated that the Chinese labourers were between 161 to 164 cm in height for males.[40] Their study did not account for factors other than economic conditions and acknowledge the limitations of such a small sample.
In 1909, the Qing dynasty established the firstNationality Law of China.[37]: 138 It granted Chinese citizenship to anyone born to a Chinese parent.[37]: 138 It permitteddual citizenship.[37]: 138
In the first half of the 20th Century, war and revolution accelerated the pace of migration out of China.[37]: 127 TheKuomintang and theCommunist Party competed for political support from overseas Chinese.[37]: 127–128
Those who fled during 1912–1949 and settled down inSingapore andMalaysia automatically gained citizenship in 1957 and 1963 as these countries gained independence.[42][43]Kuomintang members who settled in Malaysia and Singapore played a major role in the establishment of theMalaysian Chinese Association and their meeting hall atSun Yat Sen Villa. There was evidence that some intended to reclaim mainland China from the CCP by funding theKuomintang.[44][45]
After their defeat in the Chinese Civil War, parts of theNationalist army retreated south and crossed the border into Burma as thePeople's Liberation Army enteredYunnan.[37]: 65 The United States supported these Nationalist forces because the United States hoped they would harass the People's Republic of China from the southwest, thereby diverting Chinese resources from theKorean War.[37]: 65 The Burmese government protested and international pressure increased.[37]: 65 Beginning in 1953, several rounds of withdrawals of the Nationalist forces and their families were carried out.[37]: 65 In1960, joint military action by China and Burma expelled the remaining Nationalist forces from Burma, althoughsome went on to settle in theBurma–Thailand borderlands.[37]: 65–66
During the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC tended to seek the support of overseas Chinese communities through branches of theKuomintang based onSun Yat-sen's use ofexpatriate Chinese communities to raise money for his revolution. During this period, the People's Republic of China tended to view overseas Chinese with suspicion as possiblecapitalist infiltrators and tended to value relationships with Southeast Asian nations as more important than gaining support of overseas Chinese, and in theBandung declaration explicitly stated[where?] that overseas Chinese owed primary loyalty to their home nation.[dubious –discuss]
From the mid-20th century onward, emigration has been directed primarily to Western countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, The United Kingdom, New Zealand, Argentina and the nations of Western Europe; as well as to Peru, Panama, and to a lesser extent to Mexico. Many of these emigrants who entered Western countries were themselves overseas Chinese, particularly from the 1950s to the 1980s, a period during which the PRC placed severe restrictions on the movement of its citizens.
Due to the political dynamics of theCold War, there was relatively little migration from the People's Republic of China to southeast Asia from the 1950s until the mid-1970s.[37]: 117
In 1984, Britain agreed to transfer the sovereignty ofHong Kong to the PRC; this triggered another wave of migration to the United Kingdom (mainly England), Australia, Canada, US, South America, Europe and other parts of the world. The1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre further accelerated the migration. The wave calmed after Hong Kong's transfer ofsovereignty in 1997. In addition, many citizens of Hong Kong hold citizenships or have current visas in other countries so if the need arises, they can leave Hong Kong at short notice.[citation needed]
In recent years, the People's Republic of China has built increasingly stronger ties with African nations. In 2014, authorHoward French estimated that over one million Chinese have moved in the past 20 years to Africa.[46]
More recent Chinese presences have developed in Europe, where they number well over 1 million, and in Russia, they number over 200,000, concentrated in theRussian Far East. Russia's main Pacific port and naval base ofVladivostok, once closed to foreigners and belonged to China until the late 19th century, as of 2010[update] bristles with Chinese markets, restaurants and trade houses. A growing Chinese community in Germany consists of around 76,000 people as of 2010[update].[47] An estimated 15,000 to 30,000 Chinese live in Austria.[48]
Chinese emigrants are estimated to control US$2 trillion in liquid assets and have considerable amounts of wealth to stimulate economic power inChina.[49][50] The Chinese business community of Southeast Asia, known as thebamboo network, has a prominent role in the region's private sectors.[51][52]In Europe, North America and Oceania, occupations are diverse and impossible to generalize; ranging from catering to significant ranks inmedicine,the arts andacademia.
