Luigi Cadorna | |
|---|---|
 Cadorna in 1917 | |
| Chief of Staff of the Royal Italian Army | |
| In office 27 July 1914 – 9 November 1917 | |
| Preceded by | Alberto Pollio |
| Succeeded by | Armando Diaz |
| Personal details | |
| Born | (1850-09-04)4 September 1850 |
| Died | 21 December 1928(1928-12-21) (aged 78) |
| Nationality | Italian |
| Profession | Military officer |
| Awards | Order of the Bath, Grand Cross |
| Military service | |
| Allegiance |  Kingdom of Italy |
| Branch/service |  Royal Italian Army |
| Years of service | 1865–1917 |
| Rank | Marshal of Italy General |
| Battles/wars | World War I |
Luigi Cadorna,OSML,OMS,OCI (4 September 1850 – 21 December 1928) was anItalian general,Marshal of Italy and Count,[1] most famous for being theChief of Staff of the Italian Army from 1914 until late 1917 duringWorld War I. He commanded the Italian army on theItalian front, a theatre marked bytrench warfare andattrition on theEastern Alps andIsonzo river. Cadorna launched multiple offensives across theIsonzo front, during which the Italian army made gains, most notablycapturing Gorizia (after counterattacking duringthe Strafexpedition)and Bainsizza, but ultimately suffered a major defeat when German-Austrian forces attacked the Italian troopsat Caporetto and forced them to retreat to thePiave river. He was relieved as Chief of Staff and replaced byArmando Diaz. Cadorna's wartime leadership is a debated and contentious topic in public discourse and historiography: his detractors blame him for heavy casualties and a rigid discipline leading to the harsh treatment of Italian troops (with the alleged introduction ofdecimation); others have recognized a number of merits and successes to Cadorna and argued that high casualties were a consequence of the tactical-strategic realities of the war.[2][3]
Luigi Cadorna was born to GeneralRaffaele Cadorna inVerbania Pallanza,Piedmont in 1850. In 1860 Cadorna became a student at the "Teuliè" Military School in Milan. At fifteen he entered the Turin Military Academy. Upon graduation, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant of artillery in 1868. In 1870, as an officer in the 2nd Regiment of Artillery, Cadorna participated in the occupation of Rome as part of a force commanded by his father. As major he was appointed to the staff of General Pianell, afterwards taking the post of Chief of Staff of the Verona Divisional Command. As Colonel commanding the 10th Regiment ofBersaglieri from 1892 Cadorna acquired a reputation for strict discipline and harsh punishment. He wrote a manual of infantry tactics, which laid stress on the doctrine of the offensive. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1898 Cadorna subsequently held a number of senior staff and divisional/corps command positions. On the eve of Italy's entry into World War (1915), he was close to peace-time retirement age and had a history of differences with his political and military superiors.
Cadorna had been offered the post of Chief of Staff for the first time in 1908, which he had rejected over the issue of political control during wartime. He was again offered the position in July 1914, as theTriple Entente andCentral Powers girded for war. When Italy entered the war in May 1915 on the side of the Entente, Cadorna fielded thirty-six infantry divisions composed of 875,000 men, but with only 120 modern artillery pieces.[4]
Cadorna inherited a difficult political and military situation. The government of PremierAntonio Salandra favoured initial neutrality over Italy's treaty commitments under theTriple Alliance. Cadorna was accordingly obliged to reverse long-established strategic plans while discovering that the army was ill-prepared for war against Austria-Hungary and Germany.[5] In particular large numbers of men and quantities of equipment had been deployed toTripolitania leaving the home army disorganized.[6]
Cadorna launched four offensives in 1915, all along theIsonzo River. The goal of these offensives was the fortress ofGorizia, the capture of which would permit the Italian armies to pivot south and march onTrieste, or continue on to theLjubljana Gap. Many offensives failed, resulting in some 250,000 Italian casualties before capturing the city in 1916. Cadorna would ultimately fight eleven battles on the Isonzo between 1915 and 1917, comprising one outright victory, sixtactical victories or limited advances, three inconclusive offensives, and one defeat. Additional forces were arrayed alongthe Trentino salient, attacking towardsRovereto,Trento, andBolzano. These attacks also failed. The terrain along the Isonzo and Trentino was completely unsuited for offensive warfare– mountainous and broken, with no room for manoeuvring.[7]
On 24 October 1917, a combined Austro-Hungarian/German army struck across the Isonzo atKobarid (calledCaporetto in Italian) and by 12 November had advanced all the way to thePiave River. Cadorna's disposition of most of his troops far forward, with littledefence in depth, contributed greatly to theDefeat at Caporetto;[8] but graver still were the responsibilities of other officers, notablyPietro Badoglio, then corps commander in a sector overrun by the Austro-German attack. Cadorna himself had been on leave for most of October and his immediate subordinate was seriously ill.
