Movatterモバイル変換

[0]ホーム

Jump to content

Melvin Dresher

Kreyòl ayisyen

Edit links

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Polish-American mathematician (1911-1992)

Melvin Dresher
Melvin Dresher, early 1940s
Born	(1911-03-13)March 13, 1911 Krasnystaw, Poland
Died	June 4, 1992(1992-06-04) (aged 81) Kern, California, US
Education	Lehigh University Yale University
Known for	Prisoner's dilemma
Scientific career
Fields	Mathematics
Institutions	Michigan State College War Production Board National Defense Research Committee Catholic University of America RAND
Doctoral advisor	Øystein Ore

Melvin Dresher (bornDreszer; March 13, 1911 – June 4, 1992) was aPolish-bornAmerican mathematician, notable for developing, alongsideMerrill Flood, thegame theoretical model of cooperation and conflict known as thePrisoner's dilemma while atRAND in 1950 (Albert W. Tucker gave the game its prison-sentence interpretation, and thus the name by which it is known today).^[1]^[2]

Education and career

[edit]

*The Mathematics of Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications* by Melvin Dresher

Dresher came to theUnited States in 1923. He obtained his B.S. fromLehigh University in 1933 and went on to complete his Ph.D. atYale University in 1937 under the supervision ofØystein Ore. His dissertation was titled "Multi-Groups: A Generalisation of the Notion of Group." Dresher's career began as instructor of mathematics atMichigan State College from 1938 to 1941, he then served as statistician for theWar Production Board from 1941 to 1944, and worked as a mathematical physicist for theNational Defense Research Committee from 1944 to 1946 Dresher became a professor of mathematics at theCatholic University of America from 1946 to 1947, before joiningRAND in 1948 as a research mathematician.

Dresher was the author of several RAND research papers on game theory, and his widely acclaimed bookThe Mathematics of Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications (originally published in 1961 asGames of Strategy: Theory and Applications) continues to be studied today. Dresher's research has been referenced and discussed in a variety of published books, includingPrisoner's Dilemma byWilliam Poundstone andA Beautiful Mind bySylvia Nasar.^[3]

Family

[edit]

Dresher married Martha Whitaker in 1937 and had a son,Paul Dresher, and a daughter.

Bibliography

[edit]

Bohnenblust, H.; Dresher, Melvin;Girshick, M.; Harris, Theodore; Helmer-Hirschberg, Olaf; McKinsey, J.; Shapley, Lloyd; Snow, R. (1948).Mathematical Theory of Zero-Sum Two-Person Games with a Finite Number or a Continuum of Strategies. RAND Corporation.doi:10.7249/r115.
Berge, Claude; Dresher, Melvin, eds. (1970).Contributions to the theory of games. 3: C. Berge ... Ed. by M. Dresher. Annals of mathematics studies (4. print ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Pr.ISBN 978-0-691-07936-3.
Dresher, Melvin (1981).The mathematics of games of strategy: theory and applications (unabridged republ. of the [ed.] ... Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961 ed.). New York: Dover.ISBN 978-0-486-64216-1.
Dresher, M.; Aumann, R. J., eds. (1985).Advances in game theory. Annals of mathematics studies (Repr. from the hardcover ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.ISBN 978-0-691-07902-8.
Dresher, Melvin (2007).Games of strategy: theory and applications (New RAND ed.). Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corp.ISBN 978-0-8330-4225-5.

References

[edit]

Obituary, July 2, 1992 issue of thePalisadian-Post newspaper (Pacific Palisades, California).
"In Remembrance", July 9, 1992 issue ofRAND Items (a biweekly publication for employees of RAND).

^Taylor, Timothy (2020-01-17)."CONVERSABLE ECONOMIST: The Prisoner's Dilemma: Celebrating its 70th Anniversary".CONVERSABLE ECONOMIST. Retrieved2023-12-23.
^Kuhn, Steven (2019),"Prisoner's Dilemma", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved2023-12-23
^Hounshell, David (1997)."The Cold War, RAND, and the Generation of Knowledge, 1946-1962".Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences.27 (2):237–267.doi:10.2307/27757779.ISSN 0890-9997.JSTOR 27757779.

