Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen | |
|---|---|
 Petrescu-Comnen in 1938 | |
| Foreign Minister of Romania | |
| In office May 1938 – January 31, 1939 | |
| Monarch | Carol II |
| Premier | Miron Cristea |
| Member of theAssembly of Deputies | |
| In office November 1919 – May 1920 | |
| In office March 1922 – July 10, 1923 | |
| Constituency | Durostor County |
| Personal details | |
| Born | August 24, 1881 |
| Died | December 8, 1958(1958-12-08) (aged 77) |
| Political party | independent |
| Other political affiliations | National Liberal Party |
| Spouse | Antoinette von Benedek |
| Profession | Diplomat, academic, poet |
| Nickname | Petrescu-Quand même |
Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen (Romanian pronunciation:[nikoˈla.epeˈtreskukomˈnen];Gallicized asPetresco-Comnène,Petrescu-Comnène orN. P. Comnène, bornNicolae Petrescu; August 24, 1881 – December 8, 1958) was aRomanian diplomat, politician and social scientist, who served asMinister of Foreign Affairs in theMiron Cristea cabinet (between May 1938 and January 31, 1939). He debuted in France as a public lecturer and author of several books on political history, then returned to Romania as a judge and member of theUniversity of Bucharest faculty. Comnen spent most of World War I in Switzerland, earning respect at home and abroad for his arguments in favor ofnationalism, his publicizing of theGreater Romanian cause, and especially for his support of the Romanian community inDobruja. During theParis Peace Conference, he was dispatched toHungary, proposing political settlements that would have made theTreaty of Trianon more palatable to Hungarian conservatives. Also noted as an eccentric who published poetry, he was often ridiculed for his claim to aByzantine aristocratic descent from theKomnenos.
Comnen returned to serve briefly in theRomanian Assembly of Deputies, during which time he became a prominent anti-socialist. He was aNational Liberal and close to that party's leadership, before embarking on a full-time diplomatic career, originally as Romania's envoy to Switzerland and to theLeague of Nations (1923–1927). He had a steady climb during the early interwar, with alternating missions inWeimar Germany and at theHoly See. His activity centered on debilitatingHungarian irredentism, and, progressively, on the easing of tensions between Romania and theSoviet Union. As Romania's ambassador toNazi Germany, Comnen preserved a neutralist line, recognizing Romania's dependence on German industry while seeking to expand cooperation with France and Britain.
Comnen was assigned to lead Foreign Affairs during the early stages ofKingCarol II's authoritarian regime. His ministerial term was highly turbulent, overlapping with the expansion of Nazi power, Westernappeasement, and a sudden deterioration ofRomanian–Soviet relations. Comnen recognized theAnschluss, helped "liquidate" theAbyssinian question, and tried to obtain guarantees from Romania's hostile neighbors atBled andSalonika. A full crisis followed theMunich Agreement, during which Comnen worked to preserve both aCzechoslovakian state and theLittle Entente. He tacitly gave theSoviet Air Forces access to Romania's airspace, and refused to participate in a partition ofCarpathian Ruthenia.
Comnen was ultimately deposed by Carol—allegedly, because he had questioned the king's rationale for repressing the rivalIron Guard—and replaced withGrigore Gafencu. Again dispatched to the Holy See, he was sacked by aGuardist government after Carol's downfall in 1940. He never returned home, but remained inFlorence, a supporter of theAllies and agent of theRomanian National Committee. As such, Comnen worked with Gafencu in the diaspora movement againstCommunist Romania. Earning accolades for his new contributions as a humanitarian, he published works of recollections and studies in diplomatic history. In his last years before his death in Florence, he had turned to promoting apan-European identity.
Nicolae Petrescu was born inBucharest on August 24, 1884, the son of a public servant (or magistrate) and his schoolteacher wife.[1][2] BaptizedRomanian Orthodox,[3] he was part-Greek: his maternal grandmother, Ecaterina, was the last descendant of the Greek family Comninò.[4] Also through his mother, hailing from the Cernovodeanu clan, the future diplomat belonged to theboyar nobility,[5] and was an uncle of the historian Dan Cernovodeanu.[6] His collaborator and subordinateNoti Constantinide further argues that Petrescu was ofRomany descent, "a true, purebred, Gypsy" and "highly unusual character".[2] Having studied at theUniversity of Bucharest and theUniversity of Paris,[2] he took a doctorate in Law and Political Science at the latter, and began his career as anIlfov County judge in 1906. He worked as a lawyer from 1911 to 1916, while also teaching economics at Bucharest University.[7] He was at the center of political life from his Paris years, when he joined the Romanian Students' Circle. He lectured with the latter at Voltaire Coffeehouse, appearing alongside some of the country's future statesmen and scholars:Nicolae Titulescu,Ion G. Duca,Dimitrie Drăghicescu, andToma Dragu.[8]
During that period, he changed his surname toPetrescu-Comnen, thus claiming lineage from theKomnenos family ofByzantine Emperors (he also claimed to be related to theBonapartes).[2] The change was made official by his father in 1903, and later backed by a questionable family tree and heraldry, but recognized during his induction into theSacred Military Constantinian Order of Saint George.[9][10] Petrescu's views on his family's heritage were a frequent topic of ridicule among foreign diplomats (puns on his name included the French-languagePetrescu-Quand même—"Petrescu-All the Same", and the generic "Nicolae Perhaps-Comnen").[2][3] HistorianAndrei Pippidi sees the Byzantine claim as entirely spurious, "snobbish", "unjustly decreasing the value of [his] character."[11] Genealogist Dumitru Năstase proposes that the Petrescus were in fact only attached to the village ofComeni, a name later corrupted intoComneni, thenComnen.[10] The "bewildering" Byzantine pedigree was also ridiculed by the left-wing memoiristPetre Pandrea, who noted that, beyond his "princely obsession", Comnen was a "fundamentally decent man."[12]
