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May's theorem

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Social choice theorem on superiority of majority voting

Insocial choice theory,May's theorem, also called thegeneral possibility theorem,[1] says thatmajority vote is the uniqueranked social choice function between two candidates that satisfies the following criteria:

  • Anonymity: the decision rule treats each voter identically (one vote, one value). Who casts a vote makes no difference; the voter's identity need not be disclosed.
  • Neutrality: the decision rule treats eachalternative orcandidate equally (afree and fair election).
  • Decisiveness: if the vote is tied, adding a single voter (who expresses an opinion) will break the tie.
  • Positive response: If a voter changes a preference, MR never switches the outcome against that voter. If the outcome the voter now prefers would have won, it still does so.
  • Ordinality: the decision rule relies only onwhich of two outcomes a voter prefers, nothow much.

The theorem was first published byKenneth May in 1952.[1]

Various modifications have been suggested by others since the original publication. Ifrated voting is allowed, a wide variety of rules satisfy May's conditions, includingscore voting orhighest median voting rules.

Arrow's theorem does not apply to the case of two candidates (when there are trivially no "independent alternatives"), so this possibility result can be seen as the mirror analogue of that theorem. Note that anonymity is a stronger requirement than Arrow'snon-dictatorship.

Another way of explaining the fact that simple majority voting can successfully deal with at most two alternatives is to cite Nakamura's theorem. The theorem states that the number of alternatives that a rule can deal with successfully is less than theNakamura number of the rule. The Nakamura number of simple majority voting is 3, except in the case of four voters. Supermajority rules may have greater Nakamura numbers.[citation needed]

Formal statement

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LetA andB be two possible choices, often called alternatives or candidates. Apreference is then simply a choice of whetherA,B, or neither is preferred.[1] Denote the set of preferences by{A,B, 0}, where0 represents neither.

LetN be a positive integer. In this context, aordinal (ranked)social choice function is a function

F:{A,B,0}N{A,B,0}{\displaystyle F:\{A,B,0\}^{N}\to \{A,B,0\}}

which aggregates individuals' preferences into a single preference.[1] AnN-tuple(R1, …,RN) ∈ {A,B, 0}N of voters' preferences is called apreference profile.

Define a social choice function calledsimple majority voting as follows:[1]

  • If the number of preferences forA is greater than the number of preferences forB, simple majority voting returnsA,
  • If the number of preferences forA is less than the number of preferences forB, simple majority voting returnsB,
  • If the number of preferences forA is equal to the number of preferences forB, simple majority voting returns0.

May's theorem states that simple majority voting is the unique social welfare function satisfying all three of the following conditions:[1]

  1. Anonymity: The social choice function treats all voters the same, i.e. permuting the order of the voters does not change the result.
  2. Neutrality: The social choice function treats all outcomes the same, i.e. permuting the order of the outcomes does not change the result.
  3. Positive responsiveness: If the social choice was indifferent betweenA andB, but a voter who previously preferredB changes their preference toA, then the social choice becomesA.

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ May, Kenneth O. 1952. "A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions",Econometrica, Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 680–684.JSTOR 1907651
  2. ^ Mark Fey, "May’s Theorem with an Infinite Population",Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, Vol. 23, issue 2, pages 275–293.
  3. ^ Goodin, Robert and Christian List (2006). "A conditional defense of plurality rule: generalizing May's theorem in a restricted informational environment,"American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, issue 4, pages 940-949.doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00225.x

References

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  1. ^abcdeMay, Kenneth O. (1952)."A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision".Econometrica.20 (4):680–684.doi:10.2307/1907651.ISSN 0012-9682.JSTOR 1907651.
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