Naval warfare during the War of 1812 in North America proved decisive not because the United States rivalled theUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland global sea power, but because control of specific maritime and inland waters shaped military campaigns, territorial security and diplomacy.^[1] Great Britain retained overwhelming naval supremacy on the world's oceans; however, American success in selected local theatres, most notably on theGreat Lakes, directly influenced the outcome of theWar of 1812^[2] on land and constrained British negotiating leverage at the peace table. Historians increasingly emphasize that the war's naval dimension must be understood regionally rather than globally.^[3]

During the War of 1812, several distinct types of sailing warships played vital roles in naval operations on the oceans, rivers andGreat Lakes, each suited to specific strategic and tactical purposes.^[4]Brigs were two-masted, square-rigged vessels carrying roughly 10–20 guns. Fast and manoeuvrable, they served as couriers, patrol vessels, and training ships, and proved especially effective on the Great Lakes, where American brigs gained notable success.Ships of the line were the largest and most powerful warships of the era, mounting between 60 and 110 guns and designed to fight in formal battle lines. While dominant on the high seas, they were too large for most inland waters and played little direct role on the Great Lakes during the war.Schooners were among the most versatile vessels, prized for their ability to sail close to the wind. Common onLake Ontario, they were widely used as transports, supply vessels andprivateers. Their shallow draft and handling made them ideal for inland waterways.Frigates were large, fast, three-masted ships carrying lighter armament than ships of the line, typically around 28 guns. They were central to Atlantic warfare, used for patrolling, commerce raiding and escort, which became symbols of naval prestige.Sloop-of-war, smaller than frigates but often heavily armed, were employed to counter privateers and perform independent duties. Their adaptability made them effective on both coastal waters and the Great Lakes, where they frequently served as flagships or escorts.

On the Atlantic Ocean, early American victories in single shipfrigate actions had an outsized psychological impact. The battle ofUSSConstitution vs HMSGuerriere in August 1812, followed by victories ofUSSUnited States vs HMSMacedonian andHMS Java, demonstrated that American heavy frigates larger, more heavily armed and better crewed than standard British frigates could defeat isolatedRoyal Navy opponents.^[5][6] These encounters challenged British naval prestige and boosted American morale at a moment when land campaigns were going poorly. Strategically, these victories did not alter British naval doctrine nor prevent the Royal Navy from tightening its blockade of the American coastline.^[7][8]

The naval battle ofUSS Essex vs HMS Alert occurred on 13 August 1812, with the American frigateUSS Essex, commanded by Captain David Porter, encountered the British sloopHMS Alert in the Atlantic Ocean. After a brief engagement lasting only minutes, HMS Alert struck her colours and was captured. This first American naval victory of the war provided an early morale boost and demonstrated United States offensive intent at sea.^[9]

The battle of theUSS Constitution vs HMS Guerriere on 19 August 1812, had theUSS Constitution under Captain Isaac Hull defeating theHMS Guerriere in a dramatic frigate duel southeast ofHalifax, Nova Scotia. HMS Guerriere was dismasted and later burned. The victory gave rise to the nickname “Old Ironsides” and shattered assumptions about British naval invincibility.^[10]

Thecapture of HMS Frolic on 18 October 1812, had theUSS Wasp, commanded by Jacob Jones, fought and capturedHMS Frolic after a fierce close-range battle. Although both vessels were later captured by a larger British ship, the action highlighted American gunnery skill and further strengthened United States confidence during the war's opening months.^[11]

The battle of theUSS United States vs HMS Macedonian on 25 October 1812, had theUSS United States, commanded by Stephen Decatur, capturing theHMS Macedonian after a long-range engagement nearMadeira. The British frigate was badly damaged and taken into American service. This marked the first time a British warship was brought into a United States port.^[12]

The battle of theUSS Constitution vs HMS Java on 29 December 1812, had theUSS Constitution under William Bainbridge defeating theHMS Java off the coast of Brazil. After a hard-fought action, HMS Java was rendered unsalvageable and destroyed. The loss prompted the Royal Navy to restrict single-ship frigate engagements with American vessels.^[13]

Thesinking of HMS Peacock on 24 February 1813, had theUSS Hornet, commanded by James Lawrence, engagingHMS Peacock off the coast of South America. The British vessel was sunk shortly after surrendering, killing her captain. Despite the controversy over the sinking, the action reinforced American naval prestige.^[14]