Comnen's early work included poetry: in July 1904, his patrioticode toIosif Vulcan was carried by the magazineFamilia.[13] According to Constantinide, young Petrescu authored a volume of poems which he signed asPetrescu-D'Artagnan.[2] He is known to have published, as Petresco-Comnène, the collectionIl était une fois ("Once upon a Time", 1904). ComprisingParnassian verse,[14] it received a lukewarm review from the staff critic atLe Figaro: "the work of a real poet", it nevertheless contained "pages that are quite needlessly bizarre".[15] For a while, this aspect of his literary activity merged with his scholarly work. On June 4, 1905,Le Journal du Dimanche noted his "strange conference" aboutAlbert Samain, which ended with readings from Samain's works by a group of actresses.[16]
Comnen also contributed a study of early Romanian jurisprudence (1902), and a monograph on thehistory of the Jews in Romania (1905). The latter earned him theRomanian Academy'sIon Heliade Rădulescu award, and special praise from the scholarA. D. Xenopol.[14] He continued in the fields of law and sociology, with a succession of tracts and lectures:Ziua de 8 ore de muncă ("The 8-hour Day", 1906),Accidente profesionale ("Work-related Accidents", 1907),Câteva considerațiuni asupra socialismului și asupra roadelor sale ("Some Musings on Socialism and Its Results", 1909),Studiu asupra intervențiunii statului între capital și muncă ("A Review of State Intervention between Capital and Labor", 1910).[17] These contributions detail Comnen's take on thelocal labor movement, showing him as asocial liberal who fully embraced unionization.[18]Câteva considerațiuni was awarded another Academy prize, and again received a good review from Xenopol.[19]
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Although Petrescu showed himself to be staunchly againstHungarian nationalism, his wife, Antoinette von Benedek,[11][20][21] may have been ofHungarian origin—allegedly, he had her adopted by an impoverished count inTrieste, as a means for the family to inherit a formal title.[2] Other sources simply list her as a TriestineAustrian.[22] They were married on August 4, 1912, at theRussian Cathedral of Paris.[20] The couple already had a son, Raymond-Alexis, born 1908, and a daughter, Elsa-Irène, born 1909.[3] According to Pandrea, neither of the Comnen children shared their father's "obsession". He described both as "my friends", "sensible, unpretentious kids".[12]
Petrescu-Comnen's career took an upward turn afterRomania entered World War I, initially as a noted campaigner for the cause ofGreater Romania; he was also tasked with explainingRomania's capitulation. According to Duca, Comnen, "whose precarious health had exiled to Switzerland", matched and surpassed Drăghicescu's similar work in France. He displayed "exquisite skills as a propagandist".[23] He cultivated the friendship ofTransylvanians in exile, in particularAurel Popovici and Iosif Șchiopu, who became his trusted advisers.[24] Initially, Comnen contributed to the cause from a Swiss sanitarium, where he was recovering, hoping to carry forward Popovici's work after the latter had died. With articles inLe Genevois, and with tracts such asNotes sur la guerre roumaine ("Notes on the Romanian War"), he complained about theEntente Powers "sacrificing Romania" after theOctober Revolution.[25] French scholar Marcel Emerit found his a biased, "unilateral", perspective, containing "a lively condemnation" of theRussian Republic.[26] Comnen also contributed an ethnographic overview ofDobruja (La Dobrogea), just as the region was being absorbed into aGreater Bulgaria.Georges Lacour-Gayet, who presented the work at theRomanian Academy, noted that the "savant work" of "truth and justice", had exposed the practices ofBulgarization.[27]
Comnen received international attention, as well as collaborations fromEmil Isac,Constantin Flondor, andGhiță Popp.[28] He also approached theCzechoslovak National Council and established a working relationship withEdvard Beneš.[23] Eventually settling with his family inBern,[25] he was delegated toGeneva byPrime MinisterIon I. C. Brătianu, and was later one of Romania's envoys to theParis Peace Conference. While in Paris, he published the bilingual atlasRoumania through the Ages.La terre roumaine a travers les âges.[25] It was at this time that Comnen became the target of criticism from the far left—communist writerPanait Istrati, who also resided in Switzerland, alleged that Brătianu's delegatesVasile Lucaciu and Petrescu-Comnen were demagogues, preparing the annexation of Transylvania to the "satrap yoke" of theRomanian Kingdom.[29] Petrescu-Comnen's input was valued by the Transylvanian delegate,Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, who kept him as an adviser during meetings withRobert Lansing. By then, Comnen had befriended Lansing's nephew,Allen Dulles.[28]
At this stage, the collapse ofAustria-Hungary had ensured theunion of Transylvania with Romania; it also sparked aHungarian–Romanian War, in which Romania faced aHungarian Soviet Republic. According to Comnen's own account, he met with a deputation of Hungarian conservatives and liberals, includingCount Andrássy,Alftred Windisch-Grätz andMihály Károlyi, who demanded that Romania back their anti-communist government, based inSzeged, and provide support to the "White Guards".[30] In August 1919, Comnen was contacted by another delegation, representing theHungarian Republic. ComprisingIstván Bethlen,Miklós Bánffy, andPál Teleki, it asked for Transylvania to be recognized as a federal entity of the Romanian state.[31]
