Reactionary ideology in Turkey glorifying the Ottoman monarchy
Thefez, which entered public life in the Ottoman Empire as part ofMahmud II'sWesternization reforms, became a symbol ofIslamist anti-Kemalism in Turkey.The extent of the Ottoman Empire in 1683
Neo-Ottomanism emerged at the end of theCold War with thedissolution of the Soviet Union,[8] forming two distinct waves of the ideology: the first, in the early 1990s, developed by the Turkish journalist and foreign policy advisor to PresidentTurgut Özal,Cengiz Çandar; the second, associated withAhmet Davutoğlu, former president of Turkey and founder of theFuture Party.Davutoğlu's foreign policy goals include establishing Turkey as an influential power within theBalkans, Caucasia and the Middle East.[9][10]
One of the first uses of the term was in aChatham House paper by David Barchard in 1985,[24] in which Barchard suggested that a "Neo-Ottoman option" might be a possible avenue for Turkey's future development. It seems also to have been used by theGreeks sometime afterTurkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974.[25]
In the 21st century, the term has come to signify a domestic trend inTurkish politics, where the revival of Ottoman traditions and culture has been accompanied by the rise of theJustice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated AKP founded in 2001) which came to power in 2002. The use of the ideology by Justice and Development Party has mainly supported a greater influence of Ottoman culture in domestic social policy which has caused issues with the secular and republican credentials of modern Turkey.[26][27] TheAKP have used slogans such asOsmanlı torunu ("descendant of the Ottomans") to refer to their supporters and also their leaderRecep Tayyip Erdoğan (who waselected President in 2014) during their election campaigns.[28] These domestic ideals have also seen a revival of neo-Ottomanism in the AKP's foreign policy. Besides acting as a clear distinction between them and ardent supporters ofsecularism, the social Ottomanism advocated by the AKP has served as a basis for their efforts to transform Turkey's existingparliamentary system into apresidential system, favouring a strong centralised leadership similar to that of the Ottoman era. Critics have thus accused Erdoğan of acting like an "Ottomansultan".[29][30][31]
Neo-Ottomanism has been used to describe Turkishforeign policy under theJustice and Development Party which took power in 2002 under Erdoğan, who subsequently becamePrime Minister. Neo-Ottomanism is a dramatic shift from the traditional Turkish foreign policy of theKemalist ideology, which emphasized looking westward towards Europe. The shift away from this concept in Turkish foreign policy underTurgut Özal's government has been described as the first step towards neo-Ottomanism.[32]Özal's neo-Ottomanism is characterized by a rediscovery of Turkey's multiple identities, in contrast to the unitary conception of the Kemalist republic, and by a tendency to prioritize economic aspects rather than politico-state and security logics.[33]
Neo-Ottomanism had a basis in religious circles.Fethullah Gülen, an influentialIslamic leader, looks both to personal transformation and social and political activism, and fully embracesTurkish nationalism—the defining characteristic of which isIslam, not nationality—and economicneoliberalism while stressing continuity with Turkey's Ottoman past.[34] His emphasis on the role of the state and neoliberalism are legacies of the changing nature of the late Ottoman state from the vantage point of the east, including conflicts between Muslims and Christians inYugoslavia and, later, the expansion of theSoviet Union and the threat it posed.[34]
The Ottoman Empire was an influential global power which, at its peak, controlled theBalkans and most of the modern-dayMiddle East. Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy encourages increased engagement in these regions as part of Turkey's growing regional influence.[35] This foreign policy contributed to an improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbors, particularly withIraq,Iran andSyria. However Turkey's relations with Israel, once Turkey's ally, suffered, especially after the 2008–09Gaza War[36] and the2010 Gaza flotilla raid.[37]
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish foreign minister from 2009 to 2014 and "head architect" of the new foreign policy, has, however, rejected the term "neo-Ottomanism" to describe his country's new foreign policy.[38]
Turkey's new foreign policy started a debate, principally in the Western media, as to whether Turkey is undergoing an "axis shift"; in other words whether it is drifting away from the West and heading towards theMiddle East and Asia.[39] Such fears appear more frequently in Western media when Turkish tensions withIsrael rise.[39] Then-PresidentAbdullah Gül dismissed claims that Turkey has shifted its foreign policy axis.[40]
Davutoğlu worked to define Turkey's new foreign policy on the principle of "zero problems with neighbours", as opposed to Neo-Ottomanism.[39] "Soft power" is regarded as particularly useful.[39]