TheBattle of Rappahannock River on 3 April 1813, had British naval forces conducting a successful cutting-out expedition up theRappahannock River inVirginia. Using boats, they captured or destroyed several American schooners and privateers,^[15] eliminating a local threat and reinforcing British control during theChesapeake campaign.^[16]

Thecapture of USS Chesapeake on 1 June 1813, had theHMS Shannon, commanded by Philip Broke, defeating and capturing theUSS Chesapeake outsideBoston Harbour. The engagement was brief but brutal, resulting in the death of American captain James Lawrence. The loss ended the streak of American frigate victories.^[17]

Thecapture of the Young Teazer on 27 June 1813, had the American privateerschooner Young Teazer intercepted by a British warship inMahone Bay, Nova Scotia. Rather than surrender, an explosion destroyed the vessel, killing most of her crew. The incident became one of the war's most tragic privateering episodes.^[18]

Thecapture of HMS Dominica on 5 August 1813, had the American privateerDecatur capturingHMS Dominica after a fierce engagement nearBermuda. Despite being smaller, the privateer boarded and overwhelmed the British vessel, demonstrating the continued effectiveness of American privateering operations.^[19]

Thecapture of USS Argus on 14 August 1813, had theHMS Pelican capturing theUSS Argus near the British coast after a prolonged chase. The American commander was mortally wounded during the fight. The loss underscored the risks faced by United States commerce raiders operating close to Britain.^[20]

Thecapture of HMS Boxer on 5 September 1813, had theUSS Enterprise defeatingHMS Boxer off the coast ofMaine. Both commanding officers were killed in the engagement. The battle ended with MHS Boxer's capture and was notable for the mutual respect shown during the burial of both captains.^[21]

Thecapture of HMS Epervier on 29 April 1814, had theUSS Peacock capturing theHMS Epervier off the Florida coast after a short but intense engagement. The British vessel was heavily damaged and the prize included a valuable cargo ofspecie, making the victory financially and militarily significant.^[22]

Thesinking of HMS Reindeer on 28 June 1814, had theUSS Wasp defeating theHMS Reindeer in theEnglish Channel. After heavy casualties on both sides, HMS Reindeer surrendered and was later destroyed due to extensive damage. The action demonstrated American reach into European waters.^[23]

Thesinking of HMS Avon on 1 September 1814, had theUSS Wasp engaging theHMS Avon during a night action in the Atlantic Ocean. After sustained fire, HMS Avon surrendered but later sank. The arrival of additional British ships forced the USS Wasp to withdraw, preserving her own survival.^[24]

Thecapture of USS President on 15 January 1815, had theUSS President, commanded by Stephen Decatur, captured by a British squadron after attempting to escape blockade fromNew York Harbor. Severely damaged during the chase, the frigate struck her colours, marking a major late-war loss for the United States.^[25]

During theBattle of Fayal on or about 26–27 September 1814, the AmericanprivateerGeneral Armstrong resisted the British cutting-out attacks in the neutral harbour ofFaial Island. Night boat assaults were repulsed, but overwhelming force compelledscuttling of the ship. The action highlighted privateering, small-boat tactics and the diplomatic controversy over violated neutrality during the War of 1812^[26]

Thecapture of HMS Cyane and HMS Levant on 20 February 1815, had theUSS Constitution encountered by theHMS Cyane andHMS Levant near Madeira. In a skillful engagement, the American frigate captured both vessels. The action occurred after theTreaty of Ghent had been signed, though news had not yet reached the ships.^[27]

Thecapture of HMS Penguin on 23 March 1815, had theUSS Hornet engaged and captured by theHMS Penguin nearTristan da Cunha. The British vessel suffered heavy damage and was later destroyed. This engagement is generally regarded as the final naval action of the War of 1812.^[28]

Naval operations along theEast Coast of the United States during the War of 1812 formed a sustained campaign of blockade, coastal raiding and amphibious warfare conducted by the Royal Navy to exploit its overwhelming maritime superiority. By 1813, British naval forces had tightened their blockade of the American seaboard, disrupting trade and projecting power directly against coastal communities.^[29] Early demonstrations of this strategy included thebombardment of Lewes in April 1813, when British warships shelled theDelaware town after its refusal to supply the blockading squadron. Although the bombardment caused little physical damage, it illustrated British willingness to use naval firepower to coerce coastal populations and enforce blockade policy.^[30]

