Lê Đức Thọ became active inVietnamese nationalism as a teenager and spent much of his adolescence inFrench colonial prisons, an experience that hardened him. Thọ's nickname was "the Hammer" on account of his severity.[4] In 1930, Thọ helped found theIndochinese Communist Party. French colonial authorities imprisoned him from 1930 to 1936 and again from 1939 to 1944. The French imprisoned him in one of the "tiger cage" cells on the prison located on the island ofPoulo Condore (modernCôn Sơn Island) in the South China Sea, which was regarded as the harshest prison in all of French Indochina.[5] During his time in the "tiger cage", Thọ suffered from hunger, heat, and humiliation. Together with other Vietnamese Communist prisoners, Thọ studied literature, science, and foreign languages, and acted inMolière's plays.[6] Despite being imprisoned by the French, France was still regarded as the "land of culture", and the prisoners paid a "peculiar tribute" to French culture by putting on these plays.[7]
After his release in 1945, Thọ helped lead theViet Minh, the Vietnamese independence movement, against the French, until theGeneva Accords were signed in 1954. In 1948, he was inSouth Vietnam as Deputy Secretary, Head of the Organization Department of theCochinchina Committee Party. In 1955 he joined thePolitburo of the Lao Dong Party (Vietnam Workers' Party), now theCommunist Party of Vietnam. Thọ oversaw theCommunist insurgency that began in 1956 against theSouth Vietnamese government.[citation needed] In 1963, Thọ supported the purges of the party as a result of Resolution 9.[8]
The United States actively joined theVietnam War during the early 1960s. Several rounds of Paris Peace Talks (some public, some secret) were held between 1968 and 1973.Xuân Thuỷ was the official head of theNorth Vietnamese delegation, but Thọ arrived in Paris in June 1968 to take effective control.[9] On his way to Paris, Thọ stopped in Moscow to meet the Soviet PremierAleksei Kosygin. On Thọ's behalf, Kosygin sent PresidentLyndon B. Johnson a letter reading: "My colleagues and I believe and have grounds to believe that an end to the bombing [of North Vietnam] would lead to a breakthrough in the peace talks". WhileXuân Thuỷ led the official negotiating team representing theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam at the talks in Paris, Thọ andU.S. National Security AdvisorHenry Kissinger beginning in February 1970 engaged in secret conversations that eventually led to a cease-fire as part of theParis Peace Accords of 27 January 1973.
On 8 September 1968, Thọ first metW. Averell Harriman, the head of the American delegation, in a villa in the town of Vitry-sur-Seine.[10] At the meeting, Harriman conceded that in "serious talks" the National Liberation Front (NLF) might take part in the talks provided that the South Vietnamese were also allowed to join.[11] At another meeting with Harriman on 12 September, Thọ made the concession that South Vietnam could continue as an independent state provided the National Liberation Front could join the government, but demanded that the United States had to unconditionally cease bombing all of North Vietnam first.[12] After the meeting, Harriman thanked Thọ for his "straight talk", but disputed a number of Thọ's claims, saying that the Vietnam war was not the most costlywar in American history.[13]
Thọ was unhappy when Hanoi demanded that the National Liberation Front take part in the peace talks as the lead negotiating team, instead of the North Vietnamese, which he knew would cause complications. He flew back to Hanoi in an attempt to change the instructions, in which he was successful, but was also told to tell Harriman that an expanded four-party talks involving the Americans, the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese and the NLF would begin "as early as possible" without settling a firm date.[14] However, the four-party talks did not take place as planned, as South Vietnamese PresidentNguyễn Văn Thiệu decided to stall talks after receiving messages fromAnna Chennault that the Republican presidential candidateRichard Nixon would be more supportive.[15] On 18 January 1969, Thọ told Harriman that he regretted the latter's departure, saying: "If you had stopped bombing after two or three months of talks, the situation would have been different now".[16]