Game theory

Traditionalgame theory

Definitions	Asynchrony Bayesian regret Best response Bounded rationality Cheap talk Coalition Complete contract Complete information Complete mixing Confrontation analysis Conjectural variation Contingent cooperator Coopetition Cooperative game theory Dynamic inconsistency Escalation of commitment Farsightedness Game semantics Hierarchy of beliefs Imperfect information Incomplete information Information set Move by nature Mutual knowledge Non-cooperative game theory Non-credible threat Outcome Perfect information Perfect recall Ply Preference Rationality Sequential game Simultaneous action selection Spite Strategic complements Strategic dominance Strategic form Strategic interaction Strategic move Strategy Subgame Succinct game Topological game Tragedy of the commons Uncorrelated asymmetry
Equilibrium concepts	Backward induction Bayes correlated equilibrium Bayesian efficiency Bayesian game Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Bertrand–Edgeworth model Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Cursed equilibrium Edgeworth price cycle Epsilon-equilibrium Gibbs equilibrium Incomplete contracts Inequity aversion Individual rationality Iterated elimination of dominated strategies Markov perfect equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Nash equilibrium Open-loop model Pareto efficiency Payoff dominance Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Price of anarchy Program equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Rational agent Rationalizability Rationalizable strategy Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Trembling hand equilibrium
Strategies	Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim trigger Hobbesian trap Markov strategy Max-dominated strategy Mixed strategy Pure strategy Tit for tat Win–stay, lose–switch
Games	All-pay auction Battle of the sexes Nash bargaining game Bertrand competition Blotto game Centipede game Coordination game Cournot competition Deadlock Dictator game Trust game Diner's dilemma Dollar auction El Farol Bar problem Electronic mail game Gift-exchange game Guess 2/3 of the average Keynesian beauty contest Kuhn poker Lewis signaling game Matching pennies Obligationes Optional prisoner's dilemma Pirate game Prisoner's dilemma Public goods game Rendezvous problem Rock paper scissors Stackelberg competition Stag hunt Traveler's dilemma Ultimatum game Volunteer's dilemma War of attrition
Theorems	Arrow's impossibility theorem Aumann's agreement theorem Brouwer fixed-point theorem Competitive altruism Folk theorem Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem Gibbs lemma Glicksberg's theorem Kakutani fixed-point theorem Kuhn's theorem One-shot deviation principle Prim–Read theory Rational ignorance Rational irrationality Sperner's lemma Zermelo's theorem
Subfields	Algorithmic game theory Behavioral game theory Behavioral strategy Compositional game theory Contract theory Drama theory Graphical game theory Heresthetic Mean-field game theory Negotiation theory Quantum game theory Social software
Key people	Albert W. Tucker Alvin E. Roth Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein David Gale David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Herbert Scarf Hervé Moulin Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes Ken Binmore Kenneth Arrow Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Martin Shubik Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Aumann Robert Axelrod Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey

Combinatorial game theory

Core concepts	Combinatorial explosion Determinacy Disjunctive sum First-player and second-player win Game complexity Game tree Impartial game Misère Partisan game Solved game Sprague–Grundy theorem Strategy-stealing argument Zugzwang
Games	Chess Chomp Clobber Cram Domineering Hackenbush Nim Notakto Subtract a square Sylver coinage Toads and Frogs
Mathematical tools	Mex Nimber On Numbers and Games Star Surreal number Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays
Search algorithms	Alpha–beta pruning Expectiminimax Minimax Monte Carlo tree search Negamax Paranoid algorithm Principal variation search
Key people	Claude Shannon John Conway John von Neumann

Evolutionary game theory

Core concepts	Bishop–Cannings theorem Evolution and the Theory of Games Evolutionarily stable set Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Games	Chicken Stag hunt
Applications	Cultural group selection Fisher's principle Mobbing Terminal investment hypothesis
Key people	John Maynard Smith Robert Axelrod

Mechanism design

Core concepts	Algorithmic mechanism design Bayesian-optimal mechanism Incentive compatibility Market design Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
Theorems	Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem Revenue equivalence
Applications	Digital goods auction Knapsack auction Truthful cake-cutting

Other topics
Bertrand paradox Chainstore paradox Computational complexity of games Helly metric Multi-agent system PPAD-complete

Authority control databases
International	ISNI VIAF GND WorldCat
National	United States France BnF data Italy Czech Republic Netherlands Israel
Academics	Mathematics Genealogy Project zbMATH MathSciNet
Other	IdRef Yale LUX

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Melvin_Dresher&oldid=1306974902"

Categories:

Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