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| Operation Veritable | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theWestern Allied invasion of Germany in theWestern Front of theEuropean theatre of World War II | |||||||
 Operations Veritable and Blockbuster (yellow) and Grenade (green) | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United Kingdom Canada |  Germany | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Bernard MontgomeryHarry CrerarBrian Horrocks | Alfred Schlemm | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 200,000 men[citation needed] 1,400 guns 35,000 vehicles | 90,000 men 1,054 guns 700 mortars | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 15,634 casualties[a] | ~44,239 casualties[b] (Canadian First Army Estimate) | ||||||
 | |||||||
Operation Veritable (also known as theBattle of the Reichswald) was the northern part of anAlliedpincer movement that took place between 8 February and 11 March 1945 during the final stages of theSecond World War. The operation was conducted byField MarshalBernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian21st Army Group, primarily consisting of theFirst Canadian Army underLieutenant-GeneralHarry Crerar and theBritish XXX Corps underLieutenant-general Brian Horrocks.
Veritable was the northern pincer movement and started with XXX Corps advancing through theReichswald (German: Imperial Forest) while the3rd Canadian Infantry Division, in amphibious vehicles, cleared German positions in the flooded Rhine plain. The Allied advance proceeded more slowly than expected and at greater cost as the American southern pincer,Operation Grenade, was delayed by the deliberate flooding of the Roer River by German forces underAlfred Schlemm, which allowed them to be concentrated against the Commonwealth advance.
On 22 February, once clear of the Reichswald, and with the towns ofKleve andGoch in their control, the offensive was renewed asOperation Blockbuster and linked up with the U.S. Ninth Army nearGeldern on 4 March after the execution of Operation Grenade.[2] Fighting continued as the Germans sought to retain a bridgehead on the west bank of the Rhine atWesel and evacuate as many men and as much equipment as possible. On 10 March the German withdrawal ended and the last bridges were destroyed.
GeneralDwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied Commander, had decided that the best route into Germany would be across the relatively flat lands of northern Europe, taking the industrial heartland of theRuhr. This first required that Allied forces should close up to the Rhine along its whole length. Montgomery's 21st Army Group had established a front along theRiver Maas in late 1944 and had also considered several offensive operations to enlarge and defend theNijmegen, Gelderland bridgehead and its important bridges (captured during theoperation to capture Arnhem). One such proposal,Valediction (a development of an earlier plan;Wyvern) - an assault south-eastwards from Nijmegen between the Rhine and Maas rivers, initially had been shelved by Montgomery. A conference was convened atMaastricht, in Netherlands' Limburg, on 7 December 1944 between Allied generals, to consider ways of maintaining pressure on the Germans throughout the winter. Consequently,Valediction was brought forward and allocated to the First Canadian Army. British XXX Corps was attached to the Canadians for the operation and the date was provisionally set as 1 January 1945. At this point, the nameVeritable was attached to the operation in place ofValediction.[3]
In the event,Veritable was delayed by the diversion of forces to stem the German attack through theArdennes in December, (Battle of the Bulge or the Ardennes Offensive) and the advantages to the Allies of hard, frozen ground were lost.
The objective of the operation was to clear German forces from the area between the Rhine and Maas rivers, east of the Netherlands (Dutch) / German (Deutsch) frontier, in theRhineland. It was part of Eisenhower's "broad front" strategy to occupy the entire west bank of the Rhine before crossing the river. The Allied expectation was that the northern end of theSiegfried Line was less well defended than elsewhere and an outflanking movement around the line was possible and would allow an early assault against the Ruhr industrial region.
Veritable was the northern arm of a pincer movement. The southern pincer arm,Operation Grenade, was to be made byLieutenant GeneralWilliam Hood Simpson's U.S. Ninth Army. The operation had complications. First, the heavily forested terrain, squeezed between the Rhine and Maas rivers, reduced Anglo-Canadian advantages in manpower and armour; the situation was exacerbated by soft ground which had thawed after the winter and also by the deliberate flooding of the adjacent Rhineflood plain.
