| Operation Ichi-Go | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theSecond Sino-Japanese War, theChina Burma India Theater and thePacific Theater ofWorld War II | |||||||||
 Japanese plan for Operation Ichi-Go | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Japan |  China United States | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
 Shunroku HataYasuji OkamuraIsamu YokoyamaHisakazu Tanaka |  Tang EnboXue YueBai ChongxiZhang FakuiFang XianjueLi Jiayu †Joseph StilwellAlbert Coady WedemeyerClaire Lee Chennault | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
Japanese record:[2]
| Western Claim: 1,000,000[3] Chinese Claim:[2] In the Henan battlefield: 300,000 troops In the Hunan battlefield: 286,000 troops In the Guangxi battlefield: 100,000 troops[4]: 6-7 [a] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 100,000 combat and non-combat deaths[5] heavymateriel losses[6] | Western Claim: 500,000–600,000 casualties(according to "China's Bitter Victory: War with Japan, 1937-45")[3] Armies totalling 750,000 'destroyed' or put out of action according to Cox[7][8] 130,000 killed in action[9] Chinese Claim: 300,000+ combat casualties[2][10] | ||||||||
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Operation Ichi-Go (Japanese:一号作戦,romanized: Ichi-gō Sakusen,lit. 'Operation Number One') was a campaign with several battles between theImperial Japanese Army forces and theNational Revolutionary Army of theRepublic of China, fought from April to December 1944. It consisted of three battles in the Chinese provinces ofHenan,Hunan andGuangxi.
These battles were the JapaneseOperation Kogo or Battle of Central Henan,Operation Togo 1 or theBattle of Changheng, andOperation Togo 2 andTogo 3, or theBattle of Guilin–Liuzhou, respectively. The two primary goals of Ichi-Go were to open a land route toFrench Indochina, and capture air bases in southeast China from which American bombers were attacking the Japanese homeland and shipping.[12]
In Japanese the operation was also calledTairiku Datsū Sakusen (大陸打通作戦), or "Continent Cross-Through Operation", while the Chinese refer to it as theBattle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi (simplified Chinese:豫湘桂会战;traditional Chinese:豫湘桂會戰;pinyin:Yù Xīang Guì Huìzhàn).
By early 1944, Allied victories in the Pacific were eroding the Japanese defensive perimeter. Japan decided to attack inBurma and China to improve its position; these becameOperation U-Go and Ichi-Go respectively.[13] Ichi-Go corresponded with an Imperial General Staff contingency plan to the loss of the Western Pacific; the plan was for securing an overlandrail route through French Indochina and China for raw materials from south-east Asia, which would be used to develop offensives in 1946.[14] The objective for Ichi-Go approved by EmperorHirohito on 24 January 1944 was the neutralization of USAF bases in China, particularly theXX Bomber Command bases nearChengdu,Sichuan.[15][14]China Expeditionary Army (CEA), commanded by GeneralShunroku Hata, expanded the objectives in its operational planning to include securing overland routes and neutralizing China by destroying Chinese forces.[14] Ichi-Go may also have been intended to force the Allies to open peace negotiations, and give Japan a better negotiating position.[16] GeneralYasuji Okamura was placed in charge of Ichi-Go.[17]
By early February, preparations along theYangtze included repairs to a major bridge and air field maintenance.[18]
The IJA mobilized 500,000 troops, 100,000 horses, 1,500 pieces of artillery, 800 tanks, 15,000 mechanised vehicles,[19] and 200 bombers for the offensive. They were supplied with eight months of fuel and two years of ammunition.[20] According to historian Hara Takeshi, it was "the largest military operation carried out in the history of the Japanese army".[21]: 19
The Chinese economy started collapsing in 1941.[22] China entered the war in 1937 with a primarily agrarian economy and quickly lost much of its industrial capacity to the Japanese.[23] Maintaining the forces needed to stay in the war imposed an unsustainable burden on an economy further weakened by blockade, shortages of staple goods, poor weather, and inflation;[24][25] there was widespread famine from 1942. The government responded to the economic pressure, reduced Japanese activity after December 1941, and the lack of offensive capability by encouraging the military to produce its own food. Some troops went further by entering industry and smuggling. The self-sufficiency drive and the lack of military action reduced military preparedness and increased corruption.[25] By Ichi-Go, the effectiveness of the Chinese military had "plummeted".[26]