Overseas Chinese often sendremittances back home to family members to help better them financially and socioeconomically. China ranks second after India of top remittance-receiving countries in 2018 with over US$67 billion sent.[53]
Overseas Chinese communities vary widely as to their degree ofassimilation, their interactions with the surrounding communities (seeChinatown), and their relationship with China.
Thailand has the largest overseas Chinese community and is also the most successful case ofassimilation, with many claimingThai identity. For over 400 years, descendants of Thai Chinese have largely intermarried and assimilated with their compatriots. The present royal house of Thailand, theChakri dynasty, was founded by KingRama I who himself was partly of Chinese ancestry. His predecessor, KingTaksin of theThonburi Kingdom, was the son of a Chinese immigrant from Guangdong Province and was born with a Chinese name. His mother, Lady Nok-iang (Thai:นกเอี้ยง), wasThai (and was later awarded thenoble title of Somdet Krom Phra Phithak Thephamat).
Since their early migration, many of the overseas Chinese of Malay ancestry have adopted local culture, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand with largePeranakan community. Most of them in Singapore were once concentrated inKatong.
Myanmar shares a long border with China so ethnic minorities of both countries have cross-border settlements. These include theKachin,Shan,Wa, andTa'ang.[61]
InCambodia, between 1965 and 1993, people with Chinese names were prevented from finding governmental employment, leading to a large number of people changing their names to a local, Cambodian name. Ethnic Chinese were one of the minority groups targeted byPol Pot'sKhmer Rouge during theCambodian genocide.[62]
InVietnam, all Chinese names can be pronounced bySino-Vietnamese readings. For example, the name of the previousparamount leaderHú Jǐntāo (胡錦濤) would be spelled as "Hồ Cẩm Đào" in Vietnamese. There are also great similarities between Vietnamese and Chinese traditions such as the use Lunar New Year, philosophy such asConfucianism,Taoism and ancestor worship; leads to someHoa people adopt easily to Vietnamese culture, however many Hoa still prefer to maintain Chinese cultural background. The official census from 2009 accounted the Hoa population at some 823,000 individuals and ranked 6th in terms of its population size. 70% of the Hoa live in cities and towns, mostly in Ho Chi Minh city while the rests live in the southern provinces.[64]
On the other hand, in Malaysia, Singapore, andBrunei, the ethnic Chinese have maintained a distinct communal identity.
Overseas Chinese have often experienced hostility anddiscrimination. In countries with small ethnic Chinese minorities, theeconomic disparity can be remarkable. For example, in 1998, ethnic Chinese made up just 1% of the population of the Philippines and 4% of the population in Indonesia, but have wide influence in the Philippine and Indonesian private economies.[65] The bookWorld on Fire, describing the Chinese as a "market-dominant minority", notes that "Chinese market dominance and intense resentment amongst the indigenous majority is characteristic of virtually every country in Southeast Asia except Thailand and Singapore".[66]
This asymmetrical economic position has incitedanti-Chinese sentiment among the poorer majorities. Sometimes the anti-Chinese attitudes turn violent, such as the13 May Incident in Malaysia in 1969 and theJakarta riots of May 1998 in Indonesia, in which more than 2,000 people died, mostly rioters burned to death in a shopping mall.[67]
During the Indonesian killings of 1965–66, in which more than 500,000 people died,[68] ethnic Chinese Hakkas were killed and their properties looted and burned as a result ofanti-Chinese racism on the excuse thatDipa "Amat" Aidit had brought thePKI closer to China.[69][70] Theanti-Chinese legislation was in the Indonesian constitution until 1998.