British naval pressure intensified dramatically in 1814 following the defeat of Napoleon, which freed experienced ships and crews for American operations. In August 1814, a Royal Navy flotilla ascended thePotomac River during theRaid on Alexandria, Virginia, compelling the town’s surrender and seizing merchant vessels, naval stores and supplies. This operation demonstrated British mastery of riverine navigation and their ability to strike deep inland using naval forces alone, though it diverted time and resources from the subsequent Baltimore campaign.^[31]

The naval climax of theChesapeake campaign came at theBattle of Baltimore^[32] in September 1814. British warships and bomb vessels carryingCongreve rockets bombardedFort McHenry for over twenty-four hours in an effort to force entry intoBaltimore Harbour.HMS Erebus fired the congreve rockets from a 32-pound rocket battery installed below the main deck, which fired throughportholes or scuttles pierced in the ship's side. Despite sustained naval fire, the fort held, denying the Royal Navy access and compelling British withdrawal. The failure underscored the limits of naval bombardment against well-prepared coastal defences when unsupported by decisive land success.^[33] It was the use of the ship-launched Congreve rockets that inspired a phrase in the fifth line of the first verse of the United States'national anthem, "The Star-Spangled Banner": "the rockets' red glare".

Further north, British naval operations expanded intoNew England. In September 1814, a combined naval and land expedition seized easternMaine, culminating in theBattle of Hampden, where naval support enabled the defeat of American militia and the destruction of the frigateUSS Adams to prevent its capture. British occupation of the Maine coast secured maritime control of the region for the remainder of the war.^[34]

Smaller engagements also highlighted persistent coastal resistance. Thedefense of the cutter Eagle in October 1814, demonstrated how American crews used shore batteries and local militia support to contest British naval superiority in confined waters, delaying capture through improvisation and local knowledge.^[35]

Even after theTreaty of Ghent was signed, naval warfare continued. In January 1815, British naval forces engaged in theBattle of Fort Peter capturing the fort inGeorgia, using bombardment and landing parties to seize control of the coastal position. This final East Coast operation illustrated both the reach of British sea power and the delays inherent in transatlantic communications.^[36]

Collectively, the East Coast naval campaign demonstrated British dominance at sea while revealing that naval power alone could harass, punish and disrupt, but not decisively conquer, the United States.^[37]

The decisive naval theatre of the war lay on theGreat Lakes, where waterborne supply lines were indispensable. Roads were primitive, distances vast and armies could not operate without naval support.^[38] The American victory at theBattle of Lake Erie in September 1813 destroyed British control of the lake, severed British andIndigenous peoples^[39] supply lines in the Northwest, enabled the recapture of Detroit and directly facilitated the American victory at theBattle of the Thames.^[40][41] Control ofLake Erie thus translated immediately into control of the surrounding land theatre, illustrating the operational interdependence of naval and land forces.^[42]

An even clearer example of naval power shaping diplomacy occurred at theBattle of Lake Champlain in September 1814. Despite Britain's global strength following the defeat ofNapoleoninter alia theNapoleonic Wars^[43], the loss of naval control onLake Champlain forced a large British invasion army to retreat from northern New York. This failure denied Britain a territorial bargaining chip at the negotiations inGhent and reinforced American claims to the prewar boundary.^[44] Historians widely agree that this naval engagement had consequences far beyond its immediate tactical outcome.^[45]

The struggle for control of the Great Lakes led toengagements on Lake Ontario and a prolonged naval campaign that proved central to the defence ofUpper Canada^[47] and the outcome of operations along theNiagara River andSt. Lawrence River corridors.Lake Ontario was the primary strategic artery linkingMontréal toKingston and the western Great Lakes and whichever side controlled the lake could move troops, artillery and supplies far more efficiently than overland routes, which were slow, primitive and vulnerable.^[48] As a result, both Britain and the United States engaged in an intense shipbuilding race centred on Kingston andSackets Harbor, producing increasingly large and heavily armed warships in an effort to achieve naval superiority.^[49]

Throughout 1812 and 1813, naval actions on Lake Ontario were largely indecisive, characterized by manoeuvre, convoy escort and attempts to protect or disrupt amphibious operations rather than fleet destroying battles. British control of Kingston, supported by the Royal Navy and theProvincial Marine, ensured the security of the St. Lawrence River supply line, which was essential for sustaining Upper Canada against American invasions.^[50] Conversely, American naval strength at Sackets Harbor allowed the United States to support offensives againstYork andFort George in 1813, demonstrating how temporary local naval superiority could enable successful land operations even without permanent control of the lake.^[51]