Allied strategy affected Chinese preparations. At theCairo Conference in November 1943, China agreed to major combined operations in Burma on the condition that the Western Allies committed significant resources.[27][28] No such commitment occurred. A few days later at theTehran Conference, the Western Allies and theSoviet Union agreed to prioritize the European theater.[29][30] In January 1944, Chiang warned US PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt that prioritizing Europe would encourage Japan to attack and knock China out of the war.[31][32] In late-March, China believed a Japanese offensive was "imminent"; the US received corroborating reports fromClarence E. Gauss, theAmerican ambassador to China.[33] China sought to reinforce the defense withYunnan-basedY Force, which was earmarked for Burma; Y Force was an American trained and equippedNational Revolutionary Army (NRA) unit and some of the best troops available to China. In early April, the US threatened to haltLend-Lease to China if Y Force was withheld fromStilwell in Burma. Ultimately, Y Force joined the Allied campaign in Burma in mid-May as Ichi-Go was underway.[34][35]
Chinese intelligence also misassessed indicators. It estimated that the Yangtze bridge would not be usable until May, and that Japanese troop movements in the north were a feint.[36] On 27 April, after the start of Ichi-Go, China received French intelligence from Indochina of the Japanese goal of securing the rail corridor.[37] The intelligence was disregarded as Japanese misinformation to draw forces away from Burma.[38] The Chinese could not independently verify significant Japanese movements in central and southern China. Only 30,000 Japanese troops were detected operating in the north, which suggested a localized effort.[37] The Chinese expected a larger attack in southern China,[20][39] a belief that persisted into May.[20]
The first phase of Ichi-Go, codenamed Kogo,[40] was for capturing theBeijing–Hankou railway inHenan and destroying the ROC's First War Zone.[39] Kogo involved 60,000–70,000 Japanese troops.[41] The First War Zone was commanded by GeneralJiang Dingwen with GeneralTang Enbo as deputy. It had only 6,000-7,000 troops, or 60% to 70% of its authorized strength. USAF GeneralClaire Chennault described the troops as a "poorly disciplined mob".[25] Overall, there were 400,000 Chinese troops in northern China.[38]
Kogo opened on 17 April, broke through the defenses by the end of the 18 April, and tookXuchang a week later.[42] Divisional commander Lu Gongliang (呂公良), deputy divisional commander Huang Yonghuai (黃永淮), and two regimental commanders were all killed the day Xuchang fell on 1 May and none of the officers of the divisional headquarters was found after the defenders broke out from the city.[43] Tang's 31st Army Group reported the casualties of the New 29th Division - fighting in central Henan and Xuchang - as 4,092 killed, wounded, or missing.[44]Senshi Sōsho, the official Japanese military history, put Chinese losses at 2,432 killed and 858 captured and Japanese losses at 50 killed and 149 wounded.[45]
Chinese communications were poor and the defense ofLuoyang was uncoordinated.[46] Chiang intended to allow the Japanese to close around Luoyang - the city was fortified and contained provisions for weeks - and then attack the flanks once the Japanese became overextended; this tactic had been used successfully before to defendChangsha.[39] According to Jiang, he requested permission to attack as early as 23 and 24 April, but did not receive Chiang's permission until 1 May; by that time the Japanese had advanced too far. Poor communications also hampered the direction of reinforcements to Luoyang.[46] The Japanese encircled Luoyang on 14 May and captured the city on 25 May.[39] The Chinese lost more than 19,000 troops from the three divisions defending the city.[47] On 26 May, the Japanese Army reported Chinese casualties as 4,386 killed and 6,230 captured, and Japanese casualties as 80 killed and 281 wounded.[48]
At the same time as the battle of Luoyang, Chinese 36th Army Group retreated and its commander, Lieutenant general Li Jiayu, was killed.[49] The Japanese pursued Tang's westward retreat as far as theTong Pass.[39] Combined with an advance north fromWuhan, the Japanese captured the railway.[39]
Contemporary Chinese analysis identified additional factors for the collapse of the First War Zone, some of which were related to the general degeneration of the Chinese military. According to one critic, Tang'scommand and control was poor and he abandoned his army; Tang was generally seen to have been in effective control of the First War Zone.[50] The local population - alienated by wartime deprivation, state corruption, and the First War Zone's aggressive requisitions - also withheld support.[51] Incidents included civilians attacking Chinese troops, stealing abandoned weapons,[52][22] and refusing to obey orders to destroy highways.[53] According to American reports, Kogo met only "token resistance".Theodore H. White observed Chinese officers neglecting their duties and that within three weeks "a Chinese army of 300,000 men had ceased to exist".[41]
