Naval tactics and doctrine is the collective name for methods of engaging and defeating an enemyship orfleet inbattle atsea duringnaval warfare, the naval equivalent ofmilitary tactics on land.
Naval tactics are distinct fromnaval strategy. Naval tactics are concerned with the movements acommander makes in battle, typically in the presence of the enemy. Naval strategy concerns the overallstrategy for achieving victory and the large movements by which acommandant or commander secures the advantage of fighting at a place convenient to himself.
Modern naval tactics are based on tactical doctrines developed afterWorld War II, following the obsolescence of thebattleship and the development of long-rangemissiles. Since there has been no major naval conflict since World War II, apart from theIndo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 and theFalklands War, many of these doctrines reflect scenarios developed for planning purposes. Critics argue that the collapse of theSoviet Union and the subsequent reduction in the size and capabilities of theRussian Navy renders most such fleet-on-fleet scenarios obsolete.
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A central concept in Western modern naval fleet warfare isbattlespace: a zone around a naval force within which a commander is confident of detecting, tracking, engaging and destroying threats before they pose a danger. As in all forms of warfare, a critical objective is to detect theenemy while avoiding detection.
The open sea provides the most favorable battlespace for asurface fleet. The presence of land[1] and thetopography of an area compress the battlespace, limit the opportunities to maneuver, make it easier for an enemy to predict the location of the fleet, and make the detection of enemy forces more difficult. In shallow waters, the detection ofsubmarines andmines is especially problematic.
One scenario that was the focus of American andNATO naval planning during theCold War was a conflict between two modern and well equipped fleets on the high seas, the clash of the United States/NATO and theSoviet Union/Warsaw Pact. Because the Cold War ended without direct total war between the two sides, the outcome of such an action remains hypothetical, but was broadly understood to include, towards the late Cold War, multiple salvoes ofanti-ship missiles against the Americans and U.S. attempts to air strike Soviet land bases and/or fleets. Given the eventual strategic surprise effectiveness of anti-ship missiles, the outcome of such a clash is far from being clear.
The main consideration is forcarrier battle group (CVBGs). Critics of current naval doctrine argue that although such a fleet battle is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, Cold War thinking continues to dominate naval practice.[2] However, others point toward the increased naval budgets of Russia and South and East Asia as a possibility that conventional naval combat in the future may become relevant again.
Naval tactics and weapons systems can be categorized by the type of opponents they are intended to fight.Anti-air warfare (AAW) involves action against aircraft and incoming missiles.Anti-surface warfare (ASuW) focuses on attacking and defending against surface warships.Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) deals with the detection and destruction of enemy submarines.
The key threat in modern naval combat is the airbornecruise missile, which can be delivered from surface, subsurface or airborne platforms. With missile speeds ranging up toMach 4, engagement time may be only seconds and such missiles can be designed to "skim the sea" mere meters above the sea surface. The key to successful defence was argued to be to destroy the launch platformbefore it fires, thus removing a number of missile threats at once. This is not always possible so theanti-aircraft warfare (AAW) resources need to be balanced between the outer and inner air battles. Missile tactics are now mostly fire and forget in the manner of theHarpoon orExocet or utilize over-the-horizon targeting, such as theTomahawk orSilkworm. Close-range missile defence in the modern age depends heavily onclose-in weapon systems (CIWS) such as thePhalanx orGoalkeeper.
Most naval vessels can only withstand one or two missile strikes before they are put out of commission. In the 1970s, defense planners began developing backup defenses like theSea Sparrow missile and CIWS. Large navies like the US Navy responded to the advent of missiles by adopting a “haystack” distribution with ships that are more dispersed to protect major targets like aircraft carriers.[3] The 1985 article “Cruise Missile Warfare” in US Naval Institute's Proceedings used a relationship proposed by the Brookings Institution to assess the likeliness a ship would be put out of commission by missile damage.[4] The number of hits needed to put a ship out of action is related to the length of the ship. A hit by a modern warhead would incapacitate a modern 300-foot long warship. Another similar sized warhead is needed for each additional 100 feet.[5]
Though traveling under water and at lower speeds,torpedoes present a similar threat. As is the case with missiles, torpedoes are self-propelled and can be launched from surface, subsurface, and air platforms. Modern versions of this weapon present a wide selection of homing technologies specially suited to their particular target. There are far fewer means of destroying incoming torpedoes compared to missiles.
Submarines, as subsurface launching platforms, present an important threat to conventional naval operations.Anechoic coatings and ultra-quietpump-jets provide modern submarines with the advantage of stealth. The move towardsshallow water operations has greatly increased this advantage. Mere suspicion of a submarine threat can force a fleet to commit resources to removing it, as the consequences of an undetected enemy submarine can obviously be lethal. The threat posed by British submarines during theFalklands War of 1982 was one of the reasons why theArgentine Navy was limited in its operations.[6] A single submarine at sea also impacted operations in the Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971.
Conventional naval forces are also seen as providing a capability forpower projection. In several naval operations, theaircraft carrier has been used to support land forces rather than to supply air control over the sea. Carriers were used in this way during theGulf War.[7]
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Naval tactics have evolved over time with developments in naval technology and the evolution ofwarships.[8] The evolution of naval tactics can best be understood by dividingnaval history into thematic topics:
The modern period of naval tactics began with the widespread replacement of naval guns with missiles and long-range combat aircraft afterWorld War II and is the basis for most of the tactical doctrine used today.
TheIndo-Pakistani War of 1971 was the most significant conflict involving naval forces since World War II. Over two thousand sailors died, and multiple ships were sunk. Significantly, the first submarine sinking of a ship since World War II occurred when the Pakistani submarinePNS Hangor sank an Indian ASW frigateINS Khukri. Passive/active sonar, homing torpedoes, air strikes on naval facilities and fast missile craft were all utilized in this war.