At this stage,21st Army Group consisted of theBritish Second Army (Lieutenant-GeneralMiles C. Dempsey),First Canadian Army (Lieutenant-GeneralHarry Crerar) and the U.S. Ninth Army (Lieutenant General William Simpson). InVeritable, the reinforcedBritish XXX Corps (one of two such formations in the First Canadian Army), under Lieutenant-GeneralBrian Horrocks, would advance through the Reichswald Forest and its adjacent flood plains to the Kleve – Goch road.
The First Canadian Army had had a severe time clearing the approaches toAntwerp during the previous autumn. It was, numerically, the smallest of the Allied armies in northern Europe and, despite its name, contained significant British units as part of its structure. ForVeritable, it was further strengthened by XXX Corps. At the start of the operation, Allied deployment was, from left to right across the Allied front:
Further divisions were committed as the operation progressed:
Assessments by theGerman Army High Command were that an Allied advance through the Reichswald would be too difficult and the expected assault would be by the British Second Army from theVenlo area.[4] Reserves were therefore placed to respond to this.Alfred Schlemm, the local German commander, strongly disagreed, believing, correctly, that the Reichswald was the more likely route. He acted against the assessments of his superiors and therefore ensured that the area was well fortified, strengthened the Siegfried Line defences and quietly moved some of his reserves to be nearer this line of attack which meant that fresh and hardened troops were readily available to him.
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The Allied advance was fromGroesbeek (captured during Operation Market Garden) eastwards toKleve andGoch, turning south eastwards along the Rhine toXanten and the US advance. The whole battle area was between the Rhine and Maas rivers, initially through the Reichswald and then across rolling agricultural country.
The Reichswald is a forest close to the Dutch/German border. The Rhine flood plain, 2–3 miles (3.2–4.8 km) wide (and which, at the time of the operation, had been allowed to flood after a wet winter), is the northern boundary of the area and the Maas flood plain is the southern boundary. The Reichswald ridge is a glacial remnant which, when wet, easily turns to mud. At the time of the operation, the ground had thawed and was largely unsuitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. These conditions caused breakdowns to a significant number of tanks.
Routes through the forest were a problem for the Allies, both during their advance through the forest and later for supply and reinforcements. The only main roads passed to the north (Nijmegen to Kleve) and south (Mook to Goch) of the forest - no east–westmetalled route passed through it. There were three north–south routes: two radiating fromHekkens toKranenburg (between two and five kilometres behind the German frontline) and to Kleve; and Kleve to Goch, along the eastern edge of the Reichswald. The lack of suitable roads was made worse by the soft ground conditions and the deliberate flooding of the flood plains, which necessitated the use of amphibious vehicles. The few good roads were rapidly damaged and broken up by the constant heavy traffic that they had to carry during the assaults.
The Germans had built three defence lines. The first was fromWyler to the Maas along the western edge of the Reichswald, manned by the 84th Division and the 1st Parachute Regiment; this was a "trip-wire" line intended only to delay an assault and alert the main forces. The second, beyond the forest, wasRees, Kleve, Goch and the third ran from Rees, through theUedemer Hochwald to Geldern.
Preparations for the operations were complicated by the poor condition of the few routes into the concentration area, its small size, the need to maintain surprise and, therefore, the need to conceal the movements of men and materiel. A new rail bridge was constructed that extended rail access to Nijmegen, a bridge was built across the Maas atMook and roads were repaired and maintained.[5] Elaborate and strict restrictions were placed on air and daytime land movements; troop concentrations and storage dumps were camouflaged.
Operation Veritable was planned in three separate phases:
"Phase 1 The clearing of the Reichswald and the securing of the line Gennep-Asperden-Cleve.
"Phase 2 The breaching of the enemy's second defensive system east and south-east of the Reichswald, the capture of the localities Weeze-Uedem-Kalkar-Emmerich and the securing of the communications between them.
