Liwa Fatemiyoun (Arabic:لِوَاء الْفَاطِمِيُّون,romanized: Liwā’ al-Fāṭimīyūn,lit. 'FatimidBanner';Dari:لواء فاطمیون), also known asLashkar-e-Fatemiyoun (Arabic:فرقة فاطميون,romanized: Firqat al-Fāṭimīyūn;Dari:لشکر فاطمیون),Fatemiyoun Brigade, orFatemiyoun Division,[3] is aShiaAfghan militia. It formed in 2013 to fight inSyria during theSyrian civil war on the side of theSyrian government prior to thecollapse of the Assad regime.[50] The group's officially designated purpose is the defense ofthe shrine ofZaynab bint Ali, and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include theIslamic State (IS).[51][52] It is funded, trained, and equipped by theIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and fights under the command ofIranian officers.[4] Both the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Iranian government downplay their relationship with one another, despite clear coordination and the brigade's operation under the auspices of the IRGC.[4] Liwa Fatemiyoun is also closely associated withHezbollah Afghanistan.[4] It is primarily made-up ofShiaHazara migrants living in Iran.[7][4]
By late 2017, the unit was presumed to have numbered between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters.[3] According to Zohair Mojahed, a cultural official in the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the group suffered 2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded up to the end of 2017 while fighting in Syria.[53] A minimum of 925 deaths among the brigade's troops were documented based on monitoring of open source coverage of funeral services, but these burials do not take into account the bodies abandoned on the ground, executed prisoners, the missing, etc.[54] It was reported in 2019 that as many as 50,000 Afghans in total had fought in Liwa Fatemiyoun, up until then.[55]
The core of Liwa Fatemiyoun is constituted of former the fighters of the Afghan Shia militia groups like theMuhammad Army (Sepah e Muhammad),Tehran Eight,Hezbollah Afghanistan andHezb-e-Wahadat which were active during theSoviet–Afghan War,Afghan Civil War (1992–1996),Afghan Civil War (1989–1992), and fought against theTaliban during theAfghan Civil War (1996-2001), until their collapse after theU.S Invasion of Afghanistan from which point onward some of them became part of the Afghan Army and fought against theTaliban insurgency during theWar in Afghanistan (2001–2021). And also as theAbuzar Brigade, an Afghan Shia militia which voluntarily fought in theIran–Iraq War on the side ofIran.[56][57] During theIran–Iraq war, fighters of theAbuzar Brigade were stationed in the mountainous areas ofNorthwestern Iran, as they had experience inmountain andirregular warfare from theirwar with the Soviets.[58][59][60]
Iran is also known to have established branches ofHezbollah inAfghanistan andPakistan, with severalpro-Iranian groups operating in both countries during theSoviet–Afghanistan War.[23][61][62]
Reports of pro-government Afghan fighters in Syria date back to October 2012.[4] They originally fought in theIraqiAbu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade before eventually becoming a distinct brigade in 2013.[5] According to news sources affiliated with theIRGC, the group was founded on 12 May 2013.[63] The group's officially designated purpose, according to the Iranian government and affiliated news sources, is the defense of theshrine ofZaynab bint Ali, the granddaughter ofMuhammad, and to fight "takfiriterrorists" inSyria, which would come to include theIslamic State (IS) and theAl-Nusra Front.[51][52] At some point before 2014, Liwa Fatemiyoun was "incorporated" withHezbollah Afghanistan, a minor political party in Afghanistan.[4]
In terms of numbers, the first group of 22Afghan volunteers reportedly arrived inSyria at the end of 2012. A second group of 15 followed, then a third group of 22. This first contingent would have fought alongside the Iraqi Shiite militia Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and then deployed to Iraq in parallel with Syria, and even with Lebanese Hezbollah. The fifth contingent already included around 100 recruits. Liwa Fatemiyoun grew from the size of abrigade (called Liwa inArabic) to that of adivision (called Lashkar inFarsi/Persian) in 2015, which implies a strength of around 10,000 fighters, but not all of whom were deployed in Syria. The range of 4,000 to 8,000 men seemed more plausible, with regular rotation of personnel betweenIran andSyria. According to this account, theAfghans generally operated in units of 450 men (roughly the equivalent of abattalion), which seems plausible given what was seen among other actors on theSyrian regime side. This unit format also allows them to be deployed to several locations in Syria simultaneously.[64]