In September, theArtur Văitoianu cabinet, with support fromIuliu Maniu,[32] sent Comnen on mission to Hungary, where he also led the Romanian press office.[4] This experience, in the aftermath of the Soviet Republic, acquainted Petrescu with communism (as detailed by his memoir, published 1957).[30][33] Residing atHotel Gellért inBudapest, he left the city with the lifting of Romanian occupation in October 1919. As a hostileNational Army moved in, he still expressed his belief thatHungary–Romania relations would be mended and preserved.[34] At the time, he was secretly approached by Bánffy to discuss "reconciliation between the Hungarian and Romanian peoples".[35] Comnen later claimed that he had also reached a friendly agreement with Count Andrássy and other Hungarian conservatives, but that this had been vetoed by Maniu.[30][36] If accepted, the Hungarian proposal would have led to the establishment of adual monarchy;Ferdinand I,King of Romania, would have also reigned as Ferdinand VIof Hungary.[30]
Petrescu-Comnen soon joined theNational Liberal Party (PNL), and, in theNovember 1919 election, he won aDurostor County seat in theAssembly of Deputies.[37] He had little connection with his constituency, but was selected by the local party chapter because of his good reputation as an advocate of Dobrujan Romanians.[32] He only took his seat in 1920, when he returned from Paris,[38] and was again reelectedin March 1922); throughout these separate terms, he was active onParliament's Foreign Policy Commission.[39] Vaida-Voevod was Prime Minister of a coalition cabinet formed by theRomanian National Party, thePeasants' Party, and theDemocratic Nationalists. Petrescu-Comnen spearheaded the PNL opposition, especially so during March 1920, when he filibustered against the appointment ofNicolae L. Lupu asInterior Minister.[40] He was also noted for proposing legislation that made striking illegal, pressuring the Vaida-Voevod cabinet to look into allegations ofBolshevik influence inside theSocialist Party of Romania. Despite PNL protests and support from the far-rightNational-Christian Defense League, Petrescu's law was not passed.[38] A disappointed Vaida-Voevod claimed that, with his new career in Parliament, Petrescu had "sacrificed himself" to Brătianu's "politicking".[32]
Still active in diplomacy, Petrescu-Comnen had enjoyed a friendly rapport with thePolish Republic and, in 1920, had played a role in negotiating thePolish–Romanian alliance.[41] From 1922 to 1927, he was also a perennial Romanian delegate to theInternational Labour Organization (ILO).[42] On July 10, 1923, he was named ambassador to Bern, and, in August of that year, also became delegate to theLeague of Nations;[43] according to Constantinide, he owed this appointment to his political connections.[2] He followed with concern theLocarno Treaties, in whichWeimar Germany formally recognized its borders with France and Belgium but not with Poland orCzechoslovakia. Seeing this development as a bad omen, he wanted Romania to align herself with the anti-LeagueKingdom of Italy as a safeguard, personally befriendingBenito Mussolini andDino Grandi during ILO meetings.[44] He worked with representatives of both Poland andLithuania against a hostileSoviet Union, which they viewed as arogue state. When the latter would not adhere to the Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, Comnen,Kazimierz Sosnkowski andDovas Zaunius introduced their own opt-out objections to the Convention.[45]
AlongsideNicolae Titulescu, who took over his seat at the League of Nations, Comnen worked to convince the Entente that Greater Romania was respecting herethnic minorities. One effort, which also involvedConstantin Angelescu andAlexandru C. Constantinescu, involved a defense of Romania's educational programs, confronting propaganda byAlbert Apponyi and the "Hungarian bishops".[46] Titulescu and Comnen made a poor impression with British diplomats by producing blunt threats, such as announcing that Romania would individually sue all Hungarian colonists still present in theBanat.[47] However, they convinced the Norwegian inspectorErik Colban that they were acting in good faith.[48] Comnen also called for a negative campaign against theMagyar Party, once the latter had appealed to the League.[49]
Aware of the issues faced by Romanian Hungarians, Jews and other communities, Comnen showed his concern about what this could effect for Greater Romania's image abroad. In 1924, reporting from the League of Nations, he complained that the newKingdom of Hungary had a tactical advantage: "it is confident that our situation inside the European concert of nations is shakier than that of Czechoslovakia andYugoslavia, that the situation of minorities is in reality less good than elsewhere, and, finally, that an unfavorable current can be easily determined against us with support fromRussia, Jews, Catholics and Protestants the world over".[49] In 1924 and again in 1925, he welcomed in Geneva the Romanian politicoNicolae Iorga, who lectured to an international public aboutBalkan topics and "imperialism in the Orient".[50]
Early in 1926, a new National Liberal cabinet proposed Petrescu-Comnen for the post ofAmbassador to the United States. He adamantly refused, noting that America was "radically incompatible" with his character;[51] he asked instead to be moved to Rome. In the end, he was dispatched to Berlin, which was considered a very difficult mission, suited for his talents.[51] He served there between February 9, 1927 and May 1937, interrupted by a mandate to theHoly See (January 1930 – May 1932).[2][52] In 1929, Comnen also joined the faculty ofThe Hague Academy of International Law.[42] During much of 1928, he was also involved in the dispute between Romania and theKingdom of Bulgaria, reporting to the League of Nations in respect to accusations that his government had encouragedAromanian violence againstDobrujan Bulgarians,Turks, andGagauz. The commission, headed byWang Jingqi, heard Comnen's counterclaim, namely that Bulgaria had sent inKomitadji to attack Aromanian settlers, but repeatedly insisted, and obtained, that Romania prosecute wrongdoers acting on her behalf.[53]
