| Law Society of British Columbia v Mangat | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Hearing: March 21, 2001 Judgment: October 18, 2001 | |
| Full case name | Law Society of British Columbia v Jaswant Singh Mangat, Westcoast Immigration Consultants Limited, and Jill Sparling |
| Citations | [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, 2001 SCC 67 |
| Ruling | Appeal dismissed. |
| Court membership | |
| Chief Justice:Beverley McLachlin Puisne Justices:Claire L'Heureux-Dubé,Charles Gonthier,Frank Iacobucci,John C. Major,Michel Bastarache,Ian Binnie,Louise Arbour,Louis LeBel | |
| Reasons given | |
| Unanimous reasons by | Gonthier J. |
Law Society of British Columbia v Mangat [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, 2001 SCC 67[1] is a leadingSupreme Court of Canada decision where the Court held that a non-lawyer may be given the power topractice law under a federal statute even if it is contrary toprovincial legal profession legislation.
The respondent, Jaswant Mangat, was animmigration consultant carrying on his work through an immigration consulting company ("Westcoast"). He had not studied law in Canada and was not a member of theB.C. Law Society. Mangat and other Westcoast employees engaged in a number of activities involving immigration proceedings, including appearing as counsel or advocate on behalf of aliens, for or in the expectation of a fee from the persons for whom the acts were performed, before theImmigration and Refugee Board ("IRB").
The Law Society brought an application seeking a permanent injunction against Mangat and Westcoast to prevent them from engaging in the ongoing practice of law, in contravention of B.C.’sLegal Profession Act. Mangat and Westcoast admitted that they were engaged in the practice of law within the meaning of s. 1 of theLegal Profession Act, but contended that their conduct was sanctioned by ss. 30 and 69(1) of the federalImmigration Act, which permit non-lawyers to appear on behalf of clients before the IRB. The judge issued the injunction on the grounds that ss. 30 and 69(1) of theImmigration Act did not authorize the practice of law. Alternatively, she would have granted the injunction on the basis that the provisions wereultra vires[2] Parliament. The Court of Appeal set aside the injunction. The central issues raised by the appeal were whether ss. 30 and 69(1) of theImmigration Act areintra vires[3] Parliament, and whether s. 26 of theLegal Profession Act, which prohibits a person, other than a member of the Law Society in good standing or a person listed in the exceptions, to engage in the practice of law, is constitutionally inoperative to persons acting under ss. 30 and 69(1) of theImmigration Act and its associated Rules and Regulations. In that Court, the respondent Jill Sparling was added to the proceedings on the basis that she was an immigration consultant engaged in the same activities as Mangat, given that he had become a member of the Alberta Law Society soon after leave to appeal was granted by that Court.
Justice Gonthier wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. He held that those sections of theImmigration Act addressed a valid subject matter of the federal government, and that Mangat was allowed to practice law in front of the Board under the provisions of theImmigration Act.
Given the clear overlap of laws, Gonthier considered whether to apply theparamountcy doctrine or theinter-jurisdictional immunity doctrine to resolve the conflict. He found that the paramountcy doctrine was more appropriate as there was a cleardouble aspect in the law.[4]
The first part of the paramountcy test asks whether there is an "operational conflict between federal and provincial laws",[5] where "compliance with one is defiance of the other".[6] Gonthier found that the purpose of the federal law was to authorize non-lawyers to appear as counsel in immigration tribunals for a fee, but the provincial law made exercise of the authority impossible. Consequently, the paramountcy doctrine could be invoked and the provincial law was held to be inoperative to the extent of the conflict.