The Liwa Fatemiyoun became involved in multiple operations throughoutSyria, including in Darra,Aleppo, andPalmyra. In March 2016, they fought in therecapture of Palmyra from the Islamic State.[65] During theAleppo offensive (July–August 2016), a commander of the Fatemiyoun brigade was killed.[66] In 2017, the unit helped counteringa major rebel offensive in northernHama Governorate,[41] and later aided a pro-governmentoffensive in theSyrian Desert that aimed at reaching theIraqi border.[42] In course of the latter campaign, Mohammad Hosseini (also known as "Salman") was killed as he stepped on ananti-personnel mine. Hussaini had served as the intelligence chief of Liwa Fatemiyoun's Hazrat-e-Fatemeh Zahra Brigade.[67] Following the successful conclusion of this offensive, the Liwa Fatemiyoun took part in thecampaign to capture all of central Syria from theIS. Anwar Yawri, another commander of Liwa Fatemiyoun, was killed during these operations.[43] The unit later took part in theEastern Syria campaign (September–December 2017), andhelped to break theIslamic State'ssiege on Deir ez-Zor.[3]
Many of the group's commanders were veterans of previous Afghan conflicts: Sayyed Hakim, Hossein Fadaei Abdarchaya, Reza Khavari, and Seyyed Ibrahim. Hakim, killed in Syria in 2016, and was the last veteran of theAbouzar Brigade. AfterTavassoli and his deputy Reza Bakhshi were killed in action in early 2015, much of Liwa Fatemiyoun's command structure was taken over by theIRGC-QF. As of July 2018, at least 18Quds Force officers have died in Syria alongside Liwa Fatemiyoun.[64]
Liwa Fatemiyoun continued to suffer losses in Syria. On December 6, 2018, a fighter was buried in Iran. On December 13, 2018, a deceased Afghan was also buried inTehran Province. On December 27, 2018, an Afghan killed in Syria was buried inMashhad. In January 2019, five Fatemiyoun fighters were also buried inMashhad,Iran.[64]
While more conventional operations against theIslamic State had been over for over year by 2019, Liwa Fatemiyoun remained deployed both in eastern Syria near theIraqi border, still occasionally fighting ISIS aroundDeir ez-Zor,Mayadin andal-Boukamal, and also in the western Syria within theprovince of Hama, likely around the last rebel/jihadist enclave. It is to be recalled that Liwa Fatemiyoun was engaged on theHama front during and after the rebel/jihadistoffensive of March 2017. It had therefore remained there. It is likely that Fatemiyoun also continued to use its historic base camp south ofAleppo, and may have had other installations elsewhere, notably inDamascus. The deployment pattern, with at least three units (Deir Ezzor –Hama –Damascus) corresponds fairly closely to that seen in recent years. Liwa Fatemiyoun therefore had remained a tool in the hands of theRevolutionary Guards for their projection into Syria, until 2024.[64]
Throughout their operations in Syria, Liwa Fatemiyoun had sustained numerous casualties. In October 2014, three fighters were captured by the rebelIslamic Front. Their fates are unknown.[68] On 7 May 2015, Iran commemorated 49 fighters of the group who were killed.[69] During theAleppo offensive (November–December 2016), 31 Fatemiyoun fighters had been killed and many more had been wounded.[70] According toSpiegel Online, 700 members of the group were believed to have been killed in combat aroundDaraa andAleppo as of June 2015.[71]
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The pro-israelWashington Institute had estimated at least 255 casualties between 19 January 2012, and 8 March 2016.[72] While precise casualty figures are difficult to determine, the brigade is thought to have lost 925 fighters in Syria as of May 2020 based on monitoring of open source coverage of funeral services, but these burials do not take into account the bodies abandoned on the ground, executed prisoners, the missing, etc.[73] These numbers likely increased as theIranian government continued to identify the remains of Fatemiyoun members, sometimes as long as 5 years after their death, and returned their bodies to Iran.[74] According to Zohair Mojahed, a cultural official in the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the group suffered 2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded up to the end of 2017 whilefighting in Syria.[53]
On 21 November 2017, Iran declared victory overIS, and subsequently started to downsize Liwa Fatemiyoun. The first troops to be demobilized were the youngest and oldest, as well as those who had exhibited problematic behaviour such as indiscipline. The demobilized fighters were sent back to Iran to return to their families and civilian life.[3]
In the course of theCOVID-19 pandemic, Liwa Fatemiyoun reportedly began to producemasks and gloves in Iran and Syria, intending to distribute them to poor Syrians. Western observers suspected that this was supposed to boost the group's image and help it in recruiting new members.[75] By late 2020, Liwa Fatemiyoun was still operating in eastern Syria,[76] though only about 500 to 1,500 fighters strong.[29] By the time theAssad regime fell, this number had risen to 5,000 to 10,000.[15]
Experts differ on what role Liwa Fatemiyoun was fulfilling as of 2020, as theSyrian government had become relatively secure. Researcher Phillip Smyth argued that Liwa Fatemiyoun was supposed to act as Iran's "phantom force" of trained foreign soldiers, ready to be used for possible future interventions.