His main contribution during the Weimar period was a German–Romanian Chamber of Commerce. Entirely his "brainchild", it was established in November 1929 with funds pooled byDanatbank,Deutsche Bank,Dresdner Bank,Krupp, andOtto Wolff.[54] From Berlin, Comnen witnessed the diplomatic clashes between Romania and Lithuania; in 1929, Lithuanian envoys expressed their alarm that Romania's collaboration with Poland was also directed against their country. He dismissed the claim, and reassured Lithuania that Romania wanted to act as a mediator in theterritorial conflict.[55] As a partisan of Titulescu's policies, Comnen was in favor of normalizingRomanian–Soviet relations, attempting to settle the issue ofBessarabia.[56] As early as 1927, he approachedMaxim Litvinov, a Soviet diplomat who served asForeign Minister. Despite harsh criticism at home over speculations that Romania was dropping her guard, this helped bring about a period of communication between the government of Romania and the Soviets.[57] He also reported that, with backing fromGustav Stresemann, he could solve another major dispute, surrounding theRomanian Treasure, but that his government overseers never let him.[36]
Comnen and his family became close friends with theApostolic Nuncio to Germany,Eugenio Pacelli.[58] Comnen's stint inVatican City was prompted by the government reshuffle ordered by Prime Minister Maniu, and disappointed Petrescu-Comnen: he was negotiating an economic treaty with Germany and, moreover, preferred the post of ambassador to Italy.[59] While in Rome, he was primarily noted for protesting against the apparent rapprochement between the Holy See and Hungary, but also for using his position to guess at Mussolini's external policies.[60] He was responsible for obtaining fromPope Pius XI a quick recognition ofCarol II asKing of Romania, following the latter's coup, and for ending a long-standing dispute surrounding the corporate status ofRomanian Roman Catholic churches.[61]
Comnen's contacts in Vatican City informed him of an imminent Soviet attack on Romania, which is supposedly why Maniu massively increased military spending.[62] The latter part of his term coincided with Iorga's premiership: Petrescu-Comnen advised the cabinet not to engage in "violent and hasty" actions against the Hungarian Catholic clergy, while personally ensuring cooperation between the state and theGreek-Rite Catholics.[63] According to Iorga, he was supporting the King and the government, including against the PNL, boasting that he had stopped a PNL propaganda campaign abroad.[64] His dealings with the Holy See were opposed by rivalOnisifor Ghibu, who claimed that Petrescu-Comnen was a disgrace to his office.[65]
Even from Italy, Petrescu-Comnen closely observed theGreat Depression and the decline of the Weimar Republic. Already in 1931, while vacationing inBrittany, he had predicted that Germany would fall to communism.[66] His return to Berlin was facilitated by Carol II, who complained that the outgoing ambassador,Gheorghe Tașcă, was "nonexistent".[67] The establishment of aNazi regime came as a surprise. Petrescu-Comnen was prudent in his contacts with the Nazis, and his diplomatic notes of the time were ambivalent.[2][68] Former Prime Minister Iorga, who remained friends with Comnen, records that Comnen thoughtAdolf Hitler "naive and sincere, still learning the ropes."[69]
In an interview with Comnen on May 26, 1933, Hitler "bluntly conditioned the continuation of economic contacts on a change in Romania's political attitude".[70] During 1934, Comnen was still hoping to drive a wedge betweenGerman re-armament andHungarian irredentism, approaching various factions represented in theHitler Cabinet. In May, he invitedIoan Lupaș of the Romanian Anti-Revisionist League to lecture in Berlin about minority religions in Romania.[71] Later that year, he and consulConstantin Karadja obtained fromHermann Göring a guarantee that Germany would not go to war over Hungary—but this pledge was quickly dismissed byKonstantin von Neurath andAlfred Rosenberg.[72] Rosenberg was persuaded that Comnen, a "Titulescu representative", was lying, and began maneuvering to have him recalled.[73]
Comnen's Russian policy was soon restored by the apparent upset in German–Soviet relations and theFranco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance.[74] In 1935,Aarne Wuorimaa ofFinland probed Comnen's views on Titulescu's Soviet policy. The latter reassured both Germany and Finland that there was no scenario in which Romania and the Soviets would establish a military pact.[75] Though skeptical, Comnen himself preferred this Soviet realignment to the Nazi alternative: his notes of 1936 show him alarmed by the "antisemitic objective" of Nazism (accurately predicting aKristallnacht), by the regime'spublic anti-Catholicism, and overall by the "nebulous criteria of German law".[76] Although he viewed theWinter andSummer Olympics as propaganda, Comnen accepted the Olympics Cross, First Class from Hitler.[77] In early 1937, he visited Britain upon King Carol's request, and reported back that he had been able to approach various British statesmen.[78] He and Karadja obtained thatȘerban Cantacuzino's battle flag, used in theSiege of Vienna and discovered inDresden, be returned to Romania.[79]