The state of theChinese Cambodians during the Khmer Rouge regime has been described as "the worst disaster ever to befall any ethnic Chinese community in Southeast Asia." At the beginning of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1975, there were 425,000 ethnic Chinese in Cambodia; by the end of 1979 there were just 200,000.[71]
It is commonly held that a major point of friction is the apparent tendency of overseas Chinese to segregate themselves into a subculture.[72][failed verification] For example, the anti-ChineseKuala Lumpur racial riots of 13 May 1969 andJakarta riots of May 1998 were believed to have been motivated by these racially biased perceptions.[73] This analysis has been questioned by some historians, notablyKua Kia Soong, who has put forward the controversial argument that the 13 May incident was a pre-meditated attempt by sections of the ruling Malay elite to incite racial hostility in preparation for acoup.[74][75] In 2006, rioters damaged shops owned by Chinese-Tongans inNukuʻalofa.[76] Chinese migrants were evacuated from the riot-tornSolomon Islands.[77]
Ethnic politics can be found to motivate both sides of the debate. In Malaysia, many "Bumiputra" ("native sons")Malays oppose equal or meritocratic treatment towards Chinese andIndians, fearing they would dominate too many aspects of the country.[78][79] The question of to what extent ethnic Malays, Chinese, or others are "native" to Malaysia is a sensitive political one. It is currently a taboo for Chinese politicians to raise the issue of Bumiputra protections in parliament, as this would be deemed ethnic incitement.[80]
Many of the overseas Chinese emigrants who worked on railways in North America in the 19th century suffered from racial discrimination in Canada and the United States. Although discriminatory laws have been repealed or are no longer enforced today, both countries had at one time introduced statutes that barred Chinese from entering the country, for example the United StatesChinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (repealed 1943) or the CanadianChinese Immigration Act, 1923 (repealed 1947). In both the United States and Canada, further acts were required to fully remove immigration restrictions (namely United States' Immigration and Nationality Acts of1952 and1965, in addition to Canada's).
In Australia, Chinese were targeted by a system of discriminatory laws known as the "White Australia Policy" which was enshrined in theImmigration Restriction Act of 1901. The policy was formally abolished in 1973, and in recent yearsAustralians of Chinese background have publicly called for an apology from the Australian Federal Government[81] similar to that given to the 'stolen generations' of indigenous people in 2007 by the then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.
In South Korea, the relatively low social and economic statuses ofethnic Korean-Chinese have played a role in local hostility towards them.[82] Such hatred had been formed since their early settlement years, where many Chinese–Koreans hailing from rural areas were accused of misbehaviour such asspitting on streets andlittering.[82] More recently, they have also been targets of hate speech for their association with violent crime,[83][84] despite theKorean Justice Ministry recording a lower crime rate for Chinese in the country compared to native South Koreans in 2010.[85]
Both thePeople's Republic of China and theRepublic of China (known more commonly as Taiwan) maintain high level relationships with the overseas Chinese populations. Both maintaincabinet level ministries to deal with overseas Chinese affairs, and many local governments within the PRC have overseas Chinese bureaus.
Throughout its existence but particularly during thegeneral secretaryship of Xi Jinping, theChinese Communist Party makes patriotic appeals to overseas Chinese to assist the country's political and economic needs.[37]: 132 In a July 2022 meeting with the United Front Work Department, Xi encouraged overseas Chinese to support China's rejuvenation and stated that domestic and overseas Chinese should pool their strengths to realize theChinese Dream.[37]: 132 In the PRC's view, overseas Chinese are an asset to demonstrating a positive image of China internationally.[37]: 133
TheNationality Law of the People's Republic of China, which does not recognisedual citizenship, provides for automatic loss of PRC citizenship when a former PRC citizen both settles in another countryand acquires foreign citizenship. For children born overseas of a PRC citizen, whether the child receives PRC citizenship at birth depends on whether the PRC parent has settled overseas:"Any person born abroad whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have both settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality" (Article 5).[87]
By contrast, theNationality Law of the Republic of China, which both permits and recognises dual citizenship, considers such persons to be citizens of the ROC (if their parents have household registration in Taiwan).