By 1814, neither side had achieved decisive command of Lake Ontario. British naval forces, reinforced by experienced Royal Navy officers and improved ship construction at Kingston, increasingly contested American movements and limited United States operational freedom.^[52] The resulting stalemate prevented large scale American penetration toward Montréal and preserved Upper Canada from collapse. In Canadianhistoriography, the Lake Ontario campaign is therefore viewed as a strategic success for Britain andBritish North America;^[53] although tactically inconclusive, sustained naval denial on the lake ensured survival, safeguarded supply lines and prevented the United States from converting battlefield victories into decisive strategic gains.^[54]

On 10 November 1812, CommodoreIsaac Chauncey led an American squadron in a bold attack against the British naval base atKingston, Upper Canada known as theBattle of Kingston Harbour. Chauncey's force included the brigUSS Oneida and six converted schooners armed with heavy guns notably theUSS Conquest,USS Julia,USS Pert andUSS Growler.^[55] The American's pursued the 22-gun British corvetteHMS Royal George, the largest warship on Lake Ontario into Kingston’s harbour under the cover of British shore batteries. A fierce cannonade ensued between Chauncey’s schooners and the HMS Royal George, withFort Henry’s guns joining the fray.^[56] During the exchange, one of the accompanying schooners theGovernor Simcoe was hit by American shot and sank while attempting to reach the harbour. Although one American gunboat was damaged and Chauncey was ultimately forced to withdraw by nightfall, the raid kept the HMS Royal George bottled up and marked the only American attack on Kingston during the war.^[57] At the time, British naval power on the Great Lakes rested with theProvincial Marine, a relatively inexperienced force.^[55] Their flagship, the HMS Royal George, was poorly maintained and understaffed.^[55] By contrast, the USS Oneida's crew was made up of seasoned Atlantic sailors and officers with combat experience. Despite not achieving a decisive victory, the American raid proved that the Provincial Marine was unfit for combat and marked the beginning of American control over Lake Ontario.^[55] For the British, the defence sparked increased loyalty among Upper Canadians and revealed the need for Royal Navy reinforcements.^[55] The onset of winter halted further actions, leaving both sides to regroup for the next campaign season.^[55]

The naval naval engagements onLake Erie constituted one of the most decisive maritime campaigns of the conflict, as control of the lake directly determined the fate of Upper Canada's western frontier. Lake Erie was the principal supply route linking British andIndigenous forces atAmherstburg^[58] andDetroit with the interior of Upper Canada and without naval superiority the British position in the region was unsustainable.^[59] From 1812 into 1813, both sides engaged in a frantic shipbuilding race atPresque Isle and Amherstburg, recognizing that naval dominance on the lake would dictate subsequent land operations.^[60]

Early in the campaign, British naval forces maintained a fragile advantage, allowing them to supply their garrisons and Indigenous allies, while constraining American movement. However, shortages of materials, manpower and secure supply lines increasingly undermined British shipbuilding and operational readiness.^[61] The decisive moment came with theBattle of Lake Erie on 10 September 1813, when the American squadron underOliver Hazard Perry^[62] defeated the British fleet commanded byRobert Heriot Barclay.^[63][64] The loss of the British squadron resulted in the immediate collapse of British naval power on the lake and severed the supply line to Amherstburg.^[65]

The consequences of this defeat were profound and immediate. British and Indigenous forces were compelled to abandon Detroit and retreat eastward, leading directly to their defeat at theBattle of the Thames and the death ofTecumseh,^[66][67] a catastrophic blow to the British and Indigenous alliance in the region.^[68] In Canadian historiography, the Lake Erie campaign is often interpreted as a cautionary example of how naval inferiority could rapidly translate into territorial loss, contrasting sharply with the more successful naval denial strategies employed on Lake Ontario.^[69] Ultimately, the engagements on Lake Erie demonstrate the central lesson of the War of 1812’s inland naval warfare with sustained control of key waterways essential not merely for tactical success, but for the survival of entire theatres of operation in British North America.