Over the following months, the rise of the fascistIron Guard and theproblematic elections of December 1937 upset the liberal order in Romania. In the run-up to the elections, Comnen had sought to mitigate Germany's open support for the Iron Guard, offering its government a chance to apologize forAmbassador Fabricius' presence at thefunerals of Ion Moța and Vasile Marin. This request was angrily rejected in Berlin, mainly because the ambassador "had only attended a religious ceremony".[80] Eventually, Carol pleased Germany by handing government toOctavian Goga and his Nazi-orientedNational Christian Party (PNC). Comnen confirmed to this standard, communicating in Berlin the guidelines of Romania's neutralist policy: preservation ofFranco– andBritish–Romanian relations, full economic cooperation with Germany, and "no hostile attitude toward Russia."[81]
Comnen went on to serve as undersecretary of theForeign Affairs Ministry, which was led byGheorghe Tătărescu. His advancement was supposed to placate Germany, which had been unpleasantly surprised by the PNC's downfall; it was also greeted by the Italian ambassador,Ugo Sola.[82] He was described in theJournal des Débats as primarily aFrancophile,[83] but continued to be seen by theAuswärtiges Amt as a friend of Germany in the cabinet, on par withAlexandru Averescu andConstantin Argetoianu.[84] Upon his recall to Bucharest, Hitler showed his appreciation for the diplomat in a special letter to Carol II—this was a first in Romanian annals.[85] Soon after taking office, Comnen, who was more probably a neutralist,[86] presided upon the council of theBalkan Pact, and, in February 1938, drafted itsAnkara resolution, condemning "any interference in the internal politics" of member states.[85]
During the early days of 1938, Comnen announced that he was no longer involved with the National Liberal Party, taking his distance from Tătărescu.[87] Widely tipped to become the full minister, he took over on March 30, days after theAnschluss crisis.[85] His term coincided with the major developments in Carol's feud with the Iron Guard; Prime MinisterMiron Cristea served Carol's own authoritarian regime, which consolidated a single-partyNational Renaissance Front. One of Comnen's first actions was to inform theBritish Foreign Office and theFrench Foreign Ministry about Germany's economic tactics; he also advised Germany not to act against Czechoslovakia, or risk a "world war".[88] In May, he informed German diplomats that Romanian prosecutors had obtained concrete evidence that had been sponsoring the Iron Guard. He assured Fabricius that the information would not be publicized, on condition that "this thing is brought to an end."[89]
Comnen also emphasized the importance of Franco–British–Romanian relations by elevating the ranks of his ambassadors in both countries, and by making Tătărescu his Paris envoy.[90] However, Romania was facing international criticism over her disbanding of theDanube Commission and her introduction ofantisemitic laws.[91] Her relations with Britain were also strained by the appointment ofLord Halifax, a proponent ofappeasement and thus a "great friend of Hitlerian Germany", asForeign Secretary.[92] The situation was complicated by a sudden worsening of relations with the Soviet Union, when the Soviet diplomatFedor Butenko disappeared in Bucharest. Before the details of this escape emerged, the Soviet side was claiming that Butenko had been abducted or killed by a PNC militia, theLăncieri. There was a sudden worsening of Romanian–Soviet relations, almost to the brink of war.[93] Eventually, the investigating team informed Comnen of the actual facts, namely that Butenko had defected of his own free will, to escape a likely execution in theGreat Purge; this was later confirmed in a letter which Butenko addressed to the Romanian Foreign Ministry from his new home in Italy.[94] Despite being targeted by Soviet officials, who alleged that he had a role in this affair, he did not speak publicly in support of Butenko.[95]
Petrescu-Comnen was subject to increasing pressures from the Germans to reorient his country's foreign policy towards theTripartite Pact. Rosenberg called on Petrescu-Comnen to abandon Little Entente commitments to Czechoslovakia, as a prerequisite for good economic exchanges with Germany.[96] The Romanian minister sought to counter such pressures by negotiating an economic treaty with Britain, which was still being discussed, then shelved, in August 1938.[97] The relations were tested by the question ofRomanian Jewish disenfranchisement, with Comnen refusing to accept British suggestions that the policy be reversed.[98] Progressively, Romania was coming to terms with her economic dependency on Germany, with Comnen issuing statements that hinted to a change of priorities in foreign affairs. Romania was therefore quick in recognizing theAnschluss as "unavoidable"[99] and "unobjectionable".[100] His ministry still attempted to prioritize Romania's commitment to Czechoslovakia (tested by both Nazi and Polish demands, as well as by Czechoslovakia's friendship towards the Soviet state); it eventually witnessed theMunich Agreement, and, despite official protests, had to seek a new course in European politics.[101]
Petrescu-Comnen was reserved about the Soviets' intervention on Czechoslovakia's side; he insisted that Romanian cooperation with theRed Army would only come with a recognition of Bessarabia as Romanian territory.[102] More specifically, Comnen and the rest of his government expected France to provide Romania with guarantees.[103] Contacted byMaxim Litvinov andKamil Krofta in September, he promised that he would obtain flyover rights for theSoviet Air Forces, but these were never approved by his government.[104] In conversation withGeorges Bonnet, he confessed his own fears, namely that Litvinov was preparing the invasion of Bessarabia; he also commented at length on Romania's unpreparedness for war. According to Comnen, Soviet aircraft could cross into Romania's airspace at will, if the Soviets so desired, since it could not ever be hit by Romanianflak guns; he also insisted that a Red Army presence in Romania would have been of no service to Czechoslovakia, since roads linking Bessarabia toCarpathian Ruthenia were few and poorly maintained.[105]