Accordingly, Symth and ex-Herat Province governor Abdul Qayoum Rahim claimed in 2020 that Liwa Fatemiyoun had begun deployment to other localities around theMiddle East without providing firm evidence.[29]
Symth and Rahim also claimed that the constant fighting had turned Liwa Fatemiyoun into an elite force, as most of its less capable fighters had been killed or demobilized, leaving only the most experienced and radical ones. Other security analysts argued that there was no evidence for further mass foreign deployments, and that Liwa Fatemiyoun was overall diminishing in numbers and suffering from low morale, as theIranian government had proven to be slow in granting promised benefits to its fighters.[29]
In January of 2024 the American Air force did an air strike on an abandoned warehouse which formally belonged to Liwa Fatemiyoun claiming it was being used to manufacture missiles used against US troops in the Middle East.[77]
During the2024 Syrian opposition offensives, it was reported that 25 pro-Assad/Iran-backed militiamen were killed during the clashes with at least 15 of them being non-Syrian militiamen. These fighters were likely the last members ofHezbollah,Zanabiyoun, and Fatemiyoun, to have died in Syria before their withdrawal.[78]
The both Zainebiyoun and Fatmiyoun Brigades supported by Iran'sIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are important parts of the Iranian construct which uses such proxy groups as a core strategy for deterrence across the region through its main proxyHezbollah and its subgroups/allies that isKata'ib Hezbollah,Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada,Hezbollah Al-Nujaba,Ansarullah popularly known as the (Houthis) and even nowHamas have been a part of Iran's strategy of deterrence from engaging in a conventional full-scale conflict withIsrael and itsArab allies despite the limited employment of both the Zainebiyoun and Fatmiyoun brigades composed of Pakistani and Afghan nationals have successfully demonstrated Iran's capability to mobilize Shia ecosystems not only in theMiddle East but on its other borders as well event of a war betweenHezbollah-Israel andHamas-Israel these resistance force's of Pakistan and Afghanistan formerly based in Syria are expected to carry out direct attacks onIsrael under shadows either as part ofHezbollah orIslamic Resistance in Iraq or theHouthis, Iran's military strategy inLebanon andIraq is based on the concept of liberation ofState of Palestine and elimination ofZionist,State of Israel including forward defense. It entails engaging adversaries beyond its own territory to prevent threats from reaching its border. A key pillar of this strategy is a network of Iran'sIRGC-linked armed groups across the region known as theAxis of Resistance. This includesHezbollah in Lebanon various Shitte Militias in Iraq, Yemen and Iran sponsored militias in Syria as well as thePalestinian resistance forces specificallyHamas,Palestinian Islamic Jihad and their subgroups in thePalestinian territories.[79] Reportedly, Iran supports 20 or more groups/organizations directly or indirectly all over world, strategically planned and revived[clarification needed] by the formerIRGC officerQasem Solemani a "genius ofasymmetric warfare"In order to counter theImperialist influence and interests of theUnited States,Israel and their allies.[80][81][82][83] The FormerMossad directorYossi Cohen said Soleimani's strategies had "personally tightened a noose around Israel's neck".[84]
Liwa Fatemiyoun is led byIRGC-QF commanders and supplied by theIranian military.[3][85][86] Its troops are recruited fromAfghans living in Iran,[3][85][6] as well asAfghan refugees already residing in Syria.[7][87] The recruits are typicallyShiaHazaras, an ethnic group fromcentral Afghanistan primarily fromHazaristan in central Afghanistan.[7][4][85] The Iranian recruiters for Liwa Fatemiyoun are usually members of theIRGC'sBasij. In August 2016, Iranian official Qurban Ghalambor was arrested by theAfghanistan government for recruiting fighters for the brigade.[85]