In the western theatre of the war, theIndian Navy successfully attackedKarachi's port inOperation Trident[9] on the night of 4–5 December,[9] usingmissile boats, sinking PakistanidestroyerPNS Khaibar andminesweeperPNS Muhafiz;PNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged.[9] In response, Pakistani submarines sought out major Indian warships.[10] 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling thePakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. Operation Trident was followed byOperation Python[9] on the night of 8–9 December,[9] in which Indian missile boats attacked the Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships.[9] Since Pakistan's naval headquarters and almost its entire fleet operated from the port city of Karachi, this was a major strategic victory that enabled the Indian navy to attain complete naval superiority, and to partially blockade Pakistan.
In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command completely isolated East Pakistan by anaval blockade in theBay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrierINS Vikrant was deployed, and itsSea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan[11] includingChittagong andCox's Bazar. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarinePNS Ghazi, whichsank en route under mysterious circumstances offVisakhapatnam's coast[12][13] On 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani submarineHangor sank the frigateKhukri in theArabian Sea, resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors.[14]
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The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to thecoast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships –Anwar Baksh,Pasni andMadhumathi –[15] and ten smaller vessels were captured.[16] Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka.[17] According to one Pakistan scholar,Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.[18]
The Falklands War of 1982 has been the next most significant conflict involving naval forces since World War II. The primary combat was between the Argentine Air force, based on the mainland, and the British naval force centered on aircraft carriers. Argentine naval forces played only a minor role in the conflict.
The war demonstrated the importance of navalairborne early warning (AEW). Vital to British success was the protection of the twoRoyal Navy aircraft carriers,HMS Hermes andHMS Invincible. In 1982, the Royal Navy had effectively zero over-the-horizon radar capability, so to protect the British naval taskforce several destroyers and frigates were sent onradar picket duty to form the first line of defense against Argentine air attacks. As a result, the British lost theType 42 destroyerHMS Sheffield to fire following an Argentine Exocet missile strike. Following the conflict, the Royal Navy modified someWestland Sea King helicopters for the AEW role. Other navies (including France, Spain and Italy) have since included AEW aircraft or helicopters on their carriers.
The conflict also led to an increased interest in the close defense capabilities of naval ships, including close-in weapon systems (CIWS) as a last-ditch defense against incoming missiles. The attack on the US frigateUSS Stark on patrol in thePersian Gulf in 1987 also highlighted the danger of anti-ship missiles. In the case ofStark, the Iraqi Exocet missiles were not detected andStark's CIWS was not turned on as the ship was not expecting an attack.[19]
The Falklands War also saw the only time a warship has been sunk by anuclear-powered submarine in a hostile attack, when the British nuclear-powered submarineHMS Conqueror attacked the Argentine cruiserARA General Belgrano with torpedoes. With their nuclear propulsion plants, the submarines were able to remain on station virtually undetected.[6][clarification needed]
Another large naval operation conducted by a major power took place when theUS Navy provided protection to Kuwaiti-owned tankers in the Persian Gulf between 1987 and 1988, during theIran–Iraq War. Post-war calculations indicate that Iraq used French-built Exocet missiles between 257 and 261 times. Iran did not have as many missiles but attacked 207 neutral ships with guns, mines, flotilla craft, and rocket propelled grenades. It also launched a total of nine Silkworm missiles. In total around 411 ships were attacked, 60 percent of which were tankers. The tonnage damaged beyond economic repair in the Tanker War by 1986 amounted to about 20 percent of all Allied tonnage sunk in World War II.[20]
Naval forces have played a supporting role in some land battles. US battleships providednaval gunfire support during theVietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War. During the Falklands War, British destroyers and frigates carried out shelling of Argentine positions.
The1991 Croatian War and the subsequentWar of Bosnia saw some naval action, initially when theYugoslav Navy declared a blockade of the ports ofDalmatia from September to December 1991 and later in 1994–1995, when NATO naval forces, as part ofOperation Sharp Guard, deployed a number of units to theAdriatic in order to enforce aUnited Nationsarms embargo on former Yugoslavia. Later Operations on former Yugoslavia such asDeliberate Force andAllied Force involved the use of seaborne aircraft and the launch ofTomahawk cruise missiles against Serb targets. British and Australian warships provided gunfire support to theAl Faw operation during the2003 invasion of Iraq. US and UK naval forces have used again Tomahawk cruise missiles against land targets in the course of actions undertaken since the end of the Cold War, such as the opening of international involvement in theLibyan Civil War, of which the British Armed Forces played a decisive role.
TheUSSCole bombing, a suicide waterborne mission on aUS Aegis destroyer in Yemen in October 2000, has resulted in an increased awareness of terrorist risks whilst warships are in harbor or near potentially hostile coastlines. Thewar on terrorism has also seen increased awareness of the naval role against terrorism. The US-ledinvasion of Afghanistan reaffirmed the role of naval air power, and US carrier based aircraft provided most of the sorties over Afghanistan against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. Over 90% of munitions delivered by the US Navy inOperation Enduring Freedom wereprecision-guided munitions. Several nations contributed vessels and maritime patrol aircraft to deny Al-Qaeda access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, including the US, Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Netherlands and New Zealand amongst others.[21] France and Italy also used their carrier based aircraft over Afghanistan. Special forces operated from US and British carriers, in particular, theUSS Kitty Hawk. Aircraft traditionally used for maritime patrol such as theNimrod andP-3 Orion were also used in the overland surveillance role over Afghanistan as well as during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In a two-week war, Pakistan lost half its navy.
