| Operation Mastiff | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theVietnam War | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |  North Vietnam | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| MGJonathan O. Seaman | |||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
| 1st Infantry Division | 9th Infantry Division | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 17 killed | USbody count: 61 killed | ||||||
 | |||||||
Operation Mastiff was an operation conducted by the US1st Infantry Division in theDầu Tiếng District, lasting from 21 to 25 February 1966.[1]
US intelligence reports indicated that thePeople's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)9th Division planned to attack theArmy of the Republic of Vietnam(ARVN)8th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division in the Dầu Tiếng District and was massing its forces in theBoi Loi Woods 12 km south of Dầu Tiếng. US commander GeneralWilliam Westmoreland ordered MGJonathan O. Seaman to launch a spoiling attack on the PAVN.[1]: 174
Concerned about possible leaks by the ARVNIII Corps staff, Seaman shared a false plan indicating that the target was theMichelin Rubber Plantation east of Dầu Tiếng andB-52 strikes were conducted in that area to lend it credibility. It was hoped that this would cause the PAVN to move their forces to the west bank of theSaigon River where the real operation would take place. After this ruse had been in place for a week the real operation commenced.[1]: 174
On the morning of 21 February 142 helicopters began lifting the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division to establish a cordon around a 100 square kilometer area around the west bank of the Saigon River. The units then moved in from the north and south discovering abandoned base areas, hospitals and supplies but few PAVN soldiers.[1]: 174–5
Operation Mastiff officially concluded on 25 February, but it took another two days for the operation to wind down completely. The US claimed PAVN/VC losses were 61 killed (40 of them in a single airstrike), US losses were 17 killed and 94 wounded (mostly by mines and booby traps). The operation was a major disappointment for the US command as the PAVN 9th Division was not engaged and the PAVN had again demonstrated their ability to choose when and where it would stand and fight.[1]: 175
Although there were no major engagements with VC forces, the 3rd Brigade commander Colonel Brodbeck still considered they accomplished their mission successfully like defeating VC in a large battle by moving into an area never before entered by US troops and destroying critical VC base camps, stores of food, munitions andmedical supplies.[2]: 78
This article incorporatespublic domain material from websites or documents of theUnited States Army Center of Military History.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in thepublic domain.