In February 1969, Kissinger asked the Soviet ambassador in Washington,Anatoly Dobrynin, to set up a meeting with Thọ in Paris.[17] On 4 August 1969, Kissinger had a secret meeting at the house ofJean Sainteny, a former French colonial official who served in Vietnam and was sympathetic towards Vietnamese nationalism. However, Thọ did not appear as expected and insteadThuỷ represented the DRV.[18]
Thọ first met Kissinger in a secret meeting in a modest house in Paris on the night of 21 February 1970, marking the beginning of a test of wills that was to last three years. Kissinger was later to say of Thọ: "I don't look back on our meetings with any great joy, yet he was a person of substance and discipline who defended the position he represented with dedication".[7] Thọ told Kissinger at their first meeting that "Vietnamization" was doomed, dismissively saying in French: "Previously, with over one million U.S. and Saigon troops, you have failed. Now how can you win if you let the South Vietnamese Army fight alone and if you only give them military support?".[19] Kissinger saw that Thọ's beginning his activism working for Vietnamese independence at the age of 16 as proof that he was a "fanatic", and portrayed Thọ to Nixon as an unreasonable, uncompromising man, but one who was also well mannered, cultured, and polite. Kissinger found Thọ's air of superiority exasperating as Thọ took the viewpoint that North Vietnam was the real Vietnam, and regarded the Americans as "barbarians" who were merely trying to delay the inevitable by supporting South Vietnam.[20] In April 1970, Thọ broke off his meetings with Kissinger, saying that there was nothing to discuss.[21] An attempt by Kissinger to talk to Thọ again in May 1970 was rejected with a note reading "The U.S. words of peace are just empty ones".[22]
By May 1971, Thọ changed tactics in the talks, insisting that the main issue now was removing President Thiệu after the Americans departed.[23] In July 1971, Kissinger taunted Thọ with the news that President Nixon would be visiting China soon to meetMao Zedong, telling him that the days when the North Vietnamese could count of the supply of Chinese arms were coming to close. Thọ showed no emotion, saying: "That is your affair. Our fighting is our preoccupation, and that will decide the outcome for our country. What you have told us will have no influence on our fighting".[24]
On 30 March 1972, the North Vietnamese launched theEaster Offensive. It was initially successful and provoked a resumption of US bombing of North Vietnam in Operation Freedom Train, beginning on 6 April.[25] Thọ sent a message in mid-April, saying the resumed bombing was "a very serious step of escalation, aimed at stopping the collapse of the situation in South Vietnam and putting pressure on us".[26]
On 2 May 1972, Thọ had his 13th meeting with Kissinger in Paris. The meeting was hostile, as the North Vietnamese had just takenQuang Tri City in South Vietnam, which led Nixon to tell Kissinger "No nonsense. No niceness. No accommodations". During the meeting, Thọ mentioned that SenatorWilliam Fulbright was criticizing the Nixon administration, leading Kissinger to say: "Our domestic discussions are no concern of yours". Thọ snapped back: "I'm giving an example to prove that Americans share our views".[27] When Kissinger asked Thọ why North Vietnam had not responded to a proposal he sent via the Soviet Union, Thọ replied: "We have on many occasions said that if you have any question, you should talk to directly to us, and we shall talk directly to you. We don't speak through a third person".[28]
