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| Armed Forces High Command | |
|---|---|
| Oberkommando der Wehrmacht | |
 | |
| Founded | 4 February 1938 |
| Disbanded | 23 May 1945 |
| Country |  Nazi Germany |
| Allegiance |  Adolf Hitler |
| Type | High command |
| Role | Nominally oversaw: |
| Part of | Armed forces |
| Headquarters | Wünsdorf |
| Nickname | OKW |
| Engagements | World War II in Europe |
| Commanders | |
| Commander-in-chief of theWehrmacht | Adolf Hitler |
| Chief of the OKW | Wilhelm Keitel |
| Chief of Operations Staff | Alfred Jodl |
| Insignia | |
| Chief of the OKW flag (1938–1941) |  |
| Chief of the OKW flag (1941–1945) |  |
TheOberkommando der Wehrmacht (German:[ˈoːbɐkɔˌmandodeːɐ̯ˈveːɐ̯ˌmaxt]ⓘ; abbreviatedOKW [oː kaːˈve] Armed Forces High Command) was thesupreme military command and controlstaff ofNazi Germany duringWorld War II, that was directly subordinated toAdolf Hitler. Created in 1938, the OKW replaced theReich Ministry of War and had nominal oversight over the individual high commands of thecountry's armed forces: the army (Heer), navy (Kriegsmarine) and air force (Luftwaffe). With the start of World War II, tactical control of theWaffen-SS was also exercised by it.[1] There was no direct chain of command between the OKW and the other High Commands.
Rivalry with the different services' commands, mainly with theArmy High Command (OKH), prevented the OKW from becoming a unifiedGerman General Staff in an effectivechain of command, though it did help coordinate operations among the three services. During the war, the OKW acquired more and more operational powers. By 1942, the OKW had responsibility for all theatres except for theEastern Front. However, Hitler manipulated the system in order to prevent any one command from taking a dominant role in decision making.[2] This "divide and conquer" method helped put most military decisions in Hitler's own hands, which at times included even those affecting engagements at thebattalion level,[2] a practice which, due to bureaucratic delays and Hitler's worsening indecision as the war progressed, would eventually contribute to Germany's defeat.
The OKW was established by executive decree on 4 February 1938, in the aftermath of theBlomberg-Fritsch affair, which had led to the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and head of theReich Ministry of War,Werner von Blomberg, as well as theCommander-in-Chief of the Army,Werner von Fritsch.
Adolf Hitler, who had been waiting for an opportunity to gain personal control over the German military, quickly took advantage of the scandal, using the powers granted to him by theEnabling Act to do so. The decree dissolved the ministry and replaced it with the OKW. The OKW was directly subordinate to Hitler in his position asOberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht (Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces), to the detriment of the existing military structure.
The OKW was led byField MarshalWilhelm Keitel as Chief of the OKW with the rank of a Reich Minister, which essentially made him the second most powerful person in the armed forces' hierarchy after Hitler. The next officer after Keitel wasLieutenant GeneralAlfred Jodl, who served as the OKW's Chief of Operations Staff. However, despite this seemingly powerful hierarchy, the German military's officers mostly disregarded Keitel's position, deeming him nothing more than Hitler's lackey. Other officers often had direct access to theFührer, such as officers with the rank of field marshal, while other officers even outranked Keitel, an example being the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force,Hermann Göring. In theory this position meant Göring was subordinate to Keitel, but his alternate rank ofReichsmarschall made him the second most powerful person in Germany after Hitler, and he used this alternate power to circumvent Keitel and access Hitler directly whenever he wished.
By June 1938, the OKW comprised four departments:
The WFA replaced theWehrmachtsamt (Armed Forces Office) which had existed between 1935 and 1938 within the Reich War Ministry, headed by Keitel. Hitler promoted Keitel to Chief of the OKW (Chef des OKW), i.e. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. As head of the WFA, Keitel appointedMax von Viebahn [de] although after two months he was removed from command, and this post was not refilled until the promotion of Alfred Jodl. To replace Jodl at theAbteilung Landesverteidigungsführungsamt (WFA/L),Walther Warlimont was appointed.[c] In December 1941 further changes took place with theAbteilung Landesverteidigungsführungsamt (WFA/L) being merged into theWehrmacht-Führungsamt and losing its role as a subordinate organization. These changes were largely cosmetic however as key staff remained in post and continued to fulfill the same duties.