In the case ofIndonesia andBurma, political strife and ethnic tensions has caused a significant number of people of Chinese origins to re-emigrate back to China. In other Southeast Asian countries with large Chinese communities, such as Malaysia, the economic rise of People's Republic of China has made the PRC an attractive destination for many Malaysian Chinese to re-emigrate. As the Chinese economy opens up, Malaysian Chinese act as a bridge because many Malaysian Chinese are educated in the United States or Britain but can also understand the Chinese language and culture making it easier for potential entrepreneurial and business to be done between the people among the two countries.[88]
After theDeng Xiaoping reforms, the attitude of the PRC toward the overseas Chinese changed dramatically. Rather than being seen with suspicion, they were seen as people who could aid PRC development via their skills andcapital. During the 1980s, the PRC actively attempted to court the support of overseas Chinese by among other things, returning properties that had been confiscated after the 1949 revolution. More recently PRC policy has attempted to maintain the support of recently emigrated Chinese, who consist largely of Chinese students seeking undergraduate and graduate education in the West. Many of the Chinesediaspora are now investing in People's Republic of China providingfinancial resources, social andcultural networks, contacts and opportunities.[89][90]
The Chinese government estimates that of the 1,200,000 Chinese people who have gone overseas to study in the thirty years sinceChina's economic reforms beginning in 1978; three-quarters of those who left have not returned to China.[91]
Beijing is attracting overseas-trained academics back home, in an attempt to internationalise its universities. However, some professors educated to the PhD level in the West have reported feeling "marginalised" when they return to China due in large part to the country's "lack of international academic peer review andtenure track mechanisms".[92]
The usage of Chinese by the overseas Chinese has been determined by a large number of factors, including their ancestry, their ancestors' languages, assimilation through generational changes, and official policies of their country of residence. The general trend is that more established Chinese populations in the Western world and in many regions of Asia haveCantonese as either the dominant variety or as a common community vernacular, whileStandard Chinese is much more prevalent among new arrivals, making it increasingly common in many Chinatowns.[93][94]
^ab"Key Findings of Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 2020: Urban and Rural".Department of Statistics Malaysia:273–355. December 2022.ISBN978-967-253-683-3.Cite error: The named reference "DOSM2020" was defined multiple times with different content (see thehelp page).
^"Census 2020"(PDF).Singapore Department of Statistics.Archived(PDF) from the original on 11 June 2022. Retrieved20 January 2023.
^abPoston, Dudley; Wong, Juyin (2016). "The Chinese diaspora: The current distribution of the overseas Chinese population".Chinese Journal of Sociology.2 (3):356–360.doi:10.1177/2057150X16655077.S2CID157718431.
^Wang, Gungwu (1994). "Upgrading the migrant: neither huaqiao nor huaren".Chinese America: History and Perspectives 1996. Chinese Historical Society of America. p. 4.ISBN978-0-9614198-9-9.In its own way, it [Chinese government] has upgraded its migrants from a ragbag of malcontents, adventurers, and desperately poor laborers to the status of respectable and valued nationals whose loyalty was greatly appreciated.
^Kuik, Ching-Sue (Gossamer) (2013)."Introduction"(PDF).Un/Becoming Chinese: Huaqiao, The Non-perishable Sojourner Reinvented, and Alterity of Chineseness (PhD thesis).University of Washington. p. 2.OCLC879349650. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 5 October 2020. Retrieved5 October 2020.
^abcBarabantseva, Elena (2012). "Who Are 'Overseas Chinese Ethnic Minorities'? China's Search for Transnational Ethnic Unity".Modern China.31 (1):78–109.doi:10.1177/0097700411424565.S2CID145221912.
^Xiang, Biao (2003). "Emigration from China: a sending country perspective".International Migration.41 (3):21–48.doi:10.1111/1468-2435.00240.
^Zhao, Heman (2004).少數民族華僑華人研究 [A Study of Overseas Chinese Ethnic Minorities]. Beijing: 華僑出版社.