The First War Zone suffered heavy casualties in the battle for central Henan. Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group alone reported its losses as 58,036 killed, wounded, or missing.[44] Combined with the losses of other regular Chinese units in major battles in Henan, the total casualties of the First War Zone are as high as 100,000.[54] Senshi Sōsho put Chinese losses from the start of the operation until the capture of Luoyang at approximately 37,500 killed and approximately 15,000 captured and Japanese losses in the same period at approximately 850 killed and approximately 2,500 wounded.[55]
The next phase was Togo 1[40] with the objective of securing theGuangzhou–Hankou railway from Wuhan toHengyang. Togo 1 started on 27 May and involved 200,000 Japanese troops advancing south from Wuhan to Changsha.[56] Central China was defended by another 400,000 troops.[38] The ROC's Ninth War Zone, commanded by GeneralXue Yue, defended Changsha; it had held the city against three Japanese campaigns from 1939 to 1942; as in those engagements, Ninth War Zone strategy was a fighting withdrawal to the city combined withscorched earth. Togo 1 was much larger than the previous campaigns, advancing in three - rather than one - columns over a 150 kilometer-wide front; it was also adequately supplied.[56] On 29 May, the ROCMilitary Affairs Commission ordered Changsha to be held to defend USAF air bases and maintain American confidence; the option of abandoning railway and retreating south-east toGuilin was rejected.[26] Chiang refused to send supplies to Changsha because he believed Xue was disloyal.[41]
The Japanese reached Changsha in early June. The city was defended by three understrength Chinese divisions commanded by General Zhang Deneng; two of the divisions and the artillery were onYuelu Mountain south of the city across theXiang River.[42] Unlike the previous campaigns, it was the Chinese who were outnumbered with 10,000 troops against 30,000 Japanese.[41] One of the two attacking Japanese divisions hadurban warfare training.[42] Japanese bombers attacked the artillery on Yuelu, while infantry moved around the city to attack from the south. Zhang's redeployment of troops from the city to reinforce Yuelu disorganized the defense; Chinese staff officers were unable to organize movement over the Xiang, leaving many units "stranded", and unclear orders made many troops believe that they were to retreat. The Japanese took Changsha on 18 June[57] after three days of fighting. The Chinese withdrew from Yuelu the same day leaving two companies in the city.[42]
Xue retreated south to Hengyang.[57] The city was defended by 18,000 troops.[42] USAFFourteenth Air Force, commanded by Chennault, provided limited support;[57] it was also tasked with protecting USAF XX Bomber Command's bases and supporting the Allied Burma offensive.[58] The defenses included concrete fortifications, and was well provisioned with artillery, anti-tank guns, and supplies. Two large reserve groups were placed to threaten the Japanese flanks.[42] Chiang assigned General Fang Xianjue, whom he trusted, to command the city,[57] A relief force from Guangdong was organized. On 25 June, the Japanese captured a major nearby US air base. Afterwards, the Japanese 68th and 116th Division attacked Hengyang from the west and south. The flooded paddy fields and canals to the west made the use of tanks difficult. To the south were hills. The attack was halted with heavy casualties on both sides. The Japanese paused to reinforce their air forces and resupply. On 11 July, after five days of heavy fighting, the Chinese fell back to another line.[42] The Japanese paused again to bring up reinforcements of one division and several brigades. The Japanese sought to destroy Chinese reserves to reduce the defenders' morale. Air attack destroyed much of the city. By the end of July, there was a food shortage in Hengyang.[58] Chiang did not resupply the city. Stilwell - who controlled Lend-Lease in the Chinese theater - refused Chennault's request to divert 1,000 tons of supplies to Hengyang;[59] according to theUnited States Army's official history, Stilwell believed that Chinese politics would prevent the supplies from being used against the Japanese.[60] Five Japanese divisions resumed the attack on 3 August, broke through the northern wall 7 August, and captured the city by the morning of 8 August.[58]
Japanese forces enteredGuangxi in early September 1944 and quickly captured US air bases at Guilin,Liuzhou, andNanning.[21]: 20 The 170,000 Nationalist troops defending northern Guangxi were largely unwilling to fight and units disintegrated.[21]: 21 Leaders of theGuangxi Clique like GeneralBai Chongxi decided that neither Guilin nor Liuzhou could be successfully defended and Chinese forces abandoned those cities.[21]: 21