The Italian Army retreated in disarray and seemed on the verge of total collapse; 275,000 soldiers were captured. Italy's allies Britain and France insisted on the dismissal of Cadorna[9] (the General was relieved of command on 9 November 1917[10]) and sent eleven divisions to reinforce the Italian front. However, these troops played no role in stemming the advancing Germans and Austro-Hungarians, because they were deployed on theMincio River, some 97 kilometres (60 mi) behind the Piave, as the British and French strategists did not believe the Piave line could be held.
The king appointed the respected GeneralArmando Diaz as Chief of General Staff,[11] with Badoglio named as his second-in-command.[10] Cadorna was reassigned as the Italian representative to the AlliedSupreme War Council set up inVersailles.[10]
The restored Italian defensive line was held during the subsequentBattle of the Piave River and later served as a springboard for theBattle of Vittorio Veneto, where the Austro-Hungarian army was finally defeated, after eleven days of resistance, by 51 Italian divisions, 3 British divisions, 2 French divisions, 1 Czechoslovak Division, and 1 U.S. Infantry Regiment. The Italians and their allies captured 426,000 enemy soldiers.
After the war, the Italian government held an inquiry to investigate the defeat at Caporetto. It was published in 1919 and was highly critical of Cadorna, at that time a bitter man busy with writing his own memoirs. Cadorna claimed that he had no responsibility for the defeat, despite fleeing to Padua during the battle and abandoning the entire Italian Second Army to its fate. Nevertheless, he was made a Field Marshal (Maresciallo d'Italia) in 1924 afterBenito Mussolini seized power.
Cadorna died inBordighera in 1928.
Opinions on Cadorna vary significantly. Some historians record Cadorna as an unimaginativemartinet who was ruthless with his troops and dismissive of his country's political authorities.David Stevenson, Professor of International History at theLondon School of Economics, describes him as earning "opprobrium as one of the most callous and incompetent of First World War commanders."[12] Critics of Cadorna describe him as a general leading multiple and consecutive failed attacks, causing a large number of casualties among his own men, while being disproportionately bitter and ruthless.[12][13] In manner, he appeared a reserved and aristocratic officer of the old-fashioned Piedmontese school.[14] During the course of the war, Cadorna dismissed 217 officers, and during theBattle of Caporetto, he ordered thesummary execution of officers whose units retreated.[15] Six percent of Italian soldiers under his leadership faced a disciplinary charge during the war and 61% of those charged were found guilty. About 750 were executed, the highest number in any army in World War I.[16] Claims have been made that he also reintroduced the ancient Roman practice ofdecimation—the killing of every tenth man—for units which failed to perform in battle.[17] These allegations alienated him from his troops. However, the military historianJohn Keegan records that his "judicial savagery" took the form of the summary executions of individual stragglers rather than the formalized winnowing of entire detachments.[18][Note 1]
Other scholars and historians consider Cadorna a competent commander, able to obtain several victories during his offensives, despite the challenging conditions.Giorgio Rochat, although criticizing Cadorna for having "little concern for his soldiers", compares him toJoseph Joffre andDouglas Haig and writes that "trench warfare had its own terrible logic that was independent of Cadorna, as of other major commanders", adding that "Cadorna had an unshakeable faith in his own mission and was not without a sense of vision". It is also claimed that Cadorna was effective in the field ofmilitary logistics. Several of his offensives were decided together with Allied commanders as part of an overall strategy to wear out Austro-German forces, while simultaneous battles were occurring in the Western and Eastern fronts. His reputation reached its height in 1916, after the victories at the battles ofAsiago andGorizia, with the rapid conquest of theSabotino. The disaster of Caporetto has been explained with the arrival of superior German forces to the Austrian front, believed to be about to collapse following the eleventh Isonzo offensive (battle of Bainsizza) in 1917. It was argued that the quasi-absolute power he assumed over the Italian army and the harsh discipline that he imposed on his soldiers was largely derived from his own strong sense of duty.[19][20][21][22]
He was the father ofRaffaele Cadorna Jr., an Italian general who fought during World War I and World War II, and was famous as one of the commanders of the Italian Resistance against German occupying forces in northern Italy after 1943.
In fact, his record was so horrid, that he is considered by many historians as one of the worst generals ever to lead an army. That is a distinction that no one wants to have.
