Formal systems of logic that significantly differ from standard logical systems
Non-classical logics (and sometimesalternative logics ornon-Aristotelian logics) areformal systems that differ in a significant way fromstandard logical systems such aspropositional andpredicate logic. There are several ways in which this is commonly the case, including by way of extensions, deviations, and variations. The aim of these departures is to make it possible to construct different models oflogical consequence andlogical truth.[1]
Philosophical logic is understood to encompass and focus on non-classical logics, although the term has other meanings as well.[2] In addition, some parts oftheoretical computer science can be thought of as using non-classical reasoning, although this varies according to the subject area. For example, the basicboolean functions (e.g.AND,OR,NOT, etc) incomputer science are very muchclassical in nature, as is clearly the case given that they can be fully described by classicaltruth tables. However, in contrast, somecomputerized proof methods may not use classical logic in the reasoning process.
There are many kinds of non-classical logic, which include:
Computability logic is a semantically constructed formal theory of computability—as opposed to classical logic, which is a formal theory of truth—that integrates and extends classical, linear and intuitionistic logics.
InDeviant Logic (1974)Susan Haack divided non-classical logics intodeviant, quasi-deviant, and extended logics.[4] The proposed classification is non-exclusive; a logic may be both a deviation and an extension of classical logic.[5] A few other authors have adopted the main distinction between deviation and extension in non-classical logics.[6][7][8]John P. Burgess uses a similar classification but calls the two main classes anti-classical and extra-classical.[9] Although some systems of classification for non-classical logic have been proposed, such as those of Haack and Burgess as described above for example, many people who study non-classical logic ignore these classification systems. As such, none of the classification systems in this section should be treated as standard.
In anextension, new and differentlogical constants are added, for instance the "" inmodal logic, which stands for "necessarily".[6] In extensions of a logic,
the set oftheorems generated is a proper superset of the set of theorems generated by classical logic, but only in that the novel theorems generated by the extended logic are only a result of novel well-formed formulas.
In adeviation, the usual logical constants are used, but are given a different meaning than usual. Only a subset of the theorems from the classical logic hold. A typical example is intuitionistic logic, where thelaw of excluded middle does not hold.[8][9]
Additionally, one can identify avariations (orvariants), where the content of the system remains the same, while the notation may change substantially. For instancemany-sorted predicate logic is considered a just variation of predicate logic.[6]
This classification ignores however semantic equivalences. For instance,Gödel showed that all theorems from intuitionistic logic have an equivalent theorem in the classical modal logic S4. The result has been generalized tosuperintuitionistic logics and extensions of S4.[10]
The theory ofabstract algebraic logic has also provided means to classify logics, with most results having been obtained for propositional logics. The current algebraic hierarchy of propositional logics has five levels, defined in terms of properties of theirLeibniz operator:protoalgebraic, (finitely)equivalential, and (finitely)algebraizable.[11]
Humberstone, Lloyd (2011).The Connectives. MIT Press.ISBN978-0-262-01654-4. Probably covers more logics than any of the other titles in this section; a large part of this 1500-page monograph is cross-sectional, comparing—as its title implies—thelogical connectives in various logics; decidability and complexity aspects are generally omitted though.