By then, Romania's airspace was intensely used by Soviet aircraft. When pressed about this issue by Göring, asGermany's Air Minister, Comnen insisted that the planes could not be downed.[106] In effect, with his revelations about the flak range, Comnen gave the Soviets a free pass—as noted by French diplomatic cables, he did not want terrestrial passage, but "close[d] his eyes to overflights of [Romania's] territory."[107] Air defense, Comnen promised, "would take a few badly aimed potshots at Soviet planes, and that would be that."[108] More officially, in September he also allowed theCzechoslovak Air Force to fly its newly purchased warplanes from Soviet bases, over Romania.[109] Beneš andHeliodor Píka later testified that Comnen had respected his promises to Czechoslovakia.[110] As argued by journalist Alexander Bregman and historianAnna M. Cienciala, this exposes as false the claims publicized bySoviet historiography, according to which Romania sabotaged the Czechoslovak–Soviet entente. The Soviets, they note, limited their involvement because they were unprepared for war with Germany.[111] Nevertheless, as argued by historians such as Rebecca Haynes, Comnen himself never prepared for a Romanian military intervention in support of Czechoslovakia, except against an invasion by or from Hungary.[112]
In May, at the height of the Munich crisis, Petrescu-Comnen informed Fabricius that "nothing of what endangers the existence of Czechoslovakia will leave us unmoved";[113] he himself was surfacing as a spokesman for theLittle Entente as a whole. He represented it at the League of Nations, where he recognized theItalian annexation of Ethiopia as irreversible. He "took the initiative in liquidating theEthiopian question",[114] then followed the Anglo–French attempt to restore relations with Italy: "the Italian conquest would have to be acknowledged, unless [League members] were prepared to live forever in an unreal world."[115] Faced with theGerman attempts to seize control over the Danube, Comnen and other Romanian experts sought to re-legitimize the Danube Commission; in exchange, he obtained French and British recognition of Romania's full sovereignty over theDanube Delta.[116]
Comnen hosted the Little Entente leaders at a summit inSinaia, and agreed to negotiate a collective nonaggression pact with Hungary; he also empoweredIoannis Metaxas to approach Bulgaria for similar talks. He managed to sign accords to that effect (theBled andSalonika agreements), despite German pressures on Yugoslavia.[117] Although celebrated in France as a major achievement for peace and stability, these arrangements were in fact "very banal", and Bled presented no guarantees for Czechoslovakia's survival.[118] They were also notable for lifting the ban on Hungarian re-armament, which he advertised as a prelude to reaching "good terms with Hungary."[119] However, Comnen delayed the application of that clause to October, which reportedly causedHungary's Foreign Minister,Kálmán Kánya, to lose his temper on at least one occasion.[120]
Comnen was highly critical of Poland's participation in theGerman occupation of Czechoslovakia, which upset his plans for resistance. Returning to Geneva as the Little Entente was falling apart, he managed to persuade Yugoslavia'sMilan Stojadinović not to give up on the project. On September 23, they addressed Hungary an ultimatum, threatening war if she would invade Czechoslovakia; Stojadinović rescinded five days later.[121] Comnen continued to press for Yugoslavia to maintain the Little Entente, while also urgingJan Syrový's government to reconcile with the Ruthenian autonomists and theSlovak People's Party.[122] The same month, he also approached Litvinov, promising that Romania would play no part in "anti-Soviet actions",[123] also renouncing the demand for territorial guarantees, and even proposing that the Red Army be allowed to cross into Carpathian Ruthenia by way ofCernăuți County.[124]
The Polish–Romanian alliance was also threatened by warmHungary–Poland relations. Among the Polish diplomats, Count Leo Orlowski theorized that Romania should join the alliance with Hungary, "a country of the future", and abandon Czechoslovakia.[125] At an October conference inGalați, Comnen tried to persuadeJózef Beck, thePolish Foreign Minister, not to accept a Hungarian takeover in Ruthenia. He then refused Polish offers for Romania to annex parts of that region, inNorthern Maramureș.[126] Confronted with Romania's argument that either Czechoslovak rule or an independentCarpatho-Ukraine were preferable toHungarian irredentism, Beck became convinced that Comnen was a "perfect imbecile", describing him as such in his memoirs.[127] Comnen obtained from him a promise that Poland would intervene to reduce Hungary's territorial demands, but Beck never acted on that pledge.[128] For his part, Comnen continued to aggravate the Poles by stating his support for an independentUkraine, which he argued would be a natural ally of Poland and Romania against both Germany and the Soviet Union.[129]