It has also been reported that the group had recruited former and dissented Shia Afghan soldiers from theAfghan National Security Forces such as theAfghan National Army and theAfghan National Police.[88] After the2021 Taliban offensive, many former Afghan soldiers fled to Iran, bringing equipment such asHumvees,M548s, andNavistar 7000 series heavy trucks, which were given to theIranian Army (some of which went to the55th Airborne Brigade) in exchange for their stay in Iran.[89][90][91] These troops were likely recruited into the Fatemiyoun Brigade afterwards.[92]
In Afghanistan, pro-Iran affiliates mainly recruit fighters from theShia Afghan youth in Kabul and from the Shia majority areas of Afghanistan, such as the cityHerat. Those recruiting for Iran inDasht-i-Barchi,Kabul, usually work "off-grid" and "under the radar". The recruiters who are recruiting for Iran, after recruiting some recruits, send some of their newly recruited recruits to Iran through travel agencies based inHerat andKabul.[93]
TheAfghans are promisedIranian citizenship and salaries of $500–$800 per month in return for fighting (usually a 3-month-long deployment to Syria).[3][48][4][94] Many arerefugees[48] and some criminals who choose recruitment over imprisonment ordeportation,[94][71][68] though the Iranian government generally claims that they are religiously motivated volunteers.[3] The first Liwa Fatemiyoun troops sent to Syria were told that they were fulfilling their "Islamic duty" by defending theshrines ofDamascus.[29][87] After their recruitment, the recruits of Liwa Fatemiyoun have been reported to go through a training course for five-weeks, and their military training mostly takes place in Iran'sYazd Province along with some other places.[50] There have also been reports of newly deployed recruits reportedly being sent to receive training in and around the Syrian city ofAleppo in North-Western Syria.[50]Monthly salaries peaked at about $1,500, from-and-to 2017–2018 but have since dropped to less than a third of that amount because of Iran's economic crisis -- partly a result of sanctions -- and the collapse of Iran's national currency.[95]
After completing their service, many ex-Liwa Fatemiyoun fighters were frustrated that the Iranian government proved slow in fulfilling all their demands. Most importantly, fighters struggled to secure the promised benefits such as salaries, housing, and jobs due to Iran's difficult economic situation and cases of Iranian officials stalling in regards to payouts. The families of fallen fighters have also struggled to secure benefits and visas.[29][95]
As early as July 2017, a researcher on Afghanistan reported the presence of a militant network of up to 4,000 militants which was led by Liwa Fatemiyoun veterans was active inHazarajat,Kabul, andMazar-i Sharif, which is already reportedly conducting armed operations against groups hostile toHazaras inWardak province.[64]
Other veterans, on the other hand, often try to resume a normal life in cities likeHerat. While others are increased their re-enlistments under financial pressure to earn money.[64]
Afghan fighters were repatriated to Iran by IranianC-130s.[64]
Though some Afghan sub-commanders of Liwa Fatemiyoun areveterans of several wars, including theIran–Iraq War (1980-1988),Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989),First Afghan Civil War (1989–1992),Second Afghan Civil War (1992-1996),Third Afghan Civil War (1996–2001),[3] and even theWar in Afghanistan (2001–2021),[88] new recruits of the unit generally lack combat experience.[6] The recruits are given just a few weeks of training, armed, and flown to Syria via the Iran–Iraq–Syria air bridge. These soldiers are used as shock troopers, spearheading numerous important pro-government offensives alongsideIranian,Iraqi,Pakistani, andHezbollah troops. Some have more specialized training (reconnaissance, snipers) which is allegedly delivered by Hezbollah instructors.[64] Most of them operate aslight infantry, although some receive more thorough training and can work as tank crews.[96] Liwa Fatemiyoun has been reported to use tanks and vehicles such as theT-72M1,T-72AV,T-62M,MT-LBarmored vehicles (including ones with modified with aZU-23 cannon), the Iranian Safir light vehicles with a 106 mm recoilless gun orType 63 MRL, numeroustechnicals, and evenT-90 tanks.[64]