The navalengagements on Lake Huron formed a critical but often overlooked component of the defence of British North America, as control ofLake Huron sustained British communications with the western interior and preserved alliances with Indigenous nations. Lake Huron functioned as the logistical backbone linking Upper Canada toMichilimackinac^[70] and the upper Great Lakes and without secure naval transport along this route, British forces would have been isolated from their western posts.^[71] Unlike Lake Erie, where a single decisive battle determined control, the Lake Huron campaign consisted of a series of raids, convoy operations and small naval actions aimed at maintaining supply dominance rather than seeking fleet destruction.^[72]

In 1813, American forces attempted to disrupt British control by targeting supply routes and forward bases. The capture ofFort Mackinac^[73] by British and Indigenous forces early in the war, supported by naval mobility on Lake Huron, secured British influence over the upper lakes and Indigenous alliances that proved vital throughout the conflict.^[74] British and Canadian naval units, drawing on the Provincial Marine and later Royal Navy detachments, operated from bases such asPenetanguishene, escorting supply vessels and countering American incursions with limited but effective resources.^[75]

The most significant American success occurred in 1814, when United States forces temporarily disrupted British supply lines by capturing vessels and attacking outposts. This advantage proved short-lived. British naval forces rapidly reasserted control through aggressive counter-raids and the recapture of key positions, culminating in the destruction of the American squadron at theNottawasaga River and the restoration of British naval dominance on the lake.^[76] During August 1814 on Lake Huron, the British schoonerHMS Nancy,^[77] carrying supplies toMichilimackinac, was pursued by United States naval forces.^[78] To avoid capture, her crew set fire and scuttled the vessel on the Nottawasaga River, highlighting logistical warfare, inland naval mobility and British efforts to retain upper Great Lakes control.^[79]

In Canadian historiography, the Lake Huron campaign is viewed as a strategic success with sustained naval control, preserved British authority in the upper Great Lakes, protected Indigenous alliances^[80] and prevented the United States from translating tactical successes into lasting territorial gains, underscoring the decisive importance of inland naval logistics in the War of 1812.^[81]

Naval operations in theWest Indies andGulf Coast of the United States during the War of 1812 formed a peripheral but strategically significant theatre, linking Atlantic Ocean commerce warfare with Britain’s late-war offensive against the southern United States. Early in the conflict, American naval power in the Caribbean relied heavily on privateers and small warships operating against British trade routes. Engagements such as theBattle of La Guaira fought on 11 December 1812, illustrated this pattern, as American privateers challenged British maritime commerce near Spanish controlled ports, creating diplomatic frictions, while disrupting shipping without threatening British naval dominance^[82]

By 1814, the strategic balance shifted decisively after Britain’s victory over Napoleon allowed the redeployment of veteran troops and powerful naval forces to theGulf of Mexico. British naval strategy emphasized amphibious warfare, coastal control and the opening of riverine routes to support land campaigns. This approach was first tested at theFirst Battle of Fort Bowyer in mid-September 1814, when Royal Navy warships attempted to reduce the American fort guardingMobile Bay. The failure of the naval bombardment and the loss ofHMS Hermes demonstrated the vulnerability of naval forces operating close inshore against prepared coastal defences.^[83]

Thecapture of USS Frolic on 20 April 1814, had theUSS Frolic pursued and overtaken by superior British forces in theCaribbean. After a prolonged chase and attempts to escape, the American vessel surrendered. The event illustrated Britain’s increasing success in suppressing United States naval operations late in the War of 1812.^[84]

British naval forces regrouped and shifted their focus towardNew Orleans, where control of shallow inland waters proved essential. TheBattle of Lake Borgne in December 1814 exemplified small boat naval warfare, as British sailors and marines captured the American gunboat flotilla after intense close-quarters fighting. Although costly, the engagement cleared the approach routes for the British army’s landing and underscored the importance of naval mobility in amphibious operations.^[85]

Following the British defeat on land at theBattle of New Orleans, naval forces sought to assert control of theMississippi River through thebombardment of Fort St. Philip in January 1815. Despite sustained shelling by British bomb vessels, the fort held, denying naval passage upriver and confirming the limits of naval power without coordinated land success.

Together, these operations demonstrate that while British naval superiority in the Gulf of Mexico was substantial, it could not by itself secure strategic victory, reinforcing the broader lesson that sea power required effective integration with land forces to achieve decisive results^[86]

Naval operations in thePacific Ocean during the War of 1812 represented the most geographically distant extension of the conflict and were driven almost entirely by American commerce raiding strategy. In early 1813, the American frigateUSS Essex, commanded by CaptainDavid Porter, roundedCape Horn and entered the Pacific with the objective of destroyingBritish whaling and merchant shipping, exploiting the Royal Navy’s thin presence in the region.^[87] Porter’s cruise aimed not at territorial conquest but at economic warfare, targeting an industry vital to British maritime supply.