Thọ next met Kissinger on 19 July 1972.[29] Kissinger tried to persuade Thọ that he had nothing to fear from the United States in the long term, and asked: "when we can live with governments that are not pro-American in the largest Asian nations, why should we insist on a government that is pro-American in Saigon?"[30] Thọ stated that Kissinger was not offering anything new. By August 1972, Kissinger was promising Thọ that he would pressureNguyễn Văn Thiệu to resign only if Thọ would agree to make a peace deal before the presidential elections of that year. Thọ told Kissinger that the timetable for Thiệu's departure was no longer an immediate concern, and instead he wanted some $8 billion in reparations for war damage. Kissinger also told Thọ that he wanted to tell the world about their secret meetings since 1970 in order to give the impression that Nixon was making progress on peace in Vietnam, a suggestion that Thọ rejected, saying it was not his job to assist Nixon's reelection campaign.[31] On 15 September 1972, Kissinger told Thọ: "We wish to end before October 15-if sooner, all the better".[32] Thọ told Hanoi that Kissinger wanted a peace agreement before the election and now was the best time to settle.[33]
On 7 October 1972, Kissinger and Thọ agreed to a council of national reconciliation in Saigon that was to include the National Liberation Front and would preside over free elections. Kissinger told Thọ that he expected a peace agreement to be signed in Paris on 25 or 26 October 1972, saying that all that was needed now was the approval of Thiệu and Nixon.[34] However, when Kissinger arrived in Saigon, Thiệu refused to sign the peace agreement.[35] Nixon had initially agreed to the peace agreement, but, upon hearing of Thiệu's claims of betrayal, started to change his mind.[36]
On 20 November 1972, Kissinger met Thọ again in Paris. Kissinger no longer aimed at secrecy and was followed by paparazzi as he went to a house owned by the French Communist Party where Thọ was waiting for him. Kissinger announced that the Americans wanted major changes to the peace agreement made in October to accommodate Thiệu, which led Thọ to accuse Kissinger of negotiating in bad faith. Thọ stated: "We have been deceived by the French, the Japanese and the Americans. But the deception has never been so flagrant as of now". Kissinger insisted that the changes he wanted were only minor, but in effect he wanted to renegotiate almost the entire agreement. Thọ rejected Kissinger's terms, saying he would abide by the terms agreed to on 8 October.[37] Putting more pressure, Nixon told Kissinger to break off the talks if Thọ would not agree to the changes he wanted. Kissinger told Nixon: "While we have a moral case for bombing North Vietnam when it does not accept our terms, it seems to be really stretching the point to bomb North Vietnam when it has accepted our terms and when South Vietnam has not". By December 1972, the talks had broken down, and Nixon decided to resume bombing North Vietnam.[38]
On 17 December 1972, theChristmas bombings began.[39] On 26 December 1972, North Vietnam announced a willingness to resume peace talks in Paris again in January. Though Nixon had decided after all to accept peace terms very close to those of 8 October, the bombings allowed him to portray himself as having forced North Vietnam back to the table. The American historian A.J. Langguth wrote the Christmas bombings were "pointless", as the final peace agreement of 23 January 1973 was essentially the same as that of 8 October 1972, as Thọ refused to make any substantial concessions.[40]
After the Christmas bombings of 1972, Thọ was in a particularly savage mood towards Kissinger. The relationship between Kissinger and Thọ was antagonistic and condescending on the part of Thọ, angering Kissinger. After one meeting, Kissinger asked "Allow me to ask you one question: do you scold your colleagues in the Central Committee the way you scold us?"