On September 12, Petrescu-Comnen had written Bonnet to demand that France honor its promise of properly arming the Romanian military, noting: "it would be a grave error if France were to lose our army's sympathy."[130] Believing that France and Britain were not going to defend Romania,[131] he ultimately took Romania closer to Germany and theAxis powers. In parallel to his purely political work, Petrescu-Comnen worked withGeorge Oprescu andMarie of Romania, organizing the exhibit of Germanold master prints.[132] From October 1938, he tried to persuade Germany not to dismantlereduced Czechoslovakia, and especially not to allow Hungary to annex Ruthenia. Despite assurances that Germany would only let Hungary takeHungarian areas, theFirst Vienna Award produced a HungarianGovernorate of Subcarpathia, which isolated Romania's territory.[133] This then opened the way for Hungarian demands in Transylvania. In November, Comnen suggested settling the Transylvanian issue through apopulation exchange with Hungary, noting thatRomania's Hungarians were mostly town-dwellers. This proposal was rejected by demographer Béla Kenéz on the Hungarian side—he noted that it would have implied removing almost 2 million people to make room for the 16,000Romanians in Hungary.[134]
Comnen also spearheaded a project to encouragea mass emigration of Romanian Jews, a draft of which was presented byWilhelm Filderman and accepted on behalf of government byMihai Ralea.[135] In November, he organized Carol's state visit to Britain. In his own interview with Halifax, Comnen openly criticized France and Britain for abandoning Czechoslovakia; in that context, he also claimed that he himself had rejected an offer by "Slovakian political parties" to obtain aLeague of Nations mandate over that region.[136] Carol's diplomatic tour was also an attempt to quell international protests regarding Goga's treatment of the Jews. In the aftermath, Carol recalled his minister in London,Vasile Grigorcea, who had angered the monarch with his unrealistic reports; now a Grand Cross of theOrder of St Michael and St George, Comnen also found himself at odds with Carol's courtier,Ernest Urdăreanu, who flaunted diplomatic conventions by asking to receive a higher honor.[137]
The change of policy toward Germany incensed the underground democratic opposition, and especially Maniu'sNational Peasants' Party. It accused Carol of appeasement and called for a national unity cabinet to deal with the crisis. In that context, Comnen had a publicized meeting with three former Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Dimitrie I. Ghika,Victor Antonescu,Istrate Micescu), showing that they backed his German rapprochement.[138] The effort proved largely futile: as Comnen himself noted, Hitler resented Carol for repressing the Iron Guard and murdering its leader,Corneliu Zelea Codreanu; reportedly, this implicit criticism of the regime brought his demotion, by Carol, on December 20.[91] However, Yugoslav diplomat Kosta St. Pavlowitch recalls that Carol had the idea to replace Comnen withGrigore Gafencu, a journalist forTimpul, when the three of them were in London; while there, Gafencu won the king's confidence.[139] Another diplomat, Alexandru Iacovachi, also argues that Comnen had failed Carol's expectations during the London visit—specifically, that a commercial treaty would be signed, and that theRoyal Navy would send a squadron toConstanța.[140]
Before Gafencu took over, Comnen was informed that he would return as Romania's representative to the Holy See.[141] According to Pavlowitch, he had overall proven himself "a conscious bureaucrat and an astute diplomat, [...] but, as was reported, did not rise to the challenge of the events. [...] During the deepest of Europe's crises, [...] Romanian foreign politics had been entrusted to someone who had no means of influencing the events, and who looked on passively as the ground was slipping away from under his feet".[90] Petrescu-Comnen took up his new office in Rome on January 20, 1939,[142] visiting Pacelli, now Pope Pius XII, at thePalace of Castel Gandolfo to present him with works of Romanian ethnography and assess his views on international politics.[143]
From his posting, Petrescu-Comnen witnessed the revelations of aGerman–Soviet Pact, which, as he reported to Gafencu, placed Romania in imminent danger.[144] He remained in Rome after the outbreak of World War II a week later. TheGerman invasion of Poland convinced Comnen that there was "no reasoning to be tried with the Germans"—a pessimistic note which contrasted Gafencu's attempts to reach a new understanding with the Axis.[145] According to his own recollections, he was entrusted by Gafencu andŞükrü Saracoğlu with obtaining Italian backing for theBalkan Pact, which was to include a pacified Bulgaria; at the time, Italy was still "non-belligerent".[146] Although Mussolini eventually backed Hitler, Comen still hoped to obtain Italian and papal support for Romania before and during theSecond Vienna Award.[147] By April 1940, he was allegedly contacted byMyron Charles Taylor, and through him informed US foreign policy.[148]
Hungary's annexation ofNorthern Transylvania, preceded by theSoviet occupation of Bessarabia, signaled a regime change in Romania. In September 1940, King Carol was ousted and an Axis-alignedIron Guard government took over in Bucharest; Petrescu-Comnen, identified as a pillar of the old system, was sacked within days.[149] His office was unofficially taken over by GuardistIoan Victor Vojen, who, upon his arrival, prevented Comnen from attending any official function; the aging diplomat withdrew toFiesole, on a vineyard which had once belonged toNiccolò Machiavelli.[150] Effectively, Petrescu-Comnen's mission ended on November 15, 1940.[151] Following thecivil war of January 1941, which Comnen described as Romania's "black days",[152] the Guardist regime was replaced, andIon Antonescu governed alone. From his new home inMerano, Comnen petitioned the ministry, insisting that he could still prove useful in his dealings with the Holy See, and through it prevent theMagyarization of Northern Transylvania. He found a backer in the government secretary, Alexandru Cretzianu,[153] but was denied full reemployment. He was ultimately pensioned on May 1, 1941.[154]