"Phase 3 The 'break-through' of the Hochwald 'lay-back' defence lines and the advance to secure the general line Geldern-Xanten."[6]
The operation started as an infantry frontal assault, with armoured support, against prepared positions, in terrain that favoured the defenders. On 7 February more than 750 RAF heavy bombers deluged Kleve and Goch with high explosive.[7][8] In order to reduce the defenders' advantages, a large scale artillery bombardment was employed, the biggest British barrage since theSecond Battle of El Alamein. Men were literally deafened for hours by the noise of 1,034 guns.[9] It was hoped that this would not only destroy the German defences throughout the Reichswald but also destroy the defenders' morale and their will to fight. Air raids were also undertaken to isolate the battle area from further reinforcement.[10]
Operation Veritable began on 8 February 1945. At 10:30 five infantry divisions, 50,000 men with 500 tanks, attacked in line – respectively from the north, the 3rd and 2nd Canadian, the 15th (Scottish) in the center and the 53rd (Welsh) and 51st (Highland) on the right.[11] The next day the Germans released water from the largestRoer dam, sending water surging down the valley, and irreparably jammed the sluices to ensure a steady flow for many days. The next day they added to the flooding by doing the same to dams further upstream on the Roer and theUrft. The river rose at two feet an hour and the valley downstream to the Maas stayed flooded for about two weeks.
XXX Corps advanced with heavy fighting along the narrow neck of land between the Meuse and theWaal east of Nijmegen, but Operation Grenade had to be postponed for two weeks when the Germans released the waters from theRoer dams and river levels rose. The U.S. Ninth Army was unable to move and no military actions could proceed across the Roer until the water subsided. During the two weeks of flooding, Hitler forbade Field MarshalGerd von Rundstedt to withdraw east behind the Rhine, arguing that it would only delay the inevitable fight. Von Rundstedt was ordered to fight where his forces stood. The imposed US standstill allowed German forces to be concentrated against the Anglo-Canadian assault.
At first, XXX Corps made rapid progress across most of its front but after the first day, German reinforcements appeared and violent clashes were reported with a regiment of the6th Parachute Division and armored detachments. Horrocks ordered the 43rd (Wessex) Division to advance past Kleve into the German rear. This resulted in the greatesttraffic jam in the history ofmodern warfare. With only one road available, units of the 43rd, 15th and Canadian divisions became inextricably mixed in a column 10 miles (16 km) long.[12]
The 15th Division had orders to capture Kleve, but on the night of 9 February they were held up on the outskirts. The47 Panzer Corps under GeneralHeinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz was directed to Kleve and the Reichswald. On 11 February the 15th had cleared the town. Having expanded the front line to 14 miles (23 km), theII Canadian Corps, with the 2nd and 3rd Divisions and the 4th Armoured Division, became responsible for the drive along the Rhine toKalkar and Xanten. XXX Corps was to operate on the right and take Goch before swinging towards the Rhine and linking with the Americans – once Operation Grenade had been launched.[13]
The 3rd Division usedBuffalo amphibious vehicles to move through the flooded areas; the water rendered the German field defences and minefields ineffective and isolated their units on islands where they could be picked off, one by one. XXX Corps had rehearsed forest warfare tactics and were able to bring armour forward with them (despite a high rate of damage due to the natural conditions combined with the age of the tanks).[14] The German defences had not anticipated such tactics, so these tanks, includingChurchill Crocodile flame-throwers, had great shock value.
Once the Reichswald had been taken, the Allied forces paused to regroup before continuing their advance towards the Hochwald (High Forest) ridge, plus Xanten to the east of it, and the US 9th Army. This stage was Operation Blockbuster. As planned, it would start on 22 February when the 15th (Scottish) Division would attack woods north-east ofWeeze; two days later, the 53rd (Welsh) Division would advance southwards from Goch, take Weeze, and continue south-westward. Finally, the II Canadian Corps would launch, on 26 February, the operation intended to overcome the German defences based on the Hochwald and then exploit to Xanten.[15]
By the time the waters from the Roer dams had subsided and the US 9th Army crossed the Roer on 23 February, other Allied forces were also close to the Rhine's west bank. Rundstedt's divisions which had remained on the west bank of the Rhine were cut to pieces in the Rhineland and 230,000 men were taken prisoner.[16]
After the battle,34 Armoured Brigade conducted a review of its own part in the forest phase of the battle, in order to highlight the experiences of the armoured units and learn lessons.[14]
After the war, Eisenhower commented this "was some of the fiercest fighting of the whole war" and "a bitter slugging match in which the enemy had to be forced back yard by yard". Montgomery wrote "the enemy parachute troops fought with a fanaticism un-excelled at any time in the war" and "the volume of fire from enemy weapons was the heaviest which had so far been met by British troops in the campaign."[17]