Parts of Liwa Fatemiyoun have been trained by theRussian Armed Forces[3][64][31] andWagner Group.[64][31] As the unit is often used in those war zones where the most intense fighting takes place[3] due to its sometimes inadequate training,[6] observers believe that Liwa Fatemiyoun fighters often act as "cannon fodder" used inHuman wave attacks.[3][6] By 2020, analysts such as Philip Symth argued that the "cannon fodder" troops of the unit had been mostly weeded out, leaving only a hardened core of fighters.[3]
In 2024, it was reported that members of Fatemiyoun (both serving and retired) along with formerAfghan National Security Force troops (mostly from the defunctAfghan National Army andAfghan National Police), were being employed by the Arshin Kooh company, which has links to Iran'sIRGC (more specifically, itsAerospace Force), and is engaged in production of concrete walls and construction of roads in the Beris area ofChabahar, a port on theArabian Sea, in theSistan and Baluchestan province. Reports revealed that senior IRGC officials ordered the transfer of many of these Afghan workers fromChabahar toNegur, after such practices were exposed.[92]
The supervisor of the Afghan workers, Hekmat, a member of the Fatemiyoun group, has been reported to have signed a monthly contract worth 10 billion Iranian rials (over 16,000$) with Arshin Kooh for the repair and maintenance of their machinery, with Hekmat employing at least 20 Afghan workers under his command.[92] In addition to the machinery contract, it is said that Hekmat oversees at least 50 workers in the concrete wall section, earning as many as 600 million Iranian rials (1,000$) per day.[92]
The average Afghan workers make more money than that which local Balochi workers, because of these contracts. According to a report, Balochi truck drivers earn 240 million rials ($400) for 24 days of work, while non-local drivers receive 360 million rials ($600), through their contracts, for the same period.[92] This due to the contracts of companies employing Afghans migrants having a better pay than those of companies employing local Balochis.
Former Sunni Afghan soldiers were also employed by theIRGC'sparamilitaryvolunteermilitia, theBasij, after receiving special identification cards.[92]
According to researcher Phillip Smyth, Liwa Fatemiyoun and Hezbollah Afghanistan were originally different groups, but showed such great overlap in ideology and membership by 2014 that they had become "incorporated".[4] In contrast, researcher Oved Lobel continued to regard Liwa Fatemiyoun and Hezbollah Afghanistan as separate organizations in 2018, though both were part of Iran's "regional proxy network".[61] Other sources such asJihad Intel andArab News have treated the two as the same organization.[7][97] Researcher Michael Robillard called Liwa Fatemiyoun a "branch of Hezbollah Afghanistan".[98]
According toHuman Rights Watch, Liwa Fatemiyoun has recruitedchild soldiers, some of whom were as young as 14.[99][88] Liwa Fatemiyoun has also glorified children, who fought and died serving and fighting for the group in Syria, as martyrs.[64]
In 2019, theUnited States andCanada each declared the Fatemiyoun a terrorist organization.[100] According to then Treasury SecretarySteven Mnuchin, the designation of the Fatemiyoun as aterrorist organization was part of an "ongoing pressure campaign to shut down the illicit networks the Iranian regime uses to export terrorism and unrest across the globe.”[101]
Not only did Iran send smaller units of the Fatemiyoun to cross Syrian borders and fight in Yemen
Founded in the early 1980s by Afghan devotees of Ayatollah Khomeini, the division and its precursors have fought in the Iran-Iraq War and Afghan civil war before recently re-emerging as part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' expeditionary force in Syria.
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