Like many other diplomats who favored theAllies, Comnen decided not to return home as Antonescu sealed Romania's alliance with the Axis.[155] Instead, he was co-opted byViorel Tilea on London'sRomanian National Committee (RNC)—alongside Gafencu,Dimitrie Dimăncescu, andIoan Pangal.[156] Settled inFlorence, he led anInternational Red Cross Committee, and founded an exile section of theRomanian Red Cross.[157] In 1943, after theAllied invasion of Italy, he mediated between the two sides to preserve the city's art and architecture from destruction, and in return was awarded the title of honorary citizen of Florence.[158] According to historian Ioana Ursu, Comnen should be credited with having rescued thePonte Vecchio from being detonated by the retreating Germans.[150] Also in 1943, Comnen published in Geneva the bookAnarchie, dictature ou l'organisation internationale ("Anarchy, Dictatorship or International Organization").[159]
Choosing to remain in exile to Italy after theSoviet occupation of Romania, Petrescu-Comnen spoke out againstcommunization and lectured in particular against theDanubian Confederation project; nevertheless, he intervened to mitigate the effects of drought and famine in his native country.[160] By 1947, he was also collecting and publishing in Florence his records of the war, and of his own part in it, asPreludi del grande dramma ("Preludes of the Great Tragedy"), followed in 1949 by the more detailedI Responsabili ("The Culprits"), atMondadori. In exile, he resumed contacts with Carol, who stated his appreciation for the diplomat and describedPreludi as the best analysis of Romania's plight in the late interwar.[90] The books were also reviewed by the historianCarlile Aylmer Macartney, who also foundPreludi to be the better work: inI Responsabili, he argued, the "butter is spread more thinly", including "a general account of European developments in which M. Comnène had himself no hand, and for which he uses sources which are generally available". According to Macartney, the books show Comnen as "well informed, intelligent, and right-minded", his "sketches of various personalities" displaying "elegance andesprit."[161]
Comnen's hope of returning to Romania was curbed by the establishment of aCommunist regime. He joined Gafencu in cooperating with theEuropean Movement International (also advancing aEuropean federation in his various articles and books), while also maintaining links with the RNC, now an anti-communist organization, building bridges between the latter and the Holy See.[162] Until 1950, he received funding from the exile industrialistNicolae Malaxa, which he used to sponsor expatriate Romanian academics and "some 40 students in France".[163] Also in 1950, Comnen intervened as a mediator Gafencu and the RNC leader,Nicolae Rădescu.[164] The following year,Constantin Vișoianu nominated him as RNC representative to the Vatican,[165] although he was eventually assigned, that same year, to represent the RNC in the Italian republic.[42]
Comnen was also taking trips to Brazil, initially as a delegate of Florence city council.[166] In September 1954, he was atRio de Janeiro, lecturing at the Romanian House on issues of international diplomacy.[167] He resumed his publishing in 1957, with the memoirs of his 1919 trip to Hungary (published by a Romanian group inMadrid) and the historical reviewLuci e ombre sull'Europa ("Lights and Shadows over Europe").[166] By then, his Bucharest townhouse, located within walking distance ofVictory Square, had been confiscated by the communist regime together with hisobjets d'art and his antique book collection.[11] His family was also exposed to persecution: nephew Dan Cernovodeanu was sent to a labor camp on theDanube–Black Sea Canal; while there, he conspired with fellow inmate Ion Mitucă. In 1955, the latter, who was planning an anti-communist insurgency, tried to defect and contact Comnen.[6]
The former minister died in his adoptive Florence, without completing work on his final volume, a diplomatic history of Romania.[166] In addition to receiving the Olympic Cross and the Order of Saint George knighthood, he had been a Grand Cross of theOrder of the Star of Romania, a Grand Cross of theOrder For Merit, an Officer of theOrder of the Crown, a Commander of the Order of the Cross of Marie; a Grand Cross of thePour le Mérite, theGerman Eagle, theSaxe-Ernestine House Order, theOrder of George I, theOrder of the Crown of Italy, and theOrder of the Yugoslav Crown; as well as Commander of theOrder of the Redeemer and thePolonia Restituta, an Officer of theOak Crown, a Knight of theOrdre des Palmes Académiques and theHouse Order of Hohenzollern, and a recipient ofBenemerenti medal.[168]
Comnen was survived by daughter Elsa-Irène, whom Pius XII converted to Catholicism, and who lived for a while as a nun.[169] She later married and took the name Irene Bie. Settling inMaryhill, Washington, she donated her collection of Romanian paintings to the local art gallery, named after her father.[21] The diplomat's daughter-in-law Angela Comnène published in 1982 an English biography of Comnen, and did research into his genealogy.[9]
Communist censorship meant that Comnen's contribution was unmentioned in Romania until the 1970s, when his work was briefly covered, with some excerpts, detailing his anti-Nazism, appearing inMagazin Istoric in the early 1980s; his memory was primarily maintained by his peers in Italy.[170] Following theRomanian Revolution of 1989, he was again the subject of public scrutiny: hisNotes sur la guerre roumaine was translated and published byPolirom in 1995; and his decorations, donated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Angela Comnène, went on public display in 1998.[171] In 2003, his documents relating to the Holy See were published as part of anEditura Enciclopedică series, with a preface byJean-Claude Périsset.[172] The Comnen house, heavily damaged during the1977 Vrancea earthquake, was inscribed into theNational Register of Historic Monuments in Romania. However, by 2011 it had fallen into disrepair and was threatened with demolition.[11]