At their meeting on 8 January 1973 in a house in the French town ofGif-sur-Yvette, Kissinger arrived to find nobody at the door to greet him. When Kissinger entered the conference room, nobody spoke to him. Sensing the hostile mood, Kissinger speaking in French said: "It was not my fault about the bombing". Before Kissinger could say any more, Thọ exploded in rage, saying in French: "Under the pretext of interrupted negotiations, you resumed the bombing of North Vietnam, just at the moment when I reached home. You have 'greeted' my arrival in a very courteous manner! Your action, I can say, is flagrant and gross! You and no one else strained the honor of the United States". Thọ shouted at Kissinger for over an hour, and despite Kissinger's requests not to speak so loudly because the reporters outside the room could hear what he was saying, he did not relent. Thọ concluded: "For more than ten years, America has used violence to beat down the Vietnamese people-napalm,B-52s. But you don't draw any lessons from your failures. You continue the same policy.Ngu xuẩn! Ngu xuẩn! Ngu xuẩn!" When Kissinger asked whatngu xuẩn meant in Vietnamese, the translator refused to translate, asngu xuẩn (inChữ Nôm: 愚蠢) roughly means that a person is grossly stupid.[41]
When Kissinger was finally able to speak, he argued that it was Thọ, who by being unreasonable, had forced Nixon to order the Christmas bombings, a claim that led Thọ to snap in fury: "You've spent billions of dollars and many tons of bombs when we had a text ready to sign".[42] Kissinger replied: "I have heard many adjectives in your comments. I propose that you should not use them". Thọ answered: "I have used those adjectives with a great deal of restraint already. The world opinion, the U.S. press and U.S. political personalities have used harsher words".[43]
When the talks finally began, Kissinger put forward the demand that North Vietnam pull out all of its troops out of South Vietnam, a demand that Thọ rejected out of hand. The most important issue remaining wasthe demilitarized zone (DMZ). Tho accepted language that he had been rejecting a few weeks earlier, "North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line," meaning that the DMZ was actually to be demilitarized--North Vietnamese troops had to stay out of it.[44]
Thọ told Kissinger that if a peace agreement was signed, that within 15 days a peace agreement would be signed for Laos.[citation needed] But he stated, that unlike thePathet Lao in Laos, North Vietnam had no influence over theKhmer Rouge in Cambodia. Kissinger did not believe Thọ's claims that the Khmer Rouge leaderPol Pot was a fanatical Khmer nationalist with a hatred of the Vietnamese. After the meeting, Kissinger told Thọ: "We must forget all that has happened. When we walk out, we must be smiling".[43]
On the night of 9 January 1973, Kissinger phoned Nixon in Washington to say that a peace agreement would be signed very soon.[43] On 10 January 1973, the negotiations broke down when Kissinger demanded the release of allAmerican POWs in North Vietnam once a peace agreement was signed, but offered no guarantees about Viet Cong prisoners being held in South Vietnam. Thọ stated: "I cannot accept your proposal. I completely reject it".[45] Thọ wanted the release of all prisoners once a peace agreement was signed, which led Kissinger to say this was an unreasonable demand.[46] Thọ, who had beentortured as a young man by the French colonial police for advocating Vietnamese independence, shouted: "You have never been a prisoner. You don't understand suffering. It's unfair". Kissinger finally offered that the United States would use "maximum influence" to pressure the South Vietnamese government to release all Viet Cong prisoners within sixty days of a peace agreement being signed.[45] On 23 January 1973, at 12:45 pm, Kissinger and Thọ signed the peace agreement.[46]
free and democratic elections to be held in South Vietnam;
U.S. aid to South Vietnam would continue;
North Vietnamese troops could remain in South Vietnam.
On 28 March 1973, the last of the American forces left South Vietnam.[46] While 23 January is generally recognized as the enactment date of the Peace Accords, the talks continued out of necessity. Sporadic fighting continued in some regions, while U.S. ground forces were being removed. Due to continued ceasefire violations by all sides, Kissinger and Thọ met in Paris in May and June 1973 for the purpose of getting the implementation of the peace agreement back on track. On 13 June 1973, the United States and North Vietnam signed a joint communique pledging mutual support for full implementation of the Paris Accords.