In late November 1944, the Japanese advance slowed approximately 300 miles (480 km) from Chongqing as it experienced shortages of trained soldiers andmateriel.[21]: 21 Although Operation Ichi-Go achieved its goals of seizing US air bases and establishing a potential railway corridor fromManchukuo toHanoi, it did so too late to impact the result of the broader war.[21]: 21 American bombers in Chengdu were moved to theMariana Islands where, along with bombers from bases inSaipan andTinian, they could still bomb the Japanese home islands.[21]: 22 The Japanese also failed to destroy the British and Australian Commando operation, 'Mission 204' which had been working with the Chinese. Before the US bases were overrun, the mission had left China and returned to Burma.[61]
Toward the end of Ichi-Go, ROC 8th War Zone inGuizhou − with five armies and used to contain the Chinese Communists − was redeployed to fight the Japanese. Overextended supply lines and mounting casualties caused the Japanese to end Ichi-Go.[3]
According to Cox, China suffered 750,000 casualties, including soldiers who simply "melted away" and those rendered combat ineffective besides being killed or captured.[7]
After the battle of central Henan, Chiang convened with his generals in a series of meetings starting from the 21st of July that would be known as the Huangshan Conference (黃山整軍會議). In the meetings, Chiang gave several speeches regarding the performance of the First Military Front in the battle.[62] He assessed that there were too many vacancies in each unit in the army, reducing their fighting capabilities and requiring the Chinese army to outnumber the Japanese army by 6 or 7 to 1. He orderedHe Yingqin to verify that each division was at full strength and that the sick and wounded should be eliminated, reducing the army from 6.5 million in 321 divisions to 5 million in 200 divisions.[63]
In November 1944, He Yingqin resigned as the Ministry of Military Affairs andChen Cheng took over his position. There were still 5.9 million troops by then, with a reduction of 600,000 personnel. Since the goal of reducing the army to 5 million men had not been achieved, Chen Cheng pushed for further reforms in the army. From January until March 1945, Chen Cheng worked to eliminate the unneeded and reduce the amount of vacancies in the army, removing 1 million from the establishment and reducing the army to 4.9 million military personnel.[64][65] By the end of the war, Chen Cheng had reduced the army to 4.3 million personnel, but further reorganization was interrupted due to Chiang's insistence on incorporating the surrendered puppet soldiers into the National Revolutionary Army.[66]
The poor performance of Chiang's forces in opposing the Japanese advance became widely viewed as demonstrating Chiang's incompetence.[21]: 3 The campaign further weakened the Nationalist economy and government revenues.[21]: 22–24 Throughout the war, but especially after the Ichi-Go campaign, the Nationalist government could not pay its bills.[21]: 204 Because of the Nationalists' increasing inability to fund the military, Nationalist authorities overlooked military corruption and smuggling.[21]: 24–25 The Nationalist army increasingly turned to raiding villages topress-gang peasants into service and force marching them to assigned units.[21]: 25
With the rapid deterioration of the Nationalist forces, Stilwell saw Operation Ichi-Go as an opportunity to win his political struggle against Chiang and gain full command of all Chinese armed forces. He was able to convince GeneralGeorge Marshall to have President Roosevelt send an ultimatum to Chiang threatening to end all American aid unless Chiang "at once" placed Stilwell "in unrestricted command of all your forces".[67]
Stilwell immediately delivered this letter to Chiang despite pleas fromPatrick Hurley, Roosevelt's special envoy in China, to delay delivering the message and work on a deal that would achieve Stilwell's aim in a manner more acceptable to Chiang.[68] Seeing this act as a move toward the complete subjugation of China, a defiant Chiang gave a formal reply in which he said that Stilwell must be replaced immediately and he would welcome any other qualified US general to fill Stilwell's position.[69][70]In Chiang's view, Stillwell had moved too many Chinese forces into the Burma campaign, leaving China insufficiently protected.[21]: 3 Stilwell was replaced as Chief of Staff to Chiang and commander of the US Forces, China Theater (USFCT) by Major GeneralAlbert Wedemeyer. Stilwell's other command responsibilities in theChina Burma India Theater were divided up and allocated to other officers.