The campaign opened with a series of actions in theGalápagos Islands. On 28 May 1813, theAction off James Island resulted in the capture of several British whalers by American prize crews operating under the USS Essex direction, expanding Captain Porter’s improvised squadron and depriving Britain of vessels, crews and stores.^[88] This success was followed in July 1813 by theAction off Charles Island, where additional British whalers were taken after brief resistance, further crippling British Pacific commerce.^[89]

To sustain prolonged operations, Captain Porter established a forward base atNuku Hiva in theMarquesas Islands between October 1813 and May 1814. TheNuku Hiva Campaign involved fortifying a harbour, repairing ships and intervening in local conflicts to secure American control of the anchorage. Although tactically successful, the base proved diplomatically and logistically untenable, highlighting the limits of sustained naval power far from home ports.^[90]

British naval response culminated in March 1814 at theBattle of Valparaíso, whenHMS Phoebe andHMS Cherub engaged the USS Essex off theChilean coast. Employing superior long-gun tactics, the British squadron systematically disabled the USS Essex, forcing her surrender after heavy casualties. The loss of the USS Essex ended American naval operations in the Pacific and reaffirmed British command of blue-water warfare once adequate forces were deployed.^[91]

In strategic terms, the Pacific campaign demonstrated both the reach and the vulnerability of American naval power. While Captain Porter’s cruise inflicted disproportionate economic damage and forced Britain to divert resources globally, it ultimately confirmed that sustained naval operations required secure logistics and fleet support advantages Britain alone possessed in the Pacific theatre of operations.^[86]

British naval supremacy along the Atlantic Ocean coast nevertheless exerted sustained economic and military pressure on the United States. From 1813 onward, the Royal Navy imposed a tightening blockade that crippled American trade and sharply reduced customs revenue. British warships supported amphibious raids along theChesapeake Bay, culminating in the capture andburning of Washington^[92] in August 1814. Yet these operations failed to produce a decisive strategic result, as Britain lacked the manpower and political will to occupy and hold large portions of American territory.^[93] The limits of maritime power without sustained land control became increasingly evident as the war progressed.^[94]

Naval warfare in the War of 1812 demonstrates that command of the sea was most consequential when it produced sustained local control rather than symbolic victories or distant blockades. While Britain dominated the oceans, American success on the Great Lakes preserved U.S. territorial integrity, shaped land campaigns and influenced thepeace settlement. The conflict confirmed a central lesson of early nineteenth century warfare, control of strategically vital waters could determine outcomes on land and at the negotiating table even in the absence of global naval superiority.^[95]

United States historiography traditionally emphasizes early frigate victories as evidence of national resilience and naval professionalism, often portraying these battles as foundational to American naval identity. Works byDonald R. Hickey and American naval historians tend to frame Atlantic victories as morale-building while acknowledging their limited strategic effect.^[96]

Canadian historiography, by contrast, places far greater emphasis on the Great Lakes as defensive systems essential to the survival of British North America. Canadian scholars such asPierre Berton stress that naval control on inland waters prevented American conquest and preservedUpper Canada, framing Lake Erie and Lake Champlain as existential contests rather than symbolic ones.^[97] From this perspective, British failures on the lakes are often attributed to logistical constraints and industrial inferiority rather than seamanship.

Where United States historians often describe the war as a “second war of independence,”^[98] Canadian historians interpret naval operations as part of a successful defensive war that securedCanada's future boundaries. Despite these differences, both historiographical traditions converge on one conclusion that local naval supremacy on the Great Lakes not oceanic dominance was the decisive naval factor in the War of 1812.^[99]

• War of 1812 ships
• List of naval battles of the War of 1812

Wikimedia Commons has media related toNaval battles of the War of 1812.

• Berton, P. (1980). The invasion of Canada, 1812–1813. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
• Daughan, G. C. (2011). 1812: The Navy's war. New York, NY: Basic Books.
• Dudley, W. S. (Ed.). (1985). The naval war of 1812: A documentary history (Vols. 1–3). Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center.
• Gough, B. M. (1988). Fighting sail on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay: The War of 1812 and its aftermath. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
• Hickey, D. R. (2012). The War of 1812: A forgotten conflict (2nd ed.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
• Lambert, A. (2012). The challenge: Britain against America in the naval war of 1812. London: Faber & Faber.
• Taylor, A. (2010). The civil war of 1812. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

• Naval battles of the War of 1812
• Naval battles by war

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