Chief of the OKW
| No. | Portrait | Chief of the OKW | Took office | Left office | Time in office | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | .jpg) | Keitel, WilhelmGeneralfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel (1882–1946) | 4 February 1938 | 13 May 1945 | 7 years, 98 days | [7] |
| 2 |  | Jodl, AlfredGeneraloberst Alfred Jodl (1890–1946) | 13 May 1945 | 23 May 1945 | 10 days | [8] |
Chief of Operations Staff of the OKW
| No. | Portrait | Chief of Operations Staff | Took office | Left office | Time in office | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ![Max von Viebahn [de]](/mt/?noimg=&dark=on&url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2fwiki%2fFile%3aNo_image.png) | Viebahn, MaxGeneralleutnant Max von Viebahn [de] (1888–1980) | 21 February 1938 | April 1938 | 2 months | – |
| 2 | | Jodl, AlfredGeneraloberst Alfred Jodl (1890–1946) | 1 September 1939 | 13 May 1945 | 5 years, 254 days | [9] |
Officially, the OKW served as the military general staff for the Third Reich, coordinating the efforts of the army, navy, and air force. With the start ofWorld War II, tactical control of theWaffen-SS was exercised by theOberkommando der Wehrmacht.[1] In practice, however, Hitler used OKW as his personal military staff, translating his ideas into military orders, such as theFührer Directives, and issuing them to the three services while having little control over them. However, as the war progressed, the OKW found itself exercising increasing amounts of direct command authority over military units, particularly in the west. This created a situation such that by 1942, the OKW held thede facto command of western forces while the Army High Command directly controlled theEastern Front. It was not until 28 April 1945 (two days beforehis suicide) that Hitler placed the OKH directly under the OKW, finally giving the latter full command of Germany's armed forces.[10]
True to his strategy of setting different parts of the Nazi bureaucracy to compete for his favor in areas where their administration overlapped, Hitler ensured there was a rivalry between the OKW and the OKH. Since most German operations during World War II were army-controlled (withLuftwaffe support), the OKH demanded control over German military forces. Nevertheless, Hitler decided against the OKH in favor of the OKW overseeing operations in many land theaters, despite being the head of the OKH. As the war progressed, more and more influence moved from the OKH to the OKW, withNorway being the first "OKWwar theater". More and more areas came under complete control of the OKW. Finally, only the Eastern Front remained the domain of the OKH. However, as the Eastern Front was by far the primary battlefield of the German military, the OKH was still influential.
The OKW ran military operations on the Western front, inNorth Africa, and inItaly. In the west, operations were further split between the OKW andOberbefehlshaber West (OBW, Commander in Chief West), who wasGeneralfeldmarschallGerd von Rundstedt (succeeded by Field MarshalGünther von Kluge).
There was even more fragmentation since theKriegsmarine andLuftwaffe operations had their own commands (theOberkommando der Marine (OKM) and theOberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL)) which, while theoretically subordinate, were largely independent from the OKW or the OBW. Further complications in OKW operations also arose in circumstances such as when, on 19 December 1941, Hitler dismissedWalther von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, after the failure of theBattle of Moscow, and assumed von Brauchitsch's former position, in essence reporting directly to himself, since the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reported to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
In Berlin and Königsberg, the German Army had largeFernschreibstelle (teleprinter offices) which collected morning messages each day from regional or local centres. They also had aGeheimschreibstube or cipher room where plaintext messages could be encrypted onLorenz SZ40/42 machines. If sent by radio rather than landline they were intercepted and decrypted atBletchley Park in England, where they were known asFish. Some messages were daily returns, and some were between Hitler and his generals; both were valuable to Allied intelligence.[11][relevant?]
During theNuremberg trials, the OKW was indicted but acquitted of being a criminal organization because of Article 9 of the charter of the International Military Tribunal.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the General Staff and High Command is neither an "organisation" nor a "group"
Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term "group" in Article 9 must mean something more than this collection of military officers, it has heard much evidence as to the participation of these officers in planning and waging aggressive war, and in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. This evidence is, as to many of them, clear and convincing.
They have been responsible, in large measure, for the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions of men, women and children. They have been a disgrace to the honourable profession of arms. Without their military guidance, the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile. Although they were not a group falling within the words of the Charter, they were certainly a ruthless military caste. The contemporary German militarism flourished briefly with its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better than it had in the generations of the past.
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience to military orders. When it suits their defence they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is, they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to know. This must be said.
Despite this, both Keitel and Jodl were convicted of war crimes and sentenced todeath by hanging.
During the subsequentHigh Command Trial in 1947–48, fourteenWehrmacht officers were charged withwar crimes, especially for theCommissar Order to execute Soviet political commissars in occupied territories in the east, the killing ofPOWs, and participation in theHolocaust. Eleven defendants received prison sentences ranging from three years, including time served, to lifetime imprisonment; two were acquitted on all counts and one committed suicide during the trial.[13][14][15][16]
GlobalSecurity.org(n.d.) Abwehr, GlobalSecurity.org, viewed 6 March 2025, <www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/germany/abwehr.htm>.
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