Although Chiang was successful in removing Stilwell, the public relations damage suffered by his Nationalist regime was irreparable. Right before Stilwell's departure,New York Times war correspondentBrooks Atkinson interviewed him in Chongqing and wrote:
The decision to relieve General Stilwell represents the political triumph of a moribund, anti-democratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China. The Chinese Communists... have good armies that they are claiming to be fighting guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in North China—actually they are covertly or even overtly building themselves up to fight Generalissimo's government forces... The Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] naturally regards these armies as the chief threat to the country and his supremacy... has seen no need to make sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war... No diplomatic genius could have overcome the Generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle with the Japanese.[71]
Atkinson, who had visitedMao Zedong in the communist capital ofYenan, saw his Communist Chinese forces as a democratic movement (after Atkinson visited Mao, his article on his visit was titledYenan: A Chinese Wonderland City), and the Nationalists in turn as hopelessly reactionary and corrupt. This view was shared by many U.S. journalists in China at the time, but due to pro-Chiang Allied press censorship, it was not as well known to their readers until Stilwell's recall and the ensuing anti-Chiang coverage forced it into the open.[72]
The Japanese successes in Operation Ichi-Go had a limited effect on the war. The US could still bomb the Japanese homeland from Pacific bases. In the territories seized, Japanese forces controlled only the cities, not their surrounding countryside. The increased size of the occupied territory also thinned out the Japanese lines. A great majority of the Chinese forces were able to retreat out of the area, and later come back to attack Japanese positions. As a result, future Japanese attempts to fight into Sichuan, such as in theBattle of West Hunan, ended in failure. All in all, Japan was not any closer to defeating China after this operation, and the constant defeats the Japanese suffered in the Pacific and Burma meant that Japan never got the time and resources needed to achieve final victory over China. The Japanese suffered 11,742 killed in action by mid-November, and the number of soldiers that died of illness was more than twice this.[73][74] The total death toll was about 100,000 by the end of 1944.[5]
Operation Ichi-Go created a great sense of social confusion in the areas of China that it affected. Chinese Communist guerrillas were able to exploit this confusion to gain influence and control of greater areas of the countryside in the aftermath of Ichi-Go.[75] This along with the aforementioned rapid deterioration of the Nationalist forces, Nationalist unpopularity both internally and abroad, Communist popularity both internally and externally, Kuomintang corruption and other factors allowed the Communists to gain victory in theresumed Chinese Civil War after World War II. HistorianHans van de Ven argues that the impact Ichi-Go had on the political situation in China was as important to the post-war world order asOperation Overlord andOperation Bagration were in Europe.[76]
In the spring of 1945, the United States agreed to train and equip 36 Chinese divisions. China also wanted to withdraw some of its troops from China.[3] China began planning a counter-offensive for fall of 1945, called "White Tower" and "Iceman", to recapture the coastal ports in south-west China as routes for Allied aid.[77]
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The 1958 novelThe Mountain Road, byTheodore White, aTime magazine correspondent in China at the time of the offensive, was based on an interview with formerOSS Major Frank Gleason, who led a demolition group of American soldiers during the offensive that were charged with blowing up anything left behind in the retreat that might be of use to Japan. His group ultimately destroyed over 150 bridges and 50,000 tons of munitions, helping slow the Japanese advance. In 1960, it wasadapted into a film by the same name starringJames Stewart andLisa Lu, noteworthy for being one of Stewart's few war films and the only one in which he plays a soldier, as he opposed war films because of their inaccuracy. It is generally believed he made an exception for this film because it was antiwar.