^Li, Anshan (2001).'華人移民社群的移民身份與少數民族'研討會綜述 [Symposium on the Migrant Statuses of Chinese Migrant Communities and Ethnic Minorities].華僑華人歷史研究 (in Chinese).4:77–78.
^Shi, Canjin; Yu, Linlin (2010).少數民族華僑華人對我國構建'和諧邊疆'的影響及對策分析 [Analysis of the Influence of and Strategy Towards Overseas Chinese Ethnic Minorities in the Implementation of "Harmonious Borders"].甘肅社會科學 (in Chinese).1:136–139.
^Ding, Hong (1999).東干文化研究 [The study of Dungan culture] (in Chinese). Beijing: 中央民族學院出版社. p. 63.
^在資金和財力上支持對海外少數民族僑胞宣傳 [On finances and resources to support information dissemination towards overseas Chinese ethnic minorities] (in Chinese). 人民網. 10 March 2011.Archived from the original on 19 September 2017. Retrieved24 December 2012.
^The Story of California From the Earliest Days to the Present, by Henry K. Norton. 7th ed. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1924. Chapter XXIV, pp. 283–296.
^Pierson, David (31 March 2006)."Dragon Roars in San Gabriel".Los Angeles Times.Archived from the original on 13 August 2021. Retrieved20 February 2020.
^"塞拉利昂（2024年版）" [Sierra Leone (2024 edition)](PDF).www.mofcom.gov.cn (in Chinese).
^Liao, Wenhui; He, Qicai (2015). "Tenth World Conference of Overseas Chinese: Annual International Symposium on Regional Academic Activities Report (translated)".The International Journal of Diasporic Chinese Studies.7 (2):85–89.
^"International Migrant Stock 2020". United Nations. Retrieved29 March 2023.This figure includes people who are of Chinese origin in Singapore, not including the Taiwanese population in Singapore
^"Burma".The World Factbook. Cia.gov.Archived from the original on 10 February 2021. Retrieved21 February 2021.
^"Burma". State.gov. 3 August 2011. Archived fromthe original on 22 January 2017. Retrieved7 May 2012.
^"Censusstatistieken 2012"(PDF).Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek in Suriname (General Statistics Bureau of Suriname). p. 76. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 5 March 2016. Retrieved30 July 2017.
Brauner, Susana, and Rayén Torres. "Identity Diversity among Chinese Immigrants and Their Descendants in Buenos Aires." inMigrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in Latin America (Brill, 2020) pp. 291–308.
Chin, Ung Ho.The Chinese of South East Asia (London: Minority Rights Group, 2000).ISBN1-897693-28-1
Chuah, Swee Hoon, et al. "Is there a spirit of overseas Chinese capitalism?."Small Business Economics 47.4 (2016): 1095–1118online
Fitzgerald, John.Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia, (UNSW Press, Sydney, 2007).ISBN978-0-86840-870-5
Sai, Siew-Min. "Mandarin lessons: modernity, colonialism and Chinese cultural nationalism in the Dutch East Indies, c. 1900s."Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 17.3 (2016): 375–394.onlineArchived 27 June 2021 at theWayback Machine
Sai, Siew-Min. "Dressing Up Subjecthood: Straits Chinese, the Queue, and Contested Citizenship in Colonial Singapore."Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 47.3 (2019): 446–473.onlineArchived 27 June 2021 at theWayback Machine
Tan, Chee-Beng.Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues, Hong Kong University Press, 2004.
Taylor, Jeremy E. ""Not a Particularly Happy Expression":"Malayanization" and the China Threat in Britain's Late-Colonial Southeast Asian Territories."Journal of Asian Studies 78.4 (2019): 789–808.online
Van Dongen, Els, and Hong Liu. "The Chinese in Southeast Asia." inRoutledge Handbook of Asian Migrations (2018).onlineArchived 25 November 2021 at theWayback Machine
Thailand
Malaysia
United States
Indonesia
Singapore
Myanmar
Canada
Australia
Philippines
South Korea
Japan
.jpg)
Media related toChinese diaspora at Wikimedia Commons