Focused on the rhetoric of the encounter between civilizations,Davutoğlu takes up the approach of former PresidentTurgut Özal, who was the first Turkish president to begin discussions on Turkey'saccession to the West. The latter put an end to the crisis that arose following the 1974 coup inCyprus in order to move closer to the Western bloc, and thus to look towardsAsia and extend its area of influence towards the countries of theCaucasus.[41] Aiming at a policy of national harmony,Özal refuses any denial of specificity among Turkish citizens. He sought in particular to relaunch dialogue with theKurds, wishing to put an end to the permanent state of war between thePKK and the Turkish state, a conflict which tarnished Turkey's image in the world.[42]
As President, Erdoğan has overseen a revival ofOttoman tradition.[47][48][49] While serving as the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdoğan's AKP made references to the Ottoman era during election campaigns, such as calling their supporters 'grandchildren of Ottomans'(Osmanlı torunu).[50] This proved controversial, since it was perceived to be an open attack against the republican nature of modern Turkey founded byMustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 2015, Erdoğan made a statement in which he endorsed the old Ottoman termkülliye to refer to university campuses rather than the standard Turkish wordkampüs.[51] Many critics have thus accused Erdoğan of wanting to become an Ottomansultan and abandon the secular and democratic credentials of the Republic.[52][53][54][55] The American philosopher,Noam Chomsky, said that "Erdoğan in Turkey is basically trying to create something like theOttoman Caliphate, with him ascaliph, supreme leader, throwing his weight around all over the place, and destroying the remnants of democracy in Turkey at the same time".[56]
When pressed on this issue in January 2015, Erdoğan rejected these claims and toldTRT that he would aim to fill a role more similar toQueenElizabeth II of theUnited Kingdom,[57] explaining, "In my opinion, even the UK is asemi-presidency. And the dominant element is the Queen".[58]
In July 2020, after theCouncil of State annulled theCabinet's 1934 decision to establish theHagia Sophia as museum and revoking the monument's status, Erdoğan ordered its reclassification as a mosque.[59][60] The 1934 decree was ruled to be unlawful under both Ottoman and Turkish law as Hagia Sophia'swaqf, endowed by SultanMehmed II, had designated the site a mosque; proponents of the decision argued the Hagia Sophia was the personal property of the sultan.[61] This redesignation is controversial, invoking condemnation from the Turkish opposition,UNESCO, theWorld Council of Churches, theHoly See, and many other international leaders.[62][63][64] In August 2020, he also signed the order that transferred the administration ofThe Chora to the Directorate of Religious Affairs to open it for worship as a mosque.[65] Initially converted to a mosque by the Ottomans, the building had then been designated as a museum by the government since 1934.[66][47]
On August 26, 2020, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave a speech, saying that "in our civilization, conquest is not occupation or looting. It is establishing the dominance of the justice that Allah commanded in the region. First of all, our nation removed the oppression from the areas that it conquered. It established justice. This is why our civilization is one of conquest. Turkey will take what is its right in theMediterranean Sea, in theAegean Sea, and in theBlack Sea.[67][47]
^Raso Della Volta, Lea (2021).Les paradoxes du nationalisme turc: La construction de l'identité de 1869 au néo-ottomanisme de Recep Erdogan. L'Harmattan. p. 393.OCLC1268921056.
^Murinson, Alexander (December 2009).Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State Identity and Security in the Middle East and Caucasus (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics).Routledge. p. 119.ISBN978-0-415-77892-3.
^Lea, Raso Della Volta (2021).Les paradoxes du nationalisme turc : La construction de l'identité de 1869 au néo-ottomanisme de Recep Erdogan. L'Harmattan. p. 401.OCLC1268921056.
^Lea, Raso Della Volta (2021).Les paradoxes du nationalisme turc : La construction de l'identité de 1869 au néo-ottomanisme de Recep Erdogan. L'Harmattan. p. 396.OCLC1268921056.
^Edhem Eldem. “Sultan Abdülhamid II: Founding Father of the Turkish State?”Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association, vol. 5, no. 2, 2018, pp. 25–46.JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2979/jottturstuass.5.2.05. Accessed 18 July 2025.
^Barsamian, David (10 October 2020)."Noam Chomsky Discusses Azeri Aggression on Artsakh".Chomsky.info. Retrieved10 January 2021.Erdogan in Turkey is basically trying to create something like the Ottoman Caliphate, with him as caliph, supreme leader, throwing his weight around all over the place, and destroying the remnants of democracy in Turkey at the same time, Chomsky said
Kubilay Yado Arin,The AKP's Foreign Policy, Turkey's Reorientation from the West to the East?, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, Berlin 2013. ISBN 9 783865 737199.
Alexander Murinson,Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Neo-Ottomanism and the Strategic Depth Doctrine. I. B. Tauris, 2020.ISBN9781784532406
Darko Tanasković,Neo-ottomanism: A Doctrine and Foreign Policy Practice. Association of Non-Governmental Organisations of Southeast Europe-CIVIS, 2013.ISBN9788690810352
.svg)
.jpg)