Thọ andHenry Kissinger were jointly awarded the1973 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in negotiating theParis Peace Accords.[47] However, Thọ declined to accept the award, claiming that peace had not yet been established, and that the United States and the South Vietnamese governments were in violation of the Paris Peace Accords:
However, since the signing of the Paris agreement, the United States and the Saigon administration continue in grave violation of a number of key clauses of this agreement. The Saigon administration, aided and encouraged by the United States, continues its acts of war. Peace has not yet really been established in South Vietnam. In these circumstances it is impossible for me to accept the 1973 Nobel Prize for Peace which the committee has bestowed on me. Once the Paris accord on Vietnam is respected, the arms are silenced and a real peace is established in South Vietnam, I will be able to consider accepting this prize. With my thanks to the Nobel Prize Committee please accept, madame, my sincere respects.[48]
In an interview by theUPI, Thọ also explained for his decision:
Unfortunately, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee put the aggressor and the victim of aggression on the same par. ... That was a blunder. The Nobel Peace Prize is one of the greatest prizes in the world. But the United States conducted a war of aggression against Vietnam. It is we, the Vietnamese people, who made peace by defeating the American war of aggression against us, by regaining our independence and freedom.[49]
In January 1974, Thọ told GeneralHoàng Văn Thái that he could not leave to take up a command in South Vietnam as he had expected, saying that the Politburo had assigned him another, more important task. General Thai had thought Thọ should win glory on the battlefield, but Thọ was unyielding, saying that turning the Ho Chi Minh Trail into a highway was more important. Using bulldozers from the Soviet Union and China, over the course of 1974, General Thai transformed the Ho Chi Minh Trail into a paved, four lane highway that ran 1,200 kilometres (750 mi) from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam. He also laid down a 3,000-mile (4,800 km) pipeline to carry oil.[50] The paving of the Ho Chi Minh Trail allowed North Vietnam to not only send more troops to South Vietnam, but to keep them well supplied.
In December 1974, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam that proved more successful than expected, and on 6 January 1975 took the provincial capital ofPhước Long. Le Duan, the secretary-general of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, decided to follow up this victory with an offensive to seize all of the Central Highlands and sent Thọ to monitor operations.[51] Following the Communist victory at the Battle of Ban Me Thuot, which ended on 11 March 1975, Thọ approved the plans of the North Vietnamese commander, General Van Tien Dung, to take Pleiku and push further south. Thọ also reported to Hanoi that the South Vietnamese Army were suffering from low morale and were fighting poorly, which led him to suggest that all of South Vietnam might be taken that year, instead of in 1976 as originally planned. The name of the campaign to take Saigon would be the Ho Chi Minh campaign.[52] The principal problem for the North Vietnamese was that operations had to be completed before the monsoons arrived in June, giving them a very short period of two months to win the war in 1975.[53] Thọ sent Le Duan a poem that began "You warned: Go out and come back in victory...The time of opportunity has arrived". By April 1975, the North Vietnamese had advanced within striking distance of Saigon with what would prove to be the last major battle of the Vietnam war taking place at Phan Rang between 13 and 16 April 1975.[54]
On 22 April 1975, General Dung showed Thọ his plan to take Saigon, which the latter approved, saying as he signed off on Dung's plan that this was the death sentence for the regime of "reactionary traitors" in Saigon.[55] On 30 April 1975, the North Vietnamese took Saigon and Thọ entered the city in triumph. He immediately set about giving orders to ensure that the water works and electricity grid of Saigon was still functioning; that food would continue to arrive from the countryside; to make arrangements to deal with the one million soldiers of the South Vietnamese Army that he ordered dissolved; and appointing administrators to replace the South Vietnamese officials. On behalf of the Politburo he gave General Dung a telegram from Hanoi that simply read: "Political Bureau is most happy". On 1 May 1975, a parade was held in Saigon to celebrate both May Day and the victory, with Thọ watching the victorious soldiers march down the streets of Saigon, which was soon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.[56]
^Karnow, StanleyVietnam A History, New York: Viking 1983 p. 125
^abKarnow, StanleyVietnam A History, New York: Viking 1983 p. 623
^Thu-Hương Nguyễn-VõThe Ironies of Freedom: Sex, Culture, and Neoliberal Governance in Vietnam Seattle : University of Washington Press, c2008.ISBN0295988509 (pbk. : alk. paper).ISBN978-0-295-98865-8. 2008, p. 73 "This resolution unleashed a terror campaign against the "revisionist antiparty clique." Lê Đức Thọ, head of the Party Central Organization Committee, announced to party cadres: "The theoretical front to counter contemporary revisionism we ..."
^Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1972, inForeign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XLII,Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations, August 1969–December 1973 (United States Government Publishing Office, 2017), doc. 15|p=292|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d15
