Inscience,objectivity refers to attempts to do higher qualityresearch by eliminating personalbiases (orprejudices),irrationalemotions and false beliefs, while focusing mainly on provenfacts andevidence.[1] It is often linked toobservation as part of thescientific method. It is thus related to the aim oftestability andreproducibility. To be considered objective, the results of measurement must be communicated from person to person, and thendemonstrated for third parties, as an advance in acollective understanding of the world. Such demonstrable knowledge has ordinarily conferred demonstrable powers of prediction or technology.
The problem ofphilosophical objectivity is contrasted with personalsubjectivity, sometimes exacerbated by theovergeneralization of a hypothesis to the whole. For example,Newton's law of universal gravitation appears to be the norm for the attraction betweencelestial bodies, but it was later refined and extended—and philosophically superseded—by the more generaltheory of relativity.
Thescientific method was argued for byEnlightenment philosopherFrancis Bacon, rose to popularity with the discoveries ofIsaac Newton and his followers, and continued into later eras. In the early eighteenth century, there existed anepistemic virtue in science which has been calledtruth-to-nature.[1]: 55–58 This ideal was practiced by Enlightenmentnaturalists and scientific atlas-makers, and involved active attempts to eliminate any idiosyncrasies in their representations of nature in order to create images thought best to represent "what truly is".[1]: 59–60 [2]: 84–85 Judgment and skill were deemed necessary in order to determine the "typical", "characteristic", "ideal", or "average".[2]: 87 In practicing, truth-to-nature naturalists did not seek to depict exactly what was seen; rather, they sought a reasoned image.[1]: 98
In the latter half of the nineteenth-century, objectivity in science was born when a new practice ofmechanical objectivity appeared.[1]: 121 "'Let nature speak for itself' became the watchword of a new brand of scientific objectivity."[2]: 81 It was at this time that idealized representations of nature, which were previously seen as a virtue, were now seen as a vice.[1]: 120 Scientists began to see it as their duty to actively restrain themselves from imposing their own projections onto nature.[2]: 81 The aim was to liberate representations of nature from subjective, human interference and in order to achieve thisscientists began using self-registering instruments, cameras, wax molds, and other technological devices.[1]: 121
In the twentieth centurytrained judgment[1]: 309 supplemented mechanical objectivity as scientists began to recognize that, in order for images or data to be of any use, scientists needed to be able to see scientifically; that is, to interpret images or data and identify and group them according to particular professional training, rather than to simply depict them mechanically.[1]: 311–314 Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, objectivity has come to involve a combination of trained judgment and mechanical objectivity.
Another methodological aspect is the avoidance of bias, which can involvecognitive bias,cultural bias, orsampling bias. Methods for avoiding or overcoming such biases includerandom sampling anddouble-blind trials.[3] However, objectivity in measurement can be unobtainable in certain circumstances. Even the most quantitative social sciences such aseconomics employ measures that are constructs (conventions, to employ the term coined byPierre Duhem).
Some philosophers and theorists describe a middle ground between complete objectivity and complete subjectivity, which may be referred to assemi-objectivity. In this view, a claim or judgement is considered semi-objective if it is largely based on facts, logic, or standardised methods, but still retains elements of personal interpretation or value influence. Semi-objectivity thus describes knowledge that is neither wholly detached from human perspectives nor entirely reducible to individual feelings.
Related ideas can be found in the philosophy of science literature. For example, Helen Longino’s account ofcontextual empiricism emphasises that objectivity emerges through critical interaction and inter-subjective evaluation within scientific communities.[4] Donna Haraway has likewise argued for "situated knowledge," where scientific accounts are recognised as being produced from particular perspectives rather than a "view from nowhere".[5] In statistics, Andrew Gelman and Christian Hennig have proposed re-conceiving objectivity as a set of attributes such as transparency, consensus, and impartiality, rather than a binary opposition between subjective and objective.[6]
The concept of semi-objectivity highlights attempts to recognise the interplay between empirical grounding and interpretive elements in scientific practice.
Various scientific processes, such aspeer reviews, the discussions atscientific conferences, and other meetings where scientific results are presented, are part of a social process whose purpose is to strengthen the objective aspect of the scientific method.[attribution needed]
Next to unintentional and systematic error, there is always the possibility of deliberate misrepresentation of scientific results, whether for gain, fame, or ideological motives.When such cases of scientific fraud come to light, they usually give rise to anacademic scandal, but it is unknown how much fraud goes undiscovered. For important results, other groups will try to repeat the experiment. If they consistently fail, they will bring these negative results into the scientific debate.[according to whom?]
A critical argument on scientific objectivity andpositivism is that all science has a degree ofinterpretivism.[7]: 29 In the 1920s, Percy Bridgman'sThe Logic of Modern Physics and theoperationalism presented was centered in such recognition.[7]: 29
Based on a historical review of the development of certain scientific theories in his book,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scientist and historianThomas Kuhn raised some philosophical objections to claims of the possibility of scientific understanding being truly objective. In Kuhn's analysis, scientists in different disciplines organise themselves intode factoparadigms within which scientific research is done, junior scientists are educated, and scientific problems are determined.[8]
When observational data arises which appears to contradict orfalsify a givenscientific paradigm, scientists within that paradigm historically have not immediately rejected it, asKarl Popper's philosophical theory of falsificationism would have them do. Instead they have gone to considerable lengths to resolve the apparent conflict without rejecting the paradigm. Throughad hoc variations to the theory and sympathetic interpretation of the data, supporting scientists will resolve the apparent conundrum. In extreme cases, they may ignore the data altogether. Thus, the failure of a scientific paradigm will go into crisis when a significant portion of scientists working in the field lose confidence in it. The corollary of this observation is that a paradigm is contingent on the social order amongst scientists at the time it gains ascendancy.[8]
Kuhn's theory has been criticised by scientists such asRichard Dawkins andAlan Sokal as presenting arelativist view of scientific progress.[9][10]
InSituated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective (1988),Donna Haraway argues that objectivity in science and philosophy is traditionally understood as a kind of disembodied and transcendent "conquering gaze from nowhere."[11]: 581 She argues that this kind of objectivity, in which the subject is split apart and distanced from the object, is an impossible "illusion, a god trick."[11]: 583–587 She demands a re-thinking of objectivity in such a way that, while still striving for "faithful accounts of the real world,"[11]: 579 we must also acknowledge our perspective within the world. She calls this new kind of knowledge-making "situated knowledges." Objectivity, she argues, "turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and ... not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility". This new objectivity, "allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see."[11]